corporations of like character and the statute must be general in its nature and operation; Robinson v. Schenck, 102-310, over'g Greencastle Sch. Tp. v. Black, 5-557 and citing, as adverse to the ruling therein, Root v. Erdelmeyer, 37-225; S. P., Adamson v. Auditor, 9-174; Rose v. Bath Tp., 10-18; City Lafayette v. Jenners, 10-70; Conwell v. O'Brien, 11-419; Covington etc. Co. v. Auditor, 14-331; Niel v. Jenkinson, 16-425; Combs v. State, 26-99; Clem v. State, 43-421; Gentile v. State, 29-409; State v. Tucker, 46–355; Cory v. Carter, 48-327; Kelly v. State, 92-236; Wishmier v. State, 79-162; State v. Gray, 93-303; Mount v. State, 90-29; Gardner v. Haney, 86-17; Sauer v. Twining, 81-366; State v. Board etc., 101-96.

9. Indirect taxation, in the form of license on particular pursuits, is not within the meaning of this section; Bright v. M'Cullough, 27-223.

10. A statute (March 11, 1867), authorizing plank road and the like road companies to procure assessments on land, in aid of the construction of roads, is constitutional; R. R. T. Co. v. Scott, 32-37; S. C., 32-325; Law v. M., S. & G. T. Co., 30-77.

11. Local taxation for local purposes is not unconstitutional; Anderson v. Kerns Drain. Co., 14-199,

12. A statute conferring authority to tax must be general; but, the exercise of the authority need not be uniform throughout the state. Township trustees may levy a tax for building a school house; Adamson v. Auditor, 9-174.

13. A statute providing that persons residing outside of and electing to be transferred to any city or town, for educational purposes (sect. 4474), or who shall send their children to a school taught in any building in such city or town, on which a debt has been contracted, shall, with their property, be liable to taxation for the purpose of paying such debt, is constitutional; Kent v. Town Kentland, 62–291.

194. Payment of public debt. State officers have no authority to pay interest on the state debt, unless appropriations be made for that purpose. State revenues, designed for the liquidation of such indebtedness, must, first, be paid in to the treasury of the state and paid out, only, in accordance with law. An appropriation of money to a specific object is an authority to the proper officers to pay money. Such an appropriation may be made in different modes and it may be prospective; but, the pledge of the faith of the state that revenues shall be provided, in the future, and applied in discharge of certain claims, against the state, will not authorize state officers to apply the general fund to the payment of those claims; Ristine v. State, 20-328, 345.

195. Appropriations. Separate resolutions of each branch of the general assembly, authorizing payments, can not amend or vary the provisions of a statute making appropriations; Rice v. Drapier, 95-47.

2. Setting apart (stat. April 6, 1885, p. 129, 10) of so much of the county revenue as is necessary to pay the cost of repairs provided for, by the statute, is a sufficient appropriation, made by law, within this section; State v. Johnson, 105-468.

3. The justice of a claimant's claim (in this case apparent and unquestioned) does not authorize courts to require, by mandate, the auditor of state to issue his warrant, or the treasurer of state to pay such warrant, for the amount of such claim, where no money is set apart for such purpose, by an appropriation made by law; State z. Potter, 89-267.

195. Appropriations. An appropriation, to be effective, needs not to be made in a particular form or in express terms. It is sufficient if the intention to make the appropriation is clearly evinced by the language employed in the statute on the subject, or if it is evident that no effect can, possibly, be given to a statute unless it be construed as making the necessary appropriation. An appropriation of money to a specified object is an authority to the proper officer to pay the money. Such an appropriation may be prospective-i. e., it may be made in one year, of revenues to accrue in another or future years - the law being so framed as to address itself to such future revenues. Nothing more- within the meaning of this section is requisite to an appropriation than a designation of the amount and the fund from which it shall be paid. It is not essential to its validity that the funds to meet it shall, at the time, be in the treasury. A promise to pay, contained in a bond, lawfully issued and negotiated by a state is not, however, an appropriation; Carr v. State, ex rel., 127–209.

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197. Creation of debt forbidden. The power of the legislature to authorize a debt to be contracted on behalf of the state does not exist until some contingency contemplated by the constitution arises. When, however, such a contingency has, in fact, arisen, or when the legislature, without any apparent purpose to evade the constitution determines that it has, its action is not subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial department; unless, at first blush, it is evident that the conditions justifying the exercise of the power do not exist. The phrase, "to meet casual deficits in the revenue," as used in this section, in specifying the contingencies in which the legislature may authorize a debt to be contracted on behalf of the state, intends a deficit not designedly brought about, but one resulting from casual or occasional discrepancies between the revenue, received and the amounts required to provide for the general welfare and carry on the state government in the ordinary way, which could not be foreseen and provided for without the accumulation of an unnecessary surplus in the treasury. Such a casual deficit, within the meaning of this section, may be one that is anticipated and provided for, if it is foreseen that it must necessarily occur before other provision for replenishing the public funds can be made available. Wherefore it is not essential to the validity of an act authorizing the borrowing of money, on behalf of the state, that an actual deficit shall exist at the time the act is passed. Nor is it at all material, as affecting a statute passed to meet a contingency within the section, that the title thereof recites that the loan authorized is "for the purpose of carrying on the state government" rather than to provide for a casual deficit; Hovey v. Foster, 118-505.

198. Counties can not take stock. The phrase "incorporated company," in this section, refers to those associations which are created for the public benefit, to which is delegated some sovereign power, to be exercised for public utility; such as turnpike and rail road companies; L., M. & B. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34-185.

2. Counties may be authorized to subscribe for stock, in rail road companies, if they pay money for it, at the time of subscription, but only then; L., M. & B. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34-185; see City Aurora v. West, 9-74.

3. A county may not issue bonds in aid of a rail road company unless authorized by express affirmative legislation. Bonds issued without such authority are void; Board etc. v. M'Clintock, 51-325; Harney v. I., C. & D. R. R. Co., 32-244. 4. Statute of May 12, 1869, section 17, is constitutional, inasmuch as, under it, counties can not take stock in any incorporated company (for aiding rail roads) without paying the money down; Board etc. v. L., N. A. & St. L., A., L. R. R. Co., 39-192.

5. The prohibition of this section does not reach townships. No such prohibition in regard to townships is to be found in the constitution; Scott v. Hausheer, 94-13; see Bittinger v. Bell, 65-457.

200-1. Incorporation of banks. No bank of issue, except a state bank and free, or private, bank pursuant to the provisions of a general banking law, can be established; Brown v. Killian, 11-449.

2. No corporation has authority to issue its notes, except as it receives such authority, through its charter, expressly or incidentally; James v. Rogers, 23-451. 3. This article provides for two systems, or modes, of banking; (1) under a general banking law, requiring collateral security for the redemption of its issues, and, (2) a state bank, with branches, which is authorized to be chartered without security. This section was designed to insure conformity to the conditions imposed by the article (11); Wright v. Defrees, 8-298.

4. Charters are not requisite for banks of deposit and discount; Davis v. M'Alpine, 10-137.

211. State not to be a stockholder, in bank. The provision that the state shall not be a stockholder, applies to both banks created under a general banking law and a state bank; Wright v. Defrees, 8-298.

212. General laws - Corporations. This section prohibits the creation of any corporation, other than a banking company, by special enactment; State v. Dawson, 16-40.

2. A charter granted before November 1, 1851, but not accepted before that date, when the present constitution took effect, must be deemed as withdrawn, by the state, by virtue of the prohibition of this section; State v. Dawson, 16-40.

3. A town incorporated, by special act of the legislature, prior to the taking effect of the constitution of 1851, was empowered by its charter to purchase fire engines. Its charter being amended, in 1873, such power was omitted. Non obstante this, the town had the inherent power to make such purchase, for the protection of property; Corporation v. Studabaker, 106-131.

4. The federal congress, in so far as it legislates for the United States, can not incorporate a private corporation. It may do so as a local legislature of the district of Columbia; Daly v. Nat. L. I. Co., 64-1.

ARTICLE 11—CORPORATIONS.

212. General laws. This section, providing that "corporations, other than banking, shall not be created by special act, but may be formed under general laws," construed in connection with other provisions of the constitution, intends that on and after November 1, 1851, the legislature should have neither authority nor power, by special act, to create, originate or bring into existence, as a new corporate entity, a municipal corporation where none had theretofore existed. On and after the day named, the legislative power of the general assembly was limited, by this provision, to the enactment of a general law under which such new corporate entity might be formed. Section 235, clause 4, being clause 4 of the schedule annexed to and a part of the constitution provides, "that no inconvenience may arise from the change in the government, it is hereby ordained as follows: * * * Fourth. All acts of incorportion for municipal purposes shall continue in force, under this constitution, until such time as the general assembly shall, in its discretion, modify or repeal the same." Under this clause, the general assembly is expressly authorized, by and under the discretionary power to 'modify," to amend, by special or general act, an act of incorporation, or special charter, for municipal purposes, continued in force by the section, even where the effect of the amendment will be to enlarge the jurisdiction, territorially, or otherwise, of the corporate authorities of the municipality; Wiley v. Bluffton, 111-155.

ARTICLE 13-MUNICIPAL DEBT.

etc.

220. Limited - Excess void. It is essential to the idea of a debt that an obligation should have arisen out of a contract, express or implied, which entitles the holder thereof unconditionally to receive from the promisor a sum of money which the latter is under a legal or moral duty to pay without regard to any future contingency. Under this section of the constitution the statute of March 8, 1889, which authorizes the issue of bonds or certificates in pursuance of the statute, "an act concerning powers and duties of cities and incorporated towns * * * providing the mode and manner of making street and alley improvements does not create a debt within the inhibition hereof, declaring as it does, that no municipal corporation shall become indebted to an amount in excess of two per cent. of its taxable property. The bonds issued by the city, for the purpose of raising money with which to pay for the improvement, or issued to the contractor in payment for the work, bear the name of the street or alley improved or sewer constructed, and are payable from the special street improvement fund to be accumulated from assessments made against the property benefited. Hence, no indebtedness arises against the city. Assesments for street improvements are upheld on the ground that the adjacent property on which the cost of the improvement is assessed is enhanced in value to an amount equal to the sum assessed against it and that the owners have received peculiar benefits which the citizens do not share in common. The municipality, as such, is not benefited by the improvement and there is, hence, under the law in question, neither a legal nor moral obligation to pay. The municipal corporation becomes liable to pay in cash the expense of so much of street and alley improvements as shall be occupied by the street and alley crossings, upon the completion and final estimate of the work and, hence, no debt results from such improvement; Quill 2. Indianapo lis. 124-293.

220. Municipal debt-Limited. This article is, only, prospective. It will not prevent such corporations from issuing new bonds, with coupons for future

interest, for the purpose of funding debts, with accrued interest, existing prior to March 14, 1881, the date of its adoption; Powell v. City Madison, 107-115.

2. The only effect which the adoption of this constitutional amendment had, upon sections 3230-1, as to finding the indebtedness of cities and towns, was to limit their application to debts contracted prior to March 14, 1881, and to such as have been since incurred not in excess of the two per centum limitation, upon the value of their taxable property; Powell v. City Madison, 107–116.

3. A city cannot issue bonds, for current expenses, where there are no funds in the treasury and the existing indebtedness exceeds two per centum of the value of the taxable property of the city; Sackett v. New Albany, 88-473.

4. A city, being indebted to an amount equal to two per centum of its taxable property, is, under this section, prohibited from issuing an order on its treasury, even for current expenses, where there are no funds in the treasury which may be applied to its payment. It may be enjoined from issuing such an order, when one is about to be issued and no provision has been made for its payment; Sackett v. City N. Alb., 88-475..

5. When a contract, made by a municipal corporation, pertains to its ordinary current revenues and is, together with other like expenses, within the limit of its current revenues and such special taxes as it may lawfully, and in good faith, intend to levy therefor, such contract does not constitute the incurring of an indebtedness, within the meaning of this section. If the contracts and engagements of municipal corporations do not overreach the current revenues, no objection can, lawfully, be made to them, however great the indebtedness of such municipality may be; City Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97–11.

221, 222. Boundaries- Jurisdiction. Where the Ohio river constitutes the boundary between the states of Kentucky and Indiana, low water mark on the north side of the river is the southern boundary of the state of Indiana. Under these sections of the constitution, however, and an act of Virginia, entitled "an act concerning the erection of the district of Kentucky into an independent state (1 R. L., Va., p. 57, R. S., 1888, addendum, p. 9) the state of Indiana has concurrent jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases with the state of Kentucky on the Ohio river, so far as the river forms the common boundary between said states. So, where a violation of the criminal laws of this state occurs on the Ohio river it is proper to charge in the indictment that the offense was committed in the county opposite the place where the act constituting the crime was committed. Hence, where intoxicating liquors are sold without license in a boat anchored in the Ohio river opposite Harrison county, Indiana, south of low water mark on the Indiana side, the offender may be charged, tried and convicted in Harrison county, Indiana; Welsh v. State, 126-74.

221. State boundaries. Low water mark, on the north west side of the Ohio river, is the true line for the purpose of determining the boundaries with Kentucky; Sherlock v. Alling, 44–184.

2. The boundary of Spencer county, on the Ohio river, extends no further than to low water mark on the Indiana side; Carlisle v. State, 32-55; so, also, of Jefferson county; Cowden v. Kerr, 6 B., 280; also, of lands bounded by the Ohio river; Stinson v. Butler, 4 B., 285; Bainbridge v. Sherlock, 29-364.

222. Jurisdiction. The states of Indiana and Kentucky have concurrent jurisdiction on the Ohio river, where it is the boundary line of both; Sherlock v. Alling, 44-184. This jurisdiction may be exercised in such manner as this state may elect, in civil and criminal cases. It has elected to exercise such general jurisdiction and it is not limited to service of process. Its general legislation is in force, not only within the territory over which it has exclusive jurisdiction, but, also, where its jurisdiction is concurrent, without any special provision of statute, unless the contrary appears; Sherlock v. Alling, 44-184; Carlisle v. State, 32-55.

2. The courts, in the counties bordering on the Ohio river, have concurrent jurisdiction, with courts of Kentucky, over crimes committed on the river opposite; Carlisle v. State, 32-55.

ARTICLE 15 - MISCELLANEOUS.

223. Official appointments. The provision that "all officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided for in this constitution shall be chosen in such manner as now is or hereafter may be prescribed by law" is to be construed in the light of the laws in force at the time of its adoption and as the power to provide, by law, the manner or mode of making an appointment does not include the power to make the appointment itself, it is a limitation on the power of the legislature to make any appointment except such as it might make under laws existing at the date of the adoption of the constitution; State, ex rel. v. Denny, 118-386. Under this section of the constitution, providing for the appointment of officers not otherwise provided for by the constitution, no appointing power is conferred on the general assembly, save and except as to offices in existence when the constitution became of effect and operative. Where the constitution does not provide otherwise, for the filling of a vacancy in an office, the legislature may provide the manner in which it shall be filled. Unless, however, it shall be in the case of an officer created for the purpose of enabling some one of the co-ordinate departments the better to perform its functions, the power of appointment must be lodged with the executive department; State, ex rel. v. Hyde, 121-36.

This section giving the general assembly power to prescribe, by law, the manner of electing an officer does not confer the powers to elect such officer. There is a manifest distinction between providing the mode of doing and doing the thing itself; State, ex rel. v. Peele, 121-506; State, ex rel. v. Denny, 118-449; Evansville v. State, ex rel., 118–426; State, ex rel. v. Denny, 118-382.

This section has no application to any administrative state office in existence at the time of its adoption; administrative state offices having been made elective by the people by the terms of the constitution, It does apply, however, to most of the statutory state officers. The general assembly on creating an office may provide by law, under this section, that such offices shall be filled by election or by appointment; which appointment-if the law so directs-may be made by the governor or by an administrative state officer. The legislature, however, may not create an administrative state office and provide for filling the same by appointment indefinitely, this section having no application to this class of state officers; State, ex rel. v. Gorby, 122-24.

224. Duration of office. The provision hereof that "the general assembly shall not create any office the tenure of which shall be longer than four years,' does not affect the right of an officer elected by the general assembly for a term of four years to an office created by the legislature to hold over under the provision of section 225; State, ex rel. v. Harrison, 113-440.

2. Prosecuting attorney of the criminal court is not the prosecutor of the constitutional circuit court. His term of office is not fixed, but cannot exceed four years; Cropsey v. Henderson, 63-268. See vide section 1367 which provides that the prosecuting attorney of the circuit shall, by himself or his deputy, prosecute the pleas of the state in said court.”

225. Holding over. The effect of this provision is more than to supply the office until an executive appointment can or shall be made with a person qualified to discharge its duties. It adds an additional contingent and defeasible term to the original fixed term and excludes the possibility of a vacancy and, consequently the power of appointment, except in case of death, resignation, ineligi bility or the like. When it is provided that officers chosen for a given term are entitled to hold over until their successors are elected and qualified, the section applies to officers elected by the general assembly, or other organized body, equally as to those elected by the people at large, and the right to hold over continues until a qualified successor has been elected by the electoral body to which the incumbent owes his election, or which, by law, is entitled to elect a successor. So, where by section 2768a the statute of 1883 (S., p. 15), relating to the management of the benevolent institutions of the state, provision was made for the election by the legislature of a president of the several boards of trustees, whose term of office should be four years, and that if a vacancy should occur in such office during the recess of the legislature, the governor should appoint, the appointment to stand until the next session, and the term of the officer elected in