nizes as legitimate ways of communication. The dealings letween the mills and Mr. Hunt were through Payne and Knight, who acted as agents of the company. Payne had repeatedly taken orders for goods, collected money for those sold, and, according to the testimony, sold part of the goods for the price of which this action was brought. He thus stood with reference to the Elevator Company and the Crescent Flour Mills as their representative and agent, and an actual notice to him of Dryden's withdrawal would presumably reach his employers, and would most certainly bind them. Hier v. Odell, supra; Page et al. v. Brant, 18 Ill. 37 ; Ingalls et al. v. Morgan, 10 N. Y. 178; Davis v. Keyes, 38 N. Y. 94. It is wholly unnecessary to rely entirely upon the presumption that the principal was fully advised of that which was communicated to the agent. The form of the bills, the signature to the checks and the frequent visits of the agents to the house compel the belief that if the actual managers of the concern were unadvised as to the change of the copartnership, those persons connected with the company who were actually engaged in the transaction of the particular business with Hunt were fully advised as to the situation, and the company would be bound by that knowledge. This conclusion is not at all in conflict with the rule which has been so often declared by the appellate tribunals of this state, that they will not interfere with the verdict of a jury or the finding of the court upon questions of fact simply upon a conflict of testimony, or upon a question of the weight and preponderance of the evidence. It stands substantially uncontradicted in the record that Payne was given actual notice of the dissolution of the firm. The absence of a recollection on his part that such a conversation was had does not tend to shake or weaken the absolute testimony given by Mr. Hunt upon this subject. His direct and positive statement standing uncontradicted must be given full credit, unless there be something in the record which tends to overcome or weaken the force of that unimpeached testi mony. Elwood v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 45 N. Y. 549. To render the judgment entered in this case, the court below must have found that the Elevator Company received no actual notice of the dissolution of the firm. This finding was not a decision upon conflicting testimony, but was a legal conclusion upon the proof that the notice given was wholly insufficient to charge the Elevator Company. Since this was error this cause must be reversed and remanded. Reversed. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PITKIN COUNTY, APPELLANTS, PELLEE. An appeal to the supreme court from the judgment of a county court for costs only, perfected before passage of the act creating the court of appeals, is governed by the law in force at the time the appeal was taken notwithstanding its subsequent transfer to the latter court. Appeal from County Court of Pitkin County. Mr. C. D. WILSON, for appellants. Mr. W. W. COOLEY, for appellee. RICHMOND, P. J. By the record in this case it appears that a judgment was rendered for the defendant below, appellee herein, for costs only. From this judgment an appeal was prosecuted and a transcript was filed September 3, 1889, in the supreme court of Colorado. June 30, 1891, the cause was transferred from the submission docket of the supreme court to that of the court of appeals. Under the act of 1887, appeals to the supreme court 1 125 2 109 2 324 were allowable only when the judgment amounted, exclusive of costs, to the sum of one hundred dollars, or related to a franchise or freehold. Hence the supreme court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Repeated decisions have been rendered sustaining this position. "The proceeding being jurisdictional cannot be waived or cured by consent of the parties." Code, par. 388; Crane v. Farmer, 14 Colo. 294; Meyer v. Brophy, 15 Colo. 572; Sons of Amer. B. § I. Ass'n v. City of Denver, 15 Colo. 592. If this case had been appealed to this court subsequent to its creation by statute, it may be that it would be our duty to consider it upon its merits, but, inasmuch as the appeal was perfected under the act of 1887, we do not think a transfer of the cause confers upon us any other jurisdiction than that resulting from the appeal which had already been taken under the existing statutes. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Dismissed. CLARENCE M. IRELAND, PAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, DEFENDANT IN ERROR. CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.-When, upon a review of the testimony in a criminal case, it is evident that the verdict of the jury was not warranted by the evidence, and that the trial court erred in refusing to set it aside and grant a new trial, the judgment will be reversed. Error to District Court of Weld County. Mr. W. W. COOKE, for plaintiff in error. Mr. S. W. JONES, attorney general, and Mr. H. RIDDELL, for defendant in error. RICHMOND, P. J. The plaintiff in error, Ireland, was by the grand jury of the eighth judicial district charged by indictment with the crime of grand larceny. The cause came on for trial and resulted in a verdict of guilty. Motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial was duly interposed but the court denied the motion and gave judgment upon the verdict. Numerous errors are assigned but we deem it unnecessary to consider any of them save and except the second, which is to the effect that the verdict of the jury is not supported by the evidence in this case. We have carefully reviewed all of the testimony, and reached the conclusion that the verdict was unwarranted by the evidence and that the court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. In view of the fact that the attorney general, who represents the people in this case, has filed in this court a statement to the effect that he will file no briefs or argument in the cause and does not urge an affirmance of the judgment rendered, it would be superfluous for us to extend the opinion by reference to the testimony submitted at the trial. The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. HOLYOKE BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS-BY-LAWS - IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS.Plaintiff became a member of defendant building association at a time when a by-law thereof provided that "all non-borrowing stockholders wishing to withdraw shall be privileged so to do upon giving notice to the directors of his or her intention, and shall be entitled to receive the amount of instalments actually paid in, without interest." Held, that plaintiff's right of withdrawal was a vested right, of which defendant could not deprive him, without his consent, by a subsequent repeal of the by-law. 1 127 12 309 Error to District Court of Phillips County. Messrs. W. T. ROGERS and BENNETT & DEMPSTER, for plaintiff in error. Mr. E. E. BRANNON, Mr. E. M. SHERIDAN and Messrs. KELSO & SCHOOLER, for defendant in error. RICHMOND, P. J. This was an action on a money demand and was originally tried upon an agreed state of facts which in substance are, that Jerome Lewis, the defendant in error, paid into the Holyoke Building and Loan Association, plaintiff in error, the sum of seventy-five dollars, thereby becoming a member of the association. At the time of payment there was an article of the by-laws which read as follows:- "All non-borrowing stockholders wishing to withdraw shall be privileged so to do, upon giving notice to the directors of his or her intention, and shall be entitled to receive the amount of instalments actually paid in without interest." Defendant in error gave the notice, the association declined to return the money, insisting that since the payment by Lewis the directors of the association had repealed the article of the by-laws referred to and therefore defendant in error was not entitled to withdraw the money from the association. Judgment was rendered in favor of defendant in error for the amount of his demand. To reverse this judgment this writ of error is prosecuted. The rule of law is that a corporation has not the right to repeal a by-law so as to impair rights which have been given and become vested by virtue of the by-laws, although the power to alter, amend, or repeal its by-laws is granted by charter. Endlich Law of Building Associations, § 278; Insurance Company v. Connor, 17 Pa. St. 136; Paul Revere v. Boston Copper Company, 15 Pick. 351; Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 342. When that by-law was adopted it was as much the law of |