SECTION V.

On the Argument of Hume as affected

by Matters of Fact.

It is a very important axiom of the schoolmen in this case-that, à posse ad esse non valet consequentia, you can draw no inference from the possibility of a thing to its reality, but that, in the reverse order, ab esse ad posse, the inference is inevitable: if it is, or if it ever has been-then of necessity it can be. Hume himself would have admitted, that the proof of any one miracle, beyond all possibility of doubt, at once lowered the — of his argument (i. e. the value of the resistance to our faith) so as to affect the whole force of that argument, as applying to all other miracles whatever having a rational and an adequate purpose. Now it happens that we have two cases of miracles which can be urged in this view: one à posteriori, derived from our historical experience, and the other à priori. We will take them separately.

1. The à priori miracle we call such-not (as the unphilosophic may suppose) because it occurred previously to our own period, or from any consideration of time whatever, but in the logical meaning, as having been derived from our reason in opposition to our experience. This order of miracle it is manifest that Hume overlooked altogether, because he says expressly that we have nothing to appeal to in this dispute except our human experience. But it happens that we have; and precisely where the possibilities of experience desert us. We know nothing through experience (whether physical or historical) of what preceded or accompanied the first introduction of man upon this earth. But, in the absence of all experience, our reason informs us that he must have been introduced by a supernatural agency. Thus far we are sure. For the sole alternative is one which would be equally mysterious, and besides, contradictory to the marks of change-of transition-and of perishableness in our planet itself,-viz. the hypothesis of an eternal unoriginated race: and that is more confounding to the human intellect than any miracle whatever: so that, even tried merely as one probability against another, the miracle would have the advantage. The miracle supposes a supersensual

VOL. XLVI. NO, CCLXXXV.

state of nature.

and transcendent cause. The opposite hypothesis supposes effects without any cause. In short, upon any hypocompelled to suppose a miraculous thesis, we are driven to suppose-and state as introductory to the earliest might form itself by mechanical laws The planet, indeed, of motion, repulsion, attraction, and central forces. But man could not. Life could not. Organization, even animal organization, might perhaps be But life could not. explained out of mechanical causes. Life is itself a great miracle. formed by mechanic agency; still the Suppose the nostrils breath of life could not enter them without a supernatural force. And à fortiori, man, with his intellectual and moral capacities, could not arise upon this planet without a higher agency than any lodged in that nature which is the object of our present experience. This kind of miracle, as deduced by our reason, and not witnessed experimentally, or drawn from any past records, we call an à priori miracle.

2. But there is another kind of miracle, which Hume ought not to have overlooked, but which he has, however, overlooked: he himself observes, very justly, that prophecy is a distinct species of the miraculous; and, no doubt, he neglected the Scriptural Prophecies, as supposing them all of doubtful interpretation, or believing with Porphyry, that such as are not doubtful, must have been posterior to the event which they point to. It happens, however, that there are some prophecies which cannot be evaded or

refused," some to which neither objection will apply. One, we will here cite, by way of example:-The prophecy of Isaiah, describing the desolation of Babylon, was delivered about seven centuries before Christ. A century or so after Christ, comes Porphyry, and insinuates, that all the prophecies alike might be comparatively recent forgeries! Well, for a moment suppose it: but, at least, they existed in the days of Porphyry. Now, it happens, that more than two centuries after Porphyry, we have good evidence, as to Babylon, that it had not yet reached the stage of utter desolation predicted by Isaiah. Four centuries after Christ, we learn from a Father of the Christian Church, who had good personal information as to

G

Atheism. He supposes it binding on a Theist. Now a Theist, in starting from the idea of God, grants, of necessity, the plenary power of miracles far greater and more awful than man could even comprehend. All he wants is a sufficient motive for such transcendant agencies; but this is supplied in excess (as regards what we have called the constituent miracles of Christianity) by the case of a reli gion that was to revolutionize the moral nature of man. The moral nature the kingdom of the will-is essentially opposed to the kingdom of nature even by the confession of irreligious philosophers; and, therefore, being itself a supersensual field, it seems more reasonably adapted to agencies supernatural than such as are natural.

GENERAL RECAPITULATION.

In Hume's argument, which expresses the resistance to credibility in a miracle, is valued as of necessity equal to the very maximum or ideal of human testimony; which, under the very best circumstances, might be equal to +2, in no case more, and in all known cases less. We, on the other hand, have endeavoured to show

1. That, because Hume contemplates only the case of a single wit ness, it will happen that the case Beta [of Sect. II.] where a multitude of witnesses exist, may greatly exceed +; and with a sufficient multitude must exceed x.

2. That in the case of internal miracles-operations of divine agency within the mind and conscience of the individual-Hume's argument is necessarily set aside: the evidence, the +x, is perfect for the individual, and the miraculous agency is meant for him only.

3. That, in the case of one primary miracle, viz., the first origination of man on this planet, the evidence greatly transcends: because here it is an

evidence not derived from experience at all, but from the reflecting reason: and the miracle has the same advantage over facts of experience, that a mathematical truth has over the truths which rest on induction. It is the difference between must be and is-between the inevitable and the merely actual.

4. That, in the case of another order of miracles, viz., prophecies, Hume's argument is again overruled; because the +x in this case, the affirmative evidence, is not derived from human testimony. Some prophecies are obscure; they may be fulfilled possibly without men's being aware of the fulfilment. But others, as that about the fate of Babylon-about the fate of the Arabs (the children of Ishmael) -about the fate of the Jews-are not of a nature to be misunderstood; and the evidence which attends them is not alien, but is intrinsic, and developed by themselves in successive stages from age to age.

5. That, because the primary miracle in No. 3 argues at least a power competent to the working of a miracle, for any after miracle we have only to seek a sufficient motive. Now, the ob jects of the Christian revelation were equal at the least to those of the original creation. In fact, Christianity may be considered as a second creation; and the justifying cause for the constituent miracles of Christianity is even to us as apparent as any which could have operated at the primary creation, The epigenesis was, at least, as grand an occasion as the genesis. Indeed, it is evident, for example, that Christianity itself could not have existed without the constituent miracle of the Resurrection; because without that there would have been no conquest over death. And here, as in No. 3, + is derived-not from any experience, and therefore cannot be controlled by that sort of hostile experience which Hume's argument relies on; but is derived from the reason which transcends all experience.

TURKEY, EGYPT, AND THE AFFAIRS OF THE EAST.

THERE is a witchery, an enchantment, about all that relates to the East, which throws far into the shade the more homely spectacles, and the more familiar events of the western world; and which renders us fabulists rather than historians, and novelists rather than biographers, when we attempt to write of Turkey, Egypt, and the East. The Arabian Nights' Entertainments is the mirror of Eastern life and of Eastern history. The porphyry pillars, the bazaars, and baths; the gilded barges, the embroidered elephants, the cloudless skies, the half veiled maidens of Eastern luxury; the curtains which surround the voluptuous slaves of the mighty pachas, beys, and lords, of those distant climes; the feathers of the egret of Cashmere, or of the argus pheasant's wing; the costly armour of the cavaliers, the lake of pearl, the sacred shade of a banyan tree, the Brahmins of the great Pagoda, the story-tellers of the East, the shawl goats of Thibet, the flowered girdles, the hung strings of fine pearl, the kitars to which Arab maids listened by moonlight in the gardens of the Alhambra, the prophet-chief, his tomb, the haram's curtained galleries, the burning focusts of Brahma, the rich Divan with its turbaned heads, the fur-bound bonnet of Bucharian shape, the full and fawn-like eyes of Persia, the small half-shut glances of China, the bloom of Georgia, and Azar's darker smiles; the splendid pageants, the endless processions, the white flag of Mokauna, the hundreds of banners to the sunbeam spread, the plumes, and lances, and the glittering thrones; Bucharia's ruby mines, Eden's sainted shades, the mosques, mausoleums, and sepulchres of distant ages; the camels with their camel-drivers, the Hassan of the desert, the caravanseras, the gold-coloured campac on the black hair of the Eastern women, the perfumed rods of the Eastern halls, the variegated coories which visit the coral trees, the blue pigeons of Mecca, the pagoda thrush, the birds of paradise, the white heron's feathers in the Uzbek Tartar's turban, and the "Alla Acbar" cry of the Arab-are some of the Eastern remembrances of our youth, and some of the dreamy recol

lections of departed years, when "life was new, and all was in its spring!"

The Christian, when he thinks of the East, remembers "the Man of sorrows, who was acquainted with grief"-follows him in his wanderings in the Holy land-gazes on that bright star of Bethlehem, which led the Eastern sages and the Eastern shepherds to a stable and an infant-listens to the sayings of him "who spake as never man spake," on the Sea of Galilee, on the Lake of Gennesaret, on the Mount of Olives, and in the Temple of Jerusalem-weeps at the Cross of Calvary, and in the Garden of Gethsemane, and treads with hallowed awe those plains, or ascends with sacred rapture those mountains, which were once gazed on by that eye which ever beamed love and mercy, and which was itself moistened with tears, when he wept at the grave of Lazarus, or over the then future fate of the Holy City. The pious Jew, when he thinks of the East, remembers that there the first man was created-that there dwelt the first long-lived patriarchs, and the descendants of Noah till long after the Deluge-and that there the great monarchies of Assyria, Babylon, and Persia, were founded and flourished. He remembers the land of Judea or Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, Assyria, Arabia, and Egypt. Palestine is pre-eminently dear to him. There the kingdoms of Israel and Judah flourished-there the temple of God was erected by King Solomon-there most of the inspired Scriptures were written-and there, in after ages, One arose who accomplished the all-important work of human redemption, and the Apostles of the Saviour were supernaturally qua lified to go forth among all nations to preach the gospel of eternal salvation to a lost and ruined world. In the East, also, lay the land of Canaan, the land of promise to Abraham and his family, the land of Palestine, named after the Philistines, and that land of Judea, from the tribe of Judah possessing its most fertile division, now more commonly called the Holy Land, as there the ministry of Christ was exercised, and there the obedience, and death, and resurrection, and ascension of our