66 freedom of the conftitution and the freedom of the fubject. The fubject may be free, and not the conftitution *." The freedom of the fubject, according to this writer, may arife "from morals, customs, or received examples, and civil laws $6 66 may favour it :" but " on the goodness, "of criminal laws the liberty of the fubject principally depends +." On this head, when the right and duty of Juries, in cafes of libels, fhall be established, we can have no controverfy. The administration of justice is among the found parts of our Conftitution. In the beautiful review of the English. Conftitution, to which Mr. Burke alludes, Montefquieu exprefsly declares, "All the inhabitants of the feveral diftricts ought “to have a right of voting at the election of a reprefentative, except fuch as are in fo mean a condition as to be deemed to have will of their own." What more do we require? Or what does Mr. Burke with по * Spirit of Laws, b. 12. ch. 1. Ibid. b. II. ch. 6. + B. 12. ch. 2, peculiar 1 peculiar ardor refift? Montefquieu thinks the liberty of the Conftitution depends on the fundamental laws, which distribute the legiflative and executive powers, "When "the legiflative and executive powers are "united in the fame perfon, or in the "fame body of Magiftrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehenfions may 66 66 66 arife; that the fame Monarch or Senate may enact tyrannical laws to execute "them in a tyrannical manner." Again: "But if there were no Monarch, and the "executive power was committed to a "certain number of perfons felected from "the legislative body, there would be an "end of liberty; because the fame perfons "would actually fometimes have, and would moreover always be able to have, a share in both." The legiflative power vefted in a correct reprefentation of the people, the executive power in an hereditary Monarch, with a complete feparation of the legiflative and executive powers, form the basis of the French Conftitution; while in England the choice of the Sovereign is limited, in fact, to the leaders of contending factions in Parliament; and our monumental debt 66 debt attefts the folly of uniting in the fame perfons the refponfible character of Ministers, and the effective power of control. If," fays Montefquieu, "the Prince were to "have a fhare in the legiflation by the power of refolving, liberty would be "loft." Again: "Were the executive 66 66 power to ordain the raising of public 66 money, otherwife than by giving its "confent, liberty would be at an end, "because it would become legislative in "the most important point of legiflation." Does not the whole effective power of raifing public money refide in the Minifters of the Crown? What edicts of taxation haveour Parliaments refused to register? or when did they even name a Committee to infpect the public accounts, that the lift was not prepared by the Minifter? Have not the prefent Parliament Parliament voted more than 800,000l. per annum additional taxes, almost without the compliment of a debate? Yet when the Spanish Convention was concluded, when the subject had paffed into history, did they not refuse to investigate how far the expenditure of four millions was neceffary? Montefquieu fortells the ruin of our freedoin. "As all human things "must have an end; the ftate we are "fpeaking of will lofe its liberty, it will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and 66 Carthage, perifhed? It will perish when "the legislative power shall be more corrupted " than the executive." How near that calamitous period approaches, let the writings of Mr. Burke atteft! With thefe warnings, fhall the difciples of Montefquieu neglect to reclaim their rights? That great man beheld, even in his time, the rapid advance of this fatal corruption, when he added, "It is not my bufinefs to inquire 66 66 whether the English actually enjoy this liberty or not it is fufficient for my purpose that it is established by their laws, "and I inquire no farther." He then faw our practice widely diverging from the theory of our Conftitution. We have now • dif * "covered, that the forms of a free, and "the ends of an arbitrary Government, were "things not altogether incompatible." In the much-agitated question on the revolt of the French foldiery, the authority of Montefquieu is on the fide of free * Caufe of prefent Difcontents, p. 12. dom.. dom. To prevent trufted, fhould confift of the people, and "have the fame fpirit as the people :” and he recommends, as the means of preferving the fame fpirit in the armies, that "the foldiers fhould live in common with the "reft of the people; and no separate camp, barracks, or fortrefs, fhould be fuffered." Without this participation of the fame Spirit our Revolution of 1688 had been defeated; and the defpotifm of France had continued to infult and opprefs the French nation to embroil by its intrigues all the kingdoms of Europe. Thofe who do not know Mr. Burke might fufpect that his beautiful eulogy on the Polish Revolution was introduced for the gratification of one remark. "The ઠંડ genius of this faction is eafily difcerned, by obferving with what a different eye "they have viewed the late foreign Revo lutions. Two have paffed before them that of France and that of Poland." Mr. Burke knew that this faction had re* Spirit of Laws, b. 11. ch. 6. + Appeal, p. 102, |