by immediate edicts and commands of his own will governs them, as in his own and council's judgment he thinks fit. Secondly, when he sets down a rule and law by which he will ordinarily govern, reserving to himself liberty to vary from it, wherein and as often as in his discretion he judges fit: And in this the sovereign is as free as the former, only the people are at a more certainty what he expects from them in ordinary. Thirdly, When he not only sets down an express rule and law to govern by, but also promiseth and engages himself, in many cases, not to alter that rule. But this engagement is an after condescent and act of grace, not dissolving the absolute oath of subjection, which went before it, nor is intended to be the rule of his power, but of the exercise of it. This ruler is not so ab. solute as the former in the use of his power, for he hath put a bond on that, which he cannot break without breach of promise; that is, without sin: But he is as absolute in his power, if he will sinfully put it forth into act: It hath no political bounds, for the people still owe him absolute subjection, that not being dissolved or lessened by an act of grace coming afterwards,

SECT. III.

Whether Resistance be lawful in absolute Monarchy.

Now, in governments of this nature, how far obedience is due, and whether any resistance be lawful, is a question which here must be decided; for the due effecting whereof, we must premise some needful distinctions to avoid confusion. Obedience is two-fold; First, positive and active, when in conscience of an authority we do the thing commanded: Secondly, Negative and passive, when, though we answer not authority by doing, yet we do it by contented undergoing the penalty imposed. Proportionably resistance is two-fold: First, positive, by an opposing of force: Secondly, negative, when only so much is done as may defend ourselves from force, without return of force against the assailant. Now, this negative resistance is also two-fold: First, In inferior and sufferable cases: Secondly, Or in the supreme case, and last necessity of life and death; and then too, it is first either of a particular person or persons; Secondly, or of the whole community. And if of particular persons, then either under plea and pretence of equity assaulted: or else without any plea at all, merely for will and pleasure's sake; for to that degree of rage and cruelty sometimes the heart of man is given over. All these are very distinguishable cases, and will be of use either in this or the ensuing disputes.

To the question, I say, First, Positive' obedience is absolutely due to the will and pleasure of an absolute monarch, in all lawful and indifferent things; because in such a state the will of the prince is the supreme law; so that it binds to obedience in every thing not prohibited by a superior, that is, divine law: For it is in such case the higher power, and is God's ordinance.

Secondly, When the will of an absolute monarch commands a thing forbidden to be done by God's law, then it binds not to active

obedience; then it is the apostle's rule undoubtedly true, 'It is better to obey God than men :' For the law of the inferior gives place to the superior. In things defined by God, it should be all one with us, for the magistrate to command us to transgress that, as to command us an impossibility; and impossibilities fall under no law. But on this ground no man must quarrel with authority, or reject its commands as unlawful, unless there be an open unlawfulness in the face of the act commanded. For, if the unlawfulness be hidden in the ground or reason of the action, inferiors must not be curious to inquire into the grounds or reasons of the commands of superiors; for such license of inquiry would often frustrate great undertakings, which much depend on speed and secrecy of execution. I speak all this of absolute government, where the will and reason of the monarch is made the higher power, and its expression the supreme law of a state.

Thirdly, Suppose an absolute monarch should so degenerate into monstrous unnatural tyranny, as apparently to seek the destruction of the whole community, subject to him in the lowest degree of vassalage, then such a community may negatively resist such subversion: Yea, and if constrained to it by the last necessity, positively resist, and defend themselves by force against any instruments whatsoever employed for the effecting thereof. 1. David did so in his particular case, when pursued by Saul: He made negative resistance by flight, and doubtless he intended positive resistance against any instrument, if the negative would not have served the turn: Else why did he so strengthen himself by forces? Sure not to make positive resistance, and lay violent hands upon the person of the Lord's anointed, as it appeared; yet for some reason he did it, doubtless, which could be none other, but by that force of arms to defend himself against the violence of any misemployed inferior hands. If then he might do it for his particular safety, much rather may it be done for the publick. 2. Such an act is without the compass of any the most absolute po. tentate; and therefore to resist, in it, can be to resist no power, nor the violation of any due of subjection For, first, the most submiss subjection ever intended by any community, when they put them. selves under another's power, was the command of a reasonable will and power; but to will and command the destruction of the whole body, over which a power is placed, were an act of will most unreasonable and self-destructive, and so not the act of such a will, to which subjection was intended by any reasonable ereatures. Secondly, the publick good and being is aimed at in the utmost bond of subjection; for, in the constitution of such unlimited sovereignty, though every particular man's good and being is subjected to the will of one supreme, yet certainly the conservation of the whole publick was intended by it; which being invaded, the intent of the constitution is overthrown, and an act is done which can be supposed to be within the compass of no political power: So that did Nero, as it was repeated of him in his immanity, thirst for the destruction of whole Rome; and if he were truly what the senate pronounced him to be, humani generis hostis, then it might justify a negative

resistance of his person; and a positive of any agent should be set on so inhuman a service. And the United Provinces are allowed in resisting Philip II, though he had been their absolute monarch, if he resolved the extirpation of the whole people, and the planting the country with Spaniards, as it is reported he did. And that assertion of some, 'That all resistance is against the apostle's prohibition:' Re sistance by power of arms is utterly unlawful; cannot be justified in such a latitude. But of this more will be spoken in the current of this discourse.

Fourthly, Suppose by such a power any particular person or persons life be invaded, without any plea of reason or cause for it, I suppose it hard to deny him liberty of negative resistance of power; yea, and positive, of any agents, in such assault of murther: For, though the case be not so clear as the former, yet it seems to me justified by the fact of David, and the rescuing of Jonathan from the causeless cruel intent of his father's putting him to death. As also such an act of will, carrying no colour of reason with it, cannot be esteemed the act of a rational will, and so no will intended to be the law of sovereignty. Not that I think a monarch of such absolute. ness is bound to yield a reason why he commands any man to be put to death, before his command be obeyed; but I conceive the person so commanded to death may be justified before God and men for pro. tecting himself by escape, or otherwise, unless some reason or cause be made known to him of such command.

Fifthly, Persons subject to an unlimited dominion must, without resistance, subject their estates, liberties, persons, to the will and pleasure of their Lord, so it carry any plea or shew of reason and equity. First, It seems to me evident, 1 Pet. ii. 18, 19, 20, if well. doing be mistaken by the reason and judgment of the power for ill. doing, and we be punished for it, yet, the magistrate going according to his misguided reason, it is the command of a reasonable will, and so to be submitted to, because such a one suffers by law, in a state where the Lord's will is the law. Secondly, In commands of the power, where is the plea of reason and equity on the part of the commander, whether it be such indeed, some power must judge, but the constitution of absolute monarchy resolves all judgment into the will of the monarch, as the supreme law: So that, if his will judicially censure it just, it must be yielded to, as if it were just without re peal or redressment by any created power. And let none complain of this as a hard condition, when they or their ancestors have subjected themselves to such a power by oath or political contract; If it be God's ordinance to such, it must be subjected to, and its exorbitances borne, as he says in Tacitus, as men bear famine, pestilence, and other effects of God's displeasure.

Sixthly, In absolute monarchy, the person of the monarch is above the reach of just force and positive resistance; for such a full resignation of men's selves to his will and power, by the irrevocable oath and bond of political contract, doth make the person as sacred as the unction of Saul or David. In such a state, all lawful power is below him, so that he is uncapable of any penal hand, which must

be from a superior, or it is unjust. I have been the longer on this absolute monarchy, because, though it doth not concern us, yet it will give light to the stating of doubts in governments of a more restrained nature; for what is true here, in the full extent of power, is there also as true within the compass of their power.

SECT. IV.

What makes a Monarchy limited?

IN moderate or limited monarchy, it is an enquiry of some weight to know, what it is which constitutes it in the state of a limited monarchy.

First, A monarchy may be stinted in the exercise of its power, and yet be an absolute monarchy, as appeared before, in our distinc tion of absolute monarchy: if that bounds be a subsequent act, and proceeding from free will and grace in the monarch. For it is not the exercise, but the nature and measure of power, wherewith he is radically invested, which denominates him a free, or conditionate monarch.

Secondly, I take it, that a limited monarch must have his bounds of power ab externo, not from the free determination of his own will. And now kings have not divine words and binding laws to constitute them in their sovereignty, but derive it from ordinary providence; the sole mean hereof, is the consent and fundamental contract of a nation or men, which consent puts them in their power, which can be no more nor other than is conveyed to them by such contract of subjection. This is the root of all sovereignty individuated and existent in this, or that person, or family; till this come and lift him up, he is a private man, not differing in state from the rest of his brethren; but then he becomes another man, his person is sacred by that sovereignty conveyed to it, which is God's ordinance and image. The truth hereof will be more fully discovered, when we come to speak of elective and successive monarchy.

Thirdly, He is then a limited monarch, who hath a law, beside his own will, for the measure of his power. First, The supreme power of the state must be in him, so that his power must not be limited by any power above his; for then he were not a monarch, but a subordinate magistrate. Secondly, This supreme power must be restrained by some law according to which this power was given, and, by direction of which, this power must act; else he were not a limited monarch, that is, a liege sovereign, or legal king. Now, a sovereignty comes thus to be legal, or defined to a rule of law, either by original constitution, or by after condescent. By original constitution, when the society publick confers on one man a power by limited contract, resigning themselves to his government by such a law, reserving to themselves such immunities: In this case, they, which at first had power over themselves, had power to set their own terms of subjection; and he which hath no title of power over them, but by their act, can, de jure, have no greater than what is put over to him by that act. By after condescent, viz. when a Lord, who by conquest, or other right, hath an

absolute arbitrary power, but, not liking to hold by such a right, doth either formally or vertually desert it, and take a new legal right, as judging it more safe for him to hold by, and de sirable of the people to be governed by. This is equivalent to that by original constitution, yea, is all one with it; for this is, in that respect, a secondary original constitution. But if it be objected, that, this being a voluntary condescent, is an act of grace, and so doth not derogate from his former absoluteness, as was said before of an absolute monarch, who confines himself to govern by one rule: I answer, this differs essentially from that; for there a free Lord of grace yields to rule by such a law, reserving the fulness of power, and still requiring of the people a bond and oath of utmost indefinite subjection; so that it amounts not to a limitation of radical power. Whereas here is a change of title, and a resolution to be subjected to, in no other way, than according to such a frame of govern. ment; and accordingly, no other bond or oath of allegiance is re quired or taken, than according to such a law; this amounts to a limitation of radical power. And therefore they speak too generally, who affirm of all acts of grace proceeding from princes to people, as if they did not limit absoluteness: It is true, of acts of grace of that first kind, but yet, you see an act of grace may be such a one, as may amount to a resignation of that absoluteness into a more mild and moderate power, unless we should hold it out of the power of an absolute lord to be other; or that by free condescent, and act of grace, a man cannot as well part with, or exchange his right and title to a thing, as define himself in the use and exercise, which I think none will affirm.

SECT. V.

How far Subjection is due in a limited Monarchy.

In all governments of this allay and legal constitution, there are three questions of special moment to be considered:

First, How far subjection is due? As far as they are God's ordinance, as far as they are a power, and they are a power as far as the contract fundamental, from which, under God, their authority is derived, doth extend. As absolute lords must be obeyed as far as their will enjoins, because their will is the measure of their power, and their subjects law; so these, in the utmost extent of the law of the land, which is the measure of their power, and their subjects duty of obedience. I say so far, but I do not say no further; for I believe, though on our former grounds it clearly follows, that such authority transcends its bounds, if it command beyond the law, and the subject legally is not bound to subjection in such case; yet, in conscience, a subject is bound to yield to the magistrate, even when he cannot, de jure, challenge obedience, to prevent scandal, or any occasion of slighting the power which may sometimes grow, even upon a just refusal. I say, for these causes a subject ought not to use his liberty, but, morem gerere, if it be in a thing in which he can possibly without subversion, and in which his act may not be