Imagens da página
PDF
ePub

1

in every act of perception, the foul quits the body, and is prefent to the object perceived. And accor dingly this alternative is exprefsly ftated by Malebranche; who differs, however, from the writer laft quoted, in the choice which he makes of his hypothefis; and even refts his proof of its truth on the improbability of the other opinion. "I fuppofe," fays he," that every one will grant, that we perceive not "external objects immediately, and of themfelves. "We fee the fun, the ftars, and an infinity of objects "without us; and it is not at all likely that, upon "fuch occafions, the foul fallies out of the body, in or "der to be prefent to the objects perceived. She fees "them not therefore by themselves; and the im "mediate object of the mind is not the thing per"ceived, but fomething which is intimately united "to the foul; and it is that which I call an idea : fo "that by the word idea, I understand nothing elfe "here but that which is neareft to the mind when "we perceive any object.It ought to be carefully observed, that, in order to the mind's perceiv❝ing any object, it is abfolutely neceffary that the "idea of that object be actually prefent to it. Of "this it is not poflible to doubt. The things which "the foul perceives, are of two kinds. They are "either in the foul, or they are without the foul. "Those that are in the foul, are its own thoughts; "that is to fay, all its different modifications. The "foul has no need of ideas for perceiving thefe

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

things. But with regard to things without the "foul, we cannot perceive them but by means of "ideas."

To thefe quotations, I fhall add another, which contains the opinion of Buffon upon the fubject. As I do not understand it fo completely, as to be able to tranflate it in a manner intelligible to myfelf, I tranfcribe it in the words of the author. "L'ame s'unit intimement à tel objet

[ocr errors]

12

« la diftance, la grandeur, la figure, rien ne peut "nuire à cette union lorfque l'ame la veut: effe: Les "fait et le fait en un initant..... la volomé « n'eft-elle donc qu'un mouvement corporel, et la <contemplation un fimple attouchement? Com <ment cet attouchement pourroit-il fe faire fur un objet évigné, for un fajet abárait? Comment pourroit-il s'opérer en un intent indivine! hom - jamais conquc movement, fins qu'a y bu d -Pefpace et co tems: Lavoné, &c. - meat, L'été donc pa to now,,?. - 1 Potion deleted, cat, content se le té. yali ice cut' pa ne g

i tefe tienries great reto 10, m into her

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors][subsumed]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[graphic]
[ocr errors]

are commonly referred to impulfe, arise from a pow. er of repulfion, extending to a fmall and imperceptible distance round every element of matter. If this doctrine fhall be confirmed by future fpeculations in phyfics, it must appear to be a curious circumftance in the hiftory of fcience, that philofophers have been fo long occupied in attempting to trace all the phenomena of matter, and even fome of the phenomena of mind, to a general fact, which, upon an accurate examination, is found to have no exiftence.I do not make this obfervation with a view to depreciate the labours of these philofophers; for, although the fyftem of Bofcovich were completely eftablished, it would not diminish, in the smallest degree, the value of those physical inquiries, which have proceeded on the common hypothefis, with refpect to impulse. The laws which regulate the communication of motion, in the cafe of apparent contact, are the most general facts we obferve among the terreftrial phenomena; and they are, of all phyf ical events, those which are the most familiar to us, from our earliest infancy. It was therefore not only natural but proper, that philofophers fhould be gin their phyfical inquiries, with attempting to refer to thefe, (which are the most general laws of nature, exposed to the examination of our fenfes,) the particular appearances they wished to explain. And, if ever the theory of Bofcovich fhould be completely established, it will have no other effect, than to refolve these laws into fome principle ftill more general, without affecting the folidity of the common doctrine, so far as it goes.

SECTION III.

Of Dr. Reid's Speculations on the Subject of Perception.

IT was chiefly in confequence of the fceptical conclufions which Bishop Berkeley and Mr. Hume had deduced from the ancient theories of perception,, that Dr. Reid was led to call them in queftion; and he appears to me to have fhewn, in the moft fatisfactory manner, not only that they are perfectly hypothetical, but that the fuppofitions they involve, are abfurd and impoffible. His reafonings, on this part of our conftitution, undoubtedly form the moft important acceffion which the philofophy of the hu

man mind has received fince the time of Mr. Locke.

But although Dr. Reid has been at much pains to overturn the old ideal fyftem, he has not ventured to substitute any hypothefis of his own in its place. And, indeed, he was too well acquainted with the limits prescribed to our philofophical inquiries, to think of indulging his curiofity, in fuch unprofita ble fpeculations. All, therefore, that he is to be understood as aiming at, in his inquiries concerning our perceptive powers is, to give a precise state of the fact, divefted of all theoretical expreffions; in order to prevent philofophers from impofing on themselves any longer, by words without meaning; and to extort from them an acknowledgment, that, with respect to the procefs of nature in perception, they are no lefs ignorant than the vulgar.

According to this view of Dr. Reid's reafonings, on the fubject of perception, the purpose to which they are fubfervient may appear to fome to be of no very confiderable importance; but the truth is, that one of the most valuable effects of genuine philofophy, is to remind us of the limited powers of the human understanding; and to revive those nat,

ural feelings of wonder and admiration, at the fpectacle of the universe, which are apt to languish, in confequence of long familiarity. The moft profound discoveries which are placed within the reach of our researches lead to a confeffion of human ignorance; for, while they flatter the pride of man, and increase his power, by enabling him to trace the fimple and beautiful laws by which phyfical events are regulated, they call his attention, at the fame time, to thofe general and ultimate facts which bound the narrow circle of his knowledge; and which, by evincing to him the operation of powers, whofe nature muft for ever remain unknown, ferve to remind him of the infufficiency of his faculties to penetrate the fecrets of the univerfe. Wherever we direct our in quiries; whether to the anatomy and phyfiology of animals, to the growth of vegetables, to the chemical attractions and repulfions, or to the motions of the heavenly bodies; we perpetually perceive the effects of powers which cannot belong to matter. To a certain length we are able to proceed; but in every research, we meet with a line, which no industry nor ingenuity can pafs. It is a line too, which is marked with fufficient diftinctnefs; and which no man now thinks of paffing, who has juft views of the nature and object of philofophy. It forms the feparation between that field which falls under the furvey of the phyfical inquirer, and that unknown region, of which, though it was neceflary that we fhould be affured of the existence, in order to lay a foundation for the doctrines of natural theology, it hath not pleased the Author of the universe to reveal to us the wonders, in this infant ftate of our being. It was, in fact, chiefly by tracing out this line, that Lord Bacon did fo much fervice to science.

Befides this effect, which is common to all our philofophical pursuits, of impreffing the mind with a fense of that mysterious agency, or efficiency, into

« AnteriorContinuar »