The notions we annex to the words, matter, and mind, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid,* are merely relative. If I am asked what I mean by matter? [ can only explain myself by faying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or foft, rough or smooth, hot or cold;-that is, I can define it in no other way, than by enumerating its fenfible qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my senses; but only extenfion, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the conftitution of my nature leads me to refer to fomething, which is extended, figured, and coloured. The cafe is precisely fimilar with refpect to Mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of fenfation, thought, and volition; operations, which imply the existence of fomething which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impreffed with an irresistible conviction, that all these fenfations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the fame being; to that being, which he calls himself; a being, which he is led, by the conftitution of his nature, to confider as fomething diftinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the lofs or mutilation of any of his organs. From these confiderations, it appears, that we have the fame evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body; nay, if there be any difference between the two cafes, that we have stronger evidence for it; inafmuch as the one is fuggefted to us by the fubjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our own perceptions: and in this light, undoubtedly, the fact would appear to every person, were it not, that, from our earliest years, the attention is engroffed with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquaintance with which is abfolutely neceffary for the prefervation of our animal exiftence. Hence it is, * Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 8, 9. IV. Continuation of the same subject.-Of V.-Continuation of the same subject.-Ef- fects produced on the Memory by VII. Continuation of the same subject.-Im- portance of making a proper Selection among the Objects of our Knowledge, II. Of Imagination considered in its relation III. Continuation of the same subject.-Re- lation of Imagination and of Taste to IV. Of the influence of Imagination on Hu- V.-Continuation of the same Subject.-In- conveniences resulting from an ill-reg- VI.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Im- 444 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. INTRODUCTION. PART I. Of the Nature and Object of the Philofophy of the Human Mind. THE prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphyfical fpeculations, feems to arite chiefly from two causes: First, from an apprehenfion that the fubjects about which they are employed, are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, fecondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life. The frivolous and abfurd difcuffions which abound in the writings of moft Metaphyfical authors, afford but too many arguments in juftification of these opinions; and if fuch difcuffions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with B juftice be regarded, as no inconfiderable evidence of the progrefs which true philosophy has made in the prefent age. Among the various fubjects of inquiry, however, which, in confequence of the vague ufe of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphyfics, there are fome, which are effentially distinguished from the reft, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general difcredit, into which the other branches of metaphyfics have justly fallen. To this circumftance is probably to be ascribed, the little progrefs which has hitherto been made in the Philofophy of the Human Mind; a fcience, fo interesting in its nature, and fo important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquifitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been claffed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable difquifitions of the fchool-men. In order to obviate these misapprehenfions with respect to the fubject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the Nature of the truths which I propofe to investigate; and, fecondly, to point out fome of the more important Applications of which they are fufceptible. In ftating these preliminary obfervations, I may perhaps appear to fome to be minute and tedious; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by thofe, who have ftudied with care the principles of that fcience of which I am to treat; and who are anxious to remove the prejudices which have, in a great measure, excluded it from the modern fyftems of education. In the progrefs of my work, I flatter myfelf that I fhall not often have occafion to folicit the indulgence of my readers, for an unneceffary diffufenefs. The notions we annex to the words, matter, and mind, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid,* are merely relative. If I am asked what I mean by matter? I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or foft, rough or fmooth, hot or cold; that is, I can define it in no other way, than by enumerating its fenfible qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my senses; but only extenfion, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to fomething, which is extended, figured, and coloured. The case is precifely fimilar with refpect to Mind. We are not immediately confcious of its existence, but we are confcious of fenfation, thought, and volition ; operations, which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impreffed with an irrefiftible conviction, that all these fenfations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the fame being; to that being, which he calls himself; a being, which he is led, by the conftitution of his nature, to confider as fomething diftinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the lofs or mutilation of any of his organs. From thefe confiderations, it appears, that we have the fame evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body; nay, if there be any difference between the two cafes, that we have ftronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is fuggefted to us by the fubjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our own perceptions: and in this light, undoubtedly, the fact would appear to every person, were it not, that, from our earliest years, the attention is engroffed with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquaintance with which is abfolutely neceffary for the prefervation of our animal exiftence. Hence it is, * Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 8, 9. |