should cry unto the Lord, therefore they had no other means to help them but cries to God; though, I confess, in that monarchy they had not. That speech, 1 Sam. xxvi. 9, was most true there, and is as true here, but not to the purpose, being spoken of the king's own person. But the main authority, brought against resistance, is that, Rom. xiii. and on that Dr. Fern builds his whole discourse. Let us therefore something more largely consider what is deduced out of that text: First, he supposes the king to be the supreme in St. Peter, and the higher power in St. Paul. Secondly, He collects all persons, every soul is forbidden to resist. Thirdly, That then was a standing senate, which, not long before, had the supreme power in the Roman state, it is confessed; but that they could challenge more at that time when St. Paul writ, than our great council will or can, I deny; for, that state devolving into monarchy by conquest, they were brought under an absolute monarchy, the senate itself swearing full subjection to the prince; his edicts and acts of will were laws, and the senate's consent only pro forma, and at pleasure required, He who reads Tacitus, cannot but see the senate brought to a con. dition of basest servitude, and all laws and lives depending on the will of the prince: I wonder then the doctor should make such a parallel. Indeed, the senate had been far more than ever our par. liaments were, or ought to be; but now, that was far less than our parliament hath been, or, I hope, ever will be: They were become the sworn vassals of an absolute emperor; ours, the sworn subjects of a liege or legal prince. Fourthly, he says, Then was more cause of resistance, when kings were enemies to religion, and had over, thrown laws and liberties. I answer, there were no causes for resistance; not their enmity to religion, had they but a legal power, because religion then was no part of the laws, and so its violation was no subversion of established government. And, for the over, throw of laws and liberties, that was past and done, and the government new, the senate and all the rest actually sworn to absolute principality. Now an ordinance of absolute monarchy was con stituted, the sacred bond of an oath had made it inviolate. But what would he infer hence, all being granted him? Sure this he doth intend, that every soul amongst us, several, and conjoined in a senate, must be subject for conscience, must not resist, under pain of damnation. All this, and whatever besides he can justly infer out of this text, we readily grant, But can any living man hence collect, that therefore no resistance may be made to fellow.subjects, executing destructive illegal acts of the prince's will in a legal monarchy? Will he affirm that the ordinance of God is resisted, and damnation incurred thereby? God's ordinance is the power, and the person invested with that power; but here, force is offered to neither, as before I have made it appear. And herein we have Bishop Bilson consenting, where he says, *that the superior power, here forbidden to be resisted, is not the prince's will against his laws, but agreeing with his laws. I think the day itself is not more clear than this satisfaction, to all

Bilson of Subjection, p. 94, and 280,

that can be concluded out of that text; so the foundation of all that discourse is taken from it, if his intent was thence to prove unlawfulness of resistance of instruments of arbitrariness in this kingdom.

Let us also consider the force of his reasons, whether they impugn this point in hand. He says, such power of resistance would be no fit means of safety to a state, but prove a remedy worse than the diseases. His reasons, 1. Because it doth tend to the overthrow of that order, which is the life of a commonwealth; it would open a way to people, upon the like pretences, to resist, and even overthrow power duly administered. 2. It may proceed to a change of government. 3. It is accompanied with the evils of civil war. 4. On the same ground the two houses proceed against the king, may the people proceed to resistance against them, accusing them not to discharge their trust. Lastly, seeing some must be trusted in every state, it is reason the highest and final trust should be in the highest power. These are his main reasons on which he builds his con clusion against resistance.

To his first, I say, it were strange, if resistance of destructive disorder should tend to the overthrow of order. It may, for the time, disturb, as physick, while it is in working, disturbs the natural body, if the peccant humours make strong opposition; but sure it tends to health, and so doth this resistance of disorder to order. Neither would it open a way for the people to violate the powers; for doing right can open no way to the doing of wrong. If any wicked seditious spirits should make use of the veil of justice to cover unnatural rebellion, shall a people's right and liberty be taken from them to prevent such possible abuse? Rather let the foulness of such pretences discover itself, so God and good men will abhor them; such clokes of rebellion have, in former ages, been taken off, and the authors brought to just confusion, without the expence of the liberties of this kingdom.

To the second, must not instruments be resisted, which actually intend, and seek a change of government, because such resistance may proceed to a change of government? Is not an unlikely possibility of change to be hazarded, rather than a certain one suffered ? But I say, it cannot proceed to a change of government, unless it exceed the measure of lawful resistance; yea, it is impossible that resistance of instruments should ever proceed to a change of govern. ment; for that includeth the greatest resistance and violation of the person and power of the monarch, the lawfulness of which I utterly disclaim.

Thirdly, It is not ever accompanied with the evils of civil war, but when the prince's will finds enough instruments of their country's ruin to raise it; and then the mischiefs of that war must light on those which raise it. But suppose it may ensue, yet a temporary evil of war is to be chosen rather than a perpetual loss of liberty, and subversion of the established frame of a government.

In the fourth, I deny the parity of reason; for the two houses are bodies constituted and endowed with legislative authority, and

trust of preservation of the frame, by the fundamentals of the kingdom; which the people, out of those houses, are not. Again, the government being composed of a threefold consenting power, one to restrain the exorbitance of another: All three together are absolute and equivalent to the power of the most absolute monarch. The concurrent will of all three makes a law, and so it is the kingdom's law.

To the last, I answer, In every state some must be trusted, and the highest trust is in him who hath the supreme power. These two, the supreme trust, and the supreme power, are inseparable; and such as the power is, such is the trust; an absolute power supposes an absolute trust! A power, allied with the connexion of another power, as here it is, supposeth a trust of the same nature. A joint trust, yet, saving the supremacy of the monarch, so far forth as it may be saved, and not be absolute, and the other's authority nullified. It may be further argued, that it being the prerogative royal to have the managing of the sword, that is, legal force in the kingdom; none can, on any pretence whatever, use lawful force, either against him, or any, but by his will; for it is committed to him by law, and to none but whom he assigns it to; so that the laws of the kingdom, putting all power of force and arms into his trust, have placed him, and all those who serve him, in a state of irresistibleness in respect of any lawful force. This is a point much stood on, and, on this ground, the parliament now assuming the disposing of the militia by an ordinance, it is complained on, as a usurping of what the law hath committed to the king, as his prerogative; the opposing of which ordinance, by a commission of array, was the beginning of this miserable civil war. I will distinctly lay down my answer hereto, submitting it to every impartial judgment.

1. The power of the sword, being for defence of the laws, by punishing violators, and protecting subjects, it is subservient to government, and must needs belong to him who is intrusted with the government, as a necessary requisite, without which he cannot per

form his trust.

2. As it is an appendix to the power of government, and goes along with it, so it goes under the same terms, belonging to the prince, as the other doth, scil. absolutely, to use at will, where the monarchy is absolute, or with limitation, to use according to law, where the monarchy is limited; so that, in this government, the arms and sword of the kingdom is the king's, to a defined use committed to him, viz. For defence of the laws and frame of government established, and not for arbitrary purposes, or to inable ministers to execute commands of mere will.

3. The two houses, in vertue of the legislative authority, in part residing in them, are interested in the preservation of laws and government, as well as the king: And, in case the king should mis employ that power of arms to strengthen subverting instruments; or, in case the laws and government be in apparent danger, the king refusing to use the sword to that end of preservation for which it was committed to him; I say, in this case, the two estates may, by

an extraordinary and temporary ordinance, assume those arms where. with the king is intrusted, and perform the king's trust: And, though such ordinance of theirs is not formally legal, yet it is eminently legal, justified by the very intent of the architects of the govern ment, when, for these uses, they committed the arms to the king. And no doubt they may command the strength of the kingdom, to save the being of the kingdom: For none can reasonably imagine the architectonical powers, when they committed the power of government and arms to one, to preserve the frame they had composed, did thereby intend to disable any, much less the two estates, from preserving it, in case the king should fail to do it in this last need. And, thus doing the king's work, it ought to be interpreted as done by his will; because, as the law is his will, so that the law should be preserved is his will, which he expressed when he undertook the govern. ment; it is his deliberate will, and ought to be done, though at any time he oppose it by an after will, for that is his sudden will, as Dr. Fern himself, Sect. i. doth teach us to distinguish.

CHAP. VI.

In what cases the other Estates may, without, or against the King's Personal consent, assume the arms of the kingdom?

SECT. 1.

Whether it be lawful to take up arms against the Magistrate, perverting his power to a wrong end?

WHOEVER were the authors of that book lately published, stiled, 'Scripture and reason pleaded for defensive arms,' have laid new and over-large grounds for resistance. Two assertions they endeavour to maintain: First, Those governors (whether supreme, or others) who, under pretence of authority from God's ordinance, disturb the quiet and peaceable life in godliness and honesty, are far from being God's ordinance, in so doing, Sect. iii. Secondly, this tyranny, not being God's ordinance, they, which resist it even with arms, resist not the ordinance of God.' Hereon, Sect. iv. They free christians, even in the Apostle's time, and so under the Roman Emperors, or any other government, from a necessity of passive subjection in case of persecution; affirming, that the christians, in those first persecu tions, had they been strong enough, might have used arms for defence against the tyranny of their emperors. Their ground is from the reasons used by the apostle, Rom. xiii. where he commands subjec tion, and forbids resistance to the higher powers, because they are God's ordinance, his ministers, for praise to well doers, for terror to evil doers. But I must profess myself to dissent from them in this opinion, conceiving, that the apostle, in urging those reasons drawn from the ends of power, doth intend to press them to subjec tion, by shewing them what benefit comes to men by authority in its due use; and not to shew them how far they are bound to be subject, and in what cases they may resist: For, had he had such

a meaning at that time, when the governors did altogether cross those ends of their ordination, he had taught them rather a doctrine of resistance, than subjection. Shall we conceive, that he would press subjection to powers in the hands of heathens and persecutors, if he had not intended they should passively be subject unto them, even under those persecutions? Rather I approve the received doctrine of the saints in ancient and modern times, who could never find this licence in that place of the apostle, and do concur with Master Burroughs, professing against resistance of authority, though abused: 'If those (saith he, in his answer to Dr. Fern, Sect. ii.) who have power to make laws, make sinful laws, and so give authority to any to force obedience, we say, here there must be either flying, or passive obedience.' And again: We acknowledge, we must not resist for religion, if the laws of the land be against it.' But what do they say against this? In making such laws against religion, the magistrates are not God's ordinance; and therefore to resist is not to resist God's ordinance: As an inferior magistrate, who hath a commission of power for such ends, is resistible, if he exceed his commission, and abuse his power for other ends; so princes, being God's ministers, and having a deputed commission from him to such ends (viz. the promotion of godliness, peace, and justice) if they pervert their power to contrary ends, may be resisted, without violation of God's ordinance. That I may give a satisfactory answer to this, which is the sum of their long discourse, I must lay it down in several assertions.

First, I acknowledge, God's ordinance is not only power, but power for such ends, scil. the good of the people.

Secondly, It is also God's ordinance, that there should be in men, by publick consent called thereto, and invested therein, a power to chuse the means, the laws and rules of government conducing to that end; and a judging, in relation to those laws, who be the welldoers, which ought to be praised, and who the evil doers, who ought to be punished. This is as fully God's ordinance, as the former; for, without this, the other cannot be performed.

Thirdly, When they, who have this final civil judicature, shall censure good men as evil-doers, or establish iniquity by a law, to the encouragement of evil-doers; in this case, if it be a subordi nate magistrate that doth it, appeal must be made (as St. Paul did) to the supreme; if it be the supreme, which, through mistake, or corruption, doth miscensure, from whom there lies no civil appeal, then, without resistance of that judgment, we must passively sub. mit. And he, who in his own knowledge of innocency, or goodness of his cause, shall by force resist, that man erects a tribunal in his own heart against the magistrate's tribunal; clears himself by a pri vate judgment against a publick, and executes his own sentence by force against the magistrate's sentence, which he hath repealed and made void in his own heart. In unjust censures by the highest ma. gistrates, from whom there is no appeal, but to God, the sentence cannot be opposed, till God reverse it, to whom we have appealed. In the mean time we must suffer, as Christ did, notwithstanding our