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wherein some have always been fiercer for a total subversion than others, as in the miserable case of Germany, wherein nothing would satisfy the Swede and French, but dividing the very carcass of the imperial eagle, whilst the rest of the confederates were contented to cut off her beak and talons; yet they all agreed in this, that she was to be reduced and weakened. But suppose that allies should prove false, when once a war is commenced, what would it do else, but at once to hasten the ruin of them all? And, in the mean time, instruct the deserted prince to yield to larger terms, out-bid the apostates, stoop to the pretender (who, as a generous conqueror, must pity such) and with him, in revenge, set upon the perfidious, and make them eternally repent such unworthiness, unless safe counsels in the mean time present.

Again, it may be objected, that peace ought to be preserved as long as may be, in hopes that this busy and dangerous prince may expire, before his haughty designs are accomplished, and the affairs of France fall thereby into the hands of an infant, or a lazy and effeminate prince (that is worse than a child) accompanied (as com. monly) with corrupt, faithless, or factious counsellors and flatterers, the vermin of courts, and plague and ruin of crowns and scepters, whereby (without the hazard of a war) her huffling, and prosperous condition (as frequent examples tell us) may be rendered languishing enough.

I answer, that that, which may be, may not be, and either this active prince, who is now but thirty-two, may live (without a powerful confederacy) to give Europe a woful conviction of the folly of such lazy counsel, or leave a successor to tread in his glorious steps, till that be accomplished, which all but Frenchmen ought to abhor, whatever their religious persuasions are; and what wise man will expose, even his little private affairs, to such a risque, when safer remedies are at hand.

If it be said, that, in case our neighbours think fit to invade us, we have store of Sampsons to give them warlike entertainment, where by we may defend our own, without concerning ourselves in affairs abroad.

I answer, First, this is clearly against the practice of our renowned ancestors, and of all wise states in all ages, who have chosen to fight their enemies on an enemy's soil, at any rate, rather than suffer the terrors and desolations of an invasion, though the enemy should have perished all on the spot. Secondly, There is a moral im possibility to maintain England, otherwise than in a languid and frightful condition, were her Sampsons twice as many, should France (whilst we slumber) reduce the Spanish, and United Provinces, and annex the greater part of Germany to his flourishing and mighty kingdom; acquisitions whereof he has too fair a prospect. Thirdly, I dare affirm, that nothing but invincible necessity, or ill counsel, ever disposed a prince to receive an enemy into his own bowels, instead of seeking him abroad, for which I humbly offer these reasons.

1. The assailants both in their own, and their enemies opinion (which, in war, works mighty effects) have commonly the reputation

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of being the better men, merely because they have the courage, tô seek the enemy, at his own door.

2. The invader seldom ventures any thing besides an army, which, ten to one, is exceedingly strengthened (especially if his usage, or pay, be good) by either male-contents in church, or state, or necessitous persons, to whom novelty is welcome, and all governments alike; a reason which made Lycurgus fear to see a beggar, or a voluptuous person, who rides post to poverty, dwell in Sparta.

3. The assailed prince, in case he has not a standing army, and mighty treasure, is, by an invasion, cast into ten thousand straits, in procuring monies, and raising men, when he should be fighting the enemy, or securing the country; whilst the people, instead of taking sword in hand, fly with their amazed families, before the enemy, they know not where, cursing the follies of the government, which have undone them, whilst invasions seldom leave other coun. sellors, but fear and revilings, whose results are always wild and preposterous.

4. If a prince has not a treasure of his own, he shall scarce com. mand the purses of his subjects upon an invasion, when they are busier in concealing their money to supply their own wants in the day of calamity, than expend it in defence of the publick, which their fond hopes insinuate may either be saved without it, or fears suggest is past recovery with it, as was clearly seen in the loss of Constantinople, when taken by Mahomet the great; unless the subject has an egregious reverence for the government, and counsels of the prince, as the results of his justice and virtue, whereof the great Queen Elisabeth, in the attempt of 88, is a glorious instance.

5. Soldiers are generally observed to be most warlike, and manage. able, farthest from home, when freed from the cares and addresses of wives and families.

6. The prince assailed had need stand right in the opinion of his people, in relation to his religion, treasure, and government; for if they (who in all disasters will be judges in spite of fate) have once lost all sentiments of veneration, and confidence of him, through mis-government, they soon grow to despise and nauseate all his actions, distrust and preindicate his counsels, invocate the ghost of some glorious ancestor, and are easily won by the next comer.

7. The prince assailed doth not only, on a battle or two, venture his country, wherein, if he be beaten, he is certainly conquered, but, if he subdue the aggressors, he has only their carcases to atone, for the devastation of his country (the certain effect of invasion, and, next to a conquest, the business of an enemy) which hastens bar. barity, and a certain carelessness, and opens an easy way to the next comer; as it fared with this island in relation to the Danes, Saxons, and Normans, whose conquests and pressures made way one for another; so true is it, that poverty weakens the hands, and intimidates the hearts of mankind, and also renders countries not worth keeping.

8. It is the fundamental interest of princes to keep the ballance even, which is not to be done without confederacies, and warring upon

the growing and dangerous monarch, it being certain that armies, fleets, and fortresses (though highly valuable in their kind, and without which kingdoms are defective) secure a country not half so safe or cheap, as parity of strength among neighbouring princes.

9. A prince, who with his Sampsons intends only his own defence without regard had of his neighbours peace and safety, may one day fall without the help or pity of his neighbours, as the excellent Sir Philip Sidney observes, He that only stands on his own defence

stands on no defence.'

For these reasons, a kingdom, abounding with Sampsons, ought therefore to encounter the Philistines, in the Philistines country, to prevent their marching into Canaan; since every prince, by the plain rules of discretion, ought rather to humble the thriving monarch, by making his country the theatre of war, (whereon is acted nothing, but horrors, and fearful representations) than see his own, even with victory, a field of blood and desolation.

Lastly, If, from the doubtful event of war, it be alledged, that peace, even on any terms, ought to be maintained:

I answer, that, from the uncertainty of war, there remains to us as much hopes of success, as fear of miscarriage, but from a supine peace, we have only a certain assurance to be subdued at last, without the least rational hopes to escape. For let France extend her con quests and triumphs, whilst we bask and wantonise in peace, and no imaginable softness and compliance of ours can oblige her, till she has justly branded us with some hateful marks of subjection; this sort of peace being like a mercenary woman, enchanting at first, but ready enough at last to betray us to a thousand mischiefs, when once her vile ends are accomplished. And the better to represent this danger, we must consider what inclinations France has to us, when during the late Dutch inglorious attempt at Chatham (whereunto by our own nakedness and prostitution they were invited, and by what else, I know not) she was upon the point of invading us, with a royal army, though affairs seemed not then ripe for so high an attack; which if she had nevertheless performed, what dreadful effects must have ensued, I leave them to judge, who (with myself) either saw our strange consternation upon the attempt of a weak, yea, and modest enemy, in June, 1667, or ever beheld a powerful army in an enemies country; and although peradventure we might have destroyed them, yet if they had stood, but two months to an end, and harrassed four or five counties, it had been far less charge to the nation (besides our dishonour and hazard of our navy, and naval stores) to have borne the expence of an offensive war, so many years together. Nor must we imagine this haughty design of France (where the easy conquest of England, and her drooping condition, is lately exhibited in print) is otherwise than wisely deferred, till she is become our rival at sea, and Flanders subdued; for both which, she now bids fairly, unless, by some potent confederacy, she be happily prevented, And when, in our weekly audiences, I read of the French growth, and marine preparations especially (which our glorious queen, though friend enough to Henry the Fourth, abhorred to suffer, knowing the consequence, to be such, which by experience we

now find) and yet see the world inclined to slumber; I cannot dis cern whether we are warned to a generous resistance, or to prepare our necks for the yoke. In the mean time the ghost of that renowned woman (who yet loves her country, even in shades of death) reproves us for suffering these French thus to increase at sea; and from her profound experience, recommends to us justice, and thrift in publick treasure (as the main pillar of the government) and war, in the great pretender's country; (as the best expedient to keep peace at home) from which rules the prince that swerves must end ingloriously, and be content to be hard censured by posterity; however, out of fear, he may escape his own generation.

A LETTER FROM

HIS HOLINESS THE POPE OF ROME,

TO HIS

HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF ORANGE:

Containing several Proposals, and Overtures of Agreement, betwixt the Church of England, and the Church of Rome. Translated out of Latin, for the Benefit of all true Protestants. [From a Quarto Edition, reprinted at Edinburgh, Anno, 1689.]

The resentment of the people of this nation, who, a little before, had like to become a prey to popery and arbitrary power, never appeared greater against France and Rome, than at the time, when the Prince of Orange, being settled on the throne of these kingdoms, delivered them from all fear of their tyranny and superstition. Then every true Protestant strove to signify his abhorrence of the dangers, from which both their church and state were so lately and wonderfully extricated: so that the press was never more employed, than now, with learned, ingenious, and satyrical pamph Jets, amongst which, the following well deserves to be recorded to poste. rity. For, though it must be allowed to be no more than a pretended letter from the Pope to King William, yet the matter it contains is real, the subject is serious, and the consequences of the highest importance; and therefore can never be unseasonable, especially at a time, when, in defiance of treaties, religion, and the laws of our land, we are threatened with an invasion from a Popish power; because it briefly sums up both the tyranny and superstition of Popery.

If any thing herein be thought any ways partial; I have this to advance in my own favour, that I only collect what I believe to be genuine ; that I have examined the historical facts here mentioned, and find them in good and approved authors; that I will never publish any thing through partiality : that every religion, party, condition, and state of men must expect the javectives of their adversaries, in the course of this collection; and therefore, that the pamphlets or tracts, here published, are by me looked upon, as the best of their kind; and, I hope, will be generously accepted by the reader, only as the collection, and not as the composition of the Editor.

Great Prince,

ALTHOUGH the semicircle of your highness be (at present) elevated above the full orb of my holiness, I conjure you by bell, book, and candle, seriously to consider your proceedings against me, and

my Catholick church; which (as a lilly among thorns) I lately * planted in England and Scotland; and you (to the great grief of all the members of my sacred conclave, and zealous favourites of my spiritual court) have almost rooted up. Call to mind, and tremble at my great power, prudence, and supremacy; and that I am God upon earth, seventy-seven times greater than the greatest emperor in the world. Remember what I have done to mighty monarchs, kings, and puissant princes, whose glory and high looks I have laid in the dust, till they have willingly submitted their stubborn necks to my iron yoke, and humbly bowed their heads to salute my holy feet. Did not my predecessor Pope Gregory the Seventh (who poisoned nine popes in thirteen years space, to make way for him, self to the popedom), for want of due worship and honour, excom. municate and depose the Emperor Henry, both from his crown and empire, discharge all his subjects of their allegiance, and give his crown to Rodolphus Duke of Swevia, till he, with his empress, and young son, cloathed in sack-cloath, came barefoot, in the cold of winter, and begged pardon three days, without access, at his sump. tuous gates? Did not Pope Paschal the Second stir up Henry the Fifth, to rebel against his old father the emperor? Who by the assistance of his holiness beat him from his empire; so that he lived and died miserable, and lay five years above ground, without bury ing, at the pope's command, Did not Pope Alexander the Third put his foot upon the Emperor Frederick's neck, and tread upon him as he had been a dog? Did not Pope Celestine the Third crown the Emperor Henry the Sixth, and his Empress Constantina, with his feet; and (throwing off the crowns with his toe) say, 'I have power to make and unmake kings and emperors? Did not Adrian the Fourth fall out with the Emperor Frederick, for holding his wrong stirrup, and would not crown him for three days, till he begged his holiness pardon? Did not Clement the Fifth cause his hangman to take Francis Dandalus, a Venetian duke, bind him with chains, and throw him under his table, to gnaw bones with his dogs? Did not Innocent the Fourth call Henry the Third, King of England, his vassal, slave, and page; whom (at pleasure) he might im, prison, and put to open shame? Did not Pope Benedict the Ninth send to France the two sons of Charlemain, with their mother Birtha, the widow queen? Who humbly brought them to his holiness to be crowned; where (with the poor King of Lombardy, and his wife and children) they were kept in prison, till the day of their death; for disobliging their uncle, the Emperor Charles, the pope's special friend, and great favourite. The cries of poor widows and orphans I value no more than the cackling of hens. Blood and wounds are my daily delight. Murthers, battles, treasons, conspira cies, and the turning of kingdoms upside down, are to me but ordinary recreations, and May-games. With my tail or cynosure, I drew the stars of heaven backwards, and threw them to the earth. I bewitch the world with signs and lying wonders, and persuade people out of their senses; to believe that I can make, worship, and

By his nuncio, in King James the Second's reign.

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