CHAPTER II.

OF THE ARTICLE.

LANGUAGE is chiefly composed of general terms, most substantives being the names of genera or species. When we find a number of substances resembling one another in their principal and most obvious qualities, we refer them to one species, to which we assign a name common to every individual of that species. In like manner, when we find several of these species resembling one another in their chief properties, we refer them to a higher order, to which also we assign a common and more general name than that which was affixed to the inferior class. Thus we assign the general name man to the human species, as possessing a common form, and distinguished by the common attributes of life, reason, and speech. If we consider man as possessed of life only, we perceive a resemblance in this respect between him and other beings. To this higher class or genus, the characteristic attribute of which is vitality, we affix the more generic name of animal. Hence, when we use an appellative or common noun, it denotes the genus or class collectively, of which it is the name, as,

66 The proper study of mankind is man," i. e. not one man, not many men, but all men.

Not only, however, has this rule its limitations, though these seem governed by no fixed principle, but we frequently find the articles admitted when the whole genus or species is evidently implied. Thus we may say,

"Metal is specifically heavier than water;" i. e. not this or that metal, but all metals. But we cannot say, "Vege

a

It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal belong not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the result of intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one head.

table is specifically lighter than water;" or, "Mineral is specifically heavier than water." Again; we say, "Man is born unto trouble;" but we cannot say, "Tiger is ferocious," or, "Fox is cunning;" but, "The tiger, or a tiger, is ferocious;" "The fox, or a fox, is cunning;" the expressions being applicable to the whole species. It would appear, indeed, that when proper names assume the office of appellatives, the reverse of the rule takes place. Thus we say, " A Douglas braves the pointed steel;" the meaning being 66 every Douglas." Suppress the indefinite article, and the general proposition becomes individual.

But, though our words are general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences; and hence arises the use of that species of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity or one of a class, our forefathers employed ae or ane, as ae man, ane ox. When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity would naturally be unemphatical; and hence ae, by celerity of pronunciation, would become a, and ane be shortened into an. These words a and an are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, that they are truly numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c.; or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations for the repeated expression of the term one. By whatever name these terms, a, an, may be designed, it seems evident that they were originally synonymous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing whether unity or the species. were chiefly intended. Hence a and an cannot be joined with a plural noun.

Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted that in every example where a or an occurs, the term one may be substituted in its stead, without in the least degree injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words

is concerned, this opinion is doubtless incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the secondary or implied ideas which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this: If I say, "Will one man be able to carry this burden so far?" I evidently oppose one to more: and the answer might be, "No; but two men will." Let us substitute the term a, and say, "Will a man be able to carry this burden?" Is the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is; for the answer might naturally be, "No; but a horse will." I have here substituted a, for one; the converse will equally show that the terms are by no means mutually convertible, or strictly synonymous. If, instead of saying, "A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse," I should say, " One horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse," the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species is demanded; but with this difference, that in the former the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea, “one kingdom for one horse." In this respect, our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those languages where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. Donnez-moi un livre means either give me one book," i. e. not two or more books; or "give me a book," that is, "a book, not something else; a book, not a pen," for example.

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it can,

I acknowledge that, in oral language, emphasis may serve to discriminate the sentiments, and prevent ambiguity. But emphasis is addressed to the ear only, not to the eye; therefore, be of no service in written language. It is true also, that by attending to the context, error may often be avoided; but let it be remembered, as Quintilian observes,

a Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere curandum. Inst. lib. viii. cap. 4.

I am inclined to think that our language possesses a superiority in this respect over the Greek itself. Εγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ τοῦ Oro may signify either "man in the species, or an individual, was sent

that language should be, not such as the reader may understand if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to comprehend. When it is asserted, therefore, that one may in every case be substituted for a, without in the least degree injuring the expression, the position appears to me erroneous and false. Whatever creates ambiguity, whether with respect to the primary or secondary ideas annexed to words, in some degree, without question, violates the sense. Be it observed also, that, though a, an, ae, ane, one, may have been all etymologically the same, it does not follow, nor is it practically true, as has been now shown, that they are all precisely equivalent words. In Scotland, the distinction between a and ae is well known. "Give me a book," means any book, in contradistinction to any other object, as "a chair," "a pen," "a knife;" give me ae book," is in contradistinction to one or more. Such also is the difference between a and one.

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It seems, therefore, undeniable that the word a, termed the indefinite article, was originally identical with the name of unity, expressing either one of any species, as opposed to more of that species, or one of this kind, as opposed to one of that. Whether the distinction of its noting one or unity, with less emphasis than the appropriate name of unity, should entitle it to be referred to a different class of words from the numeral one, and called an article, it is unimportant to inquire. To me, however, I must acknowledge the dis

from God." The author of the article Grammar, in the Encyc. Brit., observes, “that the word aveρwños is here restricted to an individual by its concord with the verb and the participle." If he mean by this that the term must be significant of only one individual, (and I can annex no other interpretation to his words,) because a singular verb and participle singular are joined with it, he errs egregiously. Numberless examples might be produced to evince the contrary. Job. v. 7. äveрwños yevvâtai κόπῳ, man (mankind) is born unto trouble;" where the subject is joined to a verb singular. Psal. xlix. 12. åvēρwños ¿v tiμôj ŵv ov ovvîke,

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man being in honour abideth not." Here also man for mankind is joined with a participle and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently asked, would not the term one for a in the first example somewhat alter the meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by the evangelist?

tinctive name of article assigned to this word appears to be useless. Were emphasis to be admitted as the principle of classification, (and I see no other distinction between a and one,) the parts of speech might be multiplied beyond number. Besides the words a and an, termed indefinite articles, as not defining which of the species is signified, we have also another word, the, named the definite article, because it is said to point out the individual object. This word, I doubt not, proceeded from the word this or that, much in the same manner as a and an from ae and ane. To what class of words this and that should be referred has been a subject of controversy. That they are not pronouns, as some have asserted, seems abundantly evident; for they never represent a noun. By some they have been called definitives; and, though this designation be not strictly consonant with their import, it is perhaps the least exceptionable. When opposed to each other, they appear to be reducible to that species of words termed adjectives of order; the only difference between them and ordinary numerals being this, that the former express the arrangement in relation to two objects, the latter in relation to a series. This means "the nearer, ""the latter," " "the former," or

or "the second;" that, "the more remote," "the first." Their office, in general, seems to be emphatically to individuate some particular object whose character was either previously known, or is then described; hence they have also been named demonstratives. Under which of the generally received parts of speech they should be comprehended it may be difficult to determine. As, like simple attributives they accord with nouns, frequently denoting the

a

They are the Saxon words this or thes, "hic, hæc, hoc," that or that, "ille, illa, illud," which were frequently used by the Saxons for what we term the definite article, as, send us on thas swyn, "send us into the swine." Mark v. 21, tha eodon tha unclenan gastas on tha swyn, "then the unclean spirits entered into the swine."

The Saxon definites are se, seo, that, for the three genders severally; and tha in the plural, expressing the or those, as, that goed sæd, the good seed. That is also joined to masculine and feminine nouns, as, that wif, the woman; that folc, the people. The (pronounced they) still obtains in Scotland, as, "thæ men" for "these men.'