CHAPTER X. TERMINATION OF THE SERVICE. 97. When the undertaking is over. The obligations imposed by law upon those in public service are conceived of as continuing throughout the service undertaken without interruption from its beginning to its end. Thus the extraordinary liability which makes a carrier practically an insurer continues so long as the public service which it has undertaken is being performed; but after carriage may be said to be over the carrier is simply under the obligation to exercise due care. Here is a case where the extent of the undertaking assumed in the performance of a public service is minutely measured, for the special liability attaches only so long as this public service is being performed. Aside from this particular problem there is the general problem of the proper termination of all liability by completed performance. A carrier may not altogether rid itself of its responsibility for goods which it has carried until it properly parts with possession of them. This is, to a large extent, a question of the full scope of the particular undertaking, which would involve detailed description of the usual course of each particular business, if it were to be treated in detail. 98. End of the transportation.-A common carrier, as such, undertakes only transportation to a certain place. When it has deposited the goods at that point on the route it would seem that it has done all that it has professed; and it seems, therefore, that its exceptional liability as a common carrier should then terminate.36 From this necessary condition of the railroad business and from the practice of these transportation companies of having platforms on which to place goods from the cars, in the first instance, and warehouse accommodation by which they may be securely stored, the goods of each consignment by themselves, in accessible places ready to be delivered, most courts are of the opinion that the duty assumed by the railroad corporation is that it will carry the goods safely to the place of destination, and there discharge them on the platform and then and there deliver them to the consignee or party entitled to receive them, if he is there ready to take them forthwith, or if the consignee is not there ready to take them, then to place them securely and keep them safely a reasonable time, ready to be delivered when called for.37 99. Reasonable time after notice.-In a great number of cases the rule is stated to be that the common carrier is an insurer of the goods until the expiration of a reasonable time for the consignee to get them after the transit is completed.38 If the consignee is present upon the arrival of the goods these cases agree that he must take them without unreasonable delay. But if he is not present these cases argue that the carrier must notify him of the 36 Mohr & Smith v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 40 Iowa 579. 37 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 1 Gray 263 (Mass.), from which the paragraph above is virtually quoted. 38 Bobbink v. Erie R. R., 82 Atl. 877 (N. J.). arrival of the goods; and then he has a reasonable time to take and remove them. If he is absent, unknown, or cannot be found, then the carrier may place the goods in its freight house; and, after keeping them a reasonable time, if the consignee does not call for them, its liability as a common carrier ceases.39 If, after the arrival of the goods, the consignee has a reasonable opportunity to remove them and does not, he may not hold the carrier as an in surer. 100. Obligation of personal delivery. The service assumed in common carriage does not necessarily go so far as to impose upon the common carrier the obligation of seeking out the consignee, and offering to make delivery to him personally. But personal delivery is professed in certain kinds of carriage, and in such businesses it is therefore owed. If delivery is refused, or the consignee cannot be found, the consignor should be notified, and the goods held for him as a warehouseman, unless the goods are perishable, in which case they may be sold for his account.40 This distinction is marked in modern times by the difference between the railroad business as it is usually conducted, where delivery to the consignee is not undertaken beyond its own rails, and the express business, where facilities are usually provided for delivery to the addressee personally. Express companies generally undertake personal delivery to the consignee, and they are, therefore, liable as com 39 Fenner v. Buffalo & State Line R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES-from which the above paragraph is virtually quoted. 40 Missouri K. & T. R. R. v. Cox, 144 S. W. 1196 (Tex. Civ. App.). mon carriers until delivery, or rather until they have made reasonable efforts to deliver." And obviously the same rules of law govern the performance of the telegraph companies' obligation to get the message to the sendee. 101. Surrender of goods.-The modern railroad company provides for delivery of goods at its established stations.42 The railroad company, moreover, is generally bound to unload the goods from the cars before delivery may usually be said to have taken place. But when coal, ore, grain, or oil are shipped in bulk and in carload lots, as they generally are, the consignee may properly insist, if he has a private siding connected with his premises, or if there is a public siding adjoining his premises, that the cars shall be shunted to his premises, for only in this way can such bulk freight be conveniently unloaded.13 In practically all cases where delivery at private siding is conceded, it is held that when the car is placed upon the siding the liability of the carrier ceases." And this may also be true where at request of the consignee the car is put upon a special siding and he is given access thereto.45 102. Setting down passengers.-The obligation to the passenger upon a railroad is fully performed when the passenger has been allowed to alight at the station of his destination and has safely left, or 41 Bullard v. American Express Co., 107 Mich. 695, 65 N. W. 551. 42 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Higdon, 149 Ky. 321, 148 S. W. 26. 43 Olanta Coal Co. v. Beech Creek R. Co., 144 Fed. 150. 44 Independence Mills Co. v. Burlington C. R. & N. R. R. Co., 72 Iowa 535, 34 N. W. 320. 45 Rice v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 98 Mass. 212, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. 47 has a reasonable opportunity safely to leave, the station.46 In the case of a street railway company it is fulfilled by leaving the passenger when he has arrived at his destination, safely in the street. It has been held that, if passengers are given permission to remain upon the conveyance for a time after their destination is reached, they will remain passengers until they have had a reasonable time to leave in addition to the extension of time granted.48 But the act of a passenger remaining upon the ises of the carrier after arriving at his destination for an unreasonable time deprives him of his rights as a passenger. And if the passenger jumps off the car, he can complain that the company did not protect him. It would seem, however, that the passenger should be warned of an approaching danger of which he obviously is not aware.49 prem 103. Performance according to instructions.—It would seem that completion of performance, according to the instructions given by the person entitled to give directions, would always be justifiable, in the absence of complicating circumstances. Thus, delivery to the consignee would normally be a discharge from all further liability; and so would delivery to the consignor be, if title has not passed to the consignee.50 But delivery to the true owner under any circumstances will be a full excuse to the 46 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Keller, 104 Ky. 768. 47 Creamer v. West End St. Ry. Co., 156 Mass. 320, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. 48 Chicago, K. & W. Ry. Co. v. Frazer, 55 Kans. 582, 40 Pac. 923. |