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Mr. Rees. Let me stop you there. That is the same as the present law, is it not?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes. Subsection (b) is slightly different. Under the present law the requirement is that a person who petitions for naturalization, “being a resident within the judicial district of the court," and that has been interpreted by a good many courts to mean the county in which the person resides, even though there may be several counties in the judicial district or circuit. He might under the bare terms of the law, file in any one of those counties in the judicial district or judicial circuit.
The provision in the proposed code is that the person may petition for naturalization in any court within the State judicial district or State judicial circuit in which he resides, whether or not he resides within the county in which the petition for naturalization is filed.
Mr. REES. If a man is a resident of Brown County, Iowa, and Brown County is one of the eight counties in a State judicial district, he can file his petition in any one of those eight counties?
Mr. HAZARD. Correct, provided the court has jurisdiction over all of those counties.
Mr. REES. Or he can file his petition, as under the present law, in any United States district court in the State of Iowa?
Mr. HAZARD. Within the judicial district in which he resides.
The CHAIRMAN. Or within the judicial district of the State court. Do they not have the same jurisdiction for naturalization as the Federal courts? Am I correct in that?
Mr. HAZARD. They have the same power to confer naturalization.
The CHAIRMAN. What is holding that up? I mean, are they not provided with funds? So much play has been made about it that there is some discrimination on naturalization because the Department has failed to provide them with the necessary machinery. "Is there anything in that?
Mr. HAZARD. The reason, Congressman Dickstein, that many petitions for naturalization are filed in the United States district court instead of in the State court is the fact that the law permits the witnesses to be excused after they have testified before a naturalization examiner, and relieves them from the necessity of appearing the second time in open court. That is not true in the State courts, because the law does not grant that privilege.
The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to clear that up, because there has been much criticism and much demand for unification of some kind, since they have original jurisdiction as well as the Federal courts.
Mr. HAZARD. Later on this act does put them both on the same basis.
Mr. HAZARD. Section' (d) is, in effect, the same as the present law, which says that an alien may be naturalized in the following manner, and not otherwise.
Mr. REES. All right. Section 302.
Mr. HAZARD. Section 302 is merely a restatement of the declaration in the Cable Act of 1922, that the right of a person to become naturalized shall not be denied or abridged because of sex or because the person is a married woman. In other words, it places the man and the
woman on the same basis of equality, and persons who are married may not be denied naturalization merely because they happen to be married.
Mr. REES. And the fact that the wife is naturalized, or the husband, does not make any difference to the other party!
Mr. HAZARD. No. In other words, the other person may become naturalized whether one member of the family is or is not a citizen.
Mr. Rees. This is a restatement of the present law?
The CHAIRMAN. That would not change the law that we have amended on the 3-year limitation?
Mr. HAZARD. No. Section 303 contains a fundamental change, an enlargement. The present racial restrictions on naturalization are contained principally in section 2169 of the United States Revised Statutes of 1878, providing that naturalization shall apply to aliens being free white persons and persons of African nativity or African descent. The provision with reference to the naturalization of white persons has been in the naturalization laws continuously since the first naturalization act of 1790. The provision with reference to persons of African nativity or persons of African descent was incorporated in the law in 1870, immediately after the Civil War and as an outgrowth of the conditions that existed then.
There has been a change in the way of enlargement during the wartime legislation of May 9, 1918, which permitted, and still permits, a native born Filipino with service of 3 years in the United States Navy, Marine Corps, or United States Coast Guard, to be naturalized after honorable service.
Mr. REES. If he has served 3 years in the Army?
Mr. REES. If he has served 3 years in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, he has a right to make application for citizenship?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes; regardless of his race.
Mr. HAZARD. Yes; regardless of his race. That is, if he is a nativeborn Filipino.
Mr. REES. That only applies to Filipinos, though, the thing you are talking about now!
Mr. HAZARD. Yes.
Mr. HAZARD. It does not help him under the present law. There was also an enlargement with reference to race in one of the veterans' laws in 1935, which was really a curative statute, because a number of persons racially ineligible to naturalization have been naturalized by reason of service in the armed forces of the United States during the World War.
Mr. REES. Under what law did they do that?
Mr. HAZARD. That was under the act of June 1935. But that was in effect only for a short time, and has since ceased to exist, except that their certificates of naturalization may be validated by being submitted to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.
Mr. REES. And whom did they include under that act of 1935?
Mr. HAZARD. Any person who had rendered the required military service and who had been naturalized because of that service, and who would have been racially ineligible for naturalization otherwise. This
present act adds to Filipinos descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere, and that was brought about through the desirability that was felt of not prohibiting from being naturalized natives of those races in the Western Hemisphere, countries which were so closely tied to the United States by bonds of friendship. The number who might be naturalized was felt to be very small, and it was felt that the good to be accomplished by such a provision far outweighed the possibility that a few persons who would otherwise not be racially eligible might become naturalized.
Mr. REES. Let us get this just a little more definite. You are restating the present law, of course, as far as white persons are concerned, or people of African descent?' You are including the Filipinos. You are restating the law so far as Filipinos are concerned, except that you are including the Army along with the Navy and the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard ?
Mr. HAZARD. That is correct.
Mr. HAZARD. By making eligible for naturalization descendants of races indigenous to the countries of North and South America.
Mr. REES. Who are they who are not at present racially eligible?
Mr. HAZARD. Well, there would be Peruvian Indians, for instance, the Indian races of British Columbia and of South America.
Mr. REES. Well, I just thought in glancing this over that you were including—that you are making a provision here whereby natives of any country in the Western Hemisphere could become citizens who might not otherwise become citizens.
Mr. HAZARD. No; that was not the intention, Congressman Rees. The intention in using the term, "races indigenous," was to take in those that were natural to the countries of the Western Hemisphere, and they are principally Indians. In the United States all the Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States have been declared to be citizens by the act of June 2, 1924, but the native Indians of British Columbia, say, are not included, because they are of neither white nor African descent. That would prove true also of the native races, and they are principally Indians of South America.
Mr. Rees. And Negroes of South America ?
Mr. HAZARD. They are eligible now, on the theory that they are descendants of the African race.
Mr. REES. This does not include people of the yellow or brown races, then?
Mr. HAZARD. Not of the yellow race. They are not indigenous if you mean Orientals, and not the brown races, if by that is meant the Malay race from either the islands of the Pacific or Asia.
Mr. Rees. It is your opinion, then-to put it another way, what you really intended to do was to include the Indians of the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. Hazard. Because they are the predominant group that would be included.
Mr. REES. Well, put it another way: All other natives of countries in the Western Hemisphere can become citizens of the United States under the present law, except Indians? Am I right? They are not excluded ?
Mr. HAZARD. Would you repeat that again please?
Mr. Rees. Nobody is excluded from becoming a citizen who is a native of any country in the Western Hemisphere except Indians, if they comply with the law?
Mr. HAZARD. No; I would not say that, because there may be Chinese born in the Western Hemisphere who are natives but who are not eligible for citizenship.
Mr. Rees. So you put the word “indigenous” in here?
Mr. HAZARD. Chinese are not indigenous to this hemisphere. They are not eligible.
Mr. REES. I am just wondering why you put it that way. What is the occasion for it? Why did you open it up? What happened to cause you to put that word "indigenous” in here—“people that are indigenous”?
Mr. HAZARD. Unless some words were used which would describe races which were native to these countries, it would let in all of the persons of races otherwise excluded, and which it was felt were not desirable to permit to be naturalized. For instance, just at present the Chinese are prohibited from being naturalized by law.
Mr. Rees. They are not natives, though, are they, to the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. HAZARD. Some of them are natives. I would not say “many," but some are born here. We have quite a number of Chinese who are natives of the United States, born here of Chinese parents who may have come here from China.
Mr. REES. So you use this word “indigenous” because that differentiates from being a native?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes; because if Hindus, for instance, who have been held to be ineligible by the Supreme Court of the United States; Japanese, who have also been held to be ineligible by the Supreme Court of the United States if they were to go to some country of the Western Hemisphere and have children born there—unless this term or some term equally descriptive were used, they might become naturalized in spite of the fact that persons born in Japan or in British India would not be eligible.
Mr. REES. I have your story now. What demand or reason is there for including this rather new group? Who are they? Why do you want them?
Mr. HAZARD. I think it is largely, Mr. Congressman, a matter of principle in connection with our relations with the Latin American countries, as indicating a continuance of our friendly relationship to them. It probably would have a very definite bearing upon strengthening our relations with those countries internationally, while at the same time it would probably result in the naturalization of very few in this country.
Mr. Rees. And where are they?
Mr. HAZARD. Well, I would say that they might be in any one of the Central American and South American countries, and there would be undoubtedly some instances in Canada. We have had a few cases of British Columbian Indians who have applied for naturalization and been denied.
Mr. REES. We do not care anything about them, either way. Mr. HAZARD. I would say that that is on the same basis as those of Central or South America, because it would be rather difficult
to distinguish Indians born in one country as being eligible and say that Indians from other countries would not be eligible. There would be a lack of uniformity which the Constitution requires.
Mr. Rees. Has anybody else any comment on this? Mr. HAZARD. I might say that possibly this is a question that is of greater concern to the State Department than it is to the other two Departments.
Mr. Rees. I can see why it might be. You are trying to make sort of a gesture of friendship to South America.
Mr. HAZARD. Yes.
Mr. FLOURNOY. If you ask my opinion as representing the State Department, I think that the State Department favors this for the reasons given by Mr. Hazard, that it will improve our relations with the South American countries.
The CHAIRMAN. Let us take up the next section.
Mr. HAZARD. Section 304 is the same as the present requirement as to the ability to speak English
No person except as otherwise provided in this chapter shall hereafter be naturalized or admitted as a citizen of the United States upon his own petition who cannot speak the English language. This requirement shall not apply to any person physically unable to comply therewith, if otherwise qualified to be naturalized.
The CHAIRMAN. That is present law?
Mr. HAZARD. Section 305 is the same as present law, which prohibits the naturalization of persons with anarchistic ideas. It is almost word for word a copy of the present statute
No person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of the official character of such officer or officers, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. Is not that the present law?
Mr. REES. Is there any comment on these as we go along? This is present law. If you think some change ought to be made, let us hear it now. All right, take up the next section.
Mr. HAZARD. Section 306 is a reflection of present law:
A person who, at any time during which the United States has been or shall be at war, deserted or shall desert the military or naval forces of the United States, or who, having duly enrolled, departed, or shall depart from the jurisdiction of the district in which enrolled, or went or shall go beyond the limits of the United States, with intent to avoid any draft into the military or naval service, lawfully ordered, shall, upon conviction thereof by a court martial, be ineligible to become a citizen of the United States; and such deserters shall be forever incapable of holding any office of trust or of profit under the United States, or of exercising any rights of citizens thereof.
What we have done here is to take the present law, which has been in effect since the Civil War, and which in 1912 was amended to make it applicable to desertion only in time of war-or not in time of peace—to separate it into this provision which deals with the ineli