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South Carolina, aye-8; New York, Georgia, no2; Maryland divided.

On the question moved by Mr. PINCKNEY, for striking out "incapable of re-election into the first branch of the National Legislature for

and subject to recall," agreed to, nem. con.20

years,

On the question for striking out from the fifth Resolution the words requiring members of the Senatorial branch to be of the age of

years at least, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye-3; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no-6; North Carolina, Georgia, divided.

On the question for filling the blank with "thirty years," as the qualification, it was agreed to,Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no -4.

Mr. SPAIGHT moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointments to the second branch of the national Legislature, with the words "seven years."

Mr. SHERMAN thought seven years too long. He grounded his opposition, he said, on the principle, that if they did their duty well, they would be reelected; and if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred five years, which would be between the terms of the first branch and of the Executive.

Mr. PIERCE proposed three years. Seven years would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs have arisen in England from their Septennial Act, which was reprobated by most of their patriotic statesmen.

Mr. RANDOLPH was for the term of seven years. The democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this second branch is, to control the democratic branch of the National Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch, being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland, constituted on like principles, had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness and independence may be the more necessary, also, in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution against encroachments of the Executive, who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch.

Mr. MADISON Considered seven years as a term by no means too long. What we wished was, to give to the government that stability which was every where called for, and which the enemies of the republican form alleged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability, by the term of seven years. His fear was, that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The Constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Maryland created just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances, perhaps, it may have erred by yielding to the House

of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the House of Delegates, they had had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other States, as well as of their own. In the States, where the Senates were chosen in the same manner as the other branches of the Legislature, and held their seats for four years, the institution was found to be no check whatever against the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived it to be of great importance that a stable and firm government, organized in the republican form, should be held out to the people. If this be not done, and the people be left to judge of this species of government by the operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is much to be feared, the time is not distant, when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.

On the question for "seven years," as the term for the second branch,-New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye,-8; Connecticut, no-1; Massachusetts, (Mr. Gorham and Mr. King, aye; Mr. Gerry and Mr. Strong, no) New York, divided.20

Mr. BUTLER and Mr. RUTLEDGE proposed that the members of the second branch should be entitled to no salary or compensation for their services. On the question,*-Connecticut, Delaware, South Car

It is probable the votes here turned chiefly on the idea that if the salaries were not here provided for, the members would be paid by their respective States.

olina, aye-3; New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no-7; Massachusetts, divided.

It was then moved, and agreed, that the clauses respecting the stipends and ineligibility of the second branch be the same as of the first branch,Connecticut disagreeing to the ineligibilty. It was moved and seconded, to alter the ninth Resolution, so as to read, "that the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be, to hear and determine, in the dernier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."

It was moved and seconded, to strike out, "all piracies and felonies on the high seas," which was agreed to.

It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, tures from an enemy."

"all сар

It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, "other States," and insert "two distinct States of the Union."

It was moved, and agreed, to postpone the consideration of the ninth Resolution, relating to the Judiciary.

The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13TH.

In Committee of the Whole,-The ninth Resolution being resumed,

The latter part of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the national tribunals, was struck out, nem. con.; in order to leave full room for their organization.

Mr. RANDOLPH and Mr. MADISON then moved the following resolution respecting a national Judiciary, viz.: “that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony." Agreed to.

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Mr. PINCKNEY and Mr. SHERMAN moved to insert, after the words, "one supreme tribunal," the words, "the judges of which to be appointed by the National Legislature."

Mr. MADISON objected to an appointment by the whole Legislature. Many of them are incompetent judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had, perhaps, assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their constitutents, or used other winning means, would, without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws, prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate; which, as a less numerous and more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.

Mr. SHERMAN and Mr. PINCKNEY withdrew their motion, and the appointment by the Senate was agreed to, nem. con.

Mr. GERRY moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills. The other branch was

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