peculiar dignity, includes the obligation to mutual justice, as part of itself, and yet there was need to mention this part separately; because else, the higher the notion which each entertained of his own value, the more apt he might be to overlook others, especially his inferiors, and trample upon them carelessly. Therefore St. Paul, in the text, immediately subjects the mutual behaviour of all the sons of men to one common measure; and requires, that the highest and the lowest should each treat the other, as each might expect, were circumstances changed, the other should treat him; which single precept observed would keep the world in quiet and if it be transgressed, nothing is left to stop at, short of universal confusion. Every one therefore, in every part of social life, should be vigilant against the influence of pride, and passion, and interest: should inquire with diligence, and hear with candour, in order to judge with impartiality: should remember, that nothing is truly justice, but what is equity at the same time: should do frankly and immediately what he knows he ought to do: and so temper his prudence with innocence, as always to prefer harmlessness to worldly wisdom, whenever they interfere. That others will act That others will act very differently, is so much the worse for them: but no consideration for us to be moved by, in the least. The whole we have to be concerned for, is to act right ourselves. A wise and good God will take care of the rest.

Next to justice, the Apostle ranks, in the fourth place, a virtue equally flowing from the dignity of human nature, and seldom violated without grievous injustice, that of shunning the pollution of criminal pleasures, and practising whatsoever things are pure. Some kinds of sensual excess, as gluttony and drunkenness, are acknowledged to be contemptible, hateful

vices. And however favourably too many look on the free indulgence of another appetite, at least in one sex, yet their opinion cannot alter the nature of things. Irregular gratifications must still remain what they are, dishonourable to our reason, destructive to our happiness. And it is surprising, that they, who have any rightness of mind, can fail either to discern or to reflect, what meanness it is to make these things the business of their being; and associate, for the sake of them, with the profligate and abandoned: what imprudence, to ruin or to hazard their healths, fortunes, or reputations, in such wretched courses; and what mischief, to destroy the virtue and peace of the innocent, and harden the guilty in their crimes; to violate faith and honour, distress families, embitter the nearest and tenderest relations of life, confound descents and inheritances, extend infamy, and perhaps diseases also, to successive generations. Indeed the sins of this kind have not always all these bad effects: but they undeniably produce in general, by innumerable ways, more thorough wickedness, and more exquisite misery, than almost any others. And even those transgressions of purity, that may seem the least hurtful, are so wrong in themselves, and so contrary to the good order, strength, and welfare of society; they lead on so naturally to worse; they set so dangerous an example, and give so plausible an excuse to others, for going a little and a little farther in the same way, (as indeed there is no possible ground to make a sure stand upon, if once we depart from strict virtue): that whoever considers, will be far from thinking, either the precepts, or the threatenings of Scripture, on this head, too rigid and severe.

But abstaining from dishonourable, and injurious, and criminally sensual, actions, is by no means suffi

cient, unless we are careful to do becoming, beneficent, and engaging ones; or, in the Apostle's words, whatsoever things are lovely: which class of duties he hath put in the fifth place with great propriety. For the good-nature and agreeableness, required under this head, is not to supply the room of the justice and purity required before; nor can possibly make amends for the want of them; but we must first resolve to be innocent, then study to be amiable. Now the two great branches of amiable conduct are those, on which the Gospel hath laid so peculiar a stress; mildness in bearing injuries, and bounty in relieving necessities: one of them expressly made the condition of our being forgiven; the other the foundation of our being rewarded.

But, besides these endearing virtues, the Apostle undoubtedly designed to enjoin every other act of a generous and disinterested, a candid and sympathizing, heart; every instance of gentleness to the faults, and condescension to the weaknesses, of men ; moderation and humility in advantageous circumstances, and patient composedness in low and afflicted ones; every ornamental, as well as more substantial, duty of life; affability of conversation, obliging attentions, kind compliances; whatever will make our common journey through the world mutually comfortable and pleasing, without making it dangerous; and exhibit religion in its native cheerfulness, as a reasonable service paid to an infinitely good Being. For all these things are comprehended under the character of lovely; and constitute a much more valuable part of Christian practice, than many seem to be aware of. Indeed piety and virtue, however unpolished, deserve high esteem; and it would be a most unhappy mistake, to prefer superficial accomplishments before intrinsic worth. But still, both

religion and morals, disguised under a forbidding look, appear so much less to advantage, than when they wear an inviting one; that we wrong our profession, as well as ourselves, if we neglect to shew it in as much beauty, as a modest simplicity will permit; and thus to adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things*.

Nor is it enough to practise what we think right and worthy and becoming, but we ought further to respect, in a proper degree, what the rest of mankind esteem so. And therefore the Apostle adds in the sixth place, Whatsoever things are of good report: and places this head after the others; because, if a compétition arises, conscience is always to be preferred before common opinion. And indeed numberless are the poor wretches, who have been utterly ruined, by sacrificing at once their virtue and common sense to reigning sins and follies. Not that, in general, the public voice is nearly so favourable to wrong conduct, as some are willing to imagine. All, who are not guilty of it, we may be sure will disapprove it. Many who are, condemn it, even in themselves. Nay, such as encourage others in it, often censure them for it severely notwithstanding. Or, was every bad man true to his own bad cause, yet both their weight, and even their number, is less considerable, than they would have it thought. The gay and the loud, the bold and the forward, nay the great and the noble, however they fill the eye, are by no means the whole of the world: but there is reason on many accounts to look beyond these: and enquire, what the serious and considerate, what the generality and bulk of mankind, whom it is neither modest nor prudent to despise, will think of our conduct; what hath been the judgment of time past on the like be

* Tit. ii. 10.

haviour; what is likely to be the judgment of time to come; when we shall be spoken of without ceremony, and have the characters that we appear to deserve, indelibly fixed on us: a matter about which we can not really be indifferent, though we may affect it.

Nor ought the opinion of mankind only to assist in deterring us from what we know to be wrong; but restrain us from many things, that we possibly imagine very allowable. We may apprehend, perhaps, that such and such liberties have no harm in them. But if others, worthy of regard, apprehend they have; may not we be mistaken as easily as they? and is not the safer side the better? or were we sure that we judge right, is there no deference owing, in point of decency, to the contrary judgment? especially if it be the general, the established one? Besides, may we not endanger duties of great importance, by destroying wantonly even the slighter outworks that defend them? may not our transgressing what is commonly esteemed sacred, lead some to esteem nothing sacred; and others to suspect, that we esteem nothing so? Now this latter effect alone, or any thing that approaches towards it, would surely be very undesirable. And they, who have no concern what they are thought to be, are in danger of having but little concern what they do.

The Apostle, having thus recommended every thing that we can discover to be a law of life, and every thing accounted such by the wise and good, may seem now to have gone the utmost length that precept could go. But he had still one thing in reserve for the seventh and last place, to complete and crown the whole. Besides the constant obligations of all men, expressed hitherto; some, indeed most, on one occasion or another, are qualified for actions of distin