Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

32. Service asked at proper time.—The rule of the early cases was that a carrier could not be compelled to receive goods until it was ready to set out, even if it happened that it had storage facilities. In modern times, however, it is usually held necessary for the railroads, at least, to provide facilities for receiving goods in advance of the departure of their freight trains.89

This obligation to receive goods in advance is only for a reasonable period; it still remains true that the carrier is not a warehouseman by profession. To state a close point, there are conflicting decisions as to whether an express company may enforce a rule that money will not be received on any day after the departure of the trains carrying express matter, the question being whether the company need be prepared to protect currency in the local office over night. On the other hand, the carrier by rail may require that freight be delivered to it at a time sufficiently prior to the departure of its trains to enable it to make preparations for shipments.91 No person desiring to become a passenger upon a train may rightfully demand a delay of one minute to enable him to reach the train and get on board." It is of course very common to find in the conduct of a public service time-tables made which will govern the course of the service; and in public employments generally office hours are established to which public service is limited. In all dealings with public service companies, these time-tables govern and these office hours must be observed, provided they are just and reasonable, and give the community a sufficient service for the business which it provides.

89 St. Louis I. M. & So. Ry. Co. v. State, 84 Ark. 150.
80 Alsop v. Southern Exp. Co., 104 N. C. 278, 10 S. E. 297.

91 Frazier & Cooper v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 48 Ia. 571, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

92 Pickett v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 S. C. 445, 48 S. E. 466.

33. Service demanded at proper place.—A carrier is not liable for refusing to take goods unless they have been actually tendered, or at least unless they are in the process of being tendered.93 Usually the place which the carrier has designated in the particular instance must be resorted to, as where a carrier gave orders that coal should only be received at a certain siding.94 It should be added that as the carrier may make regulations with regard to its performance of its obligations, it may refuse to take goods except at the stations which it has established. Those who have goods in readiness for transportation must notify the carrier of their desire to have their goods transported before it will be in default for not taking them. It would be going to an extreme to hold, as some cases do, that a deposit in the regular place for receiving goods followed by notice to the carrier is enough to make the carrier responsible as such, without proof of a special custom to that effect. In the case of

passenger carriers, however, it is not uncommon to provide for the giving of a signal by the intending passenger.95 As street railways are usually operated they owe a duty to the public to stop at 93 Little Rock & F. S. Ry. Co. v. Conatser, 61 Ark. 560, 33 S. W. 1057.

84 Georgia Southern Ry. Co. v. Marshman, 121 Ga. 235, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

95 Southern Ry. Co. y, Wallis, 133 Ga. 553, 66 S. E. 370.

96

their regular crossings on a seasonable signal, given in any intelligible way.”

34. Application in proper form.—Before being obliged to install its service a supplying company may require the applicant to make a regular application in such form as the company may prescribe.97 This will be required to be in writing almost invariably, so as to have certainty as to the requirements; and the application must be made with sufficient particularity.98 The company may not, however, require the applicant to subscribe to unreasonable regulations, such as that there shall be access to the premises at all hours, nor to illegal stipulations, such as that the company shall not be liable for defects in the service. It is not enough to tender a message to a telegraph company with a request for its transmission, although of course one must show this at least. One will be met by the usual requirement by telegraph companies that all messages tendered to them for transmission shall be in writing upon their own blanks, which are invariably provided for the purpose, unless this requirement has been customarily waived.

35. Service demanded in proper manner.—That a carrier may refuse to receive goods for carriage unless they are properly packed, is clear enough. Thus an express company need not receive furniture

1

96 Karr v. Milwaukee L. H. & T. Co., 132 Wis. 662, 113 N. W. 62. 97 Shiras v. Ewing, 48 Kans. 170, 29 Pac. 320.

98 Bennett v. Eastchester Gas Light Co., 54 N. Y. App. Div. 74, 66 N. Y. Supp. 292.

99 Dittmar v. City of New Braunfels, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 293, 48 8. W. 1114.

1 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dozier, 67 Miss. 288, 7 So. 325, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

not crated or money not sealed.? But the requirements of the carrier as to packing must be reasonable; it may not reject a package on this ground if it is in fact reasonably safe for shipment. In general the loading and unloading of goods are under the carrier's control, and it is responsible for any injury incident thereto. Primarily it is the carrier's business to load its vehicles. A railroad may not usually require a shipper to put his goods upon the cars himself. If the shipper assumes the responsibility of loading and unloading, the carrier is thereby relieved from liability for loss in that connection unless the improper loading should have been apparent to the carrier's servant from ordinary observation, when the carrier will be liable. There are special kinds of freight which require special tender. If one wants his coal carried in bulk, he should provide facilities for loading the cars himself. And in service at private switches the shipper may justly be compelled to accept the responsibility therefor.

36. Reasonable conditions may be imposed.The general principle must be taken as established that the carrier is entitled to establish and promulgate reasonable rules and regulations governing the manner and form in which it will receive such articles of commerce as it is bound to carry, so that they may be handled with convenience; and it follows as a corollary to such authority that the carrier has also the power to modify such rules from time to time, as it may deem expedient. On the other hand, improper conditions may not be imposed even by regulation, since a common carrier is under obligation to accept within reasonable limits all ordinary goods which may be tendered to it for carriage at reasonable times, for which it has accommodation; and the carrier may not generally discriminate between persons who tender freight and exclude a particular class of customers. In household service where individual installation is necessarily required, it is the obligation of a supplying company to bring the supply to the premises of the applicant. The company, therefore, must itself provide all the facilities requisite to the performance of its service, and any attempt to defeat this obligation by imposing conditions will fail.'

2 Cohn v. Platt, 48 N. Y. Misc. 378, 98 N. Y. Supp. 535. 3 Elgin J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Bates Machine Co., 200 III. 636, 66 N. E. 326. 4 London & L. F. Ins. Co. v. Rome W. & O. R. R., 144 N. Y. 200. 6 Miltimore v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 37 Wis. 190.

37. Prepayment a universal condition.—Of the right to demand payment þefore undertaking the service requested, there can be no doubt. The carrier of goods may in all cases insist upon

the

payment of its charges when the goods are tendered to it. Even if it is a connecting carrier to which the goods are brought by the initial carrier, with the idea that the consignee shall ultimately pay, it may insist. So the carrier of passengers may make it a condition of accepting a passenger for carriage

6 Harp v. Choctaw O. & G. R. R. Co., 125 Fed. 445.
7 United States ex rel. v. Oregon y. & Nav. Co., 159 Fed. 975.
8 Franke v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 88 Ky. 467, 11 S. W. 432.

9 Snell v. Clinton Electric Light, Heat & Power Co., 196 III. 626, 63 N. E. 1082, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

10 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88.

« ZurückWeiter »