v. Dexter, 1 Curt. C. C. 178, Fed. Cas. No. | Walker v. Western Transp. Co. 3 Wall. 150, 8,988. 18 L. ed. 172; Butler v. Boston & S. S. S. Co. 130 U. S. 555, 32 L. ed. 1023, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612. That the action occurred on a navigable river did not defeat the jurisdiction of the state court, if the place was within the boundaries of the state. American S. B. Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 532, 21 L. ed. 372; McCullough v. New York & N. S. B. Co. 20 U. S. App. 570, 61 Fed. Rep. 364, 9 C. C. A. 521. If the court could hear the case at all, it certainly could hear the defense to it. 23 U. S. Stat. at L. 57. The limitation of the owner's liability is a necessary incident to the ownership of vessel property, and all rights of action against owners as such are limited by this act. The Rebecca, 1 Ware, 187, Fed. Cas. No. 11.619; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 12 L. ed. 465; cognizance of a case arising out of the laws of the United States it would be exercising a "new power" wholly dependent on, and conferred by, statutes of the United States. The major premise is undoubtedly correct, and, so far as the minor premise is true, the conclusion against the state court's jurisdiction is justified; but it is not necessarily true, since the state court may have inherent power, not at all dependent on acts of Congress, adequate to the enforcement of new rights, although such rights emanate from acts of Congress. Gilbert v. Priest, 65 Barb. 444, made a similar decision, based on much the same reasoning. It was, in effect, overruled by Cook v. Whipple, 55 N. Y. 150, which points out that the jurisdiction of the state court over the subject-matter does not depend upon the source from which the subject-matter emanates. Justice Washington in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 19, accepts the doctrine of Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97, that Congress cannot confer any of the judicial power of the United States upon the state courts, but explains it, and shows that, while it prevents Congress from conferring jurisdiction upon state courts, it does not, so long as Congress does not exercise its undoubted power to make the jurisdiction of the Federal courts exclusive, prevent the state courts from exercising jurisdiction, even over causes arising out of the acts of Congress, if they can find the requisite authority in their own inherent powers. The opinion states and adopts Hamilton's position already alluded to. Justice Washington's explanation of the doctrine has been generally followed by the later cases, and is expressly approved in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 23 L. ed. 833. It is thus apparent that the state courts must look to their own inherent powers for the source of their concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising out of the Federal laws, and that the only purpose subserved by the provisions of acts of Congress purporting to confer such concurrent jurisdiction is to negative the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts, or to with draw the classes of cases to which they relate from the exclusive jurisdiction previously conferred upon such courts. II. Civil laws. Under the influence of the doctrine of Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 19, it was held in Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill, 159 (an action by the state of Illinois against a citizen of New York), that the Federal Constitution did not devest the state courts of pre-existing It cannot be objected that the defendants should have pleaded specially the act of 1884, because the Pennsylvania procedure act of May 25, 1887, provides expressly, "special pleading is hereby abolished,” and “the only plea in the action of trespass shall be not guilty." Even under the act of 1851, it has been most distinctly asserted, and reasserted, that the benefits of a limitation of liability to the value of the vessel could be obtained in other ways than by the procedure referred to in the act, and under the rules of the Supreme Court. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, sub nom. National Steam Nav. Co. v. Dyer, 26 L. ed. jurisdiction, and that, therefore. Congress did not violate the Constitution in failing to make the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in suits by a state against a citizen of another state exclusive, notwithstanding that the judicial power of the United States is declared by the Federal Constitution to extend to such suits United States v. Dodge, 14 Johns. 95, held that an action of debt by the United States on a bond for the payment of duties to the collector would lie in the state court. Sections 9 and 11 of the judiciary act purport to confer concurrent jurisdiction on the state courts of suits at common law where the United States is plaintiff. Teall v. Felton, 1 N. Y. 537, 49 Am. Dec. 352, sustained an action of trover against a postmaster for detaining a newspaper, notwithstanding the contention that if any action could be maintained against him the jurisdiction of the Federal court would be exclusive. It was argued by defendant that the case was one of a class of which the state courts did not take cognizance when the Federal Constitution was adopted, since the post office department was entirely the creation of the national statute. The court replied, however, that the plaintiff was not seeking redress under the post office laws, but was simply seeking to recover in an appropriate common-law tribunal, competent to afford the remedy, and in a form of action more ancient than the Federal Constitution or the acts of Congress. Moyer v. McCullough, 1 Ind. 339, held that suit would lie in the state court by a party having the equitable title to public land to obtain the legal title from one to whom the patent was issued by a mistake, notwithstanding that the question depended on the acts of Congress. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. American Exch. Bank, 92 Va. 495, 44 L. R. A. 449, 23 S. E. 935, holds that the section of the United States Revised Statutes forbidding railroad companies to keep cattle confined in cars for more than twenty-eight consecutive hours without unloading them may be made the basis of an action by a shipper in the state court for negligence. United States v. Graff, 4 Hun, 634, upheld the jurisdiction of the state court over an action by the United States for duties unpaid on imported goods upon the ground that the primary object of the action was, not simply to execute the laws of the United States, but to collect a debt. Ammidown v. Freeland, 101 Mass. 303, 3 Am. Rep. 359, holds that the state court has jurisdiction of the action given to sellers of goods 1001; Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill " Mfg. Co. 109 U. S. 578, 27 L. ed. 1038, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379, 617; The Doris Eckhoff, 30 Fed. Rep. 140; Miller v. O'Brien, 35 Fed. Rep. 779: Craig v. Continental Ins. Co. 141 U. S. 638, 35 L. ed. 886, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97; The Rosa, 53 Fed. Rep. 132; The Garden City, 26 Fed. Rep. 766. If the court was unable to extend to the defendants the benefits conferred by the act of 1884, it had no jurisdiction of the cause. Butler v. Boston & S. S. S. Co. 130 U. S. 555, 32 L. ed. 1023, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612. Messrs. Fred. Taylor Pusey and Wendell P. Bowman, for appellee: The 4th section of the act of 1851 provides that a transfer of the interest of the owners to a trustee, to be appointed by the court, shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the act; but the Supreme by United States Stat. 1864, chap. 173, § 97, to recover from the buyer duties imposed on the goods subsequently to the contract. Actions by or against national banks. The question as to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over causes arising out of the Federal laws has been frequently raised in actions brought by, or against, national banks. As such banks are the creatures of the Federal laws, and must look to them for the definition of their powers and the source of their authority, actions or proceedings by or against them, of whatever nature, are generally regarded as arising under the laws of Congress, and there is express authority for the position, at least so far as concerns actions by such a bank, in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204. The correctness of the position with reference to actions against the bank where plaintiff's pleadings admit its existence and authority has been challenged by Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 96, and Ulster County Sav. Inst. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 59 How. Fr. 482; but Cadle v. Tracy, 11 Blatchf. 101, Fed. Cas. No. 2,279, expressly holds. on the authority of Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738. 6 L. ed. 204, supra, that actions against such banks are necessarily cases arising under the laws of the United States: and the other cases involving the question of concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over such actions have so treated them. Mandamus will lie in a state court to compel the officers of a national bank to exhibit to a county assessor a list of names and residences of shareholders with the number of their shares, as required by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5210. Paul v. McGraw, 3 Wash. 296, 28 Pac. 532: Paul v. Furth, 3 Wash. 296. 28 Pac. 532, and Paul v. Chapin, 3 Wash. 433, 28 Pac. 760. The state courts have jurisdiction of a suit to compel the directors of a national bank to declare a dividend. Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N. Y. Supp. 360. Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, and Nelson v. Burrows, 9 Abb. N. C. 280, hold that a siate court has jurisdiction of an action by the stockholders of a national bank against its directors to recover damages sustained through the latters' negligence. Assumpsit will lie in a state court against a national bank. Dow v. Irasburgh Nat. Bank, 50 Vt. 112, 28 Am. Rep. 493. It is true that when these actions were decided the Federal statutes expressly gave, or attempted to give, certain state courts concurrent Court of the United States has held that the giving of a stipulation for the value of the vessel as the court may think proper, or the paying of the money into court, is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co. 109 U. S. 578, 27 L. ed. 1038, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379, 617; Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 20 L. ed. 585. The defendants made no offer whatever to give a stipulation, or to pay the value into court, or to convey the vessel to a trustee, so that it is at once evident that they are not entitled to the benefits of the law in this proceeding on this account, irrespective of the question as to whether they could receive its benefits at all in the state courts. The state court has no jurisdiction at all to administer the benefits of the limited liability laws, and they can only be adminisjurisdiction with the Federal courts; but such jurisdiction, conformably to Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 19, appears to have been traced to the inherent powers of the state courts, rather than to the acts of Congress; and there are a number of cases that uphold the jurisdiction of the state courts over actions by or against national banks, even upon the assumption that provisions of the Federal statutes purporting to confer concurrent jurisdiction do not apply. Thus, First Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 49 Vt. 3, 24 Am. Rep. 97, expressly recognizes the doctrine that civil cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States may be tried and determined in the state courts, unless exclusive jurisdiction of them has been vested in the Federal courts, and holds that the state courts would have jurisdiction of suits brought by national banks, even if § 57 of the act of 1864, purporting to confer concurrent jurisdiction on them, only applied to actions against, and not to actions by, national banks. So, also, Casey v. Adams, 102 U. S. 66, 26 L. ed. 52, after holding that the provisions of the Federal statutes purporting to confer concurrent jurisdiction upon certain state courts did not apply to local actions, upheld the jurisdiction of a state court, not within those provisions, over such an action. And Fresno Nat. Bank v. San Joaquin Coun-. ty Super. Ct. 83 Cal. 491, 24 Pac. 157: Adams v. Daunis, 29 La. Ann. 315; Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 96; Robinson v. National Bank, 81 N. Y. 385, 37 Am. Rep. 508; and Holmes v. National Bank, 18 S. C. 31, 44 Am. Rep. 558,upheld the jurisdiction of state courts not within those provisions of the Federal statutes, after holding that the provisions were merely permissive, and not exclusive. First Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141, 33 L. ed. 282, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37, upheld the jurisdiction of a state court not within such provisions, upon the ground that they merely created a personal privilege that could be waived. It will be observed that each one of these various constructions of the provisions of the Federal statutes with reference to concurrent jurisdiction left the concurrent jurisdiction of the state court without the express sanction of Congress, so that in those cases also the jurisdiction must have been traced to the inherent powers of the state courts. Crocker v. Marine Nat. Bank. 101 Mass. 241. 3 Am. Rep. 336, while holding that § 57 of the act of 1864 prevents a national bank from being sued in a state court out of the city and county tered in the district court of the United | right of the appellants to have their liability. States of the proper district, or in the circuit court on appeal. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 20 L. ed. 585; The Benefactor v. Mount, 103 U. S. 239, sub nom. New York & W. S. S. Co. v. Mount, 26 L. ed. 351; Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co. 109 U. S. 578, 27 L. ed. 1038, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379, 617; Re Morrison, 147 U. S. 14, sub nom. Morrison v. United States Dist. Ct. 37 L. ed. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 246; Quinlan v. Pew, 5 U. S. App. 382, 56 Fed. Rep. 111, 5 C. C. A. 438; The Tolchester, 42 Fed. Rep. 180; The Mary Lord, 31 Fed. Rep. 416; Elwell v. Geibei, 33 Fed. Rep. 71; Benedict, Admiralty, 3d ed. p. 320, 561. Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The substantial question in this case is the in which it is located, recognizes the general doctrine that civil cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States may be tried and determined in the state courts, unless the national Constitution and laws have vested jurisdiction of them in the Federal tribunals. Actions by or against assignee in bankruptcy. The question has also been frequently raised in actions brought by, or against, assignees in bankruptcy in the state courts. Ward v. Jenkins, 10 Met. 591, upheld the jurisdiction of the state court over an action by such an assignee under the Federal bankrupt law of 1841, upon a contract made by the defendants with the bankrupt. The court heid, in effect, that the jurisdiction of the state court in cases arising under the provisions of a Federal statute rested, not upon the ground of the Judicial authority conferred as such by a law of the United States, but upon the ordinary powers of the state court acting, indeed, in the particular case upon legal rights which had been created or materially affected by the legis lation of Congress. The court further points out that under the Federal Constitution the laws of Congress are the supreme laws of the state,- as much so as statutes enacted by her own legislature. Stevens v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank, 101 Mass. 109, 3 Am. Rep. 325; Hastings v. Fowler, 2 Ind. 216; Cogdell v. Exum, 69 N. C. 464. 12 Am. Rep. 657; Barnard v. Davis, 54 Ala. 565; Hoover v. Robinson, 3 Neb. 437; Peck v. Jenness, 16 N. H. 516, 43 Am. Dec. 573 Harrod v. Burgess, 5 Rob. (La.) 449; Russell v. Owen, 61 Mo. 185, and Johnson v. Bishop, Woolw. 324, Fed. Cas. No. 7,373,-are to the same effect. for damages to the plaintiff limited to the Brigham v. Claflin, 31 Wis. 607, 11 Am. Rep. 623, is to the same effect as Voorhies v. Frisbie, 25 Mich. 476, 12 Am. Rep. 291, supra, but brings out more prominently the penal character of the action. Bromley v. Goodrich, 40 Wis. 131, 22 Am. Rep. 685, reaffirms Brigham v. Claflin, and Sheldon v. Rounds, 40 Mich. 425, held that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction of suits to determine the right of an assignee in bankruptcy to property where the right was disputed under the exemption clause of the bankrupt law of 1867, citing Voorhies v. Frisbie, 25 Mich. 476, 12 Am. Rep. 291. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 23 L. ed. 833, however, upheld the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over suits under § 35. Justice Bradley, who wrote the opinion, remarked that if an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved without specifying a remedy for its enforcement there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in the state court. To the same effect as Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 23 L. ed. 833, are: Eyster v. Gaff. 91 U. S. 521, 23 L. ed. 403; Davis v. Friedlander, 104 U. S. 570, 26 L. ed. 818; McHenry v. La Société. Francaise D'Epargnes. 95 U. S. 58, 24 L. ed. 370: McKenna v. Simpson, 129 U. S. 506, 32 L. ed. 771, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Re Central Bank, 6 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 207, Fed. Cas. No. 2,547; Rison v. Powell, 28 Ark. 427: Dambmann v. White, 48 Cal. 439; Isett v. Stuart, 80 Ill. 404, 22 Am. Rep. 194: Wooldridge v. Rickert, 33 La. Ann. 234; Jordan v. Downey, 40 Md. 401: Boone v. Hall, 7 Bush, 66. 3 Am. Rep. 288; Otis v. Hadley, 112 Mass. 100: Lane v. Innes, 43 Minn. 137, 45 N. W. 4; McKiernan v. King. 2 Mont. 72: Gage v. Dow, Voorhies v. Frisbie, 25 Mich. 476, 12 Am. 58 N. H. 420; Cook v. Whipple, 55 N. Y. 150, Rep. 291, as before shown, denied the jurisdic-14 Am. Rep. 202; Thompson v. Sweet, 73 N. Y. 622; Kemmerer v. Tool, 78 Pa. 147; tion of a state court over an action by an asBarton v. Geiler, 3 Lea, 296. signee in bankruptcy, under § 35 of the bankruptcy act of 1867, to set aside a transfer by the bankrupt as a preference in violation of the act. This decision rests, in part at least. upon the ground that the jurisdiction of the Federal courts was necessarily exclusive, since the right was created by the act. The court attempted to distinguish the case from Ward v. Jenkins, 10 Met. 591, upon the ground that in the latter action the right enforced existed at common Naturalization proceedings. and As pointed out in a note to State er rel. Rushworth v. Judges of Inferior Ct. of Common Pleas (N. J.) in 30 L. R. A. 763, the courts have not always been in accord as to the true source of the jurisdiction of the state court in naturalization proceedings. State v. l'enney, 10 Ark. 621; Morgan v. Dudley. 18 B. Mon. 714, 68 Am. Dec. 735; Re Ramsden, 13 How. Pr. 435; and Er parte McKenzie, 51 S. C. 244, 28 S. E. 468.-seem to hold, in conformity to the general doctrine of Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 19, that the juris held in the former case that the limitation of liability was enacted by Congress as part of the maritime law of the United States, and is coextensive in its operation with the whole territorial domain of that law. It applies, therefore, to the case of a disaster happening within the limits of a county of a state, and to a case where the liability itself arises from a law of the state. ing." And the act of June 26, 1884, § 18 ligence. And, on this point, see also Craig (23 U. S. Stat. at L. 57 [chap. 121], 1 Supp. v. Continental Ins. Co. 141 U. S. 638, 35 L. Rev. Stat. ed. 1891, p. 443), makes a substan- ed. 886, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97. It was further tially similar provision in more condensed phraseology: "That the individual liability of a shipowner shall be limited to the proportion of any or all debts and liabilities that his individual share of the vessel bears to the whole, and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of a vessel on account of the same shall not exceed the value of such vessels, and freight pending." By the act of June 19, 1886, § 4 (24 Stat. 79 [chap. 421], 1 Supp. Rev. Stat. ed. 1891, p. 494), the act of 1884 is made to apply to "all vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters." In Butler v. Boston & S. S. S. Co. 130 U. S. 527, 32 L. ed. 1017, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612, it was held that this limitation of liability applies to actions for damages for death caused by negdiction cannot rest alone upon the provisions | of the acts of Congress which attempt to confer it, but that the state courts must, independently of such provisions, have power adequate to the perfomance of the acts required to be done in the process of naturalization. These statutory limitations of liability, so construed by the Supreme Court of the United States, would seem to settle the question in this case in favor of appellants. But it is argued for appellee that they cannot prevail against the prohibition in § 21 of article 3 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania against any limitation of the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in Rev. Stat., is not exclusive of the jurisdiction of other state courts, while Crocker v. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass. 241, 3 Am. Rep. 336, supra, and Cadle v. Tracy, 11 Blatchf. 101, Fed. Cas. No. 2,279, hold that the jurisdiction so conferred is exclusive. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 41 L. Fettilon v. Noble, 7 Biss. 449, Fed. Cas. No. ed. 715, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326, however, holds 11,044, holds that § 629, U. S. Rev. Stat., givthat the doctrine that Congress cannot vesting United States courts jurisdiction of all suits any of the judicial powers of the United States by or against any banking association estabin the courts or judicial officers of the several lished in the district for which the court is held, states applies only to the trial and determina- under any law providing for banking association of "cases" in courts of record, and that tions, does not devest the concurrent jurisdicCongress is still at liberty to authorize the judi- tion of the state courts. cial officers of the several states to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers not of record, such, for instance, as the power to naturalize aliens, and perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power, rather than the judicial power itself. That case, however, did not involve any question as to naturalization, but related to the power of Congress to authorize justices of the peace to issue warrants for deserting seamen. When jurisdiction of state courts excluded. to There is some difference of opinion as whether the jurisdiction of the Federal courts is made exclusive, and the state courts ousted of their concurrent jurisdiction, by an act of Congress which without words of exclusion, merely confers jurisdiction upon the Federal courts. It will be observed that in many cases Congress had either expressly granted concurrent jurisdiction to the state court, or had clearly negatived exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal courts, so that this question did not arise. Hamilton in stating the doctrine says that in every case in which the state courts are not "expressly excluded by the acts of the national legislature such courts will take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 19, supra, held that the provisions of the Federal militia laws, conferring jurisdiction of the offense in question upon the Federal court martial, did not exclude the concurrent jurisdic tion of the state court martial. As already shown, Fresno Nat. Bank v. San Joaquin County Super. Ct. 83 Cal. 491, 24 Pac. 157 Adams v. Daunis, 29 La. Ann. 315; Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 96; Robinson v. National Bank, 81 N. Y. 385, 37 Am. Rep. 508; and Holmes v. National Bank, 18 S. C. 31.hold that the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal and certain state courts by § 5198, U. S. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 23 L. ed. 833, which approves the general doctrine of Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 19, intimates a doubt as to the correctness of the declsion with reference to the effect of the Federal laws involved in that case on the concurrent jurisdiction. Ward v. Jenkins, 10 Met. 591, supra, held that the various provisions of the Federal bankruptcy act of 1841, conferring jurisdiction upon the United States courts, did not exclude the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts, and the cases above cited as being to the same effect as that case must have held the same in re spect to the act of 1841 or 1867, as the case may have been. The same is true of Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 23 L. ed. 833, and the other cases, above cited, in line with it; and Wetmore v. McMillan, 57 Iowa, 344, 10 N. W. 725; Clark v. Ewing, 9 Biss. 440, 3 Fed. Rep. 83; Goodrich v. Wilson, 119 Mass. 429; Kidder v. Horrobin, 72 N. Y. 159; Olcott v. Maclean, 73 N. Y. 223; Wente v. Young, 12 Hun, 220; and Wheelock v. Lee, 54 How. Pr. 402,-expressly held that § 4974, U. S. Rev. Stat., providing that legal debts or assets of recovered in a state court, did not take away the bankrupt, if not in excess of $500, might be the jurisdiction of the state court when the debt exceeded that amount. Copp v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 43 La. Ann. 511, 12 L. R. A. 725, 9 So. 441, denied the jurisdiction of the state court over an action under the interstate commerce act for the recovery of damages for unlawful discrimination, upon the ground that the statute which created the right provided for a remedy before the interstate commerce commission or the district or circuit court of the United States, and that such remedies were exclusive under the rule that where a particular remedy is provided by law such remedy must be sought to the exclusion of all oth ers. death, and that, in any view, they cannot be administered by a Pennsylvania court in a common-law action. As to the first objection, it is clear that neither statute nor Constitution of Pennsylvania can be set up against a right given by Congress in its control of the maritime law of the country. That control is paramount, and, when it has been exercised in a particular way, all state authority must conform to it. The second objection-that the limitation cannot be administered by a state court in a common-law action-must depend primarily on the language of the acts of Congress, and the nature of the right which they confer. Battin v. Kear, 2 Phila. 301, and Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9, which were decided before the jurisdiction of the Federal courts over cases arising under the patent right laws was expressly made exclusive, held that § 17 of the act of Congress of July 4, 1836, providing that all cases of that class should be originally cognizable by the circuit courts of the United States, excluded the jurisdiction of the state courts. These decisions rest upon the ground that the rights of the patentee spring wholly from the Federal statutes, and therefore that the remedy provided by the statutes is exclusive. Missouri River Packet Co. v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 79 Mo. 478, holds that the 1st section of act of Congress of July 26, 1866, "To Authorize the Construction of Certain Bridges," conferring jurisdiction upon the United States district court of any litigation arising from obstruction to navigation by the bridges authorized by the act, does not devest the common-law jurisdiction of the state courts over the matter. When question arises incidentally. If, as above shown, the state courts may take concurrent jurisdiction when a cause of action arises out of an act of Congress, a fortiori, they may, if they have adequate power and machinery to deal with them, take cognizance of questions incidentally arising under such an act, as in the principal case. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97. supra, which goes as far as any case to uphold the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts over matters within the judicial power confided to the United States by the Constitution, recognizes the fact that such questions will arise incidentally in the state courts in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, and makes it the basis of an argument for the appellate jurisdic tion of the United States Supreme Court over judgments of the state courts. So, also, Rodney v. Illinois C. R. Co. 19 Ill. 42, while questioning the right of state tribunals to take direct cognizance of cases arising under Federal statutes, holds they can enforce such law when they come incidentally in question. It may happen, that the state court does not have the necessary methods or machinery to enforce a right under a Federal statute, even when it arises incidentally. In that event, as shown by the opinions in the principal case. and in Chisholm v. Northern Transp. Co. 61 Barb. 363, the state court should dismiss the action. The power of Congress to exclude from evidence in the state courts instruments not bearing required revenue stamps is discussed in a note to Knox v. Rossi, L. R. A. Miscellaneous. If such right is contingent on something to be done by the vessel owner or others, then we must look into the pleadings or the evidence of the acts of the parties. But if, on the other hand, the right is absolute, then, clearly, it cannot be defeated by the plaintiff's choice of the tribunal; and if the state court is unable, through defect of its jurisdiction over parties or subject-matter, or through its methods of procedure, to protect the right, then the court must dismiss the case for want of appropriate powers to determine it in accordance with the paramount law on the subject. This brings us to the consideration of the acts of Congress. The limitation of liability tion as to what cases fall within the categories of cases of which Congress has declared the jurisdiction of the Federal courts shall be exclusive. Many of the cases which turn upon that question assume that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, unless the case falls within one of such categories. There are many cases, for instance, which uphold the jurisdiction of the state courts in actions in which a defense going to the validity of a patent has been interposed, after holding within U. S. Rev. Stat. § 711, declaring that that such defense does not bring the action the Federal court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases arising under the patent right laws. The following are cases of that kind: Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co. 168 U. S. 255, 42 L. ed. 458, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. H. 311; Rich v. Atwater, 16 Conn. 409; Sherman v. Champlain Transp. Co. 31 Vt. 162; Clough v. Patrick, 37 Vt. 421; Burrall v. Jewett, 2 Paige, 134; Middlebrook v. Broadbent, 47 N. Y. 443, 7 Am. Rep. 457; Continental Store Service Co. v. Clark, 100 N. Y. 365, 3 N. E. 335; Head v. Stevens, 19 Wend. 411: liarmon v. Bird, 22 Wend. 113; Cross v. Huntly, 13 Wend. 385; Saxton v. Dodge, 57 Barb. 84; Geiger v. Cook, 3 Watts & S. 266; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 155, 98 Am. Dec. 248; McClure v. Jeffrey, 8 Ind. 79; Nye v. Raymond, 16 Ill. 153: Page v. Dickerson, 28 Wis. 694, 9 Am. Rep. 532; Rice v. Garnhart, 34 Wis. 453, 17 Am. Rep. 448; Billings v. Ames, 32 Mo. 265. III. Criminal and penal laws. Criminal laws. Notwithstanding that the judiciary act passed by the first Congress after the adoption of the Constitution expressly gave the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, and that since that time there has been a general statutory reservation of exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal courts in such cases, the question as to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts has arisen in a number of cases, because Congress, by purporting to confer concurrent jurisdiction upon the state courts over certain crimes or offenses, has as to them withdrawn the restriction previous ¡y imposed. It would seem that the question of the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over this class of cases must be determined by the same criterion that governs in civil casesnamely, the inherent power of the state courts, unaided by the acts of Congress except so far as they may remove restrictions previously imThe posed upon such jurisdiction by Congress. answer, however, is likely to be different in view This note is not intended to cover the ques- of the general rule that the courts of one sover |