tion, which could not be considered as extending to the inhabitants of Oxford who were not scholars. Regard is to be had to the nature of the incorporation; if it is a banking incorporation, for example, their by-laws must be. confined to the proper mode of conducting their affairs. Where the corporation has a local jurisdiction, their by-laws affect all who come within it; for example, the by-law of the city of London, that no citizen, freeman, or stranger should expose any broad-cloth to sale within the city before it should be brought to Blackwell Hall to be examined whether it were salable or not, was held binding upon strangers as well as citizens. 5 Co. 63.

So in Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 269, a by-law of the mayor and common council of the city of Exeter, that no person should slaughter beasts or keep swine within the walls of the city, was held good against the defendant, who was not free of the city, but only residing there. He was considered as an inhabitant pro hac vice. So where the corporation has jurisdiction over all of the same trade or profession within certain limits, as the College of Physicians has for seven miles round London; whose by-laws regulating the practice of physics are binding upon all within those limits.

The by-laws which are made by corporations having a local jurisdiction are to be observed and obeyed by all who come within it, in the same manner as aliens and strangers within the Commonwealth are bound to know and obey the laws of the land, notwithstanding they may not know the language in which they are written. They receive the benefits arising from the municipal arrangements, and are presumed to assent to them, upon the same principle which requires from them a temporary allegiance to the State for the protection it affords to them during their residence.

But it is contended that this by-law is void as it is in restraint of trade, and operates as a monopoly. Every regulation of trade is in some sense a restraint upon it; it is some clog or impediment, but it does not therefore follow that it is to be vacated. If the regulation is unreasonable, it is void; if necessary for the good government of the society, it is good.

The direction and opinion of the judge of the Municipal Court was entirely correct.

Unreasonable or Abusive Action.

CITY OF CHICAGO v. BROWN ET AL.

205 Ill. 568. 1903.

APPEAL from the County Court of Cook County.

BOGGS, J. The County Court of Cook County entered judgment refusing to confirm a special assessment levied to pay the cost of grading, paving with asphalt, and curbing Calumet Avenue from the south line of Thirty-first Street to the north line of Thirty-third Street, in the city of Chicago, and the city has appealed.

The proposed improvement covered but a distance of two blocks and one street intersection, viz., the intersection of Thirtysecond Street and Calumet Avenue. Thirty-second Street, including the intersection aforesaid, had within less than four years before been paved by the city with macadam, and the evidence, practically without contradiction, showed that the pavement at the street intersection was still in good condition. The view of the County Court was that the requirement of the ordinance that the macadam pavement laid in the intersection of Thirty-second Street and Calumet Avenue, which had been in place less than four years and was in good, serviceable condition, should at the expense of the property owners be torn up and replaced by a pavement of asphalt, was so unreasonable and oppressive as to justify the court to declare the ordinance to be void.

An ordinance adopted by a city under a grant of power from the General Assembly to legislate generally on a given subject, as was the ordinance here under consideration, if unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive, will be held invalid by the courts, and whether it is so unreasonable and unjust is a question for the decision of the court, in view of the existing circumstances and contemporaneous conditions. This rule has been frequently declared, and it is not questioned by counsel for the city. The power with which the court is vested to annul the action of the law-making body of a municipal corporation should, as is suggested by counsel for the city, be exercised only in clear and strong cases, but when such a case is presented it becomes the

duty of the court to act, and protect the citizen against arbitrary and oppressive ordinances. We agree with the County Court that the ordinance here under consideration should be regarded as inoperative. The macadam pavement of the intersection had been in place less than four years. It was in good condition and no reason for removing it appeared. To impose upon the owners of the property in these two blocks affected by the ordinance the burden of defraying the expense of tearing up and removing the macadam and of re-paving the intersection with asphalt cannot be defended against the insistence that it arbitrarily and unreasonably cast upon them unnecessary expense and operated unjustly upon them. The judgment is affirmed.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTRACTS AND IMPROVEMENTS.

Public Services.

CITY OF QUINCY v. BULL ET AL.

106 Ill. 337. 1883.

BILL in chancery to enjoin the city and its officers from interfering with the laying of water pipes by the complainants in streets of the city. A demurrer was overruled and an injunction granted. Appeal by the defendants.

According to the bill, in 1873 the city council by ordinance granted one Prince the exclusive right to construct, maintain, and operate water-works in the city for thirty years, and to sell water for municipal and private use, with the right of way in all streets and alleys for the laying of mains and services. Prince was required to construct water-works within a certain time, and to extend mains when ordered by the council; and the city was required to pay a certain rate per year for each fire hydrant. The ordinance specified that upon acceptance it should constitute a contract. Prince accepted the ordinance, and has complied with it; his co-complainants claim as assignees of parts of his interest.

In March, 1881, the council passed an ordinance repealing that of 1873, and later passed ordinances restricting digging in and obstructing the streets, under which ordinances the city officers are now interfering with complainants.

SHELDON, J. [The court held that the question whether the grant to Prince could be made exclusive was not involved in this suit.] The simple question involved here is, whether complainants, under the ordinance, have the right of way in the streets for the purpose of laying water pipes under the surface, to supply the city and inhabitants of Quincy with water, and for the purpose of repairing their pipes laid.

The ordinance of August 7, 1873, and the acceptance of it by Prince, constituted a contract between him and the city of Quincy, by which there was granted the right of way which is claimed. The power of the city to make such a grant seems quite clear. It may be derived from the exclusive control of its streets given to the city by its charter, section 33 of which is as follows: "The city council shall have exclusive power over the streets and alleys, and may abate any and all obstructions and encroachments therein in such manner as may be provided by ordinance." (Private Laws 1857, p. 170.) In this State there is vested in municipal corporations a fee simple title to the streets. Under the power of exclusive control over streets, it is very well settled by decisions of this court that the municipal authorities may do anything with, or allow any use of, streets, which is not incompatible with the ends for which streets are established, and that it is a legitimate use of a street to allow a railroad track to be laid down in it. Moses v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, and Chicago R. R. Co., 21 Ill. 522; Murphy v. Chicago, 29 id. 279; Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Elgin, 91 id. 251. The laying of water pipes under ground would be much less of an obstruction and interference with the ordinary purposes of a street than the laying and maintaining of a railroad track upon its surface. It is the general doctrine that municipalities, under the power of exclusive control over their streets, may allow any use of them consistent with the public objects for which they are held, and that uses for the purpose of sewers, gas pipes, and water pipes are among those for which the use of streets may be granted. 2 Dill., Mun. Corp. (2d ed.), §§ 544, 551, and authorities there cited.

By section 22 of its charter the city is further empowered "to provide the city with water, to erect hydrants and pumps in the street for the convenience of the inhabitants." Private Laws 1857, p. 181. By implication from this express power to supply the city with water, the power to grant the use of the streets, as was done in the ordinance of August 7, 1873, existed in the city council of Quincy.

In 2 Dill., Mun. Corp. (2d ed.), § 551, it is laid down: "The use of streets for the purpose of laying down water pipes, stands upon the same principle as their use for sewers and gas pipes. Where the charter gives to the city, in terms, the power to sup