ergy, in addition to his bread-winning pursuit, to arrange and choose. Naturally, therefore, the universal law of the division of labor is applied to politics, and a certain number of men devote themselves especially to the management of party, so that it may be asserted that in proportion to the universality of the suffrage, and the number of offices to be filled, will be the tendency to absolutism in party management. The standard of those who are elected to office will be that of the greatest number of the voters, and the standard of those who manage parties will be the same. It does not follow, however, that universal suffrage alone is immediately productive of these results. A people may have the voting privilege, and yet be led gladly by those of superior education or social position. It is not merely the power, but the consciousness of the power, which must sink deep down into the people. As it does so sink, will the management of parties pass more and more into the forms of rigid organization, and into the hands of common men who make it their sole business. The equalizing spirit must have pervaded all of society before the full development of party absolutism is seen. The reason why in England the rapid extension of the voting suffrage has not been followed by the development of party oligarchies, as in this country, is because the whole social tone is opposed to equality. There is no person in the world who has so little real appreciation of the conjunction of equality and fraternity with liberty as the Englishman. It has been well said, that every Englishman looks up to, and down upon some other Englishman. Gladstone, a few years ago, said truthfully of his own people in one of his addresses: "There is no broad political idea, which has entered less into the formation of the political system of this country, than the love of equality. The love of

freedom itself is hardly stronger in England than the love of aristocracy."*

On the contrary, in the United States the equalizing spirit appeared early in the social tone of the colonies, and has grown with especial rapidity since the Revolution. In our social and political systems equality is insisted upon. Twice in our history have the democratic masses asserted themselves in opposition to social and intellectual leadership; first in 1801, in sweeping the Federal party out of office, and again in 1829, in electing Jackson. Each of these periods marks a rise in the democratic wave.

The inevitable tendency to the support of the leader, to oligarchy, to absolutism in party, fortunately finds its corrective among the adherents of party itself. These very vices tend constantly to drive off those whom the party tie does not bind very strongly, into opposition, or the formation of new parties, so that, as already suggested, political parties constantly tend to an equilibrium, and thus, in the free state, a continuous current of political activity is maintained, which, though accompanied with many disagreeable features, nourishes a vigorous life in the state.

* The growth of the English democracy in consciousness of power is illustrated in an article in The Nation, by A. V. Dicey, entitled, "Why do people hate Mr. Gladstone?" No. 898, p. 218. Sept. 14, 1882.

CHAPTER XXI.

CONCLUSION.

In the foregoing pages we have sought to confine attention to an analysis of the nation or state, in order, if possible, to make clear to the mind the forces which determine its interior life. Starting with the nation as a social and political organic being, the line of examination has led us down through its interior constitution, bringing us finally to the political party, a purely voluntary combination of men within the nation, aiming to direct the national will and to wield the national force.

It may, perhaps, be thought that we should now take a further step and discuss the individual, the subject or citizen of the state, and more particularly the questions pertaining to his personal rights and obligations. But such an examination does not properly belong to analytical politics. Rights, whether those asserted to be inherent in every person, or those which are known as personal political rights, have no place in the discussion of analytical politics, because both can be recognized and protected under any form of government; they pertain to an inquiry into what a nation ought to do rather than into what it is.

We have seen that the idea of the sovereign state includes also the idea of despotic power lodged at some point in the state. Two questions of fact, then, necessarily arise who possesses this power, and through what persons, as organs of the state, is it distributed? If we

examine an aristocracy we find the power lodged at one point, and distributed in one way; if a democracy, at another point and in another way. Both may exist and flourish while recognizing and guarding the so-called inherent rights of men.

These inherent rights have been well formulated in our Declaration of Independence, as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Any and every form of government can foster these rights without affecting its form or internal action. To do so, must be accounted purely a matter of duty. And yet we know that when the supposed good of the State demands it our lives can be sacrificed in war, our liberty restrained by compulsory service in the army, and our pursuit of happiness subordinated to the needs of the community.

In the social state two kinds of rights are evolved: the rights which pertain to individuals because of their relations to each other, and the rights which arise in favor of the whole community as against the individual who is a member of it. Each has its attendant obligations.

The solution of the question, whether the individual has a divine or natural right to his life, is of no moment in a political point of view. We are concerned merely with his claim of right to life because of its interest to the political body. As between individuals, the right to life when looked at closely is found to be no more than an obligation or duty imposed on everybody not to kill his fellow. In the civilized state this duty is imposed by positive law. Why? Not because it pertains to the inherent constitution of the state, but because the persons who make the law think it better, more expedient, to impose the duty than to allow private vengeance or passion full play. And so also with the enjoyment of liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

But on the other hand, it is supposable that the good of the state might be advanced if the state sacrificed the life of a particular individual; this confers a right upon the state to take the life, and imposes an obligation upon the individual to surrender it. This is an extreme case, illustrating the double relations in which the members of society stand, first toward each other, and secondly toward the state. The first set of relations are regulated by private law, the second by public law. But both kinds. of law, in fact all law, is simply the expression of will on the part of the state, and whether or not the laws shall be made or what shall be their tenor are purely considerations of expediency and morals. These considerations fall within the domain of practical politics, which should treat of what the state ought or ought not to do.

When we leave what are called inherent rights and come to political personal rights we perceive equally that they have no place in the discussions of analytical politics.

Important among these rights are: Freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom to assemble and to petition; that no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered on the citizen; that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches; that no one shall be held for capital or infamous crimes without presentment or indictment of a grand jury, or be twice put in jeopardy, or be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself, or be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or have his private property taken for public use without just compensation ; that an accused person shall have speedy public trial by an impartial jury, and be confronted by the witnesses against him; that excessive bail shall not be demanded, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted; that the