the initials "S. T." as an abbreviation for "stamp tax." The instructions stated that "Tob." is an abbreviaton for "tobacco." Resort may be had to these instructions to show the meaning of the abbreviations in the assessment list. Read by the light of the instructions, the list shows a tax which the appellant might be liable to pay, and one which the commissioner had general jurisdiction to assess against him. The inhibition of section 3224 applies to all assessments of taxes, made under color of their offices, by internal revenue officers charged with general jurisdiction of the subject of assessing taxes against tobacco manufacturers. The remedy of a suit to recover back the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The remedy so given is exclusive, and no other remedy can be substituted for it. Such has been the current of decisions in the circuit courts of the United States, and we are satisfied it is a correct view of the law. Howland v. Soule, Deady, 413; Pullan v. Kinsinger, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 94; Robbins v. Freeland, 14 Int. Rev. Rec. 28; Delaware R. Co. v. Prettyman, 17 Int. Rev. Rec. 99; U. S. v. Black, 11 Blatchf. C. C. 543; Kissinger v. Bean, 7 Biss. 60; U. S. v. Pacific Railroad, 4 Dill. 69; Alkan v. Bean, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 351; Kensett v. Stivers, 18 Blatchf. C. C. 397.1 In Cheatham v. U. S. 92 U. ES. 85, 88, and again in State Railroad Tax Case, Id. 575, 613, it was said by this court that the system prescribed by the United States*in regard to both customs duties and internal revenue taxes, of stringent measures, not judicial, to collect them, with appeals to specified tribunals, and suits to recover back moneys illegally exacted, was a system of corrective justice intended to be complete, and enacted under the right belonging to the government to prescribe the conditions on which it would subject itself to the judgment of the courts in the collection of its revenues. In the exercise of that right it declares, by section 3224, that its officers shall not be enjoined from collecting a tax claimed to have been unjustly assessed, when those officers, in the course of general jurisdiction over the subject-matter in question, have made the assessment and claim that it is valid. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed. 18. C. 10 Fed. Rep. 517. (109 U. 8. 811) NEW ORLEANS NAT. BANKING Ass'N and others v. ADAMS and others. (November 12, 1883.) MORTGAGE INTENTION TO PLEDGE LAND NECESSARY. While no precise form of words is necessary to constitute a mortgage, there must be a present purpose of the mortgagor to pledge his land for the payment of a sum of money, or the performance of some other act, or it cannot be construed to be a mortgage. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. In equity. The facts, as they appear from the pleadings and evidence, were as follows: A firm doing business in Louisiana, under the name of Tucker Brothers, on February 24, 1860, made and delivered their promissory note of that date for $5,000, payable February 15, 1860, to the Bank of New Orleans, which afterwards, by virtue of the provisions of the "act to provide a national currency, etc., passed June 3, 1864, became a national bank under the name of the New Orleans National Banking Association. Tucker Brothers, on the same day, executed three other notes for $5,000, one of them, payable to Godfrey Barnsley, falling due January 21, 1861. To secure these four notes the makers executed a mortgage on a certain plantation in La Fourche parish, Louisiana. Two of the notes were paid, but those given to the Bank of New Orleans and Barnsley were not paid at maturity. Thereupon the bank, having instituted a suit on the mortgage and the note held by it on June 11, 1867, obtained a decree of foreclosure against Tucker Brothers, by virtue of which, on September 7, 1867, the mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff to one Albert N. Cummings for the price of $13,025, to satisfy said unpaid notes. Cummings being unable to pay the purchase money, it was agreed between him and the parties entitled to the proceeds of the sale that he should have time; whereupon Cummings, on September 7, 1867, executed an agreement in writing, before J. K. Gourdain, a notary of the parish of La Fourche, in which he recited that he had not paid the purchase money of the plantation, and declared as follows: "That he corresponded and compromised with the mortgage creditors hereinafter named, who agreed to give him time, without, however, impairing or novating the original claims, the right to enforce which they expressly reserved." Cummings, then, by this same agreement stipulated that out of the price of the plantation he would pay to one Gaubert the sum of $1,851.10, on or before March 1, 1861, he holding the first privilege on a part of the plantation for that amount; to Barnsley the sum of $4,904.40, on or before May 15, 1870; and to the Bank of New Orleans $6,269.50, on or before May 1, 1870, and that all these sums should bear interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum after maturity till paid. The agreement then further declared as follows: "It is understood, as above stated, that the parties hereto do not by these presents impair, affect, or novate their existing claims, and that in case of non-payment they will be entitled to enforce the judgments which may be held by them; and furthermore, that the original mortgages and privileges remain in full force and effect, and are not hereby novated, and if need be, for the purpose of avoiding all doubts, the said privileges and mortgages are hereby recognized as operating on the said property in the proportions aforesaid, and to secure the debts stated as aforesaid with the rank above stated." This agreement was duly recorded in the office of the recorder of mortgages for the parish of La Fourche, on September 12, 1867. After the making of this agreement, Cummings, without having paid the sums the payment of which was promised, thereby sold the property to a Mrs. Tucker, who conveyed an undivided half interest to one Thomas J. Daunis, and Mrs. Tucker and Daunis then executed a mortgage on the same to John I. Adams & Co., to secure certain notes made by Daunis to said firm, after which Mrs. Tucker conveyed her undivided half of the property to Daunis. Subsequently the Bank of New Orleans, now become the New Orleans National Banking Association, assuming that the agreement entered into by Cummings before Gourdain, the notary, on September 7, 1867, constituted a mortgage by which the balance found thereby to be due it from Cummings was secured, filed the bill in this case to foreclose the same. The bill made the firm of John I. Adams & Co. parties defendant, charging that said firm claimed to have a mortgage on the property covered by the alleged mortgage of the complainant, and that if said firm had any lien upon or interest in said premises it was subsequent to September 12, 1867, the date of the inscription of the complainant's alleged mortgage. To this bill John I. Adams & Co. filed a plea and answer, in which they set up that they, being holders of certain notes secured by a mortgage on the property described in the bill of complaint, instituted a certain suit upon the same against Thomas J. Daunis, in the district court sitting for the parish of La Fourche, and obtained a writ of seizure and sale against said property, under and by virtue of which the same was seized by the sheriff, and in October, 1875, sold to John I. Adams, who claimed title thereto. They further alleged that the agreement dated September 7, 1867, set forth in the complain. ant's bill, being the agreement of Cummings with the Bank of New Orleans and other holders of liens upon the plantation sold to him, was not a mortgage, and if it were, it was proscribed, because it had not been reinscribed within 10 years from the date of the original inscription, on September 12, 1867, as required by the law of Louis. iana. Upon final hearing upon the pleadings and evidence, the circuit court dismissed the bill, and from its decree the complainant appealed. J. D. Rouse, Wm. Grant, and Thos. L. Bayne, for appellant. WOODS, J. It is conceded by counsel for complainant that the original mortgage made by Tucker Brothers, dated February 24, 1860, and the decree rendered thereon in favor of the Bank of New Orleans by the district court of the parish of La Fourche, in June, 1867, were both extinguished by the sale of the mortgaged premises to Cummings on September 7, 1867. But complainant insists that the agreement made by Cummings on the day last named, with the Bank of New Orleans and other parties entitled to the proceeds of the sale, constituted a mortgage, and that the same having, on September 12, 1867, been recorded in the office of the recorder of mortgages for the parish in which the lands were situate, secured them a lien and privilege on the premises from the date of said record. We are of opinion that this contention is not well founded. While it may be conceded that no precise form of words is necessary to constitute a mortgage, yet there must be a present purpose of the mortgagor to pledge his land for the payment of a sum of money, or the performance of some other act, or it cannot be construed to be a mortgage. Wilcox v. Morris, 1 Murph. 116; S. C. 3 Amer. Dec. 678. The agreement of September 7, 1867, does not, on its face or by its terms, profess to create a lien in favor of the Bank of New Orleans on the premises in question, but it recites that the parties thereto do? not thereby impair, affect, or novate their existing claims; that the original mortgages and privileges remain in full force and are recognized as operating on said property "to secure the debts stated as aforesaid with the rank above stated." The agreement is not of doubtful meaning. Its purpose is to recognize the old mortgage made by Tucker Brothers in 1860, and to preserve its lien on the mortgaged premises from the date of its inscription. The contention of complainant is not that the agreement is a mortgage to secure the notes made by Tucker Brothers, but to secure from Cummings the price which he bid for the premises at the sale made to satisfy the mortgage executed by Tucker Brothers. The bill of complainant is framed upon this theory; but the fault of this theory is that the agreement does not profess, of its own force, to secure the money due from Cummings, but excludes the idea that such is its purpose by declaring that the original mortgages are recognized as operating on said property to secure the sums due from Cummings. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that the agreement of September 7, 1867, was not intended by the parties as a new mortgage to take effect at that date, but as a recognition of the old mortgage, and that its purpose was to keep it alive and to preserve its lien as of the date of its inscription. In other words, Cummings, by this agreement, undertakes to keep alive and in full force a mortgage made by another party after it had been fore closed, the mortgaged property sold, and the mortgage and the decree rendered thereon extinguished. It was not in his power to do this. It follows that the effect of the agreement of Cummings of September 7, 1867, is simply as a contract to pay the parties entitled to it the purchase money of the premises bought by him, and creates no lien or privilege on the premises sold. In other words, it is not a mortgage. This view is supported by the decision of the supreme court of Louisiana in the case of Adams v. Daunis, 29 La. Ann. 315. This was the proceeding by Adams to cause to be erased the mortgages anterior to his purchase of the premises in question. The agreement of Cummings of September 7, 1867, was put in evidence in that case, and this court held it to be no mortgage. It results from this view that the decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill of complaint was right, and must be affirmed. (109 U. S. 185) RETZER v. WOOD, Collector, etc. (November 12, 1883.) EXPRESS BUSINESS-ACT OF JUNE 30, 1864, c. 173, § 104-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS -PLEADING-ACTION TO RECOVER ILLEGAL INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES. The idea of regularity, as to route or time, or both, is involved in the words "express business," under section 104 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 173, (13 St. at Large, 276,) and those words do not cover what is done by a person who carries goods solely on call and at special request, and does not run regular trips or over regular routes. in the absence of a statutory rule to the contrary, the defense of a statute of limlitations, which is not raised either in pleading or on the trial, or before judgment, cannot be availed of. In a suit to recover back internal revenue taxes, tried by the circuit court without a jury, the court having found the facts, and held that the taxes were illegally exacted, but that the suit was barred by a statute of limitation, rendered a judgment for the defendant. On a writ of error by the plaintiff, the record not showing that the question as to the statute of limitations was raised by the pleadings, or on the trial, or before judgment, and the conclusion of law as to the illegality of the taxes being upheld, this court reversed the judgment and directed a judgment for the plaintiff to be entered below. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Wm. Stanley and Edwin B. Smith, for plaintiff in error. BLATCHFORD, J. This suit was commenced in a court of the state of New York, and was removed by the defendant into the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York by a writ of certiorari. The defendant was a collector of internal revenue, and exacted and collected from the plaintiff, at various times in the years 1866, 1867, and 1868, sums of money amounting in all to $61.30, as |