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of which the most pestilentious are deposing princes, and breaking faith with hereticks.
Mr. Speaker, the prince is too great a disciple both of religion and honour, not to be satisfied with our doing what is agreeable to them; and let us not press him out of his own sentiments, which have been the greatest and most heroick, that have appeared in this latter age of the world, lest, whilst we have taken arms to redress grievances, we do not draw greater upon ourselves, and that as well from abroad as at home.
For, Sir, when we believe Catholick princes to have zeal so un. seasonably fierce, and unsafe to other people, we cannot at the same time think they will tamely suffer a Catholick king to be kept out of his kingdom, for little more than being so; and I am afraid that this procedure may precipitate Ireland unto extremities; and, if it should follow the king to France, all sober sensible men know, of what ill consequence a revolt to that crown may be to this kingdom. Weshall then, instead of invading France, find difficulties to preserve our own country; nor, for what I see, are we sure of being at peace here. The tide is mightily abated since the king's going from Rochester; those, that wished his humiliation in the government, will by no means hear of his exclusion and perdition, from the crown; they either believe the fault none of his, or not of weight enough to justify so extraordinary an example; kings must see and hear by the eyes and ears of others, which makes it their misfortune, rather than their crime, that they do amiss. We are also of a church that has been singular for her honour and deference to kings, and, if we have any for her, we ought to tread tenderly in this point; and, that we may be just, two things compel us to it for our own sake.
The first is, that the most of things that made the king's govern. ment so obnoxious have already been done in this. We have had a dispensing power exercised both at Exeter and at London; we have had free quarter constrained almost in all places where the Dutch army has marched; we have, in great part, a Popish army too, though that was one of the most crying offences we objected to the king, and from which we drew the most popular notions of our insecurity; the very money, that is now receiving, was asked with armies on foot, and all men will conclude, there was no refusing a proposal so seconded , aud, how far our famous petition of right maybe concerned in this, the gentlemen of the law must determine. But, I dare say, this very loan could not escape this censure under a lawful prince; and, under our present circumstances, we cannot reasonably think the case better.
Nor is this all. The second reason of our caution is, the little truth, that at last appears in those many stories, that, above any charge, seemed to alienate the hearts of his subjects from his majesty, and to dissolve that tie of affection and duty they had to him, as his sub. jeets. Such as, the alarms we had here of a French invasion; the king's selling the kingdom for five millions sterling; the Irish kill. jug man, woman, and child upon the roads; the French embarked for the west, but met and sunk by the Dutch; the forty-thousand new-fashioned knives of slaughter; the queen's back-door for brings ing to bed a supposititious child; her cuffing the Earl of Craven and the Princess Anne, with forty more of that stamp, which time hath proved as malicious as false; how much they have influenced to this present great change, is not unworthy of our just thoughts and anj swer, and, in my opinion, it calls upon us as loudly for a speedy reparation.
Mr. Speaker, these are the things that have driven the king out of England; and, if it can be proved that the Prince of Wales is an impostor, and that there was a league with France to cut off Protestants, I think nothing has befallen him, too hard measure for him. But, truly Sir, it is upon no other terms that the people of England will part with their king, or with any patience think of the usage he has got upon that supposition. But it is objected that some of those that were in arms are in apprehension, lest their estates and lives should be at the mercy of the king, in case he returns. I think that the king will be so far from expecting, and the nation from yielding to it, that they must not only be all pardoned, but those lords and gentlemen, that have been the noble assertors of our English liberties at this juncture, must be posted in the greatest places of honour and trust. I hope the king himself will see it his interest to leave off little and parasitical favourites, and be willing, that such be employed in all his affairs, as his people can confide in, and, as will use their preferments for the honour of their prince, and the good of his subjects.
Mr. Speaker, the objection against the king's return, upon the account of having deserted his kingdoms, by going into France, I am astonished at it, since it is plain, he did not voluntarily desert us, as the Queen of Sweden did her kingdom, but was attacked from abroad, and deserted at home: Consequently, Sir, that cannot be in good morality, as well as law, a demise, forfeiture, surrender, or abdication of the crown of England.
Mr. Speaker, I fear, that, if I have not tired your patience, I have been, at least, ordinary long for some members of a contrary judgment, who sit in this convention, and, therefore, I shall add this humble caution, that our convention; consider well their power, which, I do conceive, is too scanty to make a new king, though it may call home that to whom we have most, if not all of us, sworn allegiance. Nay, let me say further, if our case were so desperate, that no remedy would serve but creating a new king, our convention has not enough of our fellow subjects for the rest to be concluded by. When things are transacted, according to the known laws and ancient customs, the usual deputies may deliver and state the intentions of the people; but, when so many and great alterations must be made in the building, that is to be for the common convenience, every matt thinketh himself worthy to be consulted, as well as the greatest architect, when he is to dwell in the house. Parliaments, that are called by kings, cannot make kings, and a convention not called by a king, and as narrow-bottomed as a parliament, is yet less nor a pa;,
liametit, because it wants the sanction, a parliament has; if then it seems a solecism, that a meeting, less than a parliament, can make a king, without whom a parliament cannot be, what shall we think of this convention's making a king of him that makes the convention? Can you act lawfully upon an unlawful call, or an unlawful con. Tention make him a lawful king? We are taught an English proverb, 'That no stream rises higher than its fountain.' How is it possible for them to give authority to govern that have none, but what they receive from him, who, by our law, can have none, to give? Sir, this is neither more nor less than for his highness to make himself king by a medium of his own, a thing as much below him to do, as it is above us to think of; therefore, if we must go to this work, let us call in more heads to our assistance; but I rather advise, and humbly move, that we pray the prince, who has been our deliverer, to be our arbitrator, to give limits to prerogative and our liberty, to secure us that are the Protestant subjects in our religion, and to shew the king what sort of liberty he only ought to expect for his Roman Catholick subjects; I say, let us beseech him to call back the king for these great ends, the accomplishing of which will make both king and kingdom happy, and the great Prince of Orange renowned in all the histories of Europe, as well as in our annals.
A TREATISE OF MONARCHY *,
CONTAINING TWO PARTS:
I. Concerning Monarchy in General. II. Concerning this Particular Monarchy.
Wherein all the main Questions, occurrent in both, are stated, dis. puted, and determined. Done by an earnest desirer of his Country's Peace. London, printed for, and sold by Richard Baldwin, in the Old-Bailey. 1689. Quarto, containing thirty. eight pages.
Part I. Chap. 1.
VTOVERNMENT and Subjection are relatives, so that what is said of the one may in proportion be said of the other: which being so, it will be needless to treat of both: because it will be easy to apply what is spoken of the one to the other. Government is Potes. tutis exercitium, the exercise of a moral power. One of these is the root and measure of the other; which, if it exceed, is exorbitant, is not government, but a transgression of it. This power and government is differenced with respect to the governed, to wit, a family, which is called oeconomical; or a publick society, which is called political, or magistracy. Concerning this magistracy we will treat, 1. In general. 2. Of the principal kind of it. In general concerning magistracy, there are two things about which I find difficulty and difference, viz. the original, and the end.
* Vide thcscoih article in the catalogue of Pamphlet! inilic Hurlcian Library. TOL. IX. Y
First, for the original: there seem to be two extreams in opinion; while some amplify the divinity thereof, others speak so slightly of it, as if there were little else but humane institution in it. I will briefly lay down my apprehensions of the evident truth in this point; and it may be, things being clearly and distinctly set down, there will be no real ground for contrariety in this matter. Three things herein must necessarily be distinguished, viz. 1. The constitution or power of magistracy in general. 2. The limitation of it to this or that kind. 3. The determination of it to this or that individual person or line.
For the first of these; 1. It is God's express ordinance, that, in the societies of mankind, there should be a magistracy or govern* ment. At first, when there were but two, God ordained it, Gen. iii. 16. St. Paul affirms as much of the powers that be, none excepted, Rom. xiii. 1. 2. This power, wherever placed, ought to be respected as a participation of divine sovereignty, Psal. lxxxii. 1, 6. and every soul ought to be subject to it for the Lord's sake, 1 Pet. ii. 13. that is, for conscience sake of God's ordinance, Rom. xiii. 5. and under penalty of damnation, ver. 2. These are truths, against which there is no colour of opposition. Indeed, this power may be claimed by them who have it not; and, where there is a limitation of this power, subjection may be claimed in cases which are without those limits. But, to this ordinance of power where it is, and when it requires subjection, it must be given, as before.
For the second; 1. In some particular communities, the limitation of it to this or that kind, is an immediate ordinance of God: So kingly power was appointed to the Jews on their desire, 1 Sam. viii. 9. Whether they had not a kind of monarchical government before, I will not stand on it; but it is evident, that then, on their earnest desire, God himself condescended to an establishment of regality in that state. 2. But, for a general binding ordinance, God hath given no word, either to command or commend one kind above another: Men may, according to their relations to the form they live under, to their affections and judgments in divers respects, prefer this or that form above the rest; but we have no divine limitation; and it were an absurdity1 to think so; for then we should uncharitably condemn all the communities which have not that form, for violation of God's ordinance, and pronounce those other powers unlawful. 3. This then must have another and lower fountain to flow from, which can be no other than human. The higher power is God's ordinance: That it resideth in one, or more; in such or such a way, is from human designment; for, when God leaves a matter indifferent, the restriction of this indifferency is left to secondary causes. And I conceive this is St. Peter's meaning, when he calls magistracy a'idfuvini »1io.k, human creature; St. Paul calls it, God's ordinance, because the power is God's; St. Peter calls it human ordinance, because the specification of it to this or that form, is, from the so. cieties of mankind. I confess it may be called a human creature, in regard of its subject, which is a man or men; or its end, which is to rule over men for the good of men: but the other seems more natural; and it induces no disparagement to authority, being so under. stood. But, however you take that place, yet the thing affirmed stands good, that God, by no word, binds any people to this or that form, till, they, by their own act, bind themselves.
For the third: The same is to be said of it as of the second. Some particular men we find whom God was pleased, by his own immediate choice, to invest with this his ordinance of authority: Moses, Saulj David, yea, God, by his immediate ordinance, determined the go* vernment of that people to David's posterity, and made it successive; so that that people, after his appointment and word was made known to them, and the room void by Saul's death was as immedi. ately bound by divine law to have David, and his sons after him, to be magistrates, as to magistracy itself. But God hath not done so for every people; a scriptum est cannot be alledged for the endowing this or that person or stock with sovereignty over a community. They alone had the privilege of an extraordinary word. All others have the ordinary and mediate hand of God to inthrone them. They attain this determination of authority to their persons, by the tacit and virtual, or else express and formal consent of that society of men they govern, either in their own persons, or the root of their succession, as I doubt not in the sequel it will be made appear. But let nojman think that it is any lessening or weakening of God's ordinance in them to teach that it is annexed to their persons by a human mean; for though it be not so full a title to come to it by the simple providence of God, as by the express precept of God; yet, when by the disposing hand of God's providence a right is conveyed to a person or family by the means of a publick fundamental oath, contract, and agreement of a state, it is equivalent then to a divine word; and, within the bounds of that publick agreement, the conveyed power is as obligatory as if an immediate word had designed it. Thus it appears that they which say there is divinum quiddam in sovereigns, and that they have their power from God, speak, in some sense, truth; as also they which say, that originally power is in the people, may in a sound sense be understood. And in these things we have Dr. Fern's consent, in his late discourse upon this subject. Sect. 3.
Sect. IF. i
Whether the end of Government be the People's good. Fon the end of magistracy: to set out that is no hard matter, if we consider what was looked at when God ordained it. That was the