CHAPTER V.

THE FORCE OF THE NATION.

THE government of every nation rests on the total physical force of the nation. The function of a government, as already suggested, is both to express and to execute the will of the state. If the government cannot enforce the execution of its laws within the nation, then the nation ceases to be sovereign. And if a majority or plurality of voters, as the case may be, determines for the time being the will of any given state, it is primarily because such majority or plurality represents the preponderance of physical force.

When the will of the nation has been announced in the law, through the organs of the government empowered to make the declaration, the next question is, who shall enforce it? It will be seen at once that he who executes the law is subordinate to those who formulate and announce the law, because he does what a superior commands him to do; consequently he is not the sovereign. In order to make the will or command of the nation effective, it must either be acquiesced in or enforced. In fact, in all nations there must exist the ability to carry out the law by the exercise of physical force, and if need be, of the entire physical force of the nation. It may be said that physical force is at the basis of every political community, whether independent or dependent. This force is either active or dormant; generally the latter, lying as it were in the background, but ready to be aroused if any exigency demands. The whole political structure of

every community rests, in a large sense, on physical force. If the body politic cannot bring the combined force of its members to bear upon any one of them in order to compel obedience to the commands of the sovereign of that body, then it cannot be said to be an independent political community, for it lacks one of its characteristic elements. Not only is an independent political community the embodiment of physical force, but, as regards its members or citizens, is, as has been suggested, an absolute despotism. If the sovereign in the nation makes a command, and any of the members of the state refuse to obey it, and the remaining members refuse to furnish the physical force to compel obedience, then the person or body of persons making such command ceases to be sovereign.

This has sometimes been styled the mere police theory of government, but in asserting that physical force is the basis on which all government rests, it must be understood in the sense that when any independent political community maintains a form of government—that is, provides an agency through which the sovereign in that community may express its commands-it necessarily, in order to make these commands effective, more than mere idle fulminations, places at the disposal of the sovereign whatever of physical force the community possesses for the purpose of compelling obedience to the commands. If such were not the case, the functions of every government would cease. It is not, of course, affirmed that every act is the exercise of propelling force. On the contrary, by far the larger part of government action is merely regulative. The reserve force may be compared to the banker's fund which is only to be drawn upon in cases of emergency; without this fund, however, he would be insolvent; and so a government unable to command its reserve is a mere form without vitality.

Laws are made by the legislature with penalties in case of disobedience. It is true that these are, in most instances, obeyed, not through fear of the penalties, but really because the law-making power has enacted them. It is certainly true that most people do not refrain from stealing because there are laws with penalties for the offence. The mass of people in civilized communities have the law-obeying habit. Still, it may be that, out of ten thousand, only one will violate a statute; but unless all the physical force of the state can be brought to bear, if necessary, to enforce the sanctions of the violated law on this one, the state has not, in fact, a government.

It is certainly not to be overlooked that very much of the mechanism of every government is provided for by laws without penalties, or, apparently, very inadequate ones. The postal system, for instance, consists of elaborate arrangements for the reception and distribution of letters. It is designed and administered entirely as a convenience to the citizen. No one is compelled to avail himself of its instrumentalities. If one does not comply with its rules, as in not prepaying the postage on a letter, he merely loses the advantages of its expeditious service. Yet at proper points this service is guarded by adequate penalties. Severe punishment is inflicted upon robbers of the mail, or for the opening of letters by unauthorized persons, or for carrying letters not stamped, on mail routes. The whole service moves, as it were, from its own volition; but, in fact, is held up, one may say, by the passive force of the community.

So with the complex body of rules regulating procedure in courts of justice. A person whose legal rights have been invaded may quietly submit to the wrong, or he may seek redress by a civil remedy in the courts. His action or non-action is entirely voluntary. If he chooses

to ask reparation he does so in a certain formal way, and the whole procedure to the decree is by methods established by statutes, or by rules adopted by the practice of courts. Up to the last moment he may abandon the pursuit of his remedy. It is only when the decree is executed by the sheriff or other officers of the court that there is any appearance of physical force.

The rules and regulations which control the interior workings of the several great departments of state are in large part provided for by voluminous statutes without penalties. The sovereign authority simply says, in substance, there shall be a Department of State, a Treasury Department, a War Department, and an Interior Department, and they shall be conducted by such and such officers, and in such and such a manner. Apparently these several functions of government do not require a basis of physical force, but if we follow out to the last degree their manifest relations to the nation, we shall see that none of them could be an active agent without the basis of that force. They live and act because they are held up and sustained by a latent force which at any moment may manifest itself.

But why is it, that in a republic the majority, or sometimes merely a plurality of voters, is permitted to form and express the will of the community? Because the majority, as between two parties, and a plurality, as between three or more, represents the preponderance of physical force, which by supposition, may be used to make the majority or plurality will effective. A thousand men may cast their votes in favor of a certain measure, but fifteen hundred may vote against it. Now, each side deeming itself in the right, there is no inherent reason why the minority should acquiesce, there is no immutable standard of policy by which to gauge the measure in question.

Why, then, should the less number of voters submit to the greater? It is, at bottom, because the majority in numbers possess the preponderance of force. Long experience teaches self-governing peoples that, instead of fighting every political controversy out to the bitter end at the point of the sword, it is wiser, it is safer, to acknowledge one's weakness. After awhile we conclude it is every way more reasonable to draw up our forces in battle array, and then, instead of opening fire, calmly count each other's rank and file, in order that the weaker may leave the stronger in possession of the field. It is the growth of this practical good sense which constantly suggests the advantage, in the long run, of counting the enemy's forces, and retiring from the contest when they are too strong for us, that distinguishes the self-governing nation from other nations.

At the root of all civil institutions is conflict, incessant conflict. Out of the continuous struggles of man with man, has gradually grown the complex political structures of ancient and modern times. The theory that political relations are based on contract, which prevailed for so long a period, is, however, only an incomplete truth. It is true, that in civilized communities, men, in a sense tacitly agree, each to recognize the rights of the others, and to perform the obligations corresponding to those rights, but, really, behind or above this agreement stands the will and the force of the political group to which the parties belong. One may cheerfully, actively, and, to all appearances, voluntarily recognize the rights of another, and perform all the obligations due to him; and he may act in the same way to all others in the state, but it is not because he feels that he has so agreed, but because he must do so; the obligation is based on force, of some character. He may consider it a moral obligation, or