troublesome and dangerous. It has always been held that it is not incumbent on carriers to assume the burden and risks of such carriage.

The trains were not to be run at the option of the defendant, but had short routes and special stoppages, and were to be run on some part of the road chiefly during the night. They were to wait over for exhibitions, and the times were fixed with reference to these exhibitions and not to suit the defendant's convenience. There was also a divided authority, so that while defendant's men were to attend to the moving of the trains, they had nothing to do with loading and unloading cars, and had no right of access or regulation in the cars themselves.

It cannot be claimed on any legal principle that plaintiff could, as a matter of right, call upon defendant to move his trains under such circumstances and on such conditions, and if he could not, then he could only do so on such terms as defendant saw fit to accept.

CHAPTER VI.

REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT.

Conditions Upon Acceptance.

PLATT v. LECOCQ.

158 Fed. 723. 1907.

SANBORN, C. J. There is another consideration which leads to the same conclusion. Courts and commissions ought not to interfere with the established rules and practice of transportation companies on account of incidental inconveniences and trivial troubles to which the conduct of all business is necessarily subject. The business of railroad companies and express companies cannot be conducted for the purpose of carrying on the business of their customers exclusively, nor without some discomforts and inconveniences to all parties engaged in any of these occupations. Unless a clear injustice is perpetrated or a substantial injury is inflicted, or there is an imminent threat of them, the annoyances and inconveniences in the transaction of the business of the transportation companies should be left for correction in the pecuniary interests and business instincts of the respective parties concerned, and their laudable anxiety to secure, retain, and increase their business. No injustice has been perpetrated in this case. No serious damage has been, or is likely to be, inflicted upon the bank by the refusal of the express company to receive money until the morning of the day when the trains depart, in view of the pregnant fact that it has elected to cause its incoming currency to be shipped to it by mail for more than a year, and to the amounts of hundreds of thousands of dollars, when it could have caused it to have been sent by this express company. No other shipper is complaining, and the practice of the express company creates no preference or prejudice to party, locality, or description of traffic, while the practice

which the bank seeks to enforce will inevitably compel other parties and other descriptions of traffic to bear a part of the burden of storing and keeping overnight the moneys it seeks to send out. There is no equity in this case of the bank, and it is entitled to no relief. Reversed.

Times Established for Service.

PHILLIPS v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.

124 N. C. 123, 32 S. E. 388. 1899.

FURCHES, J. It was in evidence, and not disputed, that the rules of defendant company required the waiting-room to be closed after the departure of defendant's train, and to remain closed until thirty minutes before the departure of its next train; that, under this rule of the defendant, it was time to close the waiting-room when the plaintiff was ordered to leave the room, and he was informed that it would not be opened again until thirty minutes before the departure of defendant's next train at 1:20 o'clock of the next morning.

So the only question remains is as to whether the defendant had the right to establish the rule for closing the waitingroom, and was the rule a reasonable one? And we are of the opinion that the defendant had the right to establish the rule and that it was a reasonable one. Webster v. Fitchburg R. Co., 161 Mass. 298; 34 At. Rep. 157; 1 Elliott on Railroads, §§ 199 and 200; 4 Elliott on Railroads, § 1579.

The case would probably be different in the case of through passengers, and in the case of delayed trains; but if so, these would be exceptions and not the rule.

Waiting-rooms are not a part of the ordinary duties pertaining to the rights of passengers and common carriers. But they are established by carriers as ancillaries to the business of carriers and for the accommodation of passengers, and not as a place of lodging and accommodation for those who are not passengers. This being so, it must be that the carrier should have a reasonable control over the same, or it could not protect its passengers in said rooms. There is error. New trial.

Limitations Upon Other Services.

GARDNER v. PROVIDENCE TELEPHONE CO.

23 R. I. 312, 50 Atl. 1014. 1901.

Decision in Gardner v. Providence Telephone Co. affirmed.

PER CURIAM. The evidence shows, as stated by the complainant, that the defendant refuses to furnish a long-distance extension set in connection with a grounded telephone circuit. The evidence does not convince a majority of the court that such a combination can be made generally without impairment of the service. The uniform practice of the company is against this contention. The company offers to annex to the complainant's grounded circuit, for a reasonable price, such an extension set as is appropriate for the circuit, and which it contends will give satisfactory service. This is all that the complainant can demand. He is in default in not requesting the company to provide what it says it is willing to give him, and in insisting on the exact form of apparatus which he has installed.

It is for the company, not for the subscriber, to determine the type of apparatus it shall use, and there is no evidence that the type it offers is inadequate. These points were fully considered by the court upon the former hearing, as a careful examination of the opinion will show. It may further be observed that in this case there is no evidence that the defendant's charge for a metallic circuit combined with a longdistance set is exorbitant. The well-known superiority of a metallic circuit to a grounded one in all essential features, and the greater cost of construction, make it reasonable to charge more for the use of the metallic circuit than for the other.

The question of price is not strictly before the court, for the complainant does not desire this kind of service, and the defendant will not tolerate the combination which the complainant has made at any price.

The motion for reargument is denied.

Present: Stiness, C. J., Tillinghast and Douglas, JJ.

Regulation Relating to Prepayment.

FUNDERBURG v. AUGUSTA & AIKEN RAILWAY COMPANY.

81 S. C. 141, 61 S. E. 1075. 1908.

WILLIAMS, J. The circuit court has found in this case that "a tender of $5 to pay a 5 cent fare would be disproportionate to the amount of the fare, and that, under a proper rule on the part of the carrier upon the subject, in existence and actually enforced, the carrier could not be forced to furnish change for so large an amount. He, however, held that such rule had not been brought to the notice of the traveling public, and had been habitually disregarded and waived. This shows that the circuit court would have regarded as unreasonable the tender to the defendant railroad of $5 for a 5 cent fare, had it been admitted that defendant had promulgated a rule to that effect, and had not waived it. There is, therefore, no finding below that the rule is unreasonable, and indeed there is no fact appearing in the record to suggest a doubt of its reasonableness. The difficulty of making change in the cotton picking season in South Carolina is a well-known fact, and the court takes notice of the territory and the thick population and the numerous mill towns along the route between Augusta and Aiken, which render it probable that numerous fares will be collected on the defendant electric railway between these points on a single trip. To require defendant to furnish change for every bill presented would be unreasonable.

Judgment for the defendant.

Excess Charge for Cash Fare.

FORSEE v. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD.

63 Miss. 66. 1885.

TERRAL, J. It is competent for a railroad corporation to adopt reasonable rules for the conduct of its business, and to determine and fix, within the limits specified in its charter and existing laws, the fare to be paid by passengers transported on its trains. It may, in the exercise of this right, make