minds of men, which it could never have acquired, if divefted of fuch an alliance. The cafe has, of late years, been moft remarkably reverfed: the common fenfe of mankind, in confequence of the growth of a more liberal spirit of inquiry, has revolted against inany of those abfurdities, which had fo long held humɑn reafon in captivity; and it was, perhaps, more than could reasonably have been expected, that, in the first moments of their emancipation, philofophers fhould have stopped fhort, at the precise boundary, which cooler reflection, and more moderate views, would have prescribed. The fact is, that they have paffed far beyond it; and that, in their zeal to deftroy prejudices, they have attempted to tear up by the rots, many of the best and happiest and most effential principles of our nature. Having remarked the powerful influence of education over the mind, they have concluded, that man is wholly a factitious being; not recollecting, that this very fufceptibility of education presupposes certain original principles, which are common to the whole fpecies; and that, as error can only take a permanent hold of a candid mind by being grafted on truths, which it is unwilling or unable to eradicate; even the influence, which false and abfurd opinions occafionally acquire over the belief, instead of being an argument for univerfal fcepticism, is the moft decifive argument against it; inafmuch as it fhews, that there are fome truths fo incorporated and identified with our nature, that they can reconcile us even to the abfurdities and contradictions with which we fuppofe them to be infeparably connected. The sceptical philofophers, for example, of the present age, have frequently attempted to hold up to ridicule, thofe contemptible and puerile fuperftitions, which have difgraced the creeds of fome of the most enlightened nations; and which have not only commanded the affert, but the reverence, of men of the most accomplished understandings. But thefe his

tories of human imbecility are, in truth, the ftrongeft teftimonies which can be produced, to prove, how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental principles of morality over the belief; when they are able to fanctify, in the apprehenfions of mankind, every extravagant opinion, and every unmeaning ceremony, which early education has taught us to affociate with them.

That implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be difputed; but it may not, perhaps, be as generally acknowledged, that the cafe is the fame with unlimited fcepticifm: on the contrary, we are fometimes apt to afcribe this difpofition to a more than ordinary vigor of intellect. Such a prejudice was by no means unnatural at that period in the hiftory of modern Europe, when reafon firft began to throw off the yoke of authority; and when it unqueftionably required a fuperiority of understanding, as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to refift the contagion of prevailing fuperftition. But in the prefent age, in which the tendency of fashionable opinions is directly oppofite to thofe of the vulgar; the philofophical creed, or the philofophical fcepticism of by far the greater number of those who value themselves on an emancipation from popular errors, arifes from the very fame weaknefs with the credulity of the multitude: nor is it going too far to fay, with Rouffeau, that " He, who, in the end "of the eighteenth century, has brought himself to "abandon all his early principles without difcrimina"tion, would probably have been a bigot in the

days of the League." In the midst of these contrary impulfes, of fashionable and of vulgar prejudices, he alone evinces the fuperiority and the strength of his mind, who is able to difentangle truth from error; and to oppofe the clear conclufions of his own unbiaffed faculties, to the united clamours of fuperftition, and of falfe philofophy.-Such are the

men, whom nature marks out to be the lights of the world; to fix the wavering opinions of the multitude, and to imprefs their own characters on that of their age.

For fecuring the mind completely from the weakneffes I have now been defcribing and enabling it to maintain a steady courfe of inquiry, between implicit credulity, and unlimited fcepticism, the moft important of all qualities is a fincere and devoted attachment to truth; which feldom fails to be accompanied with a manly confidence in the clear conclufions of human reason. It is fuch a confidence, united, (as it generally is) with perfonal intrepidity, which forms what the French writers call force of character; one of the rarest endowments, it must be contessed, of our fpecies; but which, of all endowments, is the most effential for rendering a philofopher happy in himself, and a bleffing to mankind.

There is, I think, good reason for hoping, that the sceptical tendency of the present age, will be only a temporary evil. While it continues, however, it is an evil of the most alarming nature; and, as it extends, in general, not only to religion and morality, but in fome measure, alfo, to politics, and the conduct of life, it is equally fatal to the comfort of the individual, and to the improvement of fociety. Even in its most inoffenfive form, when it happens to be united with a peaceable difpofition and a benevolent heart, it cannot fail to have the effect of damping every active and patriotic exertion. Convinced that truth is placed beyond the reach of human faculties; and doubtful how far the prejudices we defpife may not be effential to the well-being of fociety, we refolve to abandon completely all speculative inquiries; and fuffering ourselves to be carried quietly along with the stream of popular opinions, and of fashionable manners, determine to amuse ourselves, the beft way we can, with business or pleasure, during our

fhort paffage through this fcene of illufions. But he' who thinks more favourably of the human powers, and who believes that reafon was given to man to direct him to his duty and his happiness, will defpife the fuggeftions of this timid philofophy; and while he is confcious that he is guided in his inquiries only by the love of truth, wil: reft affured that their refult will be equally favourable to his own comfort, and to the best interest of mankind. What, indeed, will be the particular effects in the firft inftance, of that general diffufion of knowledge, which the art of printing muft fooner or later produce; and of that fpirit of reformation with which it cannot fail to be accompanied, it is beyond the reach of human fagacity to conjecture; but unless we chufe to abandon ourselves entirely to a defponding fcepticism, we must hope and believe, that the progrefs of human reafon can never be a fource of permanent disorder to the world; and that they alone have cause to apprehend the confequences, who are led, by the imperfection of our prefent inftitutions, to feel themfelves interested in perpetuating the prejudices, and follies, of their species.

From the obfervations which have been made, it fufficiently appears, that in order to fecure the mind on the one hand, from the influence of prejudice; and on the other, from a tendency to unlimited fcepticism; it is neceffary that it should be able to diftinguish the original and univerfal principles and laws of human nature, from the adventitious effects of local fituation. But if, in the cafe of an individual, who has received an imperfect or erroneous education, fuch a knowledge puts it in his power to correct, to a certain degree, his own bad habits, and to furmount his own fpeculative errors; it enables him to be useful, in a much higher degree, to those whose education he has an opportunity of fuperintending from early infancy. Such, and fo perma

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nent, is the effect of firft impreffions, on the character, that although a philofopher may fucceed, by perfeverance, in freeing his reafon from the prejudices with which he was entangled, they will ftill retain fome hold of his imagination, and his affections: nd, therefore, however enlightened his understanding may be in his hours of fpeculation, his philofophical opinions will frequently lose their influence over his mind, in those very fituations in which their practical affiftance is moft required :-when his temper is foured by misfortune; or when he engages in the puriuits of life, and exposes himself to the contagion of popular errors. His opinions are fupported mere ly by fpeculative arguments; and, instead of being connected with any of the active principles of his nature, are counteracted and thwarted by fome of the moft powerful of them. How different would the cafe be, if education were conducted, from the beginning, with attention and judgment? Were the fame pains taken, to imprefs truth on the mind in early infancy, that is often taken to inculcate error, the great principles of our conduct would not only be juster than they are; but, in confequence of the aid which they would receive from the imagination and the heart, trained to confpire with them in the fame direction, they would render us happier in ourselves, and would influence our practice more powerfully and more habitually. There is furely nothing in error, which is more congenial to the mind than truth. On the contrary, when exhibited separately and alone to the understanding, it fhocks our reafon, and provokes our ridicule; and it is only, (as I had occafion already to remark,) by an alliance with truths, which we find it difficult to renounce, that it can obtain our affent, or command our reverence. What advantages, then, might be derived from a proper attention to early impreffions and affociations, in giving fupport to thofe principles which are con

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