The CHAIRMAN. I think the witness can state his position. Would you prefer making your statement first and then be subject to questioning?

Mr. FLOURNOY. I have no objection.

Mr. AUSTIN. For my information, suppose Mr. and Mrs. John Smith, citizens of the United States by birth, remove themselves to England and Mr. John Smith becomes a subject of Great Britain. Does that carry with it the making of Mrs. Smith a citizen of Great Britain, or does she apply to Great Britain, or does Great Britain, for instance, take no cognizance of such a situation?

Mr. FLOURNOY. I think while I cannot speak with any authority as to the provisions of foreign laws, as there are a great many of them, I can only say what I believe. I did, incidentally, have a part in getting up a compilation of the nationality laws of foreign countries, but since it has been published there have been various changes.

My impression is that under the British law a woman is still naturalized through the naturalization of her husband. I do not think they have gone as far as we have gone in the Cable Act.

Mr. AUSTIN. In other words, if Mr. John Smith goes over there and is made a citizen, Mrs. John Smith automatically also becomes a subject of Great Britain?

Mr. FLOURNOY. That is my understanding. I could not say definitely what the foreign law is without taking it up.

Mr. AUSTIN. Do you know whether or not that is the situation in other foreign countries? I think this question is important.

Mr. FLOURNOY. Up to a few years ago it was the general rule, although perhaps not universal. Perhaps there might have been some qualifications under the laws of some foreign countries but as you know there has been a movement started in this country which some years ago culminated in the Cable Act and the Cable Act itself was changed, modified several times since it was first passed in 1922. Now in some foreign countries there have been modifications. That is the general rule, the old rule, although there may be some exceptions in the laws of some countries that a woman follows her husband as to nationality.

Mr. AUSTIN. As far as you know, does that still hold?

Mr. FLOURNOY. In most countries, the majority of countries; I am quite sure that it is still a rule, but there have been some changes made as the result of what you might call the women's movement in various foreign countries. That is based on the principle of equality between the sexes.

Mr. AUSTIN. In other words, it amounts to this, that if Mr. and Mrs. Smith go to England and if he has to become a British subject she likewise becomes a British subject.

Mr. FLOURNOY. That is my understanding. I am sorry I do not have a copy of the laws with me. I cannot keep all of them in my head as there are so many of them. I think that is still the law in Great Britain. Someone here may have more definite information. I think that is still the rule although they may have made some change allowing the woman to make an election to retain her nationality. I am sorry I did not bring the collection of laws with me. My impression is that they have made some changes in Great Britain, but just how far they go I cannot say offhand. I rather think they allow the woman to make an election.

Mr. AUSTIN. Would it be very much of a task to make a schedule in a very brief form of the situation, say, in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and so on? I think it would be very important to have that information in connection with this amendment.

Mr. FLOURNOY. It is very difficult in view of the Cable Act and the various modifications to know just what they mean but it could be done, I suppose. I could get you a copy of that compilation and possibly furnish that to the committee if you want it, with copies of the laws which have been adopted in foreign countries since this collection was compiled.

Mr. AUSTIN. What is the status today?

Mr. FLOURNOY. It is quite complicated.
Mr. AUSTIN. That is all.

Mr. CURTIS. Assuming that. an American couple, husband and wife, goes abroad, and the husband applies for naturalization in the foreign country. The wife does not by that act become a citizen of that foreign country.

Mr. FLOURNOY. Yes.

Mr. CURTIS. The law is such that the wife automatically becomes a citizen of that foreign country?

Mr. FLOURNOY. Yes.

Mr. CURTIS. What is her status under section 401 (a)? Now she does not seek naturalization in a foreign country on her own application and she is not a child.

Mr. FLOURNOY. It does not cover that woman at all.

Mr. CURTIS. Do you think she should be covered?

Mr. FLOURNOY. No, the intention was that such an American woman should not lose her American nationality as a result of naturalization automatically through the naturalization of her husband in a foreign country.

Mr. AUSTIN. That is our law.

Mr. FLOURNOY. It is the present law and it is the intent of this bill. This does not apply to this woman either on her own application or through the naturalization of a parent having legal custody of such person.

Mr. CURTIS. In that case the mother would not lose her citizenship but the child would.

Mr. FLOURNOY. If the child under the law of a foreign country is naturalized automatically through the naturalization of the father. Under this section 401 (a) the child would lose.

Mr. CURTIS. But the mother would not lose her naturalization even though she automatically became a citizen.

Mr. FLOURNOY. That is correct.

Mr. AUSTIN. And the child becomes a citizen.

Mr. FLOURNOY. Yes; just as we naturalize children here automatically through the naturalization of the parents and we have had controversies where persons naturalized here have visited their native land. Foreign countries have tried to impress these persons into their army and we have protested on the ground that the naturalization of the children here is just as much naturalization as that of the father, that the person is an American citizen and should not be regarded as a citizen of a foreign state from which he came.

Now I think the foreign laws on this subject are similar to our own in that respect. We naturalize minors through the naturalization of the parents.

Mr. CURTIS. But why is it and what is the reason that the wife is excluded from this section? You are going to have a situation here where the father and the children lose their status as a national and the mother retains it.

Mr. FLOURNOY. The reason is obviously that the intent of Congress as shown by the Cable Act and the acts passed since the Cable Act amending it, that our laws contain the principles of reciprocal nationality of husband and wife; that the wife should not be dependent on the husband. That has not been applied to the children. We still naturalize children through the naturalization of a parent.

Mr. LESINSKI. What bearing would this law have on a case like that of Barbara Hutton?

Mr. CURTIS. Whom did she marry last?

Mr. FLOURNOY. We do have, cases like this where an American woman was naturalized by marrying an alien, and she continues to live in that country, and the question does arise there as to whether her continued residence there has any effect on her status.

Mr. LESINSKI. It does affect the status of Barbara Hutton. She wanted to come back and was not permitted.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a reason for that because she went into court and signed a complete surrender of all her birthright in the Federal court of New York.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Now she wants to come back.

The CHAIRMAN. She is out of luck. As far as we are concerned she is an alien. She must go through the regular process of naturalization like any other alien.

Mr. LESINSKI. Under the law, can she come back?

The CHAIRMAN. She is here now, in Florida, some place, as a visitor.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. We may look forward to a private bill some day in regard to her.

Mr. AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, I heard some references made here. to the Cable Act. I wonder if I am the only one on the committee who is unfamiliar with it. Is that a basic law?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I think we are going far afield. I think we are going into international laws and laws of other countries.

Mr. REES. I think someone can state briefly what the Cable Act provides and it will not be necessary to go into details, just tell us briefly what it is.

Mr. FLOURNOY. The general object of the Cable Act was to establish the independent nationality of women.

Mr. REES. That is all it did.

Mr. FLOURNOY. It did not go all the way. The first act, that is the act of 1922 which still had some provisions which made a difference between men and women, but those were wiped out by successive acts passed since the Cable Act. I think they have all been wiped out so that the equality between men and women in nationalities has been established and there is no intent on the part of those who prepared this code to try to put the law back to where it was before.

Mr. LESINSKI. In other words, if either one wants to join the army he can.

Mr. FLOURNOY. Yes.

Mr. LESINSKI. With one exception.

Mr. FLOURNOY. Well, I do not know; we did not go into the army service.

Mr. REES. Is that clear?

Mr. AUSTIN. I think so. I will try to follow it, but I do not quite agree with the gentleman. I do agree with him to the point that this discussion could be kept up forever, but as I understand, the mother can retain her citizenship even while the husband gets this nationality, but it was pointed out that the child follows the father. I think it is fundamental.

Mr. REES. The point of difference between the two Departments is this, and that is where we have the controversy. We are trying to get the viewpoint of the State Department on the one hand and the viewpoints of the Department of Labor and the Department of Justice on the other. They agree on one point, but they still have one other divergent opinion which has not been brought out in this section with reference to this subsection (a) of section 401.

Subsection (a) says that

A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by obtaining naturalization in a foreign state,

* * *

We agree to that

either upon his own application or through the naturalization of a parent having legal custody of such person.

That is the point of controversy.

Now one group, the Department of State, says they would like the present law to stand; is that correct?

Mr. FLOURNOY. As to the past; not make this law retroactive.

Mr. REES. As to persons under 21 years of age they would not come under it. The Department of Labor has an amendment that changes that situation. Now you go back rather briefly and state your position with reference to those persons who obtained naturalization through their parents in any foreign country. What may they do or may they not do? If they have a right to become American citizens or rather retain their American citizenship?

Mr. FLOURNOY. In the first place we would prefer to retain the provisions of section 401 (a) just as it stands. If a change is made our proposal would be this

Mr. REES (interposing). This says that they shall lose their citizenship if their parents are naturalized.

Mr. FLOURNOY. Yes, sir; if the committee deems it desirable to make any change, especially in view of the principles stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the case of Perkins v. Elg, then we think it is desirable, in general, to limit the provisions of the code to cases arising in the future and not to attempt by anything in this code to determine whether a person who was naturalized many, many years ago in a foreign state through application has or has not lost his citizenship. We think in the first place it would hardly be within the power of Congress to pass such retroactive legislation and such cases should be determined by the principles laid down

by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the case of Perkins v. Elg; that is, the principle of election upon the attainment of majority.

In general the Chief Justice stated there that a minor person naturalized in a foreign state during minority through the naturalization of the parent should under the existing law have a right to elect upon attaining the age of 21 years whether he wants to be an American citizen or a citizen of a foreign state in which he was naturalized. If he elects to be an American citizen he should come as soon as possible to this country to reside.

Mr. LESINSKI. What do you mean by a reasonable time?

Mr. FLOURNOY. I believe you raised that question the last time and it raised some difficulty. The Court did not say what was a reasonable time.

Mr. LESINSKI. A reasonable time may be 1, 2, 3, or perhaps 5 years. He might be inducted into the Army and cannot get out in 3 years and he could not make a claim after that.

Mr. FLOURNOY. I should say if he resided voluntarily there. If there is any compulsion for a period of 2 years, that there would be a burden on him to explain that, but anyway if he remained longer than 2 years beyond that time the burden should be on him and if he could show compulsion it would not be indicative of election but if he resides there simply because he prefers that country to the United States I think it should be reasonable to hold he had made his election.

The CHAIRMAN. Who will determine these tricky little things in these thousands and thousands of cases? It seems we could avoid that by bringing this down to a common proposition along the line indicated by Mr. Rees in a sentence. You want the dead line at an age of 21. The Department of Labor wants to say, well, give him 2 additional years so that that will give him an opportunity to decide before you cut him off.

Mr. FLOURNOY. I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman, I think you misunderstood our position. For future cases we are entirely in agreement that he should have 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the opposition to this amendment then? Mr. FLOURNOY. The opposition to the amendment is simply this, that it seems to be a statement that a person who was formerly naturalized in a foreign country through the naturalization of their parents shall not be held to have lost his American nationality even though he may have been residing there for 40 years since he attained his majority. We think that those cases ought to be left open. If there were some compulsion that he could not leave then it might not be held that he elected the foreign nationality but if he continued to reside there merely because he preferred that country to the United States we think that it is entirely unreasonable to hold that he has continued to be a citizen of the United States, and, furthermore, we think that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Perkins v. Elg is directly in support of our position.

The CHAIRMAN. Your contention is also that when that law passes it actually throws him out and he is barred.

Mr. FLOURNOY. It depends who it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Without regard to who he is.

Mr. FLOURNOY. No, sir; not at all. The proposal that has been drawn up in our Department takes care of future cases. That is where they have been naturalized 40 years ago we would simply apply