liament, because it wants the sanction, a parliament has; if then it seems a solecism, that a meeting, less than a parliament, can make a king, without whom a parliament cannot be, what shall we think of this convention's making a king of him that makes the convention? Can you act lawfully upon an unlawful call, or an unlawful con vention make him a lawful king? We are taught an English proverb, That no stream rises higher than its fountain.' How is it possible for them to give authority to govern that have none, but what they receive from him, who, by our law, can have none, to give? Sir, this is neither more nor less than for his highness to make himself king by a medium of his own, a thing as much below him to do, as it is above us to think of; therefore, if we must go to this work, let us call in more heads to our assistance; but I rather advise, and humbly move, that we pray the prince, who has been our deliverer, to be our arbitratör, to give limits to prerogative and our liberty, to secure us that are the Protestant subjects in our religion, and to shew the king what sort of liberty he only ought to expect for his Roman Catholick subjects; I say, let us beseech him to call back the king for these great ends, the accomplishing of which will make both king and kingdom happy, and the great Prince of Orange renowned in all the histories of Europe, as well as in our annals.

A TREATISE OF MONARCHY *,

CONTAINING TWO PARTS:

I. Concerning Monarchy in General.

II. Concerning this Particular Monarchy.

Wherein all the main Questions, occurrent in both, are stated, disputed, and determined. Done by an earnest desirer of his Country's Peace. London, printed for, and sold by Richard Baldwin, in the Old-Bailey. 1689. Quarto, containing thirtyeight pages,

PART I. CHAP. 1.

Of Political Government, and its Distinction into several Kinds. SECT. I.

Authority, how far from God, how far from Men.

GOVERNMENT and Subjection are relatives, so that what is

said of the one may in proportion be said of the other: which being so, it will be needless to treat of both: because it will be easy to apply what is spoken of the one to the other. Government is Potestatis exercitium, the exercise of a moral power. One of these is the Vide the 200th article in the catalogue of Pamphlets inthe Harleian Library. VOL. IX.

Y

root and measure of the other; which, if it exceed, is exorbitant, is not government, but a transgression of it. This power and government is differenced with respect to the governed, to wit, a family, which is called oeconomical; or a publick society, which is called political, or magistracy. Concerning this magis tracy we will treat, 1. In general. 2. Of the principal kind of it. In general concerning magistracy, there are two things about which I find difficulty and difference, viz. the original, and the end.

First, for the original: there seem to be two extreams in opinion; while some amplify the divinity thereof, others speak so slightly of it, as if there were little else but humane institution in it. I will briefly lay down my apprehensions of the evident truth in this point; and it may be, things being clearly and distinctly set down, there will be no real ground for contrariety in this matter. Three things herein must necessarily be distinguished, viz. 1. The constitution or power of magistracy in general. 2. The limitation of it to this or that kind. 3. The determination of it to this or that individual person or line.

For the first of these; 1. It is God's express ordinance, that, in the societies of mankind, there should be a magistracy or governa ment. At first, when there were but two, God ordained it, Gen. iii. 16. St. Paul affirms as much of the powers that be, none excepted, Rom. xiii. 1. 2. This power, wherever placed, ought to be respected as a participation of divine sovereignty, Psal. lxxxii. 1, 6. and every soul ought to be subject to it for the Lord's sake, 1 Pet. ii. 13. that is, for conscience sake of God's ordinance, Rom. xiii. 5. and under penalty of damnation, ver. 2. These are truths, against which there is no colour of opposition. Indeed, this power may be claimed by them who have it not; and, where there is a limitation of this power, subjection may be claimed in cases which are without those limits. But, to this ordinance of power where it is, and when it requires subjection, it must be given, as before.

For the second; 1. In some particular communities, the limita tion of it to this or that kind, is an immediate ordinance of God: So kingly power was appointed to the Jews on their desire, 1 Sam. viii.

9.

Whether they had not a kind of monarchical government before, I will not stand on it; but it is evident, that then, on their earnest desire, God himself condescended to an establishment of regality in that state. 2. But, for a general binding ordinance, God hath given no word, either to command or commend one kind above another: Men may, according to their relations to the form they live under, to their affections and judgments in divers respects, prefer this or that form above the rest; but we have no divine limitation; and it were an absurdity' to think so; for then we should uncharitably condemn all the communities which have not that form, for violation of God's ordinance, and pronounce those other powers unlawful. 3. This then must have another and lower fountain to flow from, which can be no other than human. The higher power is God's ordinance: That it resideth in one, or more; in such or such a way, is

from human designment; for, when God leaves a matter indifferent, the restriction of this indifferency is left to secondary causes.

And

I conceive this is St. Peter's meaning, when he calls magistracy a'r pwain lions, human creature; St. Paul calls it, God's ordinance, because the power is God's; St. Peter calls it human ordinance, because the specification of it to this or that form, is, from the societies of mankind. I confess it may be called a human creature, in regard of its subject, which is a man or men; or its end, which is to rule over men for the good of men: but the other seems more natu. ral; and it induces no disparagement to authority, being so under. stood. But, however you take that place, yet the thing affirmed stands good, that God, by no word, binds any people to this or that form, till, they, by their own act, bind themselves.

For the third: The same is to be said of it as of the second. Some particular men we find whom God was pleased, by his own immedi ate choice, to invest with this his ordinance of authority: Moses, Saul, David, yea, God, by his immediate ordinance, determined the go vernment of that people to David's posterity, and made it succes sive; so that that people, after his appointment and word was made known to them, and the room void by Saul's death was as immedi ately bound by divine law to have David, and his sons after him, to be magistrates, as to magistracy itself. But God hath not done so for every people; a scriptum est cannot be alledged for the endowing this or that person or stock with sovereignty over a community. They alone had the privilege of an extraordinary word. All others have the ordinary and mediate hand of God to inthrone them. They attain this determination of authority to their persons, by the tacit and virtual, or else express and formal consent of that society of men they govern, either in their own persons, or the root of their succes. sion, as I doubt not in the sequel it will be made appear. But let no man think that it is any lessening or weakening of God's ordinance in them to teach that it is annexed to their persons by a human mean; for though it be not so full a title to come to it by the simple providence of God, as by the express precept of God; yet, when by the disposing hand of God's providence a right is conveyed to a person or family by the means of a publick fundamental oath, contract, and agreement of a state, it is equivalent then to a divine word; and, within the bounds of that publick agreement, the con veyed power is as obligatory as if an immediate word had designed it. Thus it appears that they which say there is divinum quiddam in sovereigns, and that they have their power from God, speak, in some sense, truth; as also they which say, that originally power is in the people, may in a sound sense be understood. And in these things we have Dr. Fern's consent, in his late discourse upon this subject. Sect. 3.

SECT. II.

Whether the end of Government be the People's good. FOR the end of magistracy: to set out that is no hard matter, if we consider what was looked at when God ordained it. That was the

good of the society of men over which it is set: So St. Paul, Rom. xiii. 4. σ is To ȧyador. God aimed at it in the institution of go. vernment; and so do all men in the choice of it, where they may be choosers: such a government, and such persons to sway it, as may most conduce to publick weal. Also it is the measure of all the acts of the governor; and he is good or bad according as he uses his power to the good of the state wherewith he is intrusted. That is the end, but not the sole end; the preservation of the power and honour of the governor is an end too; but I think not co-ordinate, but subordinate to the other, because, doubtless, in the constitution of government, that is first thought on, and this in congruity to that. Also the reason why the power and honour of the magistrate must be preserved, is for the publick society's sake, because its welfare depends thereon: And if it fall out that one of them must suffer, every good magistrate will descend something from his greatness, be it for the good of the community. On the other side, though every subject ought, for the honour and good of the magistrate, to give up his private; yet none ought to advance the greatness of his sovereign with the publick detriment. Whence, in my apprehension, the end of magistracy is the good of the whole body, head and members conjunctly; but, if we speak divisim, then the good of the society is the ultimate end; and next to that, as conducent to that, the governor's greatness and prerogative. And herein also accor. deth Dr. Fern with us, sect. 3, where he says, that the people are the end of the governing power. There is another question of mainer concernment here, in our general discourse of authority, fitly to be handled, viz. How far subjection is due to it? But, because it hath a great dependence on the kinds and states of power, and cannot be so well conceived without the precognition thereof, I will refer it to after opportunities.

SECT. III.

Division of Magistracy.

For the division of this power of magistracy: It cannot be well divided into several species; for it is one simple thing, an indivi. sible beam of divine perfection; yet, for our more distinct con ceiving thereof, men have framed several distinctions of it. So, with respect of its measure, it is absolute or limited. In respect of its manner, it is, as St. Peter divides it, supreme or subordinate. In respect of its mean of acquiring, it is elective or successive; for I conceive that of conquest and prescription of usage are reducible to one of these, as will appear afterwards. In respect of its degrees, it is nomothetical or architectonical, and gubernative or executive. And, in respect of the subject of its residence, there is an ancient and usual distinction of it into monarchical, aristocratical, and de mocratical. These are either simple or mixed, of two, or all three together, of which the predominant gives the denomination. These are not accurate specificative divisions of power, for it admits none such, but partitions of it, according to divers respects. The course of my

intention directs me to speak only of monarchical power, which is the chief and most usual form of government in the world, the other two being apt to resolve into this, but this not so apt to dissolve into them.

CHAP. II.

Of the division of Monarchy into Absolute and Limited.

SECT. I.

Whether Absolute Monarchy be a lawful government. Now we must know that most of these distinctions, which were ap plied to power in general, are applicable to monarchy; because the respects on which they arise are to be found in it. But I will insist on the three main divisions; for the handling of them will bring us to a clear understanding of what is needful to be known about monarchical power.

First, of the distinction of monarchy into absolute and limited. Absolute monarchy is when the sovereignty is so fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under God, but his own will. It is when a people are absolutely resigned up, or resign up themselves to be governed by the will of one man. Such were the ancient eastern monarchies, and that of the Persian and Turk at this day, as far as we know. This is a lawful government, and therefore where men put themselves into this utmost degree of subjection by oath and contract, or are born and brought unto it by God's providence it binds them, and they must abide it, because an oath to a lawful thing is obligatory. This, in Scripture, is very evident, as Ezek. xvii. 16, 18, 19, where judgment is denounced against the King of Judah, for breaking the oath made to the King of Babylon; and it is called God's oath, yet doubtless this was an oath of absolute subjection. And, Rom. xiii. the power, which then was, was absolute; yet the apostle, not excluding it, calls it God's ordinance, and commands subjection to it. So Christ commands tribute to be paid, and pays it himself; yet it was an arbitrary tax, the production of an absolute power. Also the sovereignty of masters over servants was absolute, and the same in economy as absolute monarchy is in policy; yet the apostle enjoins not masters called to christianity, to renounce that title, as too great and rigid to be kept; but exhorts them to modera tion in the exercise of it; and servants to remain contented in the condition of their servitude. More might be said to legitimate this kind of government, but it needs not in so plain a case.

SECT. II.

Three Degrees of Absoluteness.

THIS absolute monarchy hath three degrees, yet all within the state of absoluteness. The first, when the monarch, whose will is the people's law, doth set himself no stated rule or law to rule by, but