Exploratio Philosophica ...The University Press, 1900 |
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Exploratio Philosophica: Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science. Part I. John Grote Visualização completa - 1900 |
Termos e frases comuns
abstract action actual appulse Aristotle begin believe belongs Berkeley body character co-intelligence colour Comparative Psychology conceive conception consciousness consider corporeal corresponding Descartes described distinction doctrine Epistemology existence experience Expl express external world fact feeling former give Grote Herbert Spencer human ideas imagination immediate thought important impression independent individual innate idea intellectual intelligence intuition intuitive knowledge kind knowledge language logical look manner matter mean mental Mill mind nature nerves and brain optic nerve ourselves particular perceive perception pheno phenomenal universe phenomenalist philosophical physical Plato point of view portion positivism positivist possibility of sensation present Protagoras proverse psychology qualities reality reason reflection relation relativeness of knowledge relativity retroverse scepticism seems self-consciousness sense sensive sentience side sight simply Sir William Hamilton sort speak spoken substance suppose supposition term Theaetetus things true trueness truth understand visual whole word
Passagens mais conhecidas
Página 74 - First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them : and thus we come by those ideas we have, of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities...
Página 51 - Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated 'thoughts
Página 54 - But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.
Página 13 - It is now, I think, pretty generally acknowledged by physiologists, that the influence of the will over the body is a mystery which has never yet been unfolded ; but, singular as it may appear, Dr. Reid was the first person who had courage to lay completely aside all the common hypothetical language concerning perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of the fact.
Página 52 - When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself...
Página 51 - The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or see it : But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable.
Página 51 - To form monsters and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty, the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the...
Página 51 - IDEAS. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others ; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS ; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression...
Página 13 - ... of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as it would be, upon the supposition, that the mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever.
Página 51 - We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks ofthat emotion.