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carry one whose ostensible business might be to injure the line, one fleeing from justice, one going upon the train to assault a passenger, commit larceny or robbery, or any crime, as was said in one case where the issue was whether it was bound to carry persons who were traveling for the purpose of gambling. A confederate officer going to rejoin his command could have been refused passage by a railroad within the union lines.68 And a telegraph company could refuse to transmit a forged message knowing it to be such. The explanation of these decisions is clear enough. One may always refuse to involve himself in a crime.

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109. Promotion of immoral business.-There are several cases involving prostitution which test these principles. In none of them is the general problem so well worked out as in a recent case where a telephone company refused to give further service to a bawdy-house.70 A court will not compel a water company to furnish water, or a light company to supply light, to a house used for carrying on an illegal business. The courts will enjoin or abatenot aid-a public nuisance. Similarly a telephone company may not be compelled to keep an instrument in a pool room to be used as an adjunct to a gaming house." Nor is a telegraph company compelled

67 Thurston v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 4 Dill. 321 (U. S.).

GS Turner v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 63 N. C. 522.

69 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Totten, 141 Fed. 533.

70 Godwin v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 136 N. C. 258, 48 S. E. 636, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

71 Cullen v. New York Tel. Co., 106 N. Y. App. Div. 250, 94 N. Y. Supp.

290.

to furnish service to a bucket shop run in defiance of law.72 And it seems that, where dealing in market futures is not made criminal although held against public policy, the telegraph company may refuse service.73 It is also probable that reasonable suspicion of the impropriety of the business is sufficient to make out the excuse in these cases.

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110. Service involving special danger.-For the protection of those being served, as well as for the protection of the public servant's own interests, a violent, unruly applicant, or one so drunken or insane as to endanger person or property, may be rejected at the outset, or ejected afterwards. Thus one passenger who is attacking another may be ejected by the carrier-principally of course for the protection of the others then receiving service. But even if no guests should happen to be present, for his own protection the innkeeper may refuse to take in one who has attempted to break down his door.75 If the danger or inconvenience to the carrier or its patrons seems reasonably imminent, although not absolutely certain, there would seem to be sufficient ground to justify the carrier in refusing to perform the service asked. The justification is made out if the carrier has reasonable cause to suppose, and did suppose, that the safety or convenience of other passengers would be endangered by the person in question; and it is not necessary to wait to see if the

72 Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 25 Sup. Ct. 637.

73 Gist v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 45 S. C. 344, 23 S. E. 143. 74 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Logan, 88 Ky. 232, 10 S. W. 655.

75 Goodenow v. Travis, 3 Johns. 427 (N. Y.).

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person believed with reason to be dangerous, is actually so. On the same principles a carrier may refuse an armed man admission to its vehicle, the peculiar danger to other passengers being obvious enough."

111. Protection from diseased persons.-For the protection of all concerned with the service the right is obvious also to exclude from association with others those having a contagious disease.78 Moreover, a person in such a critical condition that her physicians cannot answer for her life may not insist upon transportation, even if accompanied by an attendant.79 Where a guest is taken ill at a hotel the proprietor, after notifying the sick guest to leave, has the right to remove such guest in a careful and becoming manner, and at an appropriate time to some hospital or other place of safety, provided the life of the guest be not imperiled thereby.80 This reasoning was followed in a recent case where it was held that a sleeping car company might under proper conditions exclude passengers apparently suffering from contagious disease from its cars, to avoid the danger they might cause to other passengers.s It has already been seen that the carrier owes the duty to take all reasonable steps to protect those in its charge from dangers threatening them. If the law imposes this duty upon the carrier, it should justify

76 Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221 (U. S.).

77 Flint v. Norwich & N. Y. Transportation Co., 6 Blatch. 158 (U. S.). 78 Paddock v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 37 Fed. 841.

79 Connors v Cunard S. S. Co., 204 Mass. 310, 90 N. E. 601.

80 McHugh v. Schlosser, 159 Pa. St. 480, 28 Atl. 291.

81 Pullman Co. v. Krauss, 145 Ala. 395, 40 So. 398, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

it in any steps which it feels reasonably called upon to take to protect its passengers from what seems to be a danger to them.

112. Persons under physical disability.-The aged and crippled may not be refused service, although some special care must be taken of them. The right of passenger carriage is not confined to persons who are vigorous and sound, but is open to those ailing and infirm.82 Blind persons and paralyzed people, small children and helpless people, may not expect to journey as others travel.83 Persons who might be refused if presenting themselves unaccompanied, may insist upon being carried when they do not ask special attention, being accompanied by attendants of their own, unless even with such attendants they would be an extraordinary care to the carrier. But it should be added that, if persons who are apparently incapable are given to understand that they will be helped through, peculiar care must be exercised by those having them in charge to see that their safety is not imperiled, although service involving such peculiar liabilities need not have been undertaken.85 Moreover, if one is stricken while upon a journey the carrier must care for him until he can be turned over to other aid, as emergencies create special obligations.

113. General conditions justifying suspension.There are many situations in which it is justifiable

82 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Mathew, 199 U. S. 605, 26 Sup. Ct. 752.

83 Zachery v. Mobile & O. R. R. Co., 75 Miss. 746, 23 So. 434, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

84 Southern Ry. Company v. Mitchell, 98 Tenn. 27, 40 S. W. 72.

85 Anderson v. Atlantic C. L. Co., 77 S. E. 402 (N. C.).

to suspend service in whole or in part. These will be discussed later in dealing with the obligation to have facilities at hand to carry through properly a particular service after it has been undertaken. But it is obvious that the same considerations will justify a refusal to accept new applications for service during the period, as when the company seeks to be excused for not completing in regular course the business already on hand. Without going far into the matter as to the various circumstances which may make suspension permissible, it is enough to point out here that when the management has done the best that could be expected of it under the conditions at the time, it has done all that the law requires. But in the absence of the existence of an exceptional cause, such as the act of God, the public enemy, unavoidable accident or unanticipated inrush of business, which will prevent the performance of its common-law duty to shippers, a common carrier has no right to refuse to receive and transport property offered for shipment.86 It will be seen that these general considerations apply to service in general; and therein this general justification (impersonal in its application) differs from the particular excuse (personal in its character) which has just been under discussion.87

114. Refusal to receive because of strike. Since the carrier undertakes to carry, and to provide servants as well as vehicles for the purpose, it is

86 This is virtually a quotation from Knight v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. R. Co., 120 Mo. App. 311.

87 See also the various instances of justification enumerated in Houston & T. C. R. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 329, 26 Sup. Ct. 491.