in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there are peculiar dangers arising from personal emulation, or personal animosity; from superior talents on one side, encountering strong jealousies on the other; from pride of opinion on one side, and weak devotion to popular prejudices on the other; from the vanity of being the author of a plan, or resentment from some imagined slight by the approval of that of another. From these, and other causes of the like nature, the most bitter rivalries and dissensions often spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. The wisest measures are thus often defeated, or delayed, even in the most critical moments. And what constitutes even a greater evil, the community often becomes split up into rival factions, adhering to the different persons, who compose the magistracy; and temporary animosities become thus the foundation of permanent calamities to the state. Indeed, the ruinous effects of rival factions in free states, struggling for power, have been the constant theme of reproach by the admirers of monarchy, and of regret by the lovers of republics. The Guelphs and the Ghibelins, the white and the black factions, have been immortalized in the history of the Italian states; and they are but an epitome of the same unvarying scenes in all other republics.

§ 728. Objections of a like nature apply, though in some respects with diminished force, to the scheme of an executive council, whose constitutional concurrence is rendered indispensable. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and enervate the whole public councils. And even without such a cabal, the mere diversity of views and opinions would almost

always mark the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness, or a degrading inconsistency. But an objection, in a republican government quite as weighty, is, that such a participation in the executive power has a direct tendency to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds, to censure, and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective government. Men in public trust will more often act in such a manner, as to render themselves unworthy of public favour, than to render themselves liable to legal punishment. But the multiplication of voices in the business of the executive renders it difficult to fix responsibility of either kind; for it is perpetually shifted from one to another. It often becomes impossible amidst mutual accusations to determine, upon whom the blame ought to rest. A sense of mutual impropriety sometimes induces the parties to resort to plausible pretexts to disguise their misconduct; or a dread of public responsibility to cover up, under the lead of some popular demagogue, their own faults and vacillations.Thus, a council often becomes the means, either of shifting off all effective responsibility from the chief magistrate, or of intrigues and oppositions, which destroy his power, and supplant his influence.

§ 729. The proper conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is, that plurality in the executive deprives the people of the two greatest securities for the faithful exercise of delegated power. First, it removes the just restraints of public opinion; and, secondly, it diminishes the means, as well as the power, of fixing responsibility for bad measures upon the real authors.

§730. The question as to the unity of the executive being disposed of, the next consideration is, as to

the proper duration of his term of office. It has been already mentioned, that duration in office constitutes an essential requisite to the energy of the executive department. This has relation to two objects; first, the personal firmness of the chief magistrate in the employment of his constitutional powers; and, secondly, the stability of the system of administration, which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it is evident, that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. A man will naturally be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure, by which he holds it. He will be less attached to what he holds by a momentary, or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a title durable, or certain; and of course he will be willing to risk more for the one, than for the other. This remark is not less applicable to political privilege, or honour, or trust, than to any article of ordinary property. A chief magistrate, acting under the consciousness, that in a very short time he must lay down office, will be apt to feel himself too little interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity from an independent exercise of his powers, or from those ill humours, which are apt at times to prevail in all governments. If the case should be, that he might, notwithstanding, be re-eligible, his wishes, if he should have any for office, would combine with his fears to debase his fortitude, or weaken his integrity, or enhance his irresolution.

§ 731. The other ground, that of stability in the system of administration, is still more strikingly connected with duration in office. Few men will be found willing to commit themselves to a course of policy, whose wis

dom may be perfectly clear to themselves, if they cannot be permitted to complete, what they have begun. Of what consequence will it be to form the best plans of executive administration, if they are perpetually passing into new hands, before they are matured, or may be defeated at the moment, when their reasonableness and their value cannot be understood, or realized by the public? One of the truest rewards to patriots and statesmen is the consciousness, that the objections raised against their measures will disappear upon a fair trial; and that the gratitude and affection of the people will follow their labours, long after they have ceased to be actors upon the public scenes. But who will plant, when he can never reap? Who will sacrifice his present ease, and reputation, and popularity, and encounter obloquy and persecution, for systems, which he can neither mould so, as to ensure success, nor direct so, as to justify the experiment?

§732. The natural result of a change of the head of the government will be a change in the course of administration, as well as a change in the subordinate persons, who are to act as ministers to the executive. A successor in office will feel little sympathy with the plans of his predecessor. To undo, what has been done by the latter, will be supposed to give proofs of his own capacity; and will recommend him to all those, who were adversaries of the past administration; and perhaps will constitute the main grounds of elevating him to office. Personal pride, party principles, and an ambition for public distinction will thus naturally prompt him to an abandonment of old schemes, and combine with that love of novelty so congenial to all free states, to make every new administration the founders of new systems of government.

733. It is observable, that the period actually fixed is intermediate between the term of office of the senate, and that of the house of representatives. In the course of one presidential term, the house is, or may be, twice re-composed; and two-thirds of the senate changed, or re-elected. So far, as executive influence can be presumed to operate upon either branch of the legislature unfavourably to the rights of the people, the latter possess, in their elective franchise, ample means of redress. On the other hand, so far, as uniformity and stability in the administration of executive duties are desirable, they are in some measure secured by the more permanent tenure of office of the senate, which will check too hasty a departure from the old system, by a change of the executive, or representative branch of the government.

§ 734. Hitherto our experience has demonstrated, that the period is not found practically so long, as to create danger to the people, or so short, as to take away a reasonable independence and energy from the executive. Still it cannot be disguised, that sufficient time has scarcely yet elapsed to enable us to pronounce a decisive opinion upon the subject; since the executive has generally acted with a majority of the nation; and in critical times he has been sustained by the force of that majority in strong measures, and in times of more tranquillity, by the general moderation of the policy of his administration.

§ 735. Another question, connected with the duration of office of the president, was much agitated in the convention, and has often since been a topic of serious discussion; and that is, whether he should be re-eligible to office. In support of the opinion, that the president ought to be ineligible after one period of office, it