affect to find traces of their fundamental principle, either in the Canon Law or in the ecclesiastical polity of the continental Protestants. For the same reason we shall assume, without argument, that no such principle exists in the Church of England.

But the assertion of the fundamental principle is rested mainly, we presume, on the history of the Reformed Church of Scotland, and the claims and pretensions to exclusive power and jurisdiction which that Church has from time to time advanced. To a consideration of these we accordingly proceed.

In the year 1558, on the eve of the Scottish Reformation, but while the Canon Law was still the law of the Church, and as such the law of the land, immediately after the accession of Elizabeth to the English throne, and while the Queen Regent in Scotland was "labouring what she could to make up the differences that had arisen in point of religion," ," the grievances of the CONGREGATION (as the Reformers were called) were presented in an articulate form to the Regent, and by her remitted to a convocation of all the ecclesiastics within the kingdom. Among other demands, there is one relating specially to the settlement of ministers; "That Bishops be elected by the consent of the gentry of the diocese, and parish priests. by consent of the parishioners." This is the first regular and formal intimation, so far as we know, of a desire on the part of any section of the Church of Scotland for the introduction of a new principle into this branch of Ecclesiastical Law. The answer of the Convocation is, "That what is decreed by the Canon Law concerning the election of bishops and pastors, ought to be maintained entire. And moreover, seeing the election of prelates was a privilege belonging to the Crown, which required only the consent of the Pope to determine any thing in opposition thereto, at a time when the Queen was so young, would be a picce of very high indiscretion and insolence, and a treasonable encroachment upon the royal preroga tive."

But the demand on the part of the

people, thus, for the first time, announced in general terms, was not lost sight of, when the triumph of the reforming principles in 1560 gave to John Knox and his brethren a favourable opportunity of pressing on the notice of Parliament such views as they deemed necessary to the promotion of the Reformation. It was under these circumstances that the "First Book of Discipline" was compiled, and submitted to Parliament as a system of ecclesiastical polity suited to the improved principles and condition of the Church. Many of its provisions, however, were so distasteful, especially to the nobility, that it never obtained the sanction of the Legislature, but, on the contrary, was generally denounced as a "devout imagination." The authority of this book therefore is, to say the least, extremely questionable; nor could it, with any show of reason, be relied on as evidence of the existence of a fundamental law. But, as illustrative of the views entertained on many important questions of polity, by the fathers of the Reformation in Scotland, it is beyond doubt a valuable monument, and well worthy of notice in such a discussion as the present. The fourth chapter concerns the settlement of ministers, and the subject is thus introduced:

"In a church reformed, or tending to reformation, none ought to presume either to preach, or yet to minister the sacraments, till that orderly they be called to the same. Ordinarie vocation consisteth in Election, Examination, and Admission. And because that election of ministers, in this cursed Papistrie, hath altogether been abused, we think expedient to intreat it more largely.”

The initiative, or the right of election, is then committed to the people: "It appertaineth to the people, and to every several congregation, to elect their minister." But if the people did not exercise their right within forty days after the vacancy, the election was to devolve upon the superintendent and his council, in whose place the presbytery now stands. In the first case of course, that of absolute popular election, no minister could be elected who was unacceptable to a majority

of the congregation, and no collision could take place between the right of nomination and the mera voluntas, the unreasoning distike, of the people. But when the election fell to the Church Court, let us see what provision was made for consulting the wishes of the people. In the first place, it is said that the admission of ministers to their offices" (as distinct from elec. tion, and forming the third part of "ordinarie vocation") "must consist in [the] consent of the people and church whereto they shall be appointed, and approbation of the learned ministers appointed for their examination." And if the "learned ministers' approve of the candidate; if his "doctrine be found wholesome, and able to instruct the simple, and if the Church justly can reprehend nothing in his life, doctrine, nor utterance, then we judge the church (i. e. the congregation) which before was destitute, unreasonable, if they refuse him whom the Church did offer; and [that] they should be compelled, by the censure of the councell and church, to receive the person appointed and approved by the judgment of the godly and learned."-" For altogether this is to be avoided, that any man be violently intruded or thrust in upon any congregation; but this liberty, with all care, must be reserved to every several church to have their votes and suffrages in election of their ministers. But violent intrusion we call not, when the councell of the Church, in the feare of God and for the salvation of the people, offereth unto them a suflicient man to instruct them, whom they shall not be forced to admit before just examination, as before is said."

Violent intrusion therefore, according to the First Book of Discipline," does not consist in compelling the congregation to receive a minister whom they wish to reject without stating relevant objections to his "life, doctrine, or utterance;" for this latter course is recommended to the Church Court, while violent intrusion is denounced as inexpedient. Between the Reformers of that day at least, and the framers of the Veto Act, there is but small sympathy. The stern and manly mind of John Knox must have

*Keith, p. 534,

revolted from the idea of giving effect to objections, the grounds of which the people would not or could not state.

If the First Book of Discipline is to be taken as an exposition at length of the views of those men who, in 1558, required the consent of the people in the settlement of ministers, the earliest Reformers clearly looked to popular, or a mixture of popular and clerical, election as the most desirable system, and must, of course, have aimed at the total abolition of the ancient rights of patronage. Indeed, it is impossible to read the above quoted passages, and to observe the studious omission of all allusion to the patron's right and interest to interfere, without arriving at the conclusion, that the authors of the First Book of Discipline wished and intended that lay patronage should form no part of the new code of ecclesiastical law. With the wisdom of the design we have at present no concern; suffice it to say, that the attempts to abolish patronage in the sixteenth century were eminently unsuccessful. For not only was the First Book of Discipline rejected by Parlia ment, but in five years after its compilation, the leaders of the Church found themselves compelled to admit and acquiesce in the patron's right to present to benefices. In 1565, the General Assembly solicit her Majesty "that the Benefices now vaikand, or has vaikit since the moneth of March 1558, or that hereafter sall happin to vaike, be disposed to qualified and learned personis, able to preach God's Word, and to discharge the vocatioun concerning the ministrie, be the tryall and admissioun of the superintendents."* This seems modest and reasonable enough, but the Queen's answer betrays considerable jealousy of the designs of the Church :-" To the second article it is answerit, That her Majestie thinks it na wayes reasonable that scho sould defraude herself of sa great a Pairt of the Patrimonie of her Crowne, as to put the Patronage of Benefices furth of her awin hands." The explanation of the General Assembly, in their " Answers to the Queen's Answers," is a complete submission and acquiescence in the existence and exercise of patronage within the Church:

† Ibid, p. 550.

"Our mind is not that her Majestie, or any uther Patron of this Realm, sould be defrauded of their just Patronagesi; but we mean, quhensoever her Majestie or any uther Patron does present any person to a Benefice, that the person presentit sould be tryit and examineit be the judgement of learned men of the Kirk, sick as presently are the superintendents appointed thereto : and as the presentatioun of Benefices pertains to the Patrone, sa aucht the collatioun thereof, be law and

reason, pertain to the Kirk: of the quhilk collatioun the Kirk sould not be defraudit, more nor the patrones of their presentatioun For utherwayes, if it sal be lesum to the Patrone absolutely to present quhom ever they please, without Tryall or Examinatioun, what, then, can abyde in the Kirk of God bot meere Ignorance without

all Ordour? "*

All, therefore, that the Church here proposes as a check on the absolute exercise of patronage, is the trial and examination of presentees; and the motive for insisting on this is perfectly satisfactory-viz. to prevent the intrusion of ignorant men into the ministry.

Then follows the Act 1567, c. 7, which, in the spirit of the above communications, statutes and ordains "That the examination and admission of ministers within this realme be only in the power of the Kirk, now openlie and publickly professed within the samin, the presentation of laick patronages alwaies reserved to the just and auncient patrones."

Various attempts, however, still continued to be made, to substitute the election of the people or of the Church Court for the presentation of the patron. Of these, one of the most celebrated, and historically the most important, is contained in The Second Book of Discipline, compiled by Andrew Melville and others in 1578-a work of which it is only necessary to say, that, though some of its provisions received a partial and doubtful sanction from Parliament, that portion to which our attention is at present directed, (Chap. III. § 4,) was certainly never admitted as law: "Ordinar and outward calling (it is said) hes twa parts, election and ordination. Election is the chusing out of a person, or persons, maist abile to

NO. CCLXXXIX. VOL. XLVI.

the office that vaiks be the judgment of the elderschip and consent of the congregation." And a little after (§ 5): In this ordinar election it is to be eschewit that na person be intrusit in ony of the offices of the kirk, con trar to the will of the congregation to whom they ar appointed, or without the voce of the elderschip." This is a very broad doctrine, boldly stated; and, if it had been represented as a dehave been a difficult task to reconcile claration of the existing law, it might it with the admissions of the Church in their answers to the Queen in 1565. But it is not a little remarkable that, in a subsequent part of the book, Melville and his coadjutors admit, that the system which they propose and admire is altogether impracticable in conjunction with patronage-that the two are positively incompatible. In a subsequent chapter (Chap. XII. § 9) they say:-"The libertie of the election of persons callit to the ecclesiastical functions, and observit without interruption swa lang as the Kirk was not corruptit be Antichrist, we desyre to be restorit and retenit within this realme, swa that nane be intrusit upon ony congregation, either be the prince or ony inferior person, without lawful election and the assent of the people ower quham the person is placit; as the practice of the apostolical and primitive kirk and gude order craves. And because this order, quhilk God's word craves, cannot stand with patronages and presentations to benefices usit in the Paip's kirk, we desyre all them that trewlie fear God, earnestly to consider that, for swa meikle as the names of patronages and benefices, together with the effect thairof, have flow'd fra the Paip and corruption of the canon law only, in so far as thereby ony person was intrusit, or placit owir kirks having curam animarum," therefore they beseech all true Protestants to join them in the crusade against patronage.

On this passage we remark, in the first place, that there is a clear admission, by the framers of The Second Book of Discipline, that a right of election in the people cannot exist in union with the exercise of the patron's right of nomination; and if this be morally true, we maintain, in the se

cond place, that it must be historically untrue that the liberty of election in the people was observit without interruption swą lang as the Kirk was not corruptit be Antichrist." For this seems to imply that the introduction of patronage and the corruption by Antichrist were contemporaneous; that the one did not exist before the other. Now, in what church is it asserted that patronage did not exist, and that the liberty of election in the people was observed without interruption? Is it in the Church universal during the first ages, or at least before Constantine? The history of those days, one would think, can be of little value in this question. The absence of patronage, where its exercise was impossible, in a Church not recognised by law and not possessed of benefices or endowments of any kind, is a fact of no force or relevancy in a question of ecclesiastical history or policy in a Church established and endowed. But if it be in the Church of Scotland that the liberty of election in the people is said to have been observed without interruption, we challenge the supporters of this doctrine in the present day to point out any period, previous to the compilation of The Second Book of Discipline, in which patronage did not exist, and was not acknowledged in this Church. There is a distinct statement made that it did not exist till the age of corruption; and, to justify this statement, there must be some record, there must be some authority, to which we can be referred for proof of the fact.

But if the challenge be declined, and no attempt made to produce authority in support of the statement contained in The Second Book of Discipline, we think there is abundant means to show that that statement is historically false. It is contradicted by the language of the Act 1567, which reserves the ancient right of patronage. It is contradicted by the admission of the General Assembly in 1565, already quoted, that "the presentation of benefices pertaines to the patrone." But the proofs on this subject are both numer. ous and direct. The oldest and most

venerable authority in Scottish law or Scottish history, the Regiam Majestatem, speaks of patronage as an undoubted, ancient, and well-recognised part of the ecclesiastical constitution:-"Sed caveat sibi Patronus laicus, quod vacante Ecclesià vel vicariâ, presentet personam idoneam, in literaturâ sufficientem, vitâ laudabili et sane morigeratum, et quod presentet illum infra quatuor menses, ne dilatio ulterior suæ præsentationis præjudicare sibi valeat."* And the same book, in another place, states the necessity of qualification (idoneitas) in the presentee as the sole check on the patron's absolute right. It is sufficient for our purpose thus to advert to the antiquity of patronage and its recognition in the law. Its origin is ascribed to a very remote period by the learned Selden. So early as the sixth century, we have traces of its existence in the Roman law.§ Before there was a church in Scotland, the canon law had received the maxim "Patronum faciunt dos, ædificatio, fundus," and till the Reformation the canon law was the only law of the Church of Scotland. But in the days of Melville, it is impossible that such ignorance as he exhibits, whether pretended or real, on the subject of Church History, could have been at all common among the educated class es; for Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, an eminent contemporary of Melville's, devotes a chapter of his "Practicks of the more ancient law of Scotland," to the subject of " Advocatioun and Patronage of Kirkis," every sentence of which goes to satisfy the reader that he is treating of a right which must have existed and been recognised from the carliest period in the law of Scotland. Sir Thomas Craig, too, who was alive in 1578, though his celebrated treatise had not yet been published, gives the most direct testimony to the same effect. P

The result, then, of our examination of the two Books of Discipline, seems but little conducive to the support of the principle of the Veto Act. John Knox treats the unreasonable or unexplained objections of the people with

Selden on Tithes, chap. 6. Balfour's Practicks, p. 501.

wonderfully little respect, in recom. mending their removal by the compulsitor of Church censures; and the inconsistency of this rule with the profession of a desire to place the election of pastors absolutely in the hands of the whole congregation, naturally excites a suspicion, either that the First Book is, in this matter at least, a compilation as crude and ill-considered as might be supposed from the haste with whch it was prepared; or, on the other hand, that the true purpose of the early Reformers was to procure the transference of patronage into their own hands-a purpose which they veiled, in the mean time, under the pretext of giving a voice to the people, and thus apparently liberalizing the constitution of the Church. The Second Book of Discipline, no doubt, maintains the propriety of popular election in unqualified terms. But this is accompanied by an admission of its incompatibility with patronage, which nullifies the authority of The Book in the present argument; while the historical inaccuracy of the statement respecting the previous existence of patronage in the Church, whether arising from ignorance or design, obviously renders it an unfit source from which to extract evidence of the antiquity or fundamental character of any law, and tends, in no small degree, to bring both the work itself and its authors into disrepute.

Fourteen years elapsed between the publication of the Second Book of Discipline and the final settlement of the Reformed Ecclesiastical Constitution in 1592. In this interval, many attempts were made to enhance the influence both of the Church Courts and of Congregations in the settlement of ministers; and the uniform want of success which attended these attempts, shows the determined purpose of the Sovereign and the Parliament to resist the introduction of any element which should interfere with the exercise of the right of patronage. The Act 1592, c. 116, had specially in view

the numerous recent discussions on this

subject; and the Legislature doubtless saw the necessity of fixing, by some unambiguous enactment, the limits of the Church's power in the matter of collation. The Statute, accordingly, in exact conformity with the tenor of the communications between the Queen and the General Assembly in 1565," ordainis all presentations to benefices to be direct to the particular presbyteries in all time cumming, with full power to give colation thereupon; and to put ordour to all maters and causes ecclesiasticall within their boundes, according to the discipline of the Kirk: providing the foresaid presbyteries be bound and astricted to receive and admit quhatsumever qualified minister presented be his Majesty or laick patrones."

By this Act, therefore, the qualifica tion of the presentee is the sole restriction on patronage-the single particular in which the Church is privileged to interfere. There is no concession to the demand for popular election, and still less is there any recognition of a right in the people to dissent, without cause shown, from the nomination of the patron.

Our conclusion then is, that in the Reformed Church of Scotland, in the sixteenth century, there existed no fundamental law which authorized the rejection of a presentee on the ground of the dissent of a majority, or any part of the people, without objections stated and verified. We have already, we hope, sufficiently demonstrated the absence of any such law or principle in the polity of the Church before the Reformation; and the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may, in the present question, be dismissed with a very few remarks. For the present, however, we must pause, and reserve for another occasion our observations on the later periods of the history of the Church, as well as the discussion of the more practical and important part of this great subject.