tional shall lose his American nationality by "obtaining naturalization in a foreign state."

"Naturalization," according to the usual acceptation of the term in the United States, undoubtedly means the grant of a new nationality to a natural person after birth. (Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, 88; Osborne v. Bank, 9 Wheat, 827; 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 359). The term is not ordinarily applied to the conferring of the nationality of a state, jure sanguinis, at birth, upon a child born abroad. It has sometimes been contended that the power conferred by section 8 of article I of the Constitution "to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" included the power to provide for acquisition of nationality at birth by children born abroad to citizens of the United States, and this contention finds some support in the fact that the first naturalization act of the United States, which was passed by the first Congress, that is, the act of March 26, 1790, entitled "An act to establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization" (1 Stat. 103), contained a provision that "the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as naturalborn citizens:

"Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States."

It is interesting to note, however, that the statute declares that such children shall be "considered as natural-born citizens."

Whether the term "natural-born citizen," as used in section 1 of article II of the Constitution, with reference to eligibility to the office of President of the United States, includes persons born abroad to citizens of the United States is still a subject of debate.

From the discussion in the Convention of the constitutional provision in question it is apparent that the framers of the Constitution were principally concerned with the desirability of making it clear that the acquisition of citizenship of the United States should be governed by a single Federal law and not left to diverse laws of the various States of the Union, the provision in the Articles of Confederation having proved most unsatisfactory. The members seem to have had in mind, primarily at least, the matter of conferring citizenship after birth, through the process of naturalization, upon aliens who should have taken up their abode in the United States, since mention was made of the fact that in some of the States under the Confederation a long period of residence was required before citizenship was granted, while in others it was granted immediately or very shortly after arrival. A uniform rule seemed desirable. (The Papers of James Madison (1840), vol. III, pp. 1274, 1300: The Federalist. A New Edition (1818), No. XLII, pp. 267-268; Story on the Constitution, ch. XVI; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, p. 480. See also Passenger Cases, 7 How. 282, 482). It may be possible to hold, however, that the Convention, when using the expression "an uniform rule of naturalization" contemplated a broader use of the term "naturalization" than that which is now ordinarily applied, and that it intended to cover cases in which citizenship might be conferred by statute at birth upon children born to citizens of the United States in foreign lands. The latter view was expressed in the opinion of Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, 1874, 88 U. S. 162, 168, and in the opinion of Justice Gray in U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 1898, 169 U. S. 649, 672, 702–703.

Even if it is true that the term "naturalization" in section 8 of article I of the Constitution should be construed broadly, it does not follow that in the proposed new act the narrower meaning indicated by the definition under discussion cannot properly be used, especially as this meaning is now universally attributed to the word. Certainly in recent years, at least, persons who were born abroad of citizens of the United States and who acquired citizenship of the United States at birth, under the provision of section 1993 of the Revised Statutes, have never been termed "naturalized citizens." On the other hand, the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, is entitled "An act to establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States" (34 Stat. 596).

Acquisition of nationality at birth is discussed further on with reference to chapter 2.

It may be noted that, according to the above definition, "naturalization" is not limited to the conferring of nationality upon a person as a result of his application, but includes the derivate naturalization of minors, through the naturalization of their parents, and acquisition of nationality through marriage. It also includes the collective acquisition of the nationality of a state by the inhabitants of territory annexed by a state, at least of those who had the nationality of the

predecessor state. (As to collective naturalization, see Boyd v. Thayer, 1892, 143 U. S. 135; 3 Moore, Digest of International Law, 311-327; Van Dyne, Naturalization, 266-332; Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, 1929, Title, Nationality.)

(d) The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.

It is especially important to bear in mind the fact that this definition is "for the purposes of this act" only. It does not purport to follow existing terminology, under which the term "United States" is applied narrowly to the continental United States and the incorporated Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, or broadly to include all territory over which the United States is sovereign. In bringing the Virgin Islands within the term "United States" for purposes of acquisition of nationality, and for such purposes treating them as if they were incorporated with the continental United States, this code follows the act of March 2, 1917 (39 Stat. 953, 965), and it extends the same advantages to Puerto Rico, where, considering the express provisions of the act of June 27, 1934, it seems clear that the common law rule of acquisition of nationality through the fact of birth within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States (jus soli) does not apply. According to the act mentioned, persons born in Puerto Rico acquire citizenship of the United States at birth only in case they are "not citizens, subjects, or nationals of any foreign power." In the proposed new law this condition is eliminated, and birth in Puerto Rico will have the same effect as birth in the continental United States.

(e) The term "outlying possessions” means all territory, other than as specified in subsection (d), over which the United States exercises rights of sovereignty.

The meaning of this definition, when read with subsection (d), seems clear. (f) The term "parent" includes in the case of a posthumous child a deceased parent.

(g) The term "minor" means a person under twenty-one years of age. These definitions seem to require no explanation.

Sec. 102. For the purposes of chapter III of this Act

(a) The term "State" includes (except as used in subsec. (a) of sec. 301), Alaska, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.

(b) The term "naturalization court," unless otherwise particularly described, means a court authorized by subsection (a) of section 301 to exercise naturalization jurisdiction.

(c) The term "clerk of court" means a clerk of a naturalization court. (d) The terms "Commissioner" and "Deputy Commissioner" mean the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and a Deputy Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, respectively.

(e) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Labor.

(f) The term "Service" means the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States Department of Labor.

(g) The term "designated examiner" means an examiner or other officer of the Service designated under section 332 by the Commissioner.

(h) The term "child" includes a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, whether in the United States or elsewhere; also a child adopted in the United States, provided such legitimation or adoption takes place before the child reaches the age of sixteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating or adopting parent or parents.

These definitions also seem to require no explanation.

Sec. 103. For the purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of this ActThe term "foreign state" includes outlying possessions of a foreign state, but does not include self-governing dominions or territory under mandate, which, for the purposes of these subsections, shall be regarded as separate states.

The above quoted statement is, strictly speaking, an explanation rather than a definition. Needless to say, any "state" is a "foreign state" from the stand

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point of every other "state." It is hardly necessary to enter into an extended discussion of the term "state" as a concept of political science or of international law. Since international law is that branch of the law which pertains to the relations between the various "states," or international persons, ordinarily spoken of as "sovereign" or "independent", a discussion of the term "state" may be found in any standard work on international law. Fenwick says:

"As understood in international law, a state is a permanently organized political society, occupying a fixed territory, and enjoying within the borders of that territory freedom from control by any other state, so that it is able to be a responsible agent before the world" (International Law, p. 86).

(For discussions of this term see also Dickinson, Law of Nations, ch. II, pp. 76-185; Hall, International Law, 8th ed., pt. I, ch. I, pp. 17-49; Hershey, International Law, pt. 1, ch. VI-VII, pp. 157-198: Hyde, International Law, vol. I, pp. 16-22; Oppenheim, International Law, ch. I, 4th ed., pp. 133-142.)

The discussions of the term "state" in the works referred to above and in other works on international law necessarily include discussions of "outlying possessions," that is portions of a state geographically separated from the main body of the state but subject to the control of the central government and included with it in a single sovereign entity.

The words "self-governing dominions" relate in particular to those which compose the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is believed that at the present time there are no other countries which may be termed "self-governing dominions." (For discussions of the status of the self-governing dominions in the British Commonwealth of Nations see Hershey, International Law, ed. 1927, pp. 160-164; Hall, International Law, 8th ed., pp. 34–35; Oppenheim, International Law, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 193-200.) It may be observed that, in addition to Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the following self-governing dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations are now members of the League of Nations: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Union of South Africa, and the Irish Free State (1 Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 196). Newfoundland, although not a separate member of the League of Nations, also has the status of a selfgoverning dominion (1 Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 198). India, although a member of the League of Nations, is not a self-governing dominion, but has a special position as defined by the Government of India Act, 1919 (1 Oppenheim, op. cit., 195).

It may be well to mention the peculiar status of Iceland with reference to Denmark. According to the Treaty of Amalienborg of November 30, 1918, "Denmark and Iceland shall be independent and sovereign states in association through one and the same king, and through the Covenant which is contained in this Treaty of Association. The names of both states shall be used in the title of the King" (Hall, op. cit., p. 26, note 2).

The words "territory under mandate" relate to certain "colonies and territories," referred to in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, "which, as a consequence of the late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." Article 22 provides that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations," which "tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League." Provision is made for three classes of mandates, the precise character of which should "be explicitly defined in each case by the Council."

The existing mandates are as follows: Palestine and Trans-Jordan (Great Britain) Syria and Lebanon (France); French Cameroons (France); British Cameroons (Great Britain); Tanganyika (Great Britain); Ruanda-Urundi (Belgium); British Togo (Great Britain); French Togo (France); Southwest Africa (Union of South Africa); New Guinea (Australia); Western Samoa (New Zealand); South Sea Islands (Caroline, Marshall, and the Ladrones or Marianas) (Japan); Nauru (British Empire), Annuaire de la Société des Nations, 1931, pp. 491-493; Gerig, The Open Door and the Mandates System, p. 107.

With reference to the nationality of inhabitants of mandated territories, attention is called to a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, dated April 23, 1923 reading as follows:

"The Council of the League of Nations.

"Having considered the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the national status of the inhabitants of territories under B and C mandates,

"In accordance with the principles laid down in article 22 of the Covenant: "Resolves as follows:

"(1) The status of the native inhabitants of a mandated territory is distinct from that of the nationals of the Mandatory Power and cannot be identified therewith by any process having general application.

"(2) The native inhabitants of a mandated territory are not invested with the nationality of the Mandatory Power by reason of the protection extended to them.

"(3) It is not inconsistent with (1) and (2) above that individual inhabitants of the mandated territory should voluntarily obtain naturalization from the Mandatory Power in accordance with arrangements which it is open to such Power to make, with this object under its own law.

"(4) It is desirable that native inhabitants who receive the protection of the Mandatory Power should in each case be designated by some form of descriptive title which will specify their status under the mandate. (League of Nations Official Journal, 1923, p. 604; Hudson, Cases on International Law, p. 292.)"

(The text of the Covenant of the League of Nations may be found not only in official publications, including Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., vol. 3, p. 3336, but in various works relating to international law and organization, including Hudson, International Legislation, vol. I, p. 1, Fenwick, op. cit., pp. 585–594, and Eagleton, International Government, pp. 613–625. For the text of article 22, see also Hudson, Cases on International Law, p. 56, and Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations, pp. 591–592. For a full discussion of mandates see Wright, op. cit. For brief discussions see the following: Eagleton, op. cit., pp. 452-454; Fenwick, op. cit., pp. 103-104, Hershey, op. cit., pp. 187-191; Hall, op. cit., pp. 158-163; 1 Oppenheim, op. cit., pp. 201-215.)

Sec. 104. For the purposes of sections 201, 402, 403, 404, and 405 of this ActThe place of general abode shall be deemed the place of residence.

It is practically impossible to formulate a definition of "residence" which is generally applicable. As stated in Corpus Juris, volume 54, pages 705–706, “residence" is "an ambiguous, elastic, flexible, or relative term, which, notwithstanding numerous definitions are to be found in the books, is difficult of precise definition, as it has no fixed meaning applicable alike to all cases, but instead is used in different and various senses and has a great variety of meanings and significations, because its meaning is variously shaded according to the variant conditions of its application. Also, its meaning often depends upon the subject matter and connection in which it is used, and the sense in which it should be used is controlled by reference to the object; hence it may be given a restricted or enlarged meaning, considering the connection in which it is used."

Definitions of "residence" frequently include the element of intent as to the future place of abode. However, in section 104 hereof no mention is made of intent, and the actual “place of general abode" is the sole test for determining residence. The words "place of general abode," which are taken from the second paragraph of section 2 of the Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907 (34 Stat. 1228), seem to speak for themselves. They relate to the principal dwelling place of a person.

CHAPTER II. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

Sec. 201. The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:

(a) A person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;

This subsection is to replace the provision of section 1992 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, taken from an act of April 9, 1866 (14 Stat. 27), and reading as follows:

"All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States (8 U. S. Code, § 1)."

Subsection (a), like the statute which it is to replace, is in effect a statement of the common-law rule, which has been in effect in the United States from the beginning of its existence as a sovereign state, having previously been in effect in the colonies. It accords with the provision in the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States that "all persons born * * * in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States." The meaning of the latter was discussed by Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), 169 U. S. 674, in which it was held that a person born in the United States of Chinese parents was born a citizen of the United States, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. According to this opinion, the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" had the effect of barring certain classes of persons, including children born in the United States to parents in the diplomatic service of foreign states and persons born in the United States to members of Indian tribes. This case related to a person born to parents who were domiciled in the United States, but, according to the reasoning of the court, which was in agreement with the decision of the Court of Chancery of New York in the year 1844 in Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf., chapter 583, the same rule is also applicable to a child born in the United States of parents residing therein temporarily. In other words, it is the fact of birth within the territory and jurisdiction, and not the domicile of the parents, which determines the nationality of the child.

In considering this subsection it is important to note the statement in section 101, subsection (d) of chapter I that, "for the purposes of this act the term 'United States,' when used in a geographical sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States." It will be observed that the Code in this provision assimilates to the continental United States, for purposes of acquisition of nationality, not only the incorporated Territories, Alaska and Hawaii, but also Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It may be well at this point to make special mention of the status of Alaska and Hawaii as incorporated territories of the United States, that is, part and parcel of the United States proper, so that all provisions of the Constitution, including the provisions of the fourteenth amendment concerning citizenship, are now applicable therein.

Article III of the treaty between the United States and Russia, proclaimed June 20. 1867 (2 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., p. 1521), ceding Alaska to the United States,1 provides as follows:

"The inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their natural allegiance, may return to Russia within 3 years; but if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States mav, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country." It will be observed that this provision gives to the inhabitants of the ceded territory, other than the uncivilized native tribes, the privilege of reserving their

1 For the history of the annexation of Alaska, see Farrar, V. J., The Purchase of Alaska.