has never recognised Egypt as an independent government, is at this moment demanding the payment of the arrears of the khazueh, and is anxious to oppose the dominion of the rebel Pacha, in that portion of its former dominions (Syria), to which now we must direct a moment's attention.

SYRIA, or Suristan, was possessed by a succession of foreign nations, before the time of Ptolemy, when it became a province of the Roman empire. Five centuries afterwards, when the sons of Theodosius divided their immense patrimony, this country was annexed to the empire of Constantinople. In this situation it continued till the 7th century, when the Arabian tribes, under the banners of Mohammet, laid it waste. Since that period, torn by civil wars and by numerous invaders, it fell into the hands of the Turks, who have been its masters from the beginning of the 16th century. It is divided into the governments of Aleppo, Tripoli, Damascus, Acre, and Gaza, or Palestine.

Since the incorporation of Egypt with Turkey, the two great questions, until within a few years, have been, 1st, whether the pachas have acted honestly and fairly by the Egyptians, as representatives of the Sublime Porte; and 2nd, whether they have submitted to the suzeraineté of the Sultan, and have faithfully transmitted the khazneh, or tribute, to the Sultan. The Mameluke Government was an episode. The Mamelouks or Mamelukes were a race originally composed of Circassian or Mingrelian slaves, and for some years were the only military force in the country. For many years, at the close of the past and during the present century, Egypt was distracted by civil wars between the contending beys, by whom its provinces were governed. In 1786, the Turkish admiral, Hassan Ali, gained several victories; but though he repressed, he could not totally subdue them. In 1811, the Pacha Mehemet Ali, having received information of a conspiracy formed by the Beys, he, under the plea of a solemn feast, induced 800 of the chief Mamelukes to join in a procession to Cairo. When in the citadel, they were entrapped between the outer and inner wall-many of them were shot, and the rest were beheaded. An equally large number were subsequently killed in the neighbouring towns and villages, and their massacre was pursued into Nubia, till the race of Mamelukes became extinct.

The history of the pachas, from the time of Selim I. downwards, would be profitless, though not uninteresting -and it would prolong this article to an unreasonable length. It is only necessary to be borne in mind, that the Pacha of Egypt, up to very late years, was the acknowledged subject of the Porte; that, with but very few exceptions, the submission of the pachas was complete; and that, although in consequence of the gradual weakening of Turkey by the defection of her allies England and Austria, and by the aggressions of her foes the Russians and the Greeks, her authority is so much reduced, her power so inconceivably small, and her state so help less, as to be unable to resist the disobedience and rebellion of the present Pacha and his victorious and able son, Ibrahim, yet that the Sublime Porte

Is this province of Turkey in Asia, bounded on the north by Caramania and Diarbekir, on the east by the latter and by the deserts of Arabia, on the south by Arabia Petræa and Egypt, and on the west by the Mediterranean, to become a portion of Egypt, under an independent crown, and separated from Turkey,-or is it to remain connected with the Turkish empire? This is one of the mighty questions which must erelong be resolved in the East

and one of those to which we must direct the attention of our readers. Of Syria itself it has been truly said, On Syria's plains, though plenty fills her horn,

And Smyrna's fruitful fields abound in corn, Deem not those happy in the peaceful shade, Whom earthquake, fire, and pestilence invade,

Whose freeborn souls to haughty despots

bow,

And for tyrannic pachas hold the plough."

If Syria and the Syrian Christians were unhappy under the domination of Turkey, they are not less so under that of Ibrahim. If the Druses encouraged the Sultan in his attempt to regain Syria, they did so with sincerity; and the whole of Syria is now prepared to rise up against their Egyptian oppressors. Alas! for poor Syria, the land of so many marvels in

ages long passed away, there is no hope, we fear, for her, either from the expiring power of the Porte, the rising fortunes of Mehemet Ali, or the tender mercies of the Cabinet of St Petersburg.

We think the reader of the foregoing pages will now be prepared for the contemporary history of TurkeyEgypt Syria the Sultan-the Pacha-and the approaching dénouement. Let us briefly recapitulate the events of the last very few years.

We have said that the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which was that of 1832, between Turkey and Russia, made Turkey the vassal of the Russian empire; and now we add, that the treaty of Kutahia, previously signed between the Porte and the Pacha, destroyed the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and constituted Egypt an independent province or nation. Yet the great Lord Chatham exclaimed, "I do not take the pains to discuss the question of the East with any man who does not perceive that the independence of the Ottoman empire is a question of life and death to Great Britain." Was Lord Chatham rightor is Lord Palmerston a better patriot, an abler diplomatist, and a more profound statesman? We shall see hereafter.

The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi tied and bound the Ottoman Porte, and placed it in the hands of its old enemy, Russia. The treaty of Kutahia gave Syria to the Pacha of Egypt. The Porte had lost all but Syria. Moldavia, Wallachia, Greece-allall had been taken ;-Russia was mistress de facto of the Dardanelles,Egypt was only nominally subject to the Porte, to whom it even refused the payment of the tribute; but Syria was left. Well, Syria was sacrificed also -and the Porte stood alone. The former treaty rendered the old ally of Great Britain helpless, and dependent on their common antagonist-Russia: the latter treaty, that of Kutahia, conferred power on that Pacha whose ambition knows no bounds, and who will be the first to throw all impediments in the way of Great Britain in her land approaches to her Indian possessions, if he can only make such arrangements with Russia as shall secure to him and his descendants the hereditary empire of Egypt and Syria.

Thus Turkey was weakened to help lessness, and Egypt was strengthened and fortified, whilst Great Britain, under Whig domination, looked on at the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, and at the creation of an Egyptian dynasty, and pronounced no prohibition, uttered no veto.

France boasts that the treaty of Kutahia was favourable to her views, and satisfactory to her policy. "She gained by the treaty of Kutahia," says the French ministerial organ, "because it is the interest of France to maintain the grandeur of Egypt." But why is France interested in maintaining the "grandeur of Egypt ?"

First, That she may carry on with Egypt an extensive and most profitable

commerce.

Second, That she may carry on with Syria a large and beneficial trade.

Third, That the new French possessions in the Barbary States may have a powerful and independent ally on the north of Africa.

Fourth, That France may, by her alliance with Egypt, be able to exercise a control over the maritime influence of England, and, above all, may possess sufficient influence with the Egyptian Government to prevent Great Britain from greatly profiting from her proposed land communications with India.

Fifth, That France may concur with Egypt, when powerful and independent, in preventing the northern powers of Europe from gaining any footing in the north of Africa, or in Asia Minor, and any permanent and important influence in the Mediterra

nean.

Sixth, That France may, in conjunction with Egypt, keep Turkey in a feeble and helpless state, by perpe tuating the separation of Syria from the dominions of the Porte.

And, lastly, That France may thus become in Eastern affairs a mediating power, and attain a degree of importance and weight which never could otherwise belong to her in any Oriental questions, since neither her geographical, commercial, nor maritime position entitle her to any preponder

ance.

France affects, indeed, to feel a great interest in the preservation of the Ottoman empire- and the govern. inent declares that it must remain in

tact.

But what does France mean by intact? Simply that Austria shall not possess Bosnia and Albania, and that Russia shall not take open and avowed possession of Constantinople. But is this sufficient to restore life to Turkey? Is this to be the compensation for the loss of Egypt, Greece, and Syria, as well as of Walachia and Moldavia?

"La France," says one of the ablest writers of the new school of politics in that country, "dans la question d'Orient est une puissance mediatrice. Ce qui lui donne ce caractère aux yeux de tout le monde, c'est qu'il est évident qu'elle n'a en Orient aucun intérêt de conquête et d'agrandissement. Elle n'a qu'un intérêt de civilisation."

But what is this interest of France, when examined closely, and searched to its heart? We are told that such interest is to maintain the Ottoman empire in its present state-and we are assured that such state is one of independence. It is no such thing. The Ottoman Porte is dependent. It is dependent on Russia on the one hand, and on the Pacha of Egypt on the other. The French politicians tell us, that the present independence of Turkey is necessary to the preservation of the European equilibrium. But we reply that the equilibrium was destroyed by the treaties of Kutahia and of Unkiar Skelessi. When Turkey had not bowed her neck to the Pacha of Egyptwhen Syria yet belonged to the Porte -when Russia did not exclude from the Dardannelles whom she thought fit to proscribe; when Wallachia and Moldavia were not under her real domination; when the Black Sea was not the private property of the Czar; there was something like an European equilibrium as to the affairs of the East; but such equilibrium exists no longer-and Turkey must fall, if the status quo be preserved. “But," it is said, "France protested against the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi

and she could do no more." And what was the reply of Russia to her protest? "That, whenever the case should arrive that the Porte should require her aid, in virtue of the condi tions of that treaty, that she should fulfil those conditions in the manner and to the extent she might think fit, paying no attention to that protest

The interest of France, we are told, is not one of conquest. Granted. But what is it? It is the erection of an Egyptian and Syrian empire as op. posed to Turkey. This is what France calls the status quo. "Egypt is to become a civilized state. She is on her way. France must take care not to interrupt her progress, and not to allow it to be interrupted." But why this anxiety for the progress of Egypt? The secret has escaped the French politicians of the 19th century. It is this:-for the moment, the progress of Egypt is favourable to French commerce and to French conquests in Africa;-and eventually Egypt and Syria may be worthy of French ambition! "Commençons par fonder notre colonie d'Alger," cries the monarchical organ of the Revolution of July. And what afterwards? Listen to the following announcement :

"Tant que la guerre sera contenue entre l'Egypt et la Turquie, tant que le traité de Kutahia seulement sera en question, la question sera encore touta-fait Orientale."

Yes; but when it shall cease to be wholly Oriental, when that war, as to the East, which Marshal Soult, the Premier of France, has just declared at the French tribune to be sooner or later inevitable, shall break out, what will then be the position and conduct of France? Hear, again, the government organ.

"Mais dès que la guerre sortira de ce circle, dès que le traité d'Unkiar Skelessi sera aussi remis en jeu, la lutte alors s'engagera entre l'Angleterre et la Russie, la question devien. dra Européenne, and Dieu seul sait le dénouement."

Thus the policy of France is for the moment for the time being-for some years to come, to favour the progress of Egypt in Syria; to assist the developement of what she calls "Egyptian civilisation;" to maintain intact the treaties of Kutahia and Unkiar Skelessi; to preserve a nominal and sham, but not real peace, between the Porte and the Pacha; to profit from this state of things in her trade and commerce; to exert her influence in preventing Great Britain from completing her arrangements for her overland expeditions to India; and then, when the time shall come to decide whether there shall be a Turkish or an Egyp

tian empire, to be able to say, "I have the north of Africa under my control. Algiers is mine: Tunis is mine: Tripoli is mine. It is now time that Egypt should be mine also; and that thus both coasts of the Mediterranean should be subject to my sway, and obey my domination." And is this a new project on the part of France? Is this the policy of 1839 only? No; it was the policy of the Directory, of the Consulate, and of the Empire; and if we may believe the declarations of the opponents of the Restoration, it was not foreign to the views of those who undertook, in 1830, the expedition against Algiers.

The French politicians, and the best French writers on this Oriental question, are perpetually speaking of the "interior regeneration of the Ottoman empire!" What does this mean? What has France to do with the interior regeneration of the Ottoman empire? Let us see. Has this " regeneration," as it is termed, been productive of weakness or of strength to the Ottoman Porte? Has it attached the populations of Turkey in Europe, Turkey in Asia, or Turkey in Africa, to the Ottoman government? No. Have the changes introduced fortified the alliances of the Sultan, concentrated the national spirit, bound the Mussulmans together as one man, and given life and vigour to a decaying frame? Just the reverse. We speak not as amateurs when we say this, but on the information of the most able and enlightened travellers and residents of modern days. The bankrupt noble, who has no longer his chests filled with guineas and his title-deeds free from mortgage-who can no longer meet the pressing demands of enraged creditors with a diminished revenue and lessened estates-will perhaps inveigh against the extravagance of former years, and the villainy of his dismissed stewards. The banquets of gone-by days will be condemned as absurd, and the splendours of his more wealthy years as madness and folly. But why did not the nobleman entertain these opinions when his resources were vast, and his means of existence and happiness indubitable? No, no ; he is still a spendthrift by choice, and reformed only from necessity. Thus it is with the Sultan Mahmoud and his Turkish subjects. They have no taste for the penury, the reductions, the occi

dentalism, the journalism, the budgetism, the parliamentaryism of the 19th century. The times of Soliman are still those to which they look back, and refer with Ottoman pride and Eastern delight. They know and feel that Turkey is fallen. They know and they feel that the Turkey of 1839, is but the shadow of the Turkey of former generations. The "regeneration" of the Ottoman empire, to which French writers so often refer, is nothing more than the expedient of the bankrupt noble-the disgust of a wornout voluptuary-the affected disapprobation of lust, which time and circumstances no longer allow to be enjoyed. The "regeneration" in question is the evidence of weakness, not of power-of fallen grandeur, and not of rising glory. When France thus proposes that Turkey shall be left to herself-she places the escutcheon beforehand on the gates of that once mighty empire, and inscribes on the sign of dissolution, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE!" When France proposes that the treaty of Kutahia shall be maintained, and that Turkey shall be left to pursue the work of her own regeneration, she merely seeks to gain time for the working of her own policy, which is that of suffering Turkey to expire, that Algiers in the mean time may become a wide and a mighty colony, and that, when the East shall have to be divided, her share may be Egypt. With such convictions as to the nature of French policy in the East, we have undertaken the preparation of the preceding and following observations on the Eastern question; and we now propose to examine, deliberately but briefly, the present state of the Eastern crisis.

The history of Turkey has shown us, that in all ages Russia has been the enemy of the Ottoman Porte. This is a fact of vast importance.

The history of Egypt has shown us, that the Porte has never voluntarily abandoned that province of its mighty dominions; and that Mehemet Ali is still in revolt against his legitimate sovereign.

The history of Syria has shown us, that never did it belong to Egypt; that for centuries it belonged to Turkey; and that, at this very moment, the Syrian Christians have decidedly less partiality for Ibrahim Pacha than even for the Porte and the Crescent.