could take Vicksburg; assure the blacks freedom on condition of loyalty, organize the best of them in companies, regiments, etc.; and provide, as far as practicable, for the cultivation of the plantations by the rest; that Butler should signify to the slaveholders of Louisiana that they must recognize the freedom of their work-people by paying them wages; and that Hunter should do the same thing in South Carolina.

"Mr. Seward expressed himself in favor of any measures likely to accomplish the results I contemplated, which could be carried into effect without proclamation; and the President said he was pretty well cured of objection to any measure except want of adaptedness to put down the rebellion, but did not seem satisfied that the time had come for the adoption of such a plan as I proposed."

SINCE

CHAPTER XLIII.

1862.

To Hon. William M. Dickson, Cincinnati.

"WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862.

INCE the incoming of General Halleck I have known but little more of the progress of the war than any outsider.-I mean so far as influencing it goes. My recommendations, before he came in, were generally disregarded, and since have been seldom ventured. In two or three conversations I did insist on the removal of McClellan, and the substitution of an abler and more vigorous and energetic leader; on the clearing out of the Mississippi, and the expulsion of the rebels from East Tennessee; all of which might have been done. But, though heard, I was not heeded.

66

I hope for the best. Those who reject my counsels ought to know better than I do. . . .”

From Mr. Chase's Diary.

August 29, 1862.-Mr. Stanton and Mr. Chase had a conference about General McClellan. "We called on Judge Bates, who was not at home; then on General Halleck, and remonstrated against General McClellan; the Secretary wrote and presented to General Halleck a call for a report touching General McClellan's disobedience of orders and consequent delay of support to the Army of Virginia. General Halleck promised an answer to-morrow morning."

August 30th.-"Judge Bates called, and we conversed about McClellan; he concurring in our judgment. Afterward I went to the War Department, where Watson showed me a paper expressing our views, and I suggested some modifications. I afterward saw Stanton. He approved the modifications and we both signed it." (This paper was a protest, condemning General McClellan's conduct, and demanding his removal from the command of the army.) "I then took the paper to Mr. Welles, who concurred in judgment, but thought the paper not exactly right, and did not sign it. Returned the paper to Stanton. The promised report from General Halleck was not made."

September 2d.-"The Cabinet met, but at the opening of the meeting neither the President nor the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of War was present. While the talk was going on about General McClellan, the President came in, saying that he had been at the War Department and headquarters talking about the war. The Secretary of War came in. In answer to some inquiry, the fact was stated by the President or the Secretary that McClellan had been placed in command of the forces to defend the capital or, rather, to use the President's own words, 'he had set him to putting these troops into the fortifications about Washington,' believing that he could do that better than any other man. I remarked that this could be done equally well by the engineer who had constructed the forts, and that putting General McClellan in command for this purpose was equivalent to making him second in command of the entire army. The Secretary of War said that no one was now responsible for the defense of the capital; that the order to McClellan was given by the President direct to McClellan, and that General Halleck considered himself relieved from responsibility, although he acquiesced and approved the order; that McClellan could now shield himself, should any thing go wrong, under Halleck, while Halleck could and would disclaim all responsibility for the order given. The President thought General Halleck as much responsible as before, and repeated that the whole scope of the order was, simply, to direct McClellan to put the troops into the fortifications, and command them for the defense of Washington. I remarked that this seemed to me equivalent to making him commander-in-chief for the time being, and that I thought it would prove very difficult to make any substitution hereafter, for active operations; that I had no feeling whatever against McClellan; that he came to the command with my cordial approbation and support; that until I became satisfied that his delays would greatly injure our cause, he possessed my full confidence; that after I had felt myself compelled to withhold that confidence, I had (since the President, notwithstanding my opinion that he should, refrained from putting another in the command) given him all possible support in every way, raising means and urging reënforcements; that his experience as a military commander had been little else than a series of failures; and that his omission to urge troops forward to the battles of Friday and Saturday evinced a spirit which rendered him unworthy of trust, and that I could not but feel that giving command to him was equivalent to giving Washington to the rebels. This, and more, I said. Other members of the Cabinet expressed a general concurrence, but in no very energetic terms. (Mr. Blair must be excepted, but he did not dissent.)

"The President said it distressed him exceedingly to find himself differing on such a point from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury; but he did not see who could do the work wanted so well as McClellan. . . . At length the conversation ended, and the meeting broke up, leaving the matter as we found it."

GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

445

The following "Notes on the Union of the Armies of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia," were written by Mr. Chase just after the reinstatement of General McClellan in command of the army, September 2, 1862, and were intended to explain the causes which led to the withdrawal of his confidence from that officer:

"It may have been an error of my judgment, but certainly it was not a perversity of disposition, that caused my withdrawal of confidence from General McClellan. I welcomed him to the command of the army at Washington, with the most unaffected satisfaction, and when his delays disappointed my hopes, received with credence almost if not entirely absolute, the assurances of those having the best opportunities to know, that his activity was thwarted by the disinclination of General Scott to give him means and opportunities. I honored General Scott to the point of veneration, and shared the general confidence in his military knowledge and genius; but I knew at what cost of physical suffering he discharged the arduous duties of his position, and was not surprised when he availed himself of the act of Congress, and asked to be retired. My voice was at once given in concurrence with those of other heads of departments—we had no Cabinet-for the placing of General McClellan in command of the armies of the United States. The President was disinclined to this, but yielded his objection and the order was made. I immediately wrote a note to Colonel Key-McClellan's judge-advocate-'McClellan is commander-inchief; let us thank God and take courage.' Subsequent events painfully convinced me that my confidence had not been warranted.

"At the President's instance, General McClellan called on me in November, and explained to me what he said was his plan. It was to send 50,000 men to Urbana, on the Rappahannock; establish them there immediately; follow this advance by another body of 50,000 men at once; push on to Richmond and capture it before the enemy in front of Washington could move to its defense. Nothing but great energy and great secrecy could insure the success of such a movement, but with these its success seemed certain. He asked me how early an advance was necessary to the success of the finances, and I replied that I could get along under existing arrangements until about the middle of February; and he assured me that the whole movement would be accomplished before the 1st of that month, and that he had already begun his arrangements for gathering his transportation at Annapolis. I was satisfied with these explanations, and when I went to New York soon after, expressed at a large meeting of leading capitalists my entire confidence in our young general, and my certain assurance that we were to have no going into winter quarters.

"When I returned from New York I found that no steps had been taken toward the proposed movement. November passed away and nothing was done or even begun. McClellan fell sick. The President called

several generals to his councils-McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs—and almost determined to put the army under another leader and advance on Manassas. McClellan got well just in time to neutralize action, and nothing was done. I had now so far lost confidence in him, that I was convinced a change ought to be made.

"December passed and nothing was done.

"In January Mr. Stanton came into the War Department, and put his whole influence on the side of vigor. The President made a general order -January 27th-requiring all generals to put their commands in condition and to commence an onward movement at latest on the 22d of February.Time passed in listless inaction; broken only by the famous campaign toward Winchester. One morning forty thousand men found themselves put in motion, and McClellan and his staff moved off in all the pomp of war to drive the rebels from that place, and seize the gate of the Shenandoah Valley. Boats to bridge the Potomac were provided and sent up the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. The general and his staff proceeded perhaps to Weaverton-I do not know precisely how far-when, much to his disappointment, he learned that his boats were too big for the locks! and therefore could not pass from the canal into the Potomac. So the expedition was abandoned. Some troops under Banks went over the river; but McClellan and his staff and the great body of the army returned to Washington. The expedition, it was said, and not untruly, died of lock-jaw.

"February came, and on the 13th General McClellan said to me, 'In ten days I shall be in Richmond.' A little surprised at the near approach of a consummation so devoutly to be wished, I asked, 'What is your plan, general?' 'Oh,' said he, 'I mean to cross the river; attack and carry their batteries, and push on after the enemy.' 'Have you any gunboats to aid in the attack on the batteries?' 'No: they are not needed; all I want is transportation and canal-boats, of which I have plenty that will answer.' I did not think it worth while to reply; but made a note of the date, and waited.-The ten days passed away; no movement, and no preparation for a movement, had been made. The day fixed by the order of the President had passed; we heard the echoes of victory from the West, but all was quiet on the Potomac.

"At length, about the 1st of March, the President gave McClellan a peremptory order to move in ten days. Great efforts were put forth to induce him to reverse the order. McClellan convened a council of his generals, and having inspired them with his ideas, sent them to the President to give him the results of their deliberations. The President told me he had expected them, and had asked McClellan to be present; who had declined, on the ground that he did not wish to influence their decision. They presented themselves at the White House, and eight, I think, were of opinion that it would not be safe to move till the 25th of April, while four were for an immediate advance. Of the four I recall only the

1 The rebels at this time had several batteries upon the Virginia side of the Potomac.