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TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES INTO A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONALITY CODE

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 1940

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., there being present Messrs. Dickstein (chairman of committee), Rees, and Rockefeller.

There were also present Lt. Col. Fred W. Llewellyn, War Department; Messrs. Thomas B. Shoemaker and Edward J. Shaughnessy, of the Department of Labor; Mr. Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., of the Department of State; Mr. B. W. Butler, of the Department of Justice; and Mr. Henry F. Butler, representing the Bar Association of the District of Columbia.

Mr. REES. We will first give consideration to an amendment to chapter IV, section 401 at page 82 of the bill. We all understand we have before us the amendment that is submitted, I believe, by the War Department.

Colonel LLEWELLYN. Yes, sir.

Mr. REES. And I want to know whether or not this amendment is agreeable to the State Department. There is no objection on the part of the State Department?

Colonel LLEWELLYN. Not that I know of. This was discussed by the council since last week and there has been some change in the drafting, but it does not change what was agreed to in the discussion last week.

Mr. REES. What about the Department of Justice?

Mr. B. W. BUTLER. I think it is all right, under the circumstances. Mr. REES. All right. I just want the record to show whether it is necessary for you to say yes or no, but we would like to know, at least, if there is any objection on the part of the Department of Justice to

this amendment?

Mr. B. W. BUTLER. No.

Mr. REES. And the Department of Labor?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. No objection.

Mr. SHAUGHNESSY. You understand that this applies only to incorporated territory. Do you have that understanding?

Colonel LLEWELLYN. Yes, sir; we do.

Mr. SHAUGHNESSY. I know we did.

Colonel LLEWELLYN. There have been some very minor changes since we read it into the record last week. It has been redrafted and set up

as section 401 (a), otherwise there is no change to the one agreed upon here and discussed before the committee.

Mr. REES. We will place the amendment in the record at this point. (The amendment referred to is as follows:)

Chapter IV-Loss of Nationality: Insert the following as section 401 (a), page 82, between lines 15 and 16:

"A national of the United States who was born in any incorporated territory of the United States or who was born in any place outside of the jurisdiction of the United States of a parent who was born in any incorporated territory of the United States, shall be presumed to have expatriated himself under subsection (c) or (d) of section 401 when he shall remain for six months or longer within any foreign state of which he or either of his parents shall have been a national according to the laws of such foreign state, or within any place under control of such foreign state, and such presumption shall exist until overcome, whether or not the individual has returned to the United States. Such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, or to an immigration officer of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the Department of State and the Department of Labor jointly prescribe. However, no such presumption shall arise with respect to any officer or employee of the United States while serving abroad as such officer or employee, nor to any accompanying member of his family."

Mr. REES. Is there any further discussion of this amendment?

Mr. FLOURNOY. No, sir; except that I have a proposal which has a bearing on it, but it relates to subsection (c). We discussed that to some extent, I believe, last week. The proposal was as follows: It relates to loss of citizenship by enlisting in a foreign army, and the proposal is to add a proviso as follows:

It is suggested that section 401 (c) of the code be amended by the addition of a proviso, so that it will read somewhat as follows:

"SEC. 401. A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:

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(c) Entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless expressly authorized by the laws of the United States: Provided, That if a person who has acquired American nationality at birth also has the nationality of a foreign state, through birth in the territory of such foreign state or the fact that one of his parents was a national thereof, and who is residing in such territory at the time when he reaches the age of liability for military service, his entry into the armed forces of such foreign state shall be conclusively presumed to be voluntary."

We discussed that last week, and I called attention to the fact that in the State Department we have had cases arising under section 2 of the act of March 2, 1907, concerning expatriation and taking the foreign oath of allegiance, the foreign oath of allegiance having been taken as a condition to entry into a foreign army, and the plea was nearly always made that the oath was taken under duress and was not voluntary. The point of this is that if the person is a citizen of that country that that plea of duress should not be regarded as a valid plea. An individual living in the country knows that he is a citizen of that country and knows what is coming when he reaches the military age. If he is allowed to make a plea of duress-take one of those cases that we discussed of these people now in Hawaii, a Japanese born in Hawaii living in Japan, who had become a citizen, and when the time comes, of course, he is put into the Japanese Army like any other Japanese citizen. It is a manifest absurdity that he can make a plea that this was duress, and unless we have something of this sort such persons will be able to make this plea of duress

as they have done in the past and they will remain American citizens. The proposal concerning the effect regarding entry into the foreign army will be largely nullified. It is the same thing that we discussed last week.

Mr. REES. Will you read that amendment again?

Mr. FLOURNOY. It follows subsection (c).

Mr. REES. Page 81?

Mr. FLOURNOY. Yes.

(Mr. Flournoy read the amendment as above set forth.)

Mr. FLOURNOY. That is for purposes of this bill.

Mr. REES. The problem was pretty well discussed at the last meeting, or it was discussed at the last session, as I recollect.

Colonel LLEWELLYN. That is correct.

Mr. REES. And as I understand it, there was some objection.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is correct. There was objection on the part of the Department of Labor. We feel that the individual should be given an opportunity to be heard and to say whether or not he had been placed in the foreign army under duress, and then on the statement which he made the question could be determined whether or not he is of the same opinion now. We have had cases of that sort also. Some we held to be citizens and some we have held not to be citizens, but we do give the man the opportunity to be heard.

Mr. REES. As I recall it, we agreed not to adopt such an amendment but to allow the old law to stand?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. In effect. We did not like to make it a conclusive presumption. That is our view of it.

Mr. REES. What is the attitude of the Department of Justice on this?

Mr. B. W. BUTLER. Well, I think I accepted the view at the last meeting that cases might arise where a person did not voluntarily serve in the armed forces of the foreign state, he ought to have an opportunity to claim and insist on his American citizenship and prove he did not enter or serve in the armed forces of the foreign state.

Mr. FLOURNOY. This only applies to one who is a citizen of that foreign state and also has his residence in that foreign state. We feel that there is no reason for being too soft with such people, that they belong there, they are living there, and should be citizens of that country, and if they enter the army, that loses their citizenship here. They are of military age.

Mr. B. W. BUTLER. The military age is from 18 years up. The residence of that minor child is the domicile of the parents. I do not know why a man should not have an opportunity to explain his situation and not be deprived of his citizenship if he shows an interest in retaining his United States citizenship. I am inclined to think that there is something in Mr. Shoemaker's objection.

Mr. REES. Of course, I can see where a person who has, as you say, dual citizenship, who goes into the army of some foreign country, probably voluntarily but more likely because of a draft-I can see how he would want to get out of the army or get away from military service by claiming American citizenship, but I also think I can pretty well get the view of the State Department in this, if this individual resides in this foreign country, that is his home, and it just happens that he is permitted to be a citizen over there along with being a

citizen here. I can see how he would go a long ways and use that to get away from military service especially.

Mr. B. W. BUTLER. Of course, it is not going to do him any good to get away from military service if he lives over there. If he comes later to the United States, it seems to me he ought to have some opportunity to defend his position. Of course, I am not familiar with the cases that arise under this. I think they are more a problem of the Labor Department than the other Departments, especially my Department. There may be something in Mr. Shoemaker's point.

Mr. REES. I suppose that the present world situation will bring about more of these problems than we have had in the past.

Colonel LLEWELLYN. Just for the purpose of the record, the War Department favors the amendment submitted by the State Department for the same reason we favored the amendment we submitted, to eliminate from citizenship that class of people who served in foreign armies. and have dual citizenship. So that this has the effect of eliminating the loophole which exists.

Mr. REES. How long would a man serve in the Army ordinarily? Colonel LLEWELLYN. I think it varies in every country, but mostly about a year or 18 months, I believe, and then they go on the reserve list, and then they are called back at frequent periods until 25 to 28 years, when they are called back for general training. I think in Japan it begins at 18, but I do not know the legal limit when they are in the organized reserves.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. The boy might go there, he may be over there on the other side not as a free agent but as a minor. His parents may have sent him here to this country to live until his eighteenth birthday. After he has attained the age of 18 years he is called into the army on the other side. He did not want to go, but he had no choice, because his parents were there and he had to be there.

Mr. REES. What about the parents? Could they come back if they wanted to?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. They may do anything."

Mr. REES. They may not have dual citizenship?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Oh, yes. They may or they may not have dual citizenship. It depends entirely on the circumstances. They may be simply American citizens, but he may have dual citizenship. That boy may want to get back, but we do not see that he should be deprived of his American citizenship, but the instant he goes into that Army he is forever excluded. He has, to all intents and purposes, been deprived of his citizenship, despite the fact that he tried to protect his citizenship and his parents tried to protect him.

Mr. FLOURNOY. You are referring to someone born in Great Britain. and put into the British Army. Suppose he is born here and we put him in our Army, would we pay any attention if he is protesting, if he is living here in this country?

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Mr. SHOEMAKER. He might. Let me finish my statement. He may be deprived of his citizenship, but I say give him the opportunity to say "I did not want to go into that army; I protested against it; I took up with the American consul and other officers of the American Government, but now I am deprived of my citizenship which I endeavored to protect, because I came over here and lived 5 years with my parents.

I do not think I have anything else to say, but I think you have our viewpoint.

Mr. REES. I think so. But this applies, we will say, to a young man who was born in Great Britain, we will say, of parents who had become citizens of Great Britain. Isn't that right?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. NO.

Mr. REES. American parents?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. No.

Mr. REES. I was thinking it might apply to British parents; that is, parents who became British subjects. It would apply to parents who became British subjects or British citizens?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Not necessarily.

Mr. REES. Not necessarily; it may or may not. But this man becomes a British citizen because he was born in Great Britain?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes. And only by the fact of his situs or his location, and the other by blood. That is all.

Mr. REES. All right. Let us take a case where the parents are living in Great Britain and the boy was born in the United States and has lived here until he was 18 or 19, or whenever we might draft him into an army to fight against a foreign country. He is an American-born citizen and has resided here all of his life. You feel that that boy should have a right to protest as against other American-born boys who are called into service? That is one thing. I mean by that, he can protest?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Oh, no. That has reverse English on that. Mr. REES. Let him protest "I do not want to go into the United States Army; I am a British subject."

Mr. SHOEMAKER. He may have been registered by his parents as a British subject. I do not say, for instance, that he could not object. I think he can object and say, "I am a British subject."

Mr. REES. Although born in the United States?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, although born in the United States, but I say then, when he goes back to England, England should not exclude him by saying, "We won't deprive you of your English_citizenship.” I think the English would perhaps give him a chance to be heard on that. I do not know. That would be a case which would have to come up, but, as I say, that is reverse English. That reverses all the circumstances, and then I say it applies here, and give the boy the chance to be heard.

Mr. REES. What kind of a hearing do you want him to have?
Mr. SHOEMAKER. I would let him present all of his facts.

Mr. REES. To whom?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. For instance, if it was presented to the Immigration Service, to us, or if it was as to his passport, then to the State Department. If they held that he was put under duress, he fought like the deuce and took it up with the American consul

Mr. REES. You would not change the present law?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. No. That is the way I look at it.

Mr. REES. Will you present that in writing for the record? Colonel LLEWELLYN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is all the War Department is interested in particularly in this bill. I thank you very much.

Mr. REES. We thank you very kindly.

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