land, The Elements of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1880, p. 280; also, Held, System des Verfassungsrechts der monarchischen Staaten Deutschlands, Würzburg, 1856, p. 171; Maine, Ancient Law, p. 99. "Territorial Sovereignty-the view which connects sovereignty with a limited portion of the earth's surface, was distinctly an offshoot, though a tardy one, of feudalism. This might have been expected, a priori, for it was feudalism which for the first time linked personal duties, and by consequence personal rights, to the ownership of land" (Maine, Ancient Law, p. 102). "The history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community of political functions. Nor is there any of those subversions of feeling, which we term emphatically revolutions, so startling and so complete as the change which is accomplished when some other principlesuch as that, for instance, of local contiguity-establishes itself for the first time as the basis of common political action " (p. 124). This identification of the nation with the territory which it occupies has naturally led to the modern idea that allegiance grows mainly out of the fact of birth within the limits of a particular country, though to this principle there are certain exceptions. In a recent work on international law, it is laid down, that while a state cannot enforce its laws within another state, yet that the personal relation which exists between the state and its citizens or subjects, travels with the latter into the new jurisdiction. They are not freed from allegiance by absence; whether legitimate or illegitimate, the date at which they attain majority, the conditions of marriage and divorce, are determined by the state so far as their effects within its own dominions are concerned; if they commit crimes they can be arraigned before the tribunals of their country notwithstanding that they may have been already punished elsewhere. On the other hand, there may be instances where the state will not demand the same duties from, or claim the same rights over, foreigners within its territory, as over its own citizens—but this is always ex gratia. It has power over them, but it does not choose to exercise it. Out of the rules which, by consent, govern these relations of the state to its citizens in other states, and its relations to foreigners in its own dominions, has grown private international law (Hall, International Law, p. 43).

The doctrine of allegiance, more especially with reference to the United States, and also as affecting the question of citizenship of

the State and of the United States, is discussed by Salem Dutcher, in an article on The Right of Expatriation in the American Law Review for April, 1877, p. 447. He shows that the distinction between a citizen of a State and a citizen of the United States was recognized in the Federal Constitution before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment (see Art. I., sec. 2 and 3; Art. I., sec. I; Art. III., sec. 2; Art. IV., sec. 2, and Art. XI). The fourteenth amendment sets the question at rest, in providing that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."

The duty of allegiance to the United States having become fixed, either by birth within its limits or by naturalization, cannot be abolished by the citizen without the consent of the United States, declared by law (Judge Story in Spanks vs. Dupont, Peters' Rep., III., 242; Kent's Commentaries, II., 12, also Lecture XXV.). There may be a change of domicile for commercial purposes, but this does not necessarily include the right of expatriation. Of course when treaty stipulations so provide, as is the case between the United States and Austria, Sweden, Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Wurtemburg, Prussia, Belgium, Denmark, Mexico, and Great Britain, the citizen may expatriate himself. By an Act of the Congress of the United States, July 27, 1868 (Statutes at Large xv., 224), it was enacted "That any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officer of this government, which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the government." The executive branch of the government considered this act as merely a legislative expression of the opinion that the citizen ought to be allowed to expatriate himself. President Grant in his message of Dec. 7, 1875, treated it as such, and asked Congress to enact a law providing how expatriation might be accomplished. Our laws go even so far as to confer citizenship upon all children born out of the United States, whose fathers are citizens (United States Revised Statutes, sec. 1993).

The allegiance of the citizen of a State within the United States is, in many respects, different from the allegiance due by the citi zen to the Federal Union. It must be borne in mind that while every citizen of a State is ipso facto a citizen of the United States, it is not necessarily the case that every citizen of the United States

is also a citizen of a State: he may be a citizen of a Territory or of the District of Columbia. Again, a citizen of a State may absolve himself from his allegiance by changing his residence State of his former resi

to another State, and the consent of the dence is not requisite.

CHAPTER III.

THE SOVEREIGN.

FROM the conception of the nation as a social organism, made up of a multitude of individuals bound together in a vast network of intimate relations, sympathies, and interests, we are led to the discussion of the nation as a power, as a society clothed with sovereignty.

The nation, viewed as a political society, is either independent or dependent. It is independent when the power, and the organs through which power is brought to bear upon the community, are contained within and proceed from the nation itself, or, as it may be otherwise expressed, when the nation governs itself. It is dependent when its governmental action is subordinate, in any essential particular, to the governmental authority of another political society. The independent political society is frequently termed a sovereign nation or state. term "sovereign," when applied to the nation or state, is really synonymous with the term independent; it indicates that in the family of nations or states, the particular one about which the expression is used is the political equal of any of the other members of the family.

The

As applied to a state within a federation, as one of the United States, or a kingdom or duchy of the German Empire, it signifies that the community referred to is the political equal in the federation of each of the other members. Not that it may have in all respects the same weight as each of the others in the federal councils, but that its

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political tie with the others is alone through the federal government, and but for that tie the States would be independent of one another.

The term "sovereign," implies a superior and subjects, and hence it is not strictly correct to speak of an independent political society as a sovereign state, because such a society is not superior to any other state, nor subject to any other state. As Bentham and Austin have shown, there is no such thing as a limited sovereign, because the instant the sovereign is limited in his power he ceases to be sovereign. So that we cannot correctly speak of a state as "sovereign" which is subject to any external controlling power.

There has grown up in the United States, in the discussion of the many and important constitutional questions which arose out of the relations of the several States to each other and to the federal government, a nomenclature that discriminates between the supremacy of the United States and the positions of the several States with relation to that supremacy. The several States are spoken of as "sovereign" States. The abstract interpretation on which courts and statesmen are agreed is, that the State is supreme in the exercise of all those powers which it has not by the terms of the federal constitution surrendered to the United States, while the latter is supreme as to all powers granted by that instrument. ) The practical questions which have agitated courts, legislative bodies, and parties have mainly turned upon the definition of the limits of the powers granted and the powers reserved. As we shall see later (when we inquire, who is the sovereign in this great political body which we call the United States?) the individual State, accurately speaking, is not the sovereign, nor has it sovereignty.}

This division of sovereignty between the United States 2*