so that, for such other estates, it is not only lawful to deny obedience and submission to illegal proceedings, as private men may, but it is their duty, and by the foundations of the government they are bound to prevent the dissolution of the established frame.

Fourthly, the person of the monarch, even in these mixed forms (as I said before in the limited) ought to be above the reach of violence in his utmost exorbitances. For, when a people have sworn allegiance, and invested a person or line with supremacy, they have made it sacred, and no abuse can divest him of that power, irrevocably communicated. And, while he hath power in a mixed monarchy, he is the universal sovereign, even of the other limiting states: So that, being above them, he is de jure exempt from any penal hand.

Fifthly, That one inconvenience must necessarily be in all mixed governments, which I shewed to be in limited governments, there can be no constituted, legal, authoritative judge of the fundamental controversies arising betwixt the three estates. If such do arise, it is the fatal disease of these governments, for which no salvo can be prescribed. For the established being of such authority would, ipso facto, overthrow the frame, and turn it into absoluteness. So that, if one of these, or two, say their power is invaded, and the govern ment assaulted by the other, the accused denying it, it doth become a controversy. Of this question there is no legal judge. It is a case beyond the possible provision of such a government. The accusing side must make it evident to every man's conscience. In this case, which is beyond the government, the appeal must be to the commu. nity, as if there were no government; and, as by evidence men's consciences are convinced, they are bound to give their utmost assistance. For the intention of the frame, in such states, justifies the exercise of any power, conducing to the safety of the universality and government established.

PART II.

OF THIS PARTICULAR MONARCHY.

CHAP. I.

Whether the power, wherewith our Kings are invested, be an absolute, or limited and moderated Power.

SECT. 1.

HAVING thus far proceeded in general, before we can bring

home this to a stating of the great controversy, which now our sins, God's displeasure, and evil turbulent men, have raised up in our lately most flourishing, but now most unhappy kingdom: We must first look into the frame and composure of our monarchy; for, till we fully are resolved of that, we cannot apply the former general truths, nor on them ground the resolution of this ruining conten Mon.

Concerning the essential composure of this government, that it is monarchical, is by none to be questioned; but the enquiry must be about the frame of it. And so there are seven great questions to be prosecuted.

First, whether it be a limited monarchy, or absolute? Here the question is, not concerning power in the exercise, but the root and being of it; for none will deny, but that the way of government used, and to be used in this realm, is a defined way; only some speak, as if this definement was an act of grace from the monarchs themselves, being pleased at the suit and, for the good of the people, to let their power run into act through such a course and current of law; whereas, if they at any time shall think fit, on great causes, to vary from that way, and use the full extent of their power, none ought to contradict or refuse to obey. Neither is it the question, whether they sin against God, if they abuse their power, and run out into acts of injury at pleasure, and violate those laws which they have, by publick faith and oath, promised to observe; for none will deny this to be true, even in the most absolute monarch in the world. But the point controverted is punctually this. whether the authority, which is inherent in our kings, be boundless and absolute, or limited and determined; so that the acts which they do, or command to be done, without that compass and bounds, be not only sinful in themselves, but invalid and nonauthoritative to others?

SECT. II.

Now, for the determining hereof, I conceive, and am in my judgment persuaded, that the sovereignty of our kings is radically and funda. mentally limited, and not only in the use and exercise of it; and am persuaded so on these grounds and reasons.

First, because the king's majesty himself, who best knows, by his council, the nature of his own power, says, that the law is the measure of his power; which is as full a concession of the thing as words can express. If it be the measure of it, then his power is limited by it; for the measure is the limits and bounds of the thing limited. And, in his answer to both houses concerning the militia, speaking of the men named to him, says, if more power shall be thought fit to be granted to them, than by law is in the crown itself, his majesty holds it reasonable, that the same be by some law first vested in him, with power to transfer it to those persons, &c. In which passage it is granted, that the powers of the crown are by law, and that the king hath no more than are vested in him by law.

Secondly, Because it is in the very constitution of it mixed, as I shall afterwards make it appear, then it is radically limited; for, as I shewed before, every mixed monarchy is limited, though not on the contrary; for the necessary connexion of other power to it is one of the greatest limitations. A subordination of causes doth not ever prove the supreme cause of limited vertue; a co-ordination doth always.

Declaration from Newmarket, Mart. 9, 1641.

Thirdly, I prove it from the ancient, ordinary, and received denominations; for the king's majesty is called our liege, that is, legal sovereign; and we his liege, that is, his legal subjects; what do these names argue, but that his sovereignty and our subjection are legal, that is, restrained by law?

Fourthly, Had we no other proof, yet that of prescription were sufficient. In all ages, beyond record, the laws and customs of the kingdom have been the rule of government: liberties have been stood upon, and grants thereof, with limitations of royal power, made and acknowledged by Magna Charta, and other publick and solemn acts; and no obedience acknowledged to be due, but that which is according to law, nor claimed, but under some pretext or title of law.

Fifthly, The very being of our common aud statute laws, and our kings, acknowledging themselves bound to govern by them, doth prove and prescribe them limited; for those laws are not of their sole composing, nor were they established by their sole authority, but by the concurrence of the other two estates; so that, to be confined to that which is not merely their own, is to be in a limited condition.

Some there be which have lately written on this subject, who take another way to prove our government limited by law, viz. By denying all absolute government to be lawful; affirming, that absolute monarchy is not at all God's ordinance, and so no lawful power secured from resistance. What is their ground for this? God allows no man to rule as he lists,nor puts men's lives in the pleasure of the monarch; it is a power arbitrary and injurious. But I desire those authors to consider, that, in absolute monarchy, there is not a resignation of men to any will or list, but to the reasonable will of the monarch, which, having the law of reason to direct it, is kept from injurious acts. But see, for defence of this government, Part i. cap. 2.

SECT. III.

HAVING set down those reasons, on which my judgment is settled on this side, I will consider the main reasons, whereby some have endeavoured to prove this government to be of an absolute nature, and will shew their invalidity. Many divines, perhaps inconside rately, perhaps wittingly for self ends, have been, of late years, strong pleaders for absoluteness of monarchical power in this land; and pressed obedience on the consciences of people in the utmost extremity, which can be due in the absolute monarchy in the world; but I seldom, or never, heard or read them make any difference of powers, but usually bring their proofs from those scriptures, where subjection is commanded to the higher powers, and all resistance of them forbidden, and from examples taken out of the manner of the government of Israel and Judah; as if any were so impious to con.

Pleaders for defensive arms, Sect. ii, and iv.

tradict those truths, and they were not as well obeyed in limited government, as in absolute; or, as if examples, taken out of one government, do always hold in another, unless their aim was to deny all distinction of governments, and to hold all absolute, who have any where the supreme power conveyed to them.

Amongst these, I wonder most at that late discourse of Dr. Fern, who, in my judgment, avoucheth things inconsistent, and evidently contradictory one to the other. For in his preface he acknowledges our obedience to be limited and circumscribed by the laws of the land, and accordingly to be yielded or denied to the higher power; and, that he is as much against an absolute power in the king, and to raise him to an arbitrary way of government, as against resistance on the subjects part; also, that his power is limited by law, Sect. v. Yet, on the other side, he affirms, that the king holds his crown by conquest; that it is descended to him by three conquests, Sect. ii. that even our senate of parliament hath not so much plea for resistance, as the ancient Roman senate had under the Roman emperors, whose power we know was absolute, Sect ii; that, in monarchy, the judgment of many is reduced to one; that monarchy settles the chief power and final judgment in one, Sect. v. What is this but to con

fess him limited, and yet to maintain him absolute ?

But let us come to the arguments. First, say they, our kings came to their right by conquest; yea, says the doctor, by three conquests: He means, the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, as appears afterwards: Therefore their right is absolute. Here, that they may advance themselves, they care not, though it be on the ruin of publick liberty, by bringing a whole nation into the condition of conquered slaves. But to the argument: 1. Suppose the antecedent true, the conse cution is not always true; for, as it is evident in the first part, all conquest doth not put the conqueror into an absolute right. He may come to a right by conquest; but not sole conquest, but a partial, occasioning a right by final agreement; and then the right is specificated by that fundamental agreement. Also, he may by the sword prosecute a claim of another nature; and, in his war, intend only an acquiring of that claimed right, and, after conquest, rest in that. Yea, farther, he may win a kingdom merely by the sword, and enter on it by the right of conquest; yet, considering that right of conquest hath too much of force in it to be safe and permanent; he may think conquest the best means of getting a kingdom, but not of holding, and, in wisdom for himself and posterity, gain the affections of the people, by deserting that title, and taking a new by politick agreement, or descend from that right by fundamental grants of liberties to the people, and limitations to his own power. But these things I said, in effect, before, in the first part, only here I have recalled them, to shew what a non sequitur there is in the argument. But that which I chiefly intend, is to shew the infirmity or falshood of the antecedent; it is an assertion most untrue in itself, and pernicious to the state. Our princes profess no other way of coming to the crown, but by right of succession to rule free subjects, in a legal monarchy. All the little shew of proof, these assertors

have, is from the root of succession: So William commonly called the Conqueror. For that of the Saxons was an expulsion, not a conquest; for, as our histories record, they, coming into the kingdom, drove out the Britons, and by degrees planted themselves under their commanders, and no doubt continued the freedom they had in Ger many; unless we should think, that by conquering they lost their own liberties to the kings, for whom they conquered, and expelled the Britons into Wales. Rather I conceive, the original of the subjects liberty was by those our fore-fathers brought out of Germany: Where, as Tacitus reports, nec regibus infinita aut libera potestas; their kings had no absolute, but limited power; and all weighty matters were dispatched by general meetings of all the estates. Who sees not here the antiquity of our liberties, and frame of government ? So they were governed in Germany, and so here, to this day, for, by transplanting themselves, they changed their soil, not their man. ners and government. Then, that of the Danes, indeed, was a violent conquest; and, as all violent rules, it lasted not long; when the English expelied them, they recovered their countries and li berties together. Thus it is clear, the English liberty remained to them, till the Norman invasion, notwithstanding that Danish interruption. Now for Duke William, I know nothing they have in him, but the bare stile of conqueror, which seems to make for them. The very truth is, and every intelligent reader of the history of those times will attest it, that Duke William pretended the grant and gift of King Edward, who died without children, and he came with forces into this kingdom, not to conquer, but make good his title against his enemies. His end of entering the land was not to gain a new absolute title, but to vindicate the old limited one, whereby the English Saxon kings his predecessors held this kingdom. Though his title was not so good, as it should be, yet it was better than Ha. reld's, who was only the son of Goodwynt, steward of King Edward's house: Whereas William was cousin to Emma, mother to the said King Edward; by whom he was adopted, and by solemn promise of King Edward was to succeed him. Of which promise, Harold himself became surety, and bound by oath to see it performed. Here was a fair title, especially Edgar Atheling, the right heir, being of tender age, and disaffected by the people. Neither did he proceed to a full conquest, but after Harold, who usurped the crown, was slain in battle, and none to succeed him; the throne being void, the people chose rather to submit to William and his title, than endure the hazard of ruining war, by opposing him, to set up a new king. It is not to be imagined, that such a realm as England could be con quered by so few, in such a space, if the people's voluntary acceptance of him, and his claim, had not facilitated and shortened his undertaking. Thus we have it related in Mr. Camden, that before Harold usurped the crown most men thought it the wisest policy to set the crown on William's head, that, by performing the oath and promise, a war might be prevented: And that Harold, by assuming

Tacit de Morib. Germ. Sect. 3, and 5.

Camden Britan. Norman