they?" the answer would have properly been "They are the gentlemen." But when the question is "Who is it?" I apprehend the only apposite answer is, "It is the gentlemen," the identity of the terms (it being repeated) clearly evincing an identity of subject in the question and in the answer; in other words, that the subject of the inquiry, and the subject of the answer, are one and the same.

I conclude with observing, that, though I have here considered the word that as a pronoun, there can be no question that in its import it is precisely the same with the demonstrative that, which has been already explained. "The house that you built is burned," is resolvable thus, "The house is burned, you built that."

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE ADJECTIVE.

AN adjective has been defined by most grammarians to be "that part of speech which signifies an accident, quality, or property of a thing." This definition appears to me to be somewhat defective and incorrect: for the adjective does not express the quality simply, but the quality or property, as conjoined with a substance; or, as grammarians have termed it, in concreto. Thus, when we say "good man," goodness is the name of the quality, and good is the adjective expressing that quality, as conjoined with the subject man. Accordingly, every adjective is resolvable into the name of the thing implied, and any term of reference or conjunction, as of, with. Thus "a prudent man" is equivalent to "a man with" or "having prudence," or to " a man of prudence." An adjective, therefore, is that part of speech which denotes any substance or attribute, not by itself, but as conjoined with a subject, or pertaining to its character. This conjunction is generally marked by changing the termination of the simple name of the substantive or attribute, as fool, foolish, wax, waxen. Sometimes no change is made; and the simple name of the substance, or attribute, is prefixed to the name of the subject, as sea fowl, race horse, corn field. In writing these, and similar expressions, the conjunction is sometimes marked by a hyphen, as sea-fowl, river-fish, winevessel.

As every appellative denotes the whole of a genus or species, the intention and effect of the adjective is, by limiting the generic meaning of the substantive, to specify what part of the genus or species is the subject of discourse. If I say "man," the term is universal: it embraces the species. If I say "a man," the expression is indefinite, being applicable

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to any individual of the kind. If I say a good man," I confine the term to an individual distinguished by goodness. Here man expresses the substance; and good the quality in concreto. Sometimes, on the contrary, the substantive is the general name of the quality or property; and the adjective modifies or determines its degree, as, wisdom, little wisdom. Let us take another example. The word stone is applicable to a whole species of substances. If I say round stone, I confine the meaning of the substantive to that part of the genus which is distinguished by roundness. Here the substantive denotes the matter, or substance, in general, and the adjective limits its signification, by expressing the form. Sometimes the converse takes place, as golden globe. Here the substantive is the generic name of a certain figure; and the adjective, by expressing the matter, confines that figure to the substance of gold.

Some grammarians have denominated this part of speech by the name of adjective noun; to others this designation appears inadmissible. The latter observe, that neither is the adjective the name of anything, nor is it in English variable, like the substantive. They allow, that in Greek and Latin, the designation in question is, in some degree, justifiable, because, though the noun and adjective differ essentially in office, in these languages, they agree in form; but in our language they deem it a singular impropriety a.

a Mr. Tooke contends, that this part of speech is properly termed adjective noun, and “that it is altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun substantive." Names and designations necessarily influence our conceptions of the things which they represent. It is therefore desirable, that in every art or science, not only should no term be employed which may convey to the reader or hearer an incorrect conception of the thing signified, but that every term should assist him in forming a just idea of the object which it expresses. Now, I concur with Mr. Tooke in thinking, that the adjective is by no means a necessary part of speech. I agree with him also in opinion, that, in a certain sense, all words are nouns or names. But, as this latter doctrine seems directly repugnant to the concurrent theories of critics and grammarians, it is necessary to explain in what sense the opinion of Mr. Tooke requires to be understood; and in presenting the reader with this explanation, I shall briefly state the objections which will naturally offer themselves against the justness

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I have said that the adjective denotes a substance, quality, or property, "as pertaining," or in concreto. Now, it is to

of this theory. "Gold, and brass, and silk, is each of them," says Mr. Tooke, "the name of a thing, and denotes a substance. If, then, I say, a gold-ring, a brass-tube, a silk-string; here are the substantives adjectivè posita, yet names of things, and denoting substances." It may be contended, however, that these are not substantives, but adjectives, and are the same as golden, brazen, silken. He proceeds: "If again I say, a golden ring, a brazen tube, a silken string; do gold, and brass, and silk, cease to be the names of things, and cease to denote substances, because instead of coupling them with ring, tube, and string, by a hyphen thus (-), I couple them to the same words, by adding the termination en ?” It may be answered, they do not cease to imply the substances, but they are no longer names of those substances. Hard implies hardness, but it is not the name of that quality. Atheniensis implies Athenæ, but it is not the name of the city, any more than belonging to Athens can be called its name. He observes: If it were true, that adjectives were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives; for you cannot attribute nothing." This conclusion may be disputed. An adjective may imply a substance, quality, or property, though it is not the name of it. Cereus, "waxen," implies cera, "wax;" but it is the latter only which is strictly the name of the substance. Pertaining to wax, made of wax, are not surely names of the thing itself. Every attributive, whether verb or adjective, must imply an attribute; but it is not therefore the name of that attribute. Juvenescit, "he waxes young," expresses an attribute; but we should not call juvenescit the name of the attribute.

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It may be asked, what is the difference between caput hominis, "a man's head," and caput humanum, a human head?" If hominis, man's," be deemed a noun, why should not humanum, “human," be deemed a noun also? It may be answered, that hominis does, in fact, perform the office of an adjective, expressing not only the individual, but conjunction also; and that Mr. Wallis assigns to the English genitive the name of adjective. Besides, does not Mr. Tooke himself maintain, "that case, gender, and number, are no parts of the noun"? and does it not hence follow, that the real nouns are not hominis, but homo,— not man's, but man? for such certainly is their form when divested of those circumstances which, according to Mr. Tooke, make no part of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of the learned author be correct, and if the real noun exclude gender, case, and number, as any part of it, neither hominis nor humanum, man's nor human, can with consistency be called

nouns.

But let Mr. Tooke's argument be applied to the verb, the rò pîμa, which he justly considers as an essential part of speech. "If verbs were

be observed, that substances do not admit degrees of more or less, in regard to their essential character. "A wooden

not the names of things, there could be no attribution by verbs, for we cannot attribute nothing." Are we then to call sapit, vivit, legit, names? If so, we have nothing but names; and to this conclusion Mr. Tooke fairly brings the discussion; for he says, that all words are names.

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Having thus submitted to the reader the doctrine of this sagacious critic, with the objections which naturally present themselves, I proceed to observe, that the controversy appears to me to be, in a great degree, a mere verbal dispute. It is agreed on both sides, that the adjective expresses a substance, quality, or property; but, while it is affirmed by some critics, it is denied by others, that it is the name of the thing signified. The metaphysician considers words merely as signs of thought, while the grammarian regards chiefly their changes by inflexion and hence arises that perplexity in which the classification of words has been, and still continues to be, involved. Now, it is evident that every word must be the sign of some sensation, idea, or perception. It must express some substance or some attribute: and in this sense all words may be regarded as names. Sometimes we have the name of the thing simply, as person. Sometimes we have an accessary idea combined with the simple sign, as "possession," conjunction," "action," and so forth, as personal, personally, personify. This accessary circumstance, we have reason to believe, was originally denoted by a distinct word, significant of the idea intended; and that this word was, in the progress of language, abbreviated and incorporated with the primary term, in the form of what we now term an affix or prefix. Thus frigus, frigidus, friget, all denote the same primary idea, involving the name of that quality, or of that sensation, which we term cold. Frigus is the name of the thing simply; frigidus expresses the quality in concreto, or conjunction. Considering, therefore, all words as names, it may be regarded as a complex name, expressing two distinct ideas,-that of the quality, and that of conjunction. Friget (the subject being understood) may be regarded as a name still more complex; involving, first, the name of the quality; secondly, the name of conjunction; thirdly, the sign of affirmation, as either expressed by an appropriate name, or constructively implied, equivalent to the three words, est cum frigore. According, then, to this metaphysical view of the subject, we have first nomen simplex, the simple name; secondly, nomen adjectivum or nomen duplex, the name of the thing, with that of conjunction; thirdly, nomen affirmativum, the name of the thing affirmed to be conjoined.

The simple question now is, whether all words, not even the verb excepted, should be called nouns; or whether we shall assign them such appellations as may indicate the leading circumstances by which they are distinguished. The latter appears to me to be the only mode which the