that the wrongdoer is endowed with all the attributes of sovereignty, and therefore as to injuries by it done to others in the assumed sovereign character, courts are unable to administer justice by affording redress for the wrong inflicted.

"The practical destruction of a uniform maritime law, which must arise from this premise, is made manifest when it is considered that if it be true that the principles of the general maritime law giving relief for every character of maritime tort where the wrongdoer is subject to the jurisdiction of admiralty courts can be overthrown by conflicting decisions of state courts, it would follow that there would be no general maritime law for the redress of wrongs, as such law would be necessarily one thing in one state and one in another; one thing in one port of the United States and a different thing in some other port. As the power to change state laws or state decisions rests with the state authorities by which such laws are enacted or decisions rendered, it would come to pass that the maritime law affording relief for wrongs done, instead of being general and ever abiding, would be purely local-would be one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow. That the confusion resulting would amount to the abrogation of a uniform maritime law is at once patent. And the principle by which the maritime law would be thus in part practically destroyed would besides apply to other subjects specially confided by the Constitution to the federal government. Thus, if the local law may control the maritime law, it must also govern in the decision of cases arising under the patent, copyright, and commerce clauses of the Constitution. It would result that a municipal corporation, in the exercise of administrative powers which the state law determines to be governmental, could with impunity violate the

patent and copyright laws of the United States or the regulations enacted by Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution, such as those concerning the enrollment and licensing of vessels. This follows if a corporation must, for a wrong by it done, be allowed to escape all reparation upon the theory that, though ordinarily liable to sue and be sued, it possessed in the particular matter the freedom from suit which attaches to a sovereign state."

CHAPTER XI.

CONTROL OF COURTS OVER PUBLIC OFFICERS.

87. Power to nullify acts of legislatures.-Though the courts will not enjoin the passing of a statute or ordinance, they will, if it is beyond the power of the legislative body to pass such a law, nullify it by declaring it unconstitutional. The exercise of this power by the courts is very familiar and it is needless to attempt an exhaustive list of examples of its exercise. The classic case is that of Marbury v. Madison,78 which is a case of the exercise of its power by the Supreme Court to nullify an act of Congress. In City of Clinton v. Phillips," the Supreme Court of Illinois set aside an ordinance of the city of Clinton requiring druggists to make quarterly reports of their sales of spirituous liquors, giving the kinds and quantities sold and to whom sold. It was declared unconstitutional as "it is an invasion of the sanctity of private business, and ought not to be tolerated."

Also the Supreme Court of California, in the Matter of Ah You,80 set aside an ordinance of the city of San Francisco imposing a maximum fine of $1,000 or six months' imprisonment, or both, for visiting a house of ill-fame. The reasonableness of the ordinance was brought before the court on a petition for

78 1 Cranch 137 (U. S.).

79 58 Ill. 102.

80 88 Cal. 99.

a writ of habeas corpus. The court says: "The act of which the petitioner was convicted is not enumerated among the crimes which are defined in the Penal Code, but is made an offense solely by virtue of the ordinance. The legislature has not deemed it necessary to prescribe any punishment therefor, and from the statutes which it has adopted upon kindred topics, the penalty allowed by the ordinance in question must be held to be not in harmony with its general policy. We are of the opinion that so much of the ordinance in question as permits a fine of one thousand dollars to be imposed as the penalty for visiting a house of ill-fame is unreasonable, and not in harmony with the laws of the state, and therefore void. The petitioner must therefore be discharged from custody."

88. Courts will not enjoin passing of an ordinance. The court will not, as stated, enjoin the passing of an ordinance; for the mere act of passing an ordinance does not render the danger to anyone sufficiently imminent to warrant the intervention of the court, as the passage of an ordinance does not necessarily mean its enforcement. Until there is an attempt to enforce the will of the legislative body, life, liberty, or property are not placed in sufficient danger to call for the intervention of any extraordinary remedy. The legislative branch may furnish the remedy by repealing the law, or the executive branch by doing nothing, either of which is simpler than the remedy of the court. As said by the court in Harrison et al. v. City of New Orleans:81 "The

81 33 La. Ann. 222.

mere voting on or passing the ordinance in question cannot per se do the plaintiff any possible injury. It will be time enough to complain, if it be a subject for complaint, when steps are taken or a beginning made to put the ordinance into actual execution.'

89. Courts slow to enjoin collection of a tax.— The courts are also slow to enjoin the collection of a tax and will not do so unless there are circumstances which bring it within equity jurisdiction. They recognize the fact that the state must have revenue in order to perform the functions of government, and will not, except in an extreme case, throw impediments in the way of its collection. As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Dows v. Chicago: "It is upon taxation that the several states chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the publié. No court of equity will, therefore, allow its injunction to issue to restrain their action, except where it may be necessary to protect the rights of the citizen whose property is taxed, and he has no adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law. It must appear that the enforcement of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or produce irreparable injury, or where the property is real estate, throw a cloud upon the title of the complain