appeared to be the case according to the testimony of the surveyor who located the first patent. He took as a starting point a monument known as the "Point of Rocks," whereas the patent described the premises as land under water, adjacent or opposite to the patentee's land or farm, "beginning at a certain stake at high-water mark." No part of the land in controversy was adjacent to said farm. The owner thereof had never occupied it, and although he and his grantees built landings and wharves upon the land under water in front of the farm, they never built any upon the land in controversy. Held, that the evidence warranted a finding that the prior patent did not include any of the land granted plaintiff. (2) Where a riparian owner conveys his land he cannot reserve any right to the adjacent land under the water, of which he has received no grant from the State; but the grantee becomes the riparian owner, aud as such is entitled to apply to the State for a grant of the land under the water. (3) Plaintiff's patent could not be collaterally assailed on the ground that his land had been erroneously assumed to be upland, or that the land granted him was not in fact in front of the same. Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns. 23; People v. Mauran, 5 Den. 389; People v. Jones, 112 N. Y. 598; Erhardt v. Hogaboom, 115 U. S. 67; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 83; French v. Fyan, 93 U. S. 169; Steel v. Refining Co., 106 id. 447. Dec. 1, 1891. E. G. Blackslee Manufg Co. v. E. G. Blackslee's Sons' Iron Works. Opinion by Andrews, J. 13 N. Y. Supp. 493, affirmed. ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE- COUNTY-CARE OF JAILS.-The care and control of cers placed in charge of the prisons controlled by the State directly. We have not found it necessary to discuss the question before us, for the reason that it has been fully discussed in many cases. It is settled, and rightly settled, that for the negligence of officers whose duties require an exercise of such a governmental power as the police power, neither a county nor a city is liable. Whether the wrong-doing officers are Summers personally liable is quite another question. V. County of Daviess, 103 Ind. 262, and authorities cited; Pfefferle v. Commissioners, 39 Kans. 432; Manuel v. Commissioners, 98 N. C. 9; Watkins v. County Court, 30 W. Va. 657; Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95 Ill. 148; Commissiouers v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa, 430; Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), $$ 957-974. Sup. Ct. Ind., Oct. 31, 1891. White v. Board of Commissioners of Sullivan County. Opinion by Elliott, J. CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-DOG. Penal Code of Texas, article 724, defines "theft as "the fraudulent taking of corporeal personal property belonging to another." Article 725 declares that the property must have some specific ascertainable value, and that it embraces every species of property capable of being taken. Article 733 includes, within the meaning of "personal property" all domesticated animals, when of some specific value. Articles 735, 748, make theft of the value of $20 or over punishable by imprisonment in the * * penitentiary, and provide particularly that the penalty shall attach to the theft of sheep, hogs and goats. Article 679, punishing malicious mischief, makes it an offense to willfully kill, wound, poison or disfigure any * dog or other domesticated animal. Held, that a dog may become the subject of theft, and that where he is shown to be worth at least $20, such theft is a felony. So far as we are aware, this is the first conviction in this State of a felony for stealing a dog, and owing to the rule as it obtained at the common law and the contrariety of decision by the American courts upon the subject, we deem it not inappropriate to determine in the first instance whether or not it is felony In the case under our present statutes to steal a dog. of State v. Marshall, 13 Tex. 58, Mr. Justice Wheeler says: "By the common law, though a man may have such property in these animals as to entitle him to maintain a civil action for an injury done to them, yet as they are not classed among valuable domestic animals, as horses and other beasts of burden, nor among the animals domitiæ naturæ, which serve for food, as neat cattle, swine, poultry and the like, the property in them is considered of so base a nature, and they are held in so little estimation as property that the stealing of them does not amount to larceny. 4 Bl. Comm. 236; 1 Hale P. C. 512. But by statute in England very severe penalties are inflicted for the crime of stealing a dog. 4 Bl. Comm. 236, note. And in some of the States dogs are by statute placed upon the same footing as other personal property. Whart. Crim. Law, tit. Larceny:' Heisrodt v. Hackett, 34 Mich. 283. We have in this State no statute upon the subject." And in the case of Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. App. 489, which was a case involving the constitutionality of the dogtax law, after quoting the above extract from Judge Wheeler in Marshall's Case, it was said: "At the time that decision was made there was no statute making it malicious mischief to kill a dog, but such animals have since been included in that particular statute. Pasch. Dig., art. 2344. Besides that statute, we know of no other recognizing them (in terms) among the domestic animals or as property. These authorities, we think, settle the first proposition, and to the effect that, in law, dogs are not recognized as other property, and subject to an ad valorem taxation." Mr. Bishop says: Animals fera naturæ, when reclaimed, become subjects of larceny, provided they are fit for food, and not otherwise; and he says: "Of animals of which, when reclaimed, larceny may be committed, within the foregoing rules, are pigeons and doves, hares, conies, deer, swans, wild boars, cranes, pheasants and partridges; to which may be added fish for food, including, undoubtedly, oysters. Of those of which there can be no larceny, though reclaimed, are dogs, cats, bears, foxes, apes, monkeys, polecats, ferrets, squirrels, parrots, singing-birds, martins and coons. Though animals of the latter class may, when reclaimed, have a recognized value, and the right of property in them be protected in civil jurisprudence, it is otherwise in criminal, on the ground probably that anciently they were deemed of no determinate worth, and thus was established a rule which the courts could not afterward change." 2 Bish. Crim. Law, §§ 771, 773. In our State courts dogs have been so far regarded as property that civil actions for damages for negligently and willfully killing them have been sustained. Railway v. Holden, 3 Civil Cas. App. 323, and Railway Co. v. Hauks, 78 Tex. 300. In the case of State v. Harriman, 75 Me. 562, under a statute which provided for killing or wounding "domestic animals," it was held that dogs are not domestic animals, and that a prosecution would not lie. We might, if necessary, draw the dis tinction between "domestic" and " domesticated, as used in our statute; but we do not deem it necessary to do 80. We quote approvingly the following * * * language used by Appleton, C. J., dissenting from the opinion of the court in that case: A dog, being a domestic animal,' and property, an indictment is maintainable, under Revised Statutes, chapter 127, section 1, for his malicious destruction. When the statute made malicious mischief indictable, it was held that a dog was the subject of absolute property, and the killing of one under the act prohibiting`malicious mischief was an indictable offense." State v. Sumner, 2 Ind. 377. There is such property in dogs as to sustain an indictment for malicious mischief. State v. Latham, 13 Ired. 33. In State v. McDuffie, 34 N. H. 523, which was for maliciously shooting a dog, Fowler, J., says: We can see no reason why the property of its owner in a valuable dog is not quite as deserving of protection against the willful and malicious injury of the reckless and malignant as property in fruit, shade or ornamental trees, whether standing in the garden or yard of their owner or in a public street, or any other species of personal property.' Dogs have been included under 'property,' and their malicious destruction has been held indictable. 2 Whart. Crim. Law, 1082. A fortiori is it so when the owner is subject to taxation for his dog." In Mullaly v. People, 86 N. Y. 365, which was a case for stealing a dog, it was held that the term "personal property," as used in the New York statute, included dogs, and that the stealing of a dog was therefore larceny under said provision. In the case of State v. Yates, 10 Crim. Law Mag. 439, there is a very learned opinion on the same subject, and it was held therein that "a dog is a thing of value,' and may be stolen, and burglary may be committed by breaking and entering with intent to steal a dog." So we see that in other States the larceny of a dog has been held punishable upon the ground that he is a "domestic" animal; that he is 'personal property," and a "thing of value." We think that under our statute there can be no question but that the dog would come within the terms "domesticated animal," and as such become the subject of theft. Ct. App. Tex., Oct. 31, 1891. Hurley v. State. Opinion by White, P. J. 44 INJUNCTION-VIOLATION OF CONTRACT TO FURNISH GAS.-One who has a contract with a gas company to furnish him, free of charge, for twenty years, with gas for all ordinary purposes in his dwelling, including two street lamps in front of the house and a gas-log in the library, can have a temporary injunction against the company to prevent it from wholly cutting off his gas supply, and the fact that plaintiff has used the gas extravagantly is no reason for refusing the injunction, as it would be an irreparable injury to him to be deprived of it wholly. The resolution of the directors of defendant, we think, expresses in unmistakable language a contract whereby it became bound to furnish plaintiff gas for ordinary purposes, "including gas-log in library." and two street lamps, to be used in plaintiff's dwelling and buildings, for the period of twenty years, if Graves or his family occupy the building that long. The validity of this contract, we think, cannot be doubted, and its language, when interpreted under the rules of the law, expresses with sufficient clearness and certainty the agreement of the parties. fendant, by the contract, undertakes upon considerations before recited to furnish gas to plaintiff as provided for in the contract. The gas is furnished from pipes running from the mains, presumably owned by defendant, into and through plaintiff's dwelling and premises. The refusal to supply the gas is not only a breach of contract, but is in effect an interference with plaintiff's enjoyment of his property by its use, as contemplated by the parties when they entered into the contract. Plaintiff, by his contract, provides for gas to be used for illuminating and other ordinary purpo The de ses. If defendant may withhold the supply of gas, plaintiff may obtain it from no other existing source, for defendant it appears has in effect at the present a monopoly of the right to furnish gas to private consumers such as plaintiff. His gas-pipes and gas-burners and fixtures would become useless and valueless, and he would be deprived of gas-light, which to a certain extent is regarded by house-keepers using it as a necessity and a source of comfort. As plaintiff can supply his dwelling, out-houses and street lamps in no other way, this injury cannot be repaired. If defendant supplies him with no gas, he must do without it and the comfort it brings. It is therefore irreparable. It is true he could use candles, oils or electricity, but he contracted for gas-light and is entitled to it. It will not do to say he may have compensation in damages. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to estimate his damage. If it might be done, there would be delay in compensation, subjecting plaintiff to discomfort, inconvenience and loss for probably a protracted period. Equity will not permit one to be deprived of his rights in this way by the violation of a contract, but by injunction will interfere to prevent it. It is insisted that as the plaintiff violated the contract for gas by using a quantity largely in excess of the amount provided for by the contract, the defendant may cut off the supply and deprive him of the use of all gas. Such deprivation would extend to some gas-burners-the street lamps for instance through which it is not shown excessive quantities of gas were used. Plaintiff insists that his use of the gas has not been excessive or wasteful, and was contemplated when the contract was made. It is true that the evidence tends to show a large use by plaintiff, but if such use of gas was made by plaintiff with the knowledge of defendant without complaint or objection on account of the alleged excess, the defendant, thereby acquiescing in such large use and putting a construction upon the contract as to the quantity authorized to be used, ought not now to be permitted to disregard its acquiescence, and take the law in its own hands and enforce its claims by disregarding its contract according to the interpretation it had put on it. Such acquiescence puts the laboring oar in the hands of defendant. It must establish its interpretation of the contract and its right thereunder upon a trial of the issues of the case. If it be made to appear upon the law and the facts as developed in the case that defendant is entitled to relief of some character, the law will not permit it to help itself to that relief and deprive plaintiff of all gas contemplated by the contract. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1891. Graves v. Key City Gas Co. Opinion by Beck, C. J. CHARGES LIBEL PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICER.-A letter written by the defendant to the superintendent of the United States census, stated that the defendant thought himself entitled to recommend some of his political friends in the district in which he lived, and have them appointed as enumerators; that the supervisor however had paid no attention to his recommendations, but had appointed the plaintiff, a man who had since the war murdered two Union soldiers, and been instrumental also in defrauding the defendant out of his election to the Legislature. There was evidence that the charges were untrue, and that the character of the plaintiff was good. There was no evidence in reply, and the answer admitted that the object of the defendant was to secure plaintiff's removal from office. Held, that the communication was one only of qualified privilege, and that as there was evidence tending to show malice the case should have been submitted to the jury. The defendant was not in government employ under PorHe was not called upon by any moral or legal ob ter. power false and defamatory charges against him ma ligation to make the report, and it was not made in the line of official duty. It was not absolutely privi-liciously or without probable cause, simply to secure leged. But he was an American citizen, interested in the proper and efficient administration of the public service. He had therefore the right to criticise public officers, and if he honestly and bona fide believed and had probable cause to believe that the character and conduct of the plaintiff were such that the public interest demanded his removal, he had a right to make the communication in question, giving his reasons therefor, to the head of the department. The presumption of law is that he acted bona fide, and the burden was on the plaintiff to show that he wrote the letter with malice or without probable cause. Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Penn. St. 404; Bod well v. Osgood, 3 Pick. 379. "Malice," in this connection, is defined as "any indirect and wicked motive, which induces the defendant to defame the plaintiff. If malice be proved, the privilege attaching to the occasion is lost at once.' Odger Sland. & L. 267; Clark v. Molyneux, 3 Q. B. Div. 246; Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & C. 247; Hooper v. Truscott, 2 Bing. N. C. 457; Dickson v. Earl of Wilton, 1 Fost. & F. 419. The rules applicable to an ordinary action for libel apply in such cases whenever malice is proved. Proof that the words are false is not sufficient evidence of malice, unless there is evidence that the defendant kuew at the time of using them that they were false. Fountain v. Boodle, 43 E. C. L. 605; Odger Sland. & L. 275. That the defendant was mistaken in the words used by him on such confidential or privileged occasion is, taken alone, no evidence of malice. Kent v. Bongartz, 15 R. I. 72. We do not assent to the opposite doctrine, which would seem to be laid down by Pearson, J., in Wakefield v. Smithwick, 4 Jones (N. C.) 327, which is not supported by the authority he cites and doubtless intended to follow, for if the words are true, a defendant does not need the protection of privilege. his removal from office. If the defendant thought the plaintiff should be removed from office because belonging to a different political party, and therefore in his judgment unsuitable or unfit to hold the office, hơ should have put his letter on that ground and there could have been no complaint. He had no right to make defamatory charges, if false, to secure defendant's removal, the motive not being a bona fide one to purge the public service of a felon and ballot-box stuffer, but merely to remove one who was objectionable to him either as being of an opposite party, or by having injured him personally, or from having been appointed instead of his own recommendee for the place. If the defendant's motive was to injure Hawkins, and to do that he recklessly made false and defamatory allegations against the plaintiff, that is malice which would entitle the plaintiff to damages. It is to the public interest that the unfitness or derelictions of public officials should be reported to the authority having the power of removal, and any citizen bona fide making such report does no more than his duty, and is protected by public policy against the recovery of damages, even though the charge should prove to be false. But public justice will not permit the government archives to be made with impunity the receptacle of false and defamatory charges, made to secure the removal of an officer, whereby the malice of the party making such charge may be gratified, or that some benefit or advantage, direct or indirect, may come to him. Proctor v. Webster, 16 Q. B. Div. 112 (1885). N. C. Sup. Ct., Nov. 3, 1891. Ramsey v. Cheek. Opiuion by Clark, J. It is when they are MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-OPENING STREET-VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE.-A promise made by a citizen to pay a part of the expense of opening a street is not op false that he claims it. To strip him of such protec-posed to public policy, and an ordinance passed by a tion there must be both falsehood and malice. To hold that falsehood is itself proof of malice in such cases reduces the protection to defend on the presumption of the truth of the charges. If however there were means at hand for ascertaining the truth of the matter, of which the defendant neglects to avail him self, and chooses rather to remain in ignorance whenefits. It is contended that this offer to contribute to he might have obtained full information, there will be no pretense for any claim of privilege. Odger Sland. & L. 199. To entitle matter otherwise libellous to the protection [of qualified privilege] which attaches to communications made in the fulfillment of duty, bona fides, or to use our own equivalent, honesty of purpose, is essential, and to this again two things are necessary: (1) That it be made not merely on an occasion which would justify making it, but also from a sense of duty; (2) that it be made with a belief of its truth." Cockburn, C. J., in Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L. R., 5 Q. B. 102. The malice may be proved by some extrinsic evidence, such as ill feeling, or personal hostility, or threats and the like on the part of the defendant toward the plaintiff, but the plaintiff is not bound to prove malice by extrinsic evidence. He may rely on the words of the libel itself, and on the circumstances attending its publication, as affording evidence of malice. Odger Sland. & L. 277-288; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 431. There was evidence on the face of the letter tending to show that the motive of the plaintiff was ill-will to the plaintiff by reason of his alleged action in defrauding defendant of his election, and spleen on account of his (the defendant's) not having his recommendation more considered, and his friends appointed to the offices to which Ramsey and others, named in the letter, had been appointed. That the plaintiff was of a different political party from himself gave him no license to make to the appointing common council to open such street will not, upou that ground, be set aside. This offer was made by a Mr. Barber, whose property will obviously be much benefited by the opening of the new street. He appeared before the common council and stated that he would give $1,000 above his assessment for special ben the expenses of the improvement was calculated to influence the judgment of the common council in its determination whether the street should or should not be opened. It is further insisted that this influence is inimical to a sound rule of public policy. There is a line of cases decided by the courts of the State of New Hampshire in which this view seems to receive support. Dudley v. Cilley, 5 N. H. 558; Dudley v. Butler, 10 id. 281; Smith v. Town of Conway, 17 id. 586; Gurnsey v. Edwards, 26 id. 224. Chief Justice Parsons, in the early case of Com. v. Cambridge, 7 Mass. 158, seems also to have entertained a similar view. A different view is taken concerning the effect of such an offer in other cases. Partridge v. Ballard, 2 Me. 50; Crockett v. Boston, 5 Cush. 182. The opinion of Chief Justice Shaw in Copeland v. Packard, 16 Pick. 217, is in the same direction as the doctrine announced in the lastnamed cases. Then there are a number of cases holding that gifts of land or subscriptions of money for the location of public buildings in a certain place are not inimical to public policy. These cases are collected in the opinion in Pepin Co. v. Prindle, 61 Wis. 301-311. I am unable to perceive how the offer made in this case infringes on any rule of public policy. It is observable that the offer holds out no personal advantage to any member of the common council. Nor does it, as in the case of Smith v. Applegate, 23 N. J. Law, 352, offer an inducement to a party to the proceedings to fasten a burden upon the public, after a reviewing body had declared it unnecessary. The offer in this instance operated to make the conditions under which the judgment of the common council was to be exercised as to the advisability of opening the street more favorable to the public interests. It is almost always necessary, in deciding upon propriety of a public improvement, to consider, on the one hand, the advautages which are likely to accrue to the public from it, and on the other hand, the expense and burden which will be imposed by reason of it. These considerations lie at the root of the question whether it shall be done, and, if done, how it shall be done. Where the amount of expense is so great that the undertaking is dropped, a public gain is lost by reason of this unfortunate obstacle. If the expense can in any way be reduced, so that the balance, after weighing these counter-considerations, is in favor of the benefit over the burden, then the public reap the advantage. It seems to follow that an offer to diminish the expense which would fall upon the public is a gain, and not a loss, to the public. It is of course apparent that if the public improvement would have been executed without the intervention of the offer, the offer diminishes the amount which would otherwise have to be raised by tax. In fact the offer merely introduces a new factor in the conditions under which the common council is to consider the propriety of opening the proposed street. But it leaves that body untrammelled by any bribe, directly or indirectly, in view of all the conditions and with a regard to the best interests of the public, to exercise that discretion with which it is invested by the Legislature. It may be observed that if it should be held that an offer to contribute money is opposed to public policy, it must follow that a donation of land must stand upon the same footing. The acceptance of public highways which have been dedicated would come under the ban of such a doctrine. The very same argument could be employed against it, namely, that if it had been necessary to condemn the route and assess the cost upon neighboring owners and upon the public, the street might have been opened, and so the burden of maintaining it would not have been imposed upon the public. Sup. Ct. N. J., Nov. 5, 1891. State v. Mayor, etc., of the City of Orange. Opinion by Reed, J. UNITED STATES MARSHALS DEPUTIES POWERS OUTSIDE DISTRICT-CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS. -The authority and powers of United States marshals and their deputies are confined to the districts for which they are appointed, and hence where a deputy marshal for the Western District of Tennessee, while temporarily in Mississippi ou private business, learns of the whereabouts of a person for whom he has a warrant of arrest, and thereupon conceals a pistol about his person preparatory to starting in pursuit, he is answerable to the Mississippi courts for the offense of carrying concealed weapons, and habeas corpus will not issue to effect his release. Concisely stated, the argument is that, as the relator, at the time of his arrest, was a deputy United States marshal, and was in the act of starting in the pursuit of a criminal for whose arrest he had a warrant in his possession, he was therefore engaged in the performance of an act enjoined upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and had a right to carry a pistol, for the carrying of which he was arrested, and that it is immaterial that the acts which are claimed to have been done in pursuance of the laws of the United States were done and performed outside of the limits of the district for which the relator had been appointed, and was serving as a deputy marshal. This argument is ingenious but it is unsound. It overlooks the vital principle running through our laws (and which is in fact admitted by the relator in another form) that, subject to certain well-defined exceptions (not ma terial to be stated here), the authority of the United States marshals and their deputies to act in an official capacity is confined to the respective districts for which they have been appointed. Rev. Stat., §787; Fletcher v. U. S., 45 Fed. Rep. 213, 214. In this case the relator was a deputy United States marshal for the Western District of Tennessee, and the warrant which he had for the arrest of Bowers had been issued by a United States commissioner for that district. No part of his district extended into Mississippi. The warrant was effective only in the Western District of Teunessee. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300; Ex parte Graham, 3 Wash. C. C. 456; 4 id. 211; Day v. Manuf. Co., 1 Blatchf. 628. Moreover the official character of the relator could be recognized only in that district. Outside of that district, except in certain special cases not material in this consideration, he was simply a private citizen, and as such was amenable to the laws of the place where he chanced to be. He could not serve the warrant outside of his own district, and his official authority could be recognized only in that district. If he could not do the main act connected with the service of the warrant without his district, neither could he perform, outside of his district, such incidental preliminary acts as are claimed in this case to have been done in the line of his duty, and therefore in pursuance of the law. Much reliance however is placed ou section 788 of the Revised Statutes. That section provides as follows: "The marshals and their deputies shall have, in each State, the same powers in executing the laws of the United States as the sheriffs and their deputies in such State may have by law in executing the laws thereof." The argument in this connection is that as, in the performance of their duty, the sheriffs and their deputies in Mississippi have a right to carry a pistol, therefore the relator, as a deputy United States marshal for the Western District of Tennessee, being in Mississippi, should have the same right. That conclusion is a non sequitur. That section of the statute will not warrant such a construction. It was never intended by that section to enlarge the territorial jurisdiction of the United States marshals aud their deputies, which is the logical effect of the construction contended for. That section must be read and construed in pari materia with section 787. Wheu so read, it means simply that the marshals and their deputies, within their respective districts, shall have in each State the same powers in executing the laws of the United States as the sheriffs and their deputies in such States may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof. It would greatly protract this opinion, and would subserve no useful purpose, to review the many authorities cited and commented upon by counsel, both in their oral arguments and their briefs since filed. It is sufficient to say that none of them, it is believed, are directly in point, but, so far as they are applicable to the facts herein, their principles have been embodied in this opinion. This may be considered a hard case, in some particulars, on the relator, who evidently had no intention of violating the laws of the State of Mississippi in arming himself with a pistol, but that consideration touches the merits of the defense in the State court rather than its jurisdiction, and cannot influence this court in habeas corpus proceedings. U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Miss., W. D., Sept. 30, 1891. Walker v. Leu. Opinion by Lamar, J. 47 Fed. Rep. 645. CORRESPONDENCE. SUNDAY LAWS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: I wish to thank you for your kind notice of my lit tle book on "Sunday Law," and at the same time I am moved by an instinct which you will recognize as paternal, though you may possibly consider it morbid, to endeavor to turn aside from my offspring even the very delicate point of the criticism you have directed against it. You find fault with my conclusion that Sunday laws are immoral, demoralizing, etc., and add that it is as a holiday and not as a holy day that American jurisprudence should regard Sunday. I confess myself one of those who feel the force of the suggestion that what this country needs is not more holidays but more days to get over them. Years ago Horace Mann voiced what was then supposed to be the American idea in the incessant burden of his song praising work for its own sake, and insisting that it was to be valued altogether independent of its rewards, because of its strengthening, refining and purifying effects on human character. Nous avons changé tout cela. Now-a-days in many branches of industry the man who is willing to do all the work he can is called a "scab," and is stoned by the other men of his trade and scratched by their women, and many times he is lucky to escape with his life. We have vast organizations, constant agitation, occasional riots and a good deal of legislation, the sole object of which is to enable people to do as little work as possible, and in fact seem to be living under a sort of National apotheosis of idleness. Of course it is possible that the school of Horace Mann was all wrong and the school of the walking delegate is really the church of the new dispensation. But the change of ideals in a professedly industrial civilization is certainly curious and interesting and it seems to me has attracted too little the attention of students of our social phenomena. However, as Mr. Rudyard Kipling would say, "that is another story." What I intended to observe about Sunday laws is that they are not designed to make the day a holiday, for if they were they would not prohibit play as well as work. Just as soon as they are reduced to laws establishing a mere legal holiday on the first day of the week all the interest of their present supporters in their existence or enforcement will be at an end. The first English "Sunday law "passed under the Puritan dispensation was not directed against work at all, but against play, and this law coutained all that was really esteemed of value by our American Puritans, to whom Sunday laws owe their being and vitality. Even as regards work, the idea of compulsory idleness is grotesque enough and really originated with Mr. Squeers of Dotheboy's Hall, to the best of my kuowledge. His pupil Moggs was suiffing and lowspirited, whereupon Mr. S. "moistened the palm of his terrible right hand" and observed: "Cheerfulness and contentment must be kept up-Moggs, come here." So the State, under the holiday theory of Sunday laws, says to the citizens: You must be cheerful on Sunday under a penalty of 8for each and every offense. And in order to encourage you to be so, we will deprive you of every possible means of diversion ou that day and punish you if you go out into the fields and play all by yourself." Of course the State may close its own offices on Sundays, forbid the protest of notes, etc., but to do this is not to pass a Sunday law at all. January 1, 1892. Yours truly, JAS. T. RINGGOLD. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. THE GREEN BAG. The Green Bag, a useless but entertaining magazine for lawyers, edited by Horace W. Fuller. Vol. 3, covering the year 1891. The Boston Book Company, Boston, Mass. This publication is always received and read by us with pleasure and instruction-every word of it except The certain cases in verse. The present volume is not inferior to its two predecessors at any point. It contains valuable biographical sketches of eminent lawyers, exhaustive histories of several of the State courts and very copious and admirable portraiture. courts of final appeal in Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Missouri, Illinois and New Jersey are here described, with a great number of portraits of their judges. Among the best full-page portraits are those of Benj. Vaughan Abbott, David Dudley Field, Sir Johu Thompson, Rufus King, James T. Brady, Sir John A. Macdonald, Lord Selborne, Sir Edward Clarke and Johu Marshall. A large copy, for framing, of that of John Marshall-which is one not commonly known and is extremely interesting-is given to every subscriber who has "paid up" for the new year. There is one law school described in this volume-that of Osgoode Hall, Toronto-and this article is illustrated by a beautiful group of portraits. It is our belief that in the distant future these volumes will command high prices on account of the portraits alone. The volume gives also a great amount of matter not only "entertaining" but valuable and instructive as well. It is well and appropriately bound in green. May its color prove perenuial! Law. Report of committees. Miscellaneous business. |