increased by the board of equalization. How much tax would thus be rendered void it is impossible to say. The main function of this board is to equalize these assessments over the whole state. If they find that a county has had its property assessed too high in reference to the general standard, they may reduce its valuation; if it has been fixed too low, they may raise it to that standard. When they raise it in any county, they necessarily raise it on the property of every individual who owns any in that county. Must each one of these have notice and a separate hearing? If a railroad company is by law entitled to such notice, surely every individual is equally entitled to it. Yet if this be so, the expense of giving notice, the delay of hearing each individual, would render the exercise of the main function of this board impossible. The very moment you come to apply to the individual the right claimed by the corporation in this case, its absurdity is apparent. Nor is there any hardship in the matter. This board has its time of sitting fixed by law. Its sessions are not secret. No obstruction exists to the appearance of any one before it to assert a right, or redress a wrong; and, in the business of assessing taxes, this is all that can be reasonably asked.

As we do not know on what evidence the board acted in regard to these railroads, or whether they did not act on knowledge which they possessed themselves, and as all valuation of property is more or less matter of opinion, we see no reason why the opinion of this court, or of the Circuit Court, should be better, or should be substituted for that of the board, whose opinion the law has declared to be the one to govern in the matter.

Power of Court to Control the Executive.

STATE OF GEORGIA v. STANTON.

6 Wall. 50 (U. S.). 1867.

Supreme court without jurisdiction to enjoin executive from acting under authority of "Reconstruction Acts."

NELSON, J. By the second section of the third article of the Constitution "the judicial power extends to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States," etc., and, as applicable to the case in hand, "to

controversies between a state and citizens of another state," which controversies, under the judiciary act, may be brought, in the first instance, before this court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; and we agree that the bill filed presents a case which, if it be the subject of judicial cognizance, would, in form, come under a familiar head of equity jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain a party from a wrong or injury to the rights of another, where the danger, actual or threatened, is irreparable, or the remedy at law inadequate. But, according to the course of proceeding under this head in equity, in order to entitle the party to the remedy, a case must be presented appropriate for the exercise of judicial power; the rights in danger, as we have seen, must be rights of persons or property, not merely political rights, which do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity.

The remaining question on this branch of our inquiry, is whether, in view of the principles above stated, and which we have endeavored to explain, a case is made out in the bill of which this court can take judicial cognizance. In looking into it, it will be seen that we are called upon to restrain the defendants, who represent the executive authority of the government, from carrying into execution certain acts of Congress, inasmuch as such execution would annul and totally abolish the existing state government of Georgia, and establish another and different one in its place; in other words, would overthrow and destroy the corporate existence of the state, by depriving it of all the means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might, and otherwise would, be maintained.

This is the substance of the complaint, and of the relief prayed for. The bill, it is true, sets out in detail the different and substantial changes in the structure and organization of the existing government, as contemplated in these acts of Congress, which, it is charged if carried into effect by the defendants, will work this destruction. But they are grievances, because they necessarily and inevitably tend to the overthrow of the state as an organized political body. They are stated, in detail, as laying a foundation for the interposition of the court to prevent the specific execution of them, and the resulting threatened mischief. So in respect to the prayers of the bill. The first is that the defendants may be enjoined against doing or permitting

any act or thing, within or concerning the state, which is or may be directed or required of them, by or under the two acts of Congress complained of; and the remaining four prayers are of the same character, except more specific as to the particular acts threatened to be committed.

That these matters, both as stated in the body of the bill and in the prayers for relief, call for the judgment of the court upon political questions, and, upon rights, not of persons or property, but of a political character, will hardly be denied. For the rights for the protection of which our authority is invoked are the rights of sovereignty of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence as a state, with all its constitutional powers and privileges. No case of private rights or private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement, is presented by the bill, in a judicial form, for the judgment of the court.

It is true the bill, in setting forth the political rights of the state and of its people to be protected, among other matters, avers that Georgia owns certain real estate and buildings therein, state capitol and executive mansion, and other real and personal property, and that putting the acts of Congress into execution, and destroying the state, would deprive it of the possession and enjoyment of its property. But it is apparent that this reference to property and statement concerning it are only by way of showing one of the grievances resulting from the threatened destruction of the state, and in aggravation of it, not as a specific ground of relief. This matter of property is neither stated as an independent ground nor is it noticed at all in the prayers for relief. Indeed, the case, as made in the bill, would have stopped far short of the relief sought by the state and its main purpose and design given up, by restraining its remedial effect simply to the protection of the title and possession of its property. Such relief would have called for a very different bill from the one before us.

Having arrived at the conclusion that this court, for the reasons above stated, possesses no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter presented in the bill for relief, it is unimportant to examine the question as it respects jurisdiction over the parties defendant.

Bill dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

CHAPTER XII.

TERMINATION OF THE OFFICIAL RELATION.

Power of Removal.

DULLAM v. WILLSON.

53 Mich. 392. Decided in 1884.

What constitutes sufficient notice and hearing? The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court which was delivered by Justice Champlin :

The issue is whether, under the constitution and laws of Michigan, the Governor has power to remove a state officer by such action as was taken in this case, viz.: An act of removal evidenced by writing, under the hand and seal of the executive, filed in the executive office, with notice thereof to the officer removed, communicating to him the alleged grounds of removal, but without giving him notice of charges, complaint or claim of official misconduct or neglect of duty, or opportunity of hearing, or defense.

The Constitution (article 12, § 8) provides that "the Governor shall have power and it shall be his duty, except at such times as the Legislature may be in session, to examine into the condition and administration of any public office, and the acts of any public officer, elective or appointed, to remove from office for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct in office, for any other misfeasance, or malfeasance therein, either of the following state officers, to wit: The Attorney General, or any other officer of the state, except legislative and judicial, elective or appointed, and to appoint a successor for the remainder of their respective unexpired terms of office, and report the causes of such removal to the Legislature at its next session." This provision was not contained in the Constitution of 1835. It was added to the present Constitution, by amendment, by the Legislature of 1862 (Laws 1861, p. 588), ratified by the people in 1862.

It will be observed that the section of the Constitution under consideration only authorizes the Governor to remove for specified causes. He is not authorized to exercise the power at his pleasure or his caprice. It is only when the causes named exist that the power conferred can be exercised. It follows as a necessary consequence that the fact must be determined before the removal can be made. It is also clear that the fact must be determined by some tribunal invested with judicial power, for a determination whether specified causes exist is the exercise of judicial functions. Judicial determination of facts must rest upon and be preceded by notice, proof and hearing. And the first question is, what is the proper tribunal in which such facts are to be ascertained? In my opinion this provision of the Constitution requires no legislation to make it effective. Read in the light of the history of the times, and the surrounding circumstances when it was adopted, the grant of power is to the Governor coupled with the duty enjoined to examine into the condition and administration of any public office, and to examine into the acts of any public officer, and to remove from office for gross neglect of duty, or for corrupt conduct in office, any of the officers specified. The amendment for this purpose clothes him with judicial power. It is implied in the grant and without it the grant would be nugatory and ineffectual to accomplish the purposes for which it was given.

The counsel for the respondent, while granting this, insist that such removal cannot be made without charges, notice and an opportunity for defense, and this I consider the important question in the case.

Unless it is the manifest intention of the section under consideration that the proceedings should be ex parte as well as summary, a removal without charges, notice and an opportunity for defense cannot be upheld. The exercise of such power, in such manner, would be too despotic for any attempt at vindication in a country which boasts of the utmost liberty compatible with the safety of the state, and is entirely opposed to the genius of our free institutions. I do not think the people, when they adopted this amendment, intended or supposed that they were placing such unlimited power in the hands of any man.

In Ramsay's Case, 18 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 190, it was said: "The Chancellor has authority to remove a judge of a county