entrusted in that service, and the due qualifications of such, who are now to be elected. I shall, therefore, confine my present thoughts only to one particular head, which yet, in my opinion, seems to involve in it the inevitable fate of England, which wholly depends upon the choice of members for the next session of parliament: I mean the choosing or refusing of such persons, who are now possessed of any places and preferments, depending upon the gift and pleasure of the court.' If herein my endeavours prove unsuccessful, I shall have nothing left, but the satisfaction of my own conscience to support me under the deplorable consequents and effects, which must necessarily attend the choice of a house of commons filled with Officers and court pensioners. This is the last struggle and effort the people of England have left them for their properties; and, should we now miscarry in this, we may sit down and idly shew our affections for our country, and fruitlesly bewail the loss of our liberties, but shall never meet with another opportunity of exerting ourselves in its service. That I may, therefore, set the minds of people right, in this particular, before it be too late, I think it will be only necessary to shew the danger of chusing members that are in places, from two considerations:

First, From the nature of such a parliament, considered in itself: And,

Secondly, From what has already been done by parliaments so qualified.

In both which, I shall be very brief, and content myself with much fewer arguments than might be urged upon this subject. For I should almost despair of being survived by the liberties of England, if I could imagine there was a necessity of saying much, in a case not only of such irresistible evidence and demonstration, but also of the utmost concern and importance to us.

2. First, then, we shall best be able to understand the nature of such an ill-chosen parliament, by comparing it with a true one, and with the original design of parliaments in their institution. I hope it need not be told, that they were, at first, intended for a support to the king's just prerogative, and a protection to the subjects in their as just rights and privileges: For maintaining all due honour to the executive power,and all suitable respect and encouragement to those, who are intrusted with the administration of the laws: For a poise and balance between the two extreme contending powers of absolute mon. archy and anarchy: For a check and curb to insolent and licentious ministers, and a terror to ambitious and over-grown statesmen: For giving their advice to his majesty in all matters of importance: For making necessary laws, to preserve or improve our constitution, and abrogating such as were found burthensome and obsolete: For giving the king money for defraying the charges and expences of the government, or maintaining a necessary war against foreign and domestick enemies: For examining and inspecting the publick accounts, to know if their money be applied to its true use and purposes: In short, for the best security imaginable to his majesty's honour and royal digni ties, and the subjects liberties, estates, and lives.

3. This being the nature and true design of a parliament, let us now see whether a house of commons, full of officers and court pen, sioners, will answer those noble and laudable ends of their consti tutions. And, here indeed, I begin already to be ashamed of my un, dertaking; the proof of the negative is so ridiculous, that it looks too much like a jest, to ask any one in his wits, whether a parlia ment, filled with delinquents, will ever call themselves to an ac count, or what account would be given, if they should? Whether an assembly of publick robbers will sentence one another to be punished, or to make restitution? Whether it is possible, our grievances can be redressed, that are committed by persons, from whom there is no higher power to appeal? Whether there is any hope of justice, where the malefactors are the judges? Whether his majesty can be rightly informed in affairs relating to himself or the publick, when they are represented to him, only by such persons, who design to abuse him? Whether the publick accounts will be faithfully inspected by those, who embezzle our money to their own use? Whether the king's prerogative can be lawfully maintained by such, who only pervert it to their own sinister ends and purposes? Whether a parliament can be a true balance, where all the weight lies only in one scale? Or, lastly, Whether a house of commons can vote freely, who are either prepossessed with the hopes and promises of enjoying places, or the slavish fears of losing them? Methinks it is offering too much violence to human nature, to ask such questions as these; I shall, therefore, leave this invidious point.

4. Yet, lest still any should remain unsatisfied, or lulled into a fond opinion, that these mischiefs will not ensue upon the elections they shall make, I shall further endeavour to convince those, who are most moved by the force of examples, by coming to my second par ticular, and shewing how parliaments, so qualified, have all along behaved themselves. And here I must confess there are not many instances to be given, the project of corrupting parliaments being but of a late date, a practice first set on foot within the compass of our own memories, as the last and most dangerous stratagem that ever was invented by an incroaching tyrant to possess himself of the rights of a free-born people; I mean King Charles the Second, who, well remembering, with how little success, both he and his father had made use of open arms and downright violence to storm and batter down the bulwarks of our excellent constitution, had recourse at last to those mean arts, and underhand practices, of bribing and corrupt, ing, with money, those who were intrusted with the conservation of our laws, and the guardianship of our liberties. And herein he so well succeeded, that the mischiefs and calamities, occasioned by that mercenary parliament, did not terminate with his life and reign; but the effects of then, are handed and continued down, and very sensibly felt by the nation, to this very hour. For it is to that house of com. mons the formidable greatness of France was owing, and to their account, therefore, ought we to set down the prodigious expences of the late war. It was by those infamous members that money was given to make a feigned and collusive war with France, which, at the

banished liberties, and exposed the persons, who sold them, to the universal hatred and reproach of their fellow-subjects; a punishment indeed infinitely less than they deserved, for the highest crime a member of parliament is capable of committing.

5. As for King James's reign, though it was notoriously guilty of the breach and violation of most of our fundamental laws, which sufficiently justifies our carriage towards him, yet, cannot we say that his mismanagement is to be ascribed to the corruption of any parliament sitting in his time. It is true, indeed, he reaped too much advantage from the conduct of the bribed parliament in his brother's reign, and used all possible endeavours to procure such another for himself, well knowing it to be the most effectual means for car. rying on his ruinous and destructive projects; yet, either from the unshaken constancy of the people, or want of dexterity in his ministers, he was altogether defeated in his expectation.

6. This miserable disappointment of King James's hopes made. way for our late glorious revolution, which was brought about by the hearty endeavours, and accompanied with the most unfeigned vows and wishes of all true lovers of their country, who, from hence, expected a full deliverance from their present miseries, and a sure re medy from their future fears. For what happiness might not the people well hope for under the government of the best of kings, supported by the best of titles, viz. The general consent and election of his people? We were filled with golden dreams, not only of a bare security for our estates and lives, but an inexhausted affluence of all manner of blessings a nation is capable of enjoying. But, though we have dreamt the dreams, yet have we not seen the visions. And though the nation is, by this time, sadly sensible, how wretchedly they have fallen short of their expected happiness, yet are they not all acquainted with the true spring and fountain from whence all their misfortunes flow; which is, indeed, no other, than that barefaced and openly avowed corruption, which, like an universal lepro. sy, has so notoriously infected and overspread both our court and parliament. It is, from hence, are plainly derived all the cala. mities and distractions under which the whole nation at present groans: It is this that has changed the very natures of Englishmen, and, of valiant, made them cowards; of eloquent, dumb; and, of honest men, villains: It is this can make a whole house of commons eat their own words, and counter-vote what they had just before resolv. ed on: It is this could summon the mercenary members from all quarters of the town in an instant, to vote their fellow-criminals in. nocent: It is this that can make a parliament throw away the peo. ple's money with the utmost profusion, without enquiring into the management of it: It is this that put a stop to the examination of that scandalous escape of the Thoulon fleet into Brest: It is this that has encouraged the mismanagements of the admiralty, in relation to the loss of so vast a number of men of war, and merchant ships, as well as other miscarriages, which were by all men judged to proceed, not from their want of understanding in sea-affairs: It is this that has hindered the passing a bill so often brought into the house for

incapacitating members to bear offices: It is this that could not only indemnify, but honour a leading member, for his audacious procuring and accepting a grant of lands, which, by the parliament, had been set a-part for the publick service; a vote that shall stand recorded in their own journals, to the never-dying infamy of that mercenary assembly: It is this could make the same person most confidently affirm, that he was sure the majority of the house would agree to what he was going to propose: It is this that could make men of peaceable dispositions, and considerable estates, vote for a standing army: It is this that could bring admirals to confess, that our fleets, under their command, was no security to us: It is this could make wise men act against their own apparent interest: In short, it is this that has infatuated our prudence, staggered our constancy, sullied our reputation, and introduced a total defection from all true En. glish principles. Bribery is, indeed, so sure and unavoidable a way to destroy any nation, that we may all sit down and wonder, that so much as the very name of a free government is yet continued to us. And, if, by our wary choice of members, we should happen to recover our ancient constitution, we shall, with horror and amaze. ment, look back, and reflect upon the dreadful precipice we so nar. rowly escaped.

7. Fatal experience has now, more than enough, convinced us, that courts have been the same in all ages, and that few persons have been found of such approved constancy and resolution, as to with. stand the powerful allurements and temptations which from thence have been continually dispensed, for the corrupting of men's minds, and debauching their honest principles. Such instances of the frail. ty of human nature may be given, within these few years past, as might make a man even ashamed of his own species, and which, were they not so open and notorious, ought, out of pity to mankind, to be buried in perpetual silence. Who can enough lament the wretch. ed degeneracy of the age we live in? To see persons, who were for. merly noted for the most vigorous assertors of their country's liberty, who, from their infancy, had imbibed no other notions, than what conduced to the publick safety, whose principles were further im proved and confirmed by the advantages of a suitable conversation, and who were so far possessed with this spirit of liberty, that it sometimes transported them beyond the bounds of moderation, even to unwarrantable excesses: To see these men, I say, so infamously fall in with the arbitrary measures of the court, and appear the most active instruments for enslaving their country; and that, without any formal steps or degrees, but, all in an instant, is so violent and sur. prising a transition, from one extream to another, without passing the mean, as would have confounded the imaginations of Euclid or Pyrrho. All the stated maxims, in relation to the nature of man. kind, which have been long ago settled and established by philoso, phers, and observing men, are now baffled and exploded; and we have nothing left us to contemplate, but the wild extravagancies of romantick fables, the sudden conveyances of nimble-fingered jug

glers, the inimitable dispatches of transubstantiating priests, or the now more credible metamorphoses of men into beasts.

8. The necessity we have lain under of frequent meetings of par liament, during the war, has taught our managers so much dexterity and address in their applications to the members of that assembly, that they are now become consummate masters in that most detestable art of corrupting our representatives, by hopes and fears of attaining or losing offices and preferments. And though I here name offices, yet those offices are downright bribes and pensions, since they are held precariously from the court, and constantly taken away upon non-compliance with the court-measures; though. I am not ignorant, that several considerable pensions were also paid out of the Exchequer to members of both houses. For places could not be had for all, though they have tried all imaginable arts, for dividing among them. selves the considerable posts of the kingdom: for, either by splitting of offices among several persons which were formerly executed by one, or by reviving such as were sunk, or by creating others which were altogether useless and unnecessary, or by promises of prefer ment to those who could not presently be provided for, they had made above two-hundred members absolutely dependent upon them. And what points may not such a number carry in the house, who are always ready, and constantly attending, with more diligence to destroy our constitution, than the rest were to preserve it? Who represented not their country, but themselves, and always kept together in a close and undivided phalanx, impenetrable either by shame or honour, voting always the same way, and saying always the same things, as if they were no longer voluntary agents, but so many engines, merely turned about by a mechanick motion, like an organ, where the great humming bases, as well as the little squeaking trebles, are filled but with one blast of wind from the same sound-board. Yet a few of them may, in some measure be distinguished from those pointblank voters, whom neither their country's safety, nor their own more dear and valued interest, nor the persuasion of their once intimate friends, nor fear of reproach, nor love of reputation, could ever prevail to join in an honest point, or dissent from a question that carried in it the violation of the rights and properties of the subject. These are the men who have persuaded his majesty, or rather assumed to themselves, not to fill up any vacant offices, whilst the parliament is sitting; but to keep all pretenders in a dependence till the end of the session, and bind them up to their ill behaviour, which will then be their best pretence to demand their wages of unrighteousness: Witness the commission of excise the last session, which was sued for by, and promised to above thirty competitors, who all did their utmost to signalise their several merits for an office, which, doubtless, will be at last divided amongst those who have deserved worst of their country. By these means, they made their numbers and in terest in the house so great, that no miscarriage in the government could ever be redressed, nor the meanest tool, belonging to them, be punished: Some of which they did, indeed, take into their own hands, which raised in the people a high expectation that some ex