THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY OF|pany shall not be liable, under any circum CANADA, Piff. in Err., v. ANSEL STEVENS. (See S. C., 5 Otto, 655-660.) Carrier of passengers-stipulation exempting from liability—free pass-effect of. stances, whether of negligence by their agents or otherwise, for any injury to the person, or for any loss or injury to the property, of the passenger using the ticket. If presented by any other person than the individual named therein, the conductor will take up this ticket and collect fare." The plaintiff testified that he put the pass into his pocket without looking at it; and the jury 1. A common carrier of passengers cannot law-found specially that he did not read the indorsefully stipulate for exemption from liability for personal injuries caused by the negligence of its servants, where the transportation of the plaintiff in its cars, although not paid for by him in money, was not a matter of charity nor of gratuity. 2. The giving plaintiff a free pass did not alter the nature of the transaction. He was not estopped from showing that he was not to take his passage upon the terms therein expressed. 3. This court does not mean to imply, however, that it would have come to a different conclusion, had the plaintiff been a free passenger instead of a passenger for hire. [No. 134.] Argued Dec. 5, 1877. Ν Decided Jan. 7, 1878. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maine. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. J. Rand & E. M. Rand, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. C. P. Mattocks, Edward W. Fox and J. E. Leonard, for defendant in error: A pass given for a consideration, other than a pecuniary one, is no greater protection to the carrier than a ticket regularly sold. The evidence proves, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that this pass was given in pursuance of a contract to do so, made between the parties, for certain valid considerations, whereby plaintiffs in error agreed to safely transport the defendant in error from Portland to Montreal. Kinney v. R. R. Co., 34 N. J., 513; S. C., 3 Am. Rep., 265; R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How., 486; Wilton v. R. R. Co., 107 Mass., 108; Jacobus v. R. Co., 20 Minn., 125; Rose v. R. R. Co., 39 Ia., 246; R. R. Co. v. Curran, 19 Ohio St., 1; S. C., 2 Am. Rep., 362; Brown v. R. R. Co., 11 Cush., 97. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: This was an action on the case for negligence, brought to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff (now defendant in error) whilst a passenger in the defendant's cars. The plaintiff, being owner of a patented car coupling, was negotiating with the defendant, at Portland, Maine, for its adoption and use by the latter, and was requested by the defendant to go to Montreal to see the superintendent of its car department in relation to the matter, the defendant offering to pay his expenses. The plaintiff consented to do this; and, in pursuance of the arrangement, he was furnished with a pass to carry him in the defendant's cars. This pass was in the usual form of free passes, thus: "Pass Mr. Stevens from Portland to Montreal,' and signed by the proper officer. On its back was the following printed indorsement: "The person accepting this free ticket, in consideration thereof, assumes all risk of all accidents, and expressly agrees that the Com NOTE.-Liability of carrier, for injury to passenger carried free or riding on a free pass. See note to R. R. Co., v. Lockwood, 84 U. S., XXI., 627. ment previous to the accident, and did not know what was indorsed upon it. He had been a railroad conductor, however, and had seen many free passes, some with a statement on the back, others without. During the passage from Portland to Montreal, the car in which the plaintiff was riding ran off the track and was precipitated down an embankment, and he was much injured. The direct cause of the accident, according to the proof, was, that at the place where it occurred and for some considerable distance in each di rection, the bolts had been broken off the fish plates which hold the ends of the rails together, so that many of these plates had fallen off on each side, leaving the rails without lateral support. The consequence was, that the track spread and the cars ran off, as before stated. There was also evidence that at this place the track was made of old rails patched up. The above facts appeared on the plaintiff's case, and the defendant offered no evidence, but requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: First. That if the plaintiff, at the time of sustaining the injury, was traveling under and by virtue of the pass produced in evidence in the case, he was traveling upon the conditions annexed to it. Second. That if the plaintiff, at the time of sustaining the injury, was traveling under and by virtue of the pass produced in evidence in the case, the defendants are not liable. Third. That if the plaintiff, at the time of sustaining the injury, was traveling as a free passenger, the defendants are not liable. Fourth. That if the plaintiff, at the time of sustaining the injury, was traveling as a gratuitous passenger, without any consideration to the defendants for his transportation, the defendants are not liable. The court refused these instructions, as inapplicable to the evidence produced, and instructed the jury as follows, viz.: That if the jury find that, in May, 1873, the plaintiff was interested in a car coupling, which had been used on the cars of the defendant since December previous, and that the officers of the Company were desirous that the plaintiff should meet them at Montreal to arrange about the use of such couplings on their cars by defendant, and they agreed with him to pay his expenses if he would come to Montreal, and he agreed so to do, and took passage on defendant's cars, and was, by the reckless misconduct and negligence of the defendant, and without negligence on his part, injured whilst thus a passenger in defendant's car, the defendants are not exonerated from liability to plaintiff for his damages occasioned by such negligence, by reason of the indorsement upon the pass produced in evidence. charge, if not formally accurate, was not such as to prejudice the defendant. It is strongly urged, however, that the plaintiff, by accepting the free pass indorsed as it was, was estopped from showing that he was not to take his passage upon the terms therein expressed; or at least, that his acceptance of the pass should be regarded as competent if not conclusive evidence that such a pass was in the contemplation of the parties when the arrangement for his going to Montreal was made. But we have already shown that the carrying of the plaintiff from Portland to Montreal was not a mere gratuity. To call it such would be repugnant to the essential character of the whole transaction. There was a consideration for it, both good and valuable. It necessarily follows, therefore, that it was a carrying for hire. Being such, it was not competent for the defendant, as a common carrier, to stipulate for the immunity expressed on the back of the pass. This is a sufficient answer to the argument propounded. The defendant being, by the very nature of the transaction, a common carrier for hire, cannot set up, as against the plaintiff, who was a passenger for hire, any such estoppel or agreement as that which is insisted on. It is evident that the court below regarded this case as one of carriage for hire, and not as one of gratuituous carriage, and that no sufficient evidence to go to the jury was adduced to show the contrary; and hence, that under the ruling of this court in R. R. Co. v. Lock wood, 17 Wall., 357 [84 U. S., XXI., 634], it was a case in which the defendant, as a common carrier of passengers, could not lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability for the negligence of its servants. In taking this view, we think the court was correct. The transportation of the plaintiff in the defendant's cars, though not paid for by him in money, was not a matter of charity nor of gratuity in any sense. It was by virtue of an agreement, in which the mutual interest of the parties was consulted. It was part of the consideration for which the plaintiff consented to take the journey to Montreal. His expenses in making that journey were to be paid by the defendant, and of these the expense of his transportation was a part. The giving him a free pass did not alter the nature of the transaction. The pass was a mere ticket or voucher, to be shown to the conductors of the train, as evidence of his right to be transported therein. It was not evidence of any contract by which the plaintiff was to assume Since, therefore, from our view of the case, all the risk; and it would not have been valid it is not necessary to determine what would if it had been. In this respect it was a stronger have been the rights of the parties if the plaintcase than that of Lockwood's. There the pass iff had been a free or gratuitous passenger, we was called a "drover's pass," and an agreement rest our decision upon the case of R. R. Co. v. Lockwas actually signed, declaring that the accept wood [supra]. We have no doubt of the correctance of the pass was to be considered as a waiv-ness of the conclusion reached in that case. We er of all claims for damages or injury received on the train. The court rightly refused, therefore, in the present case to charge that the plaintiff was traveling upon the conditions in dorsed on the pass, or that, if he traveled on that pass, the defendant was free from liability. And the court was equally right in refusing to charge, that, if the plaintiff was a free or gratuitous passenger, the defendant was not liable. The evidence did not sustain any such hypoth esis. It was uncontradicted, so far as it referred to the arrangement by virtue of which the journey was undertaken. The charge actually given by the court was also free from material error. It stated the law as favorably for the defendant as the latter had a right to ask. If subject to any criticism, it is in that part in which the court supposed that the jury might find that the plaintiff was injured by the reckless misconduct and negligence of the defendant. If this degree of fault had been necessary to sustain the action, there might have been some difficulty in deducing it from the evidence. However, the condition of the track where the accident took place, without any explanation of its cause, was, perhaps, sufficient even for such an inference. If the defendant could have shown that the injury to the rails was the result of an accident occurring so shortly before the passage of the train as not to give an opportunity of ascertaining its existence, it did not do so, but chose to rest upon the evidence of the plaintiff. In fact, however, negligence was all that the plaintiff was bound to show; and of this there was abundant evidence to go to the jury. On the whole, therefore, we think that the charge presents no sufficient ground for setting aside the verdict. The do not mean to imply, however, that we should have come to a different conclusion, had the plaintiff been a free passenger instead of a passenger for hire. We are aware that respectable tribunals have asserted the right to stipulate for exemption in such â case; and it is often asked, with apparent confidence, "May not men make their own contracts, or, in other words, may not a man do what he will with his own?" The question, at first sight, seems a simple one. But there is a question lying behind that: "Can a man call that absolutely his own, which he holds as a great public trust, by the public grant, and for the public use as well as his own profit?" The business of the common carrier, in this country at least, is emphatically a branch of the public service: and the conditions on which that public service shall be performed by private enterprise are not yet entirely settled. We deem it the safest plan not to anticipate questions until they fairly arise and become necessary for our decision. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. UNITED STATES, Appt., v. IRVING F. WILCOX. (See S. C., 5 Otto, 661-664.) Collector's commissions. The Act of Congress of July 20, 1868, was not intended to change the rule prescribed by the Act of July 13, 1866, as amended by the Act of March 2 1867, for the allowance of commissions to Collectors for articles removed from one district to a bonded of Internal Revenue, upon taxes collected by them warehouse in another district. The purposes of the sioner, a large quantity of manufactured toAct were distinct. bacco, to each package of which was affixed by said collector an engraved stamp, as required by [No. 794.] Submitted Dec. 17. 1877. Decided Jan. 7, 1878. said section. APPEAL from the Court of Claims. The following are the findings of the Court of Claims. I. Under the provisions of the Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, sec. 73, 15 Stat. at L., 157, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue designated and established at different ports of entry, bonded warehouses for the storage of manufactured tobacco and snuff in bond, intended for exportation, under the control of the Collector of Internal Revenue, in charge of exports at the port and in the district where located. II. The commissioner promulgated the following instructions and regulations applicable to the withdrawal of tobacco from said warehouses for consumption, so far as material in this Withdrawal after payment of tax. "The party desiring to withdraw manufactured tobacco or snuff from an export bonded warehouse after the tax has been paid thereon, will file with the collector an entry for withdrawal in the following form, describing the goods as they were entered for warehousing, viz.: Entry for withdrawal. Entry of merchandise intended to be withdrawn from the export bonded warehouse of * * * * * * * * * * at, in the-district of the State of by, for consumption, on payment of the taxes, the same having been stored in said warehouse by, on the day of—, 18—, and which were described as follows: viz.: The taxes having been fully paid and the stamps affixed and canceled, the collector will issue a permit for the delivery of the goods, which permit must be presented to the assessor of the district, for his certificate that the same has been presented to him and that the amount of taxes paid thereon has been entered in his bonded account of the district." The collector was required to certify that the full amount of tax due and owing thereon had been paid to him. III. The claimant was Collector of Internal Revenue for the Fifth Collection District of Virginia, from Apr., 1869, to Mar., 1871, as alleged in his petition. V. Of the tobacco so removed from manufactories in the district of the claimant, and shipped to export bonded warehouses in other districts, there was withdrawn by the owners from said warehouses, to be sold in districts other than that of the claimant, and not for export, in accordance with the regulations of the Commissioner mentioned in the second finding, a large quantity of tobacco, and the tax thereon was paid to the collectors in the districts where said warehouses were situated. VI. Adding one half the amount of the tax received on the quantity of tobacco shipped from the claimant's district, as set forth in the fourth finding, and withdrawn from the warehouses in other districts to be sold, as stated in the fifth finding, to the amount of taxes collected by the claimant on which his commissions were calculated, if he was entitled to have such addition made under the provisions of the Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, sec. 25, 13 Stat. at L., 231, as amended by the Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, sec. 9, 14 Stat. at L., 106, and the Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, sec. 9, 14 Stat. at L., 171, the claimant would be entitled to additional commissions amounting to the sum of $1,020, which has not been paid to him. Conclusion of law: that the claimant is entitled to recover the sum of $1,020. Mr. S. F. Phillips, Solicitor Gen., for appellant. Mr. I. G. Kimball, for appellee. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: We agree with the Court of Claims in the opinion that the Act of Congress of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, secs. 73, 74, 15 Stat. at L., 157, was not intended to change the rule prescribed by the Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, sec. 24, 14 Stat. at L.,153, as amended by the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. at L., 473, for the allowance of commissions, to Collectors of Internal Revenue, upon taxes collected by them for articles removed from one district to a bonded warehouse in another district. The purposes of the Act were distinct. The Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. at L.,202, as amended by the 9th section of the Act of July 13th, 1866, enacted that manufactured tobacco might be removed from the place where manufactured to a bonded warehouse in another collection district without payment of the tax, under certain treasury regulations, and might be withdrawn from the bonded warehouse on payment of the tax, or removed for export to a foreign country without such payment. The warehouses provided were for two purposes-one for the custody of tobacco designed for export, and the other for custody of tobacco designed either for export or for domestic consumption or sale. Whenever the tobacco was removed for the latter uses, and when, consequently, the tax was paid to the collector of the district in which the warehouse was situated, the proviso inserted by the Act of 1866 divided the commissions on the tax between the collector of that district and the collector of the district from which the tobacco IV. During the time the claimant was Collector as aforesaid, there were removed from manufactories in his district, without the payment of tax thereon, and transported directly to export warehouses in other districts, under the provisions of section 74 of said Act, 15 Stat. at L., 157, and the regulations of the commis-had been removed. 537 Such was the law when the Act of 1868 was enacted. That Act was plainly intended to throw around the removal of the manufactured tobacco greater security against evasion of payment of the tax upon it than had existed before. In no manner did it attempt to deal with the subject of collectors' commissions. Nor did it relieve collectors from any of the duties incumbent upon them before. We cannot better express our opinion of it than by adopting the language of the Court of Claims: The only real changes effected were the sub 2. It is competent for Congress to enforce, by suitable penalties, all legislation necessary or proper to the execution of powers with which it is intrusted; and any act committed with a view of evading such legislation, or fraudulently securing its benefits, may be made an offense against the United States. But it is otherwise, when an act committed in a State has no relation to the execution of a power of Congress, or to any matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act haying no such relation is one in respect to which the State can alone legislate. [No. 995.] Argued Dec. 17, 1877. Decided Jan. 7, 1878. Na certificate of division in opinion be stitution of export bonded warehouses for inter-Otween the judges of the Circuit Court of nal bonded warehouses, and requiring the owners of tobacco shipped from the manufactory to the warehouses to affix to each package an en. graved stamp, for which he paid to the government through the collector of the shipping district twenty-five cents, and which was to be ndicative of the owner's intention to export the package. But, notwithstanding that stamp, the owner was not bound to export the tobacco, but was permitted to withdraw it from bond for consumption on payment of the taxes due thereon, precisely as before. And it is upon this narrow construction that the defense in this case rests; that because under the Act of 1868 tobacco could be shipped in bond from the manufactory only with a stamp thereon indicative of the intention of the owner to export it, while the language of the proviso of 1866 referred to articles 'shipped in bond to be sold in another district,' therefore the commissions of collectors were to be calculated on a different basis in the two cases, upon taxes collected in like manner upon tobacco shipped in bond from the manufactory and withdrawn for consumption from the bonded warehouse alike under both Acts. In our opinion, the Fortieth Congress, in passing the Act of 1868 (ch. 186), had no such intention and expressed no such will; and to adopt the construction contended for by the defendants would be to defeat the clearly established policy of Congress in this particular, by giving substantial force to language not material to the subject-matter legislated upon, and by establishing an incidental and accidental change of the law beyond the contemplation of the legislators." The judgment is, therefore, affirmed. UNITED STATES, Piff., v. LEWIS FOX. Criminal offense-inoperative Act. (See S. C., 5 Otto, 670-673.) 1. *An act which is not an offense at the time it is committed cannot become such by any subsequent independent act of the party, with which it has no connection. Accordingly, the statute of the United States, which declares that every person respecting whom proceedings in bankruptcy are commenced. either upon his own petition or that of a creditor, who, within three months before their commencement, obtains goods upon false pretenses with intent to defraud shall be punished by imprisonment, is inoperative to render the act an offense because its criminal character is to be determined by subsequent proceedings, which, at the time the goods were so obtained, may not have been in his contemplation, and may be instituted against his will, by another. *Head notes by Mr. Justice FIELD. the United States for the Southern District of New York. The case is stated by the court. Mr. Edwin B. Smith, Asst. Atty-Gen., for plaintiff: Is this legislation contrary to natural justice, or in excess of ordinary legislative powers? That it is not, may be inferred from the many instances of it in England and in our several States, sanctioned by universal approval. It is very common for penal laws to declare that several successive events shall transpire to constitute a crime and incur its penalty, without the concurrence or combination of which, no offense shall be deemed to exist, and no liability to punishment. For instance: a single act of sale or brokerage, etc., by an unlicensed person, would not constitute an offense against the revenue laws; but the bare repetitions (after some interval of time, no matter what) of the act originally lawful, would be an offense. It will be a fair parallel if we take, by way of illustration, acts which are wrong in morals, but not punishable by law, as was Fox's conduct in obtaining goods by false pretenses. Adultery and fornication are not crimes, at common law, yet the open commission of them is one; so are those acts which make one a barrator, common scold, etc. Indeed, no difference is perceived in principle whether the act, the repetition of which constitutes an offense, be one that is itself punishable or not; for if it be so and be punished, it then stands, so far as the law is concerned and considered as an element of another crime, upon the same footing as an innocent act. Thus, one who has been three times convicted of larceny may be sentenced as a common thief; or if found guilty of three illegal sales of liquor, as a common seller, etc.; or may be convicted upon proof of the same repeated acts, of the single offenses, and of such other crimes as their combination may amount to; e. g., for keeping a drinking-house and tippling shop and for being a common seller. State v. Inness, 53 Me., 536, citing Hale. Pl. Cr., 241; 4 Bl. Com., 336; Com. v. Andrews, 2 Mass., 409; Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick., 496: State v. Sonnerkalb 2 Nott. & McC., 280; State v. Taylor, 2 Bailey, 49; Regina v. Brettel, 1 C. & M., 609, and other authorities. This section (Rev. Stat. 5132, par. ninth) was embodied in the original Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, sec. 44, 14 Stat. at L., 539, and was borrowed, almost in its identical words, from the 12 and 13 Vict., ch. 106, sec. 253, which follows, but extends the 5 and 6 Vict., ch. 122, sec. 35. In the case of Reg.v. Boyd, 5 Cox, Cr. L. Cas., 502, 504, the respondent was found guilty and sentenced under this section, before Alderson, B., and Wightman, J., the former giving to the jury the views of the the court. It is a case on all fours with the one at the bar. There have been many convictions in England under this statute, which has been repeated, coupled with other stringent provisions in the consolidated Acts of 1869. Reg. v. Cherry, 12 Cox, Cr. L. Cas., 32, 36; Reg. v. Watkinson, 12 Cox, Cr. L. Cas., 271-274; Reg. v. Raudnitz, 4 F. & F., 171. The above mentioned case of Regina v. Boyd, 5 Cox, 502, is cited by Miller, J., in his opinion in U. 8., v. Prescott, 2 Biss., 327. In that volume is reported a case of conviction under this section where the instruction to the jury was, that, upon sufficient evidence, they might "Infer an intent to defraud, reaching back to the time when the goods were obtained." U. S. v. Frank, Id., 263, 266. It is no novelty for the Legislature to declare that certain acts and determinations shall be conclusive, or at least prima facie, evidence of a particular state of facts. People v. Mitchel, 45 Barb., 208; Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y., 541; Hickox v. Tallman, 38 Barb., 608; Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y., 262; Com. v. Williams, 6 Gray, 1; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis., 54; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162 and 8. C., 46 Mo., 291; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me., 555; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H., 323; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis., 289; Cooley, Const. Lim. (Fed.), 367 and cases cited. Mr. B. F. Tracy, for defendant: Congress has no power to subject a person to punishment for an act or "transaction which, at the time of its occurrence, is not a violation of any law of the United States." There is no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had to spell out an offense against the United States. To constitute an offense against the United States the act complained of must be forbidden by some statute in exist ence at the time it was committed. Ex post facto laws are expressly prohibited. An ex post facto law is defined to be an Act which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall., 386; Cummings v. Mo., 4 Wall., 277 (71 U. S., XVIII., 356). A statute which, by its operation, makes that criminal or penal, which was not so when the action was performed, is ex post facto within the meaning of the Constitution. U. S. v. Hall, 3 Pa., 1809: U. S. v. Hall, 2 Wash. C. C., 366; affirmed, 6 Cranch, 171. A law which alters the character or quality of an act by something that occurs afterwards, so as to make an antecedent innocent act criminal by relation, is in principle and effect an ex post facto law. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: In November, 1874, the defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. In March, 1876, he was indicted in the Circuit Court for that district for alleged offenses against the United States, and, among others, for the of fense described in the 9th subdivision of section 5132 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that "Every person respecting whom proceedings in bankruptcy are commenced, either upon his own petition or that of a creditor," who, within three months before their commencement. "Under the false color and pretense of carrying on business, and dealing in the ordinary course of trade, obtains on credit from any person any goods or chattels with intent to defraud." shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years. The indictment, among other things, charged the defendant with having, within three months previous to the commencement of his proceedings in bankruptcy, purchased and obtained on credit goods from several merchants in the City of New York, upon the pretense and representation of carrying on business and dealing in the ordinary course of trade as a manufacturer of clothing; whereas, he was not carrying on business in the ordinary course of trade as such manufacturer, but was selling goods to some parties by the piece for cost, and to other parties at auction for less than cost, and that these pretenses and representations were made to defraud the parties from whom the goods were purchased. The defendant was convicted; and, upon a motion in arrest of judgment, the Judges holding the Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and have certified to this court the question upon which they differed. That question is thus stated in the certificate: "If a person shall engage in a transaction which, at the time of its occurrence, is not a violation of any law of the United States, to wit: the obtaining goods upon credit by false pretenses, and if, subsequently thereto, proceedings in bankruptcy shall be commenced respecting him, is it within the constitutional limits of congressional legislation to subject him to punishment for such transaction considered in connection with the proceedings in bankruptcy?" The question presented by the certificate of division does not appear to us difficult of solution. Upon principle, an act which is not an offense at the time it is committed cannot become such by any subsequent independent act of the party with which it has no connection. By the clause in question, the obtaining of goods on credit, upon false pretenses, is made an offense against the United States, upon the happening of a subsequent event, not perhaps in the contemplation of the party and which may be brought about, against his will, by the agency of another. The criminal intent essential to the commission of a public offense must exist when the act complained of is done; it cannot be imputed to a party from a subsequent independent transaction. There are cases, it is true, where a series of acts are necessary to constitute an offense, one act being auxiliary to another in carrying out the criminal design. But the present is not a case of that kind. Here an act which may have no relation to proceedings in bankruptcy becomes criminal, according as such proceedings may or may not be subsequently taken, either by the party or by another. There is no doubt of the competency of Congress to provide, by suitable penalties, for the enforcement of all legislation necessary or proper to the execution of powers with which it is intrusted. And as it is authorized "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies |