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oreign countries, who have but little sympathy for the ufferings of our people, when their own sordid or ambiious views make it their interest to inflict it.

If it should be urged as an objection to the State banks, that they cannot afford a general currency, the nswer is obvious. If it were deemed necessary to create paper currency, possessing equal credit with that of the resent Bank of the United States, the object can be as ell accomplished with the State banks as with the Bank f the United States. The provision which has made the tter current every where, is the clause in the charter hich compels the Government to receive their notes in ayment of all debts due to the public; and a similar prosion in favor of the State banks which might be selected the depositories of the moneys of the United States, ould immediately make their notes equally current, and sure for them equal confidence in any part of the Unid States; but the committee are not prepared to recamend the adoption of such a measure. They are conced that all which public convenience requires in this spect will soon be accomplished by arrangements among e banks themselves; and that there ought to be no gislation of Congress for the purpose of establishing a rrency of paper.

The main object of legislation should be to enlarge the sis of specie, on which the paper circulation of the State nks is to depend for support. And the committee are rsuaded that, by the adoption of the State banks as the cal agents of the General Government, and a judicious urse of legislation founded upon it, a sounder state of ⚫ currency than now exists would soon be attained, 1 the country rescued permanently from the danger of se sudden expansions and contractions of the paper rrency which have been constantly succeeding each her since the Bank of the United States was established, 1 which have brought such severe and extensive evils on the country. The aid and co-operation of the sev. States may be relied on to banish, gradually, the aller notes, and introduce in their place silver and gold ordinary domestic purposes, and the convenience of vel between distant places. Such a reform is strongly led for by sound policy, and the best interests of the intry; and the accomplishment of an object so desiramay be mainly accelerated by laws passed by Coness, adjusting the standard of value of our coins, and ulating the deposites and collection of the revenue. gold and silver were brought into common use, and the all notes banished from circulation, payments of small ns would probably be made in specie. The great obit is not to diminish the amount of the ordinary circulag medium, but to give it a broader and firmer foundan on the precious metals.

[23d CONG. 1st SESS.

taken, the duties they shall be required to perform, and the terms on which they shall be employed."

In accordance with these views, they accordingly report, for the consideration of the House, resolutions declaring that the Bank of the United States ought not to be rechartered, and that the State banks ought to continue to be employed as the fiscal agents of the Government, under such regulations as Congress shall prescribe. Before they close this report, the committee consider it to be their duty to state that, in their judgment, a necessity exists for an immediate examination into the conduct of the Bank, and they proceed to state the grounds which make it absolutely necessary that a strict and rigorous scrutiny should be instituted. They think such an examination necessary, in reference to the security of the interests which the United States as a stockholder have in the bank. as well as to correct, as far as practicable, the abuses of which it has been guilty, and to prevent it from using its corporate power and money for purposes of corruption or oppression.

Numerous memorials have been referred to the com. mittee, complaining of embarrassments in mercantile transactions; some attributing them to the removal of the deposites, and others chiefly to the subsequent conduct of the Bank of the United States. That serious embar rassments exist in many of the commercial cities, cannot be doubted, and it seems necessary clearly to ascertain the cause before an attempt be made to prescribe the remedy. The powers possessed by the committee are inadequate to that object, and they are unable to do more at present than to submit the facts which have come to their knowledge, with the course they seem to suggest. That the simple transfer of a given sum of money from one bank of deposite to another could have produced the commercial embarrassment complained of, is impossible. The public deposites have not been annihilated, nor have they been transported from the country; they are still in the country; and in the use of the community. It is in vain that they look for the cause of embarrassment in the state of our markets, or the operations of trade; our agricultural productions and manufactures generally bear a good price; foreign exchange is at its lowest rate; the balance of trade is decidedly in our favor; and the precious metals are flowing in upon us from South Americo, Mexico, and Europe. None can doubt the power of the bank to create embarrassment whenever its managers deem it expedient. In four months, commencing with August last, and ending with November, it called in $9,707,245 of its loans. As the State banks could not commence extending until they began to receive the public deposites in October, and from that till December, they could not, in their extension, keep pace with the curtailments of the Bank of the United States. It is evident that such rapid curtailment by the Bank of the Uni ted States must have created some sensation in the commerce of the country; but it is easy for the Bank of the United States to produce universal embarrassment, with out any aggregate curtailment of its accommodations. By According to the law, as it now stands, the duty of se- calling in rapidly one month, letting out the next, and ting the banks, and of prescribing the securities to be calling again during the third, while it loans out in one sen, is devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury, place what it curtails in another, and in this manner falls der the supervision of the President. This power has upon all the commercial cities in rotation, it may more en heretofore exercised by the head of the Treasury effectually embarrass trade than by a steady curtailment. epartment, and in a manner advantageous to the pub- When the policy of the bank is unsteady and capricious, and it is not doubted, if the law should continue un-producing scarcity of money to-day, and an abundance anged, that it may and will continue to be so exercised the head of that Department; yet it is the opinion of e committee that discretionary power should never be en in any case to any officer of the Government, where can be regulated and defined by law. They think that would be more consistent with the principles of our overnment for Congress to regulate, by law, the mode selecting the fiscal agents, the securities proper to be

With these views, the committee are of opinion that › State banks ought to be continued as the depositories the moneys of the United States, and that measures ght forthwith to be taken to regulate, by law, the manin which they shall be selected, and to ensure the ety of the public money.

to-morrow, to be succeeded by a greater dearth the next day, it is impossible for merchants to conduct business with safety, and prudent men will restrict or discontinue their operations. The bank has long enjoyed a large portion of the business of domestic exchange; and whenever it chooses to cut off the supply in any or all directions, embarrassment and difficulty naturally ensue.

There is much reason to suspect that the bank has

been managed for the last six months with a view to em- and then on another, enlarge in one place, and contract barrass the community, as a means of operating on public | in another, for the purpose of continuing to the end of its opinion, and controlling the action of Government. In existence the evils which there is too much reason to be the proceedings of the bank in relation to domestic ex- lieve it has already inflicted on the community. If, upon change, so far as known, are perceived indications of a examination, it shall be found that it has been guiity of disposition to use the power it possesses through that such offences, its charter cannot be too soon terminated, branch of its business, for the purpose of producing ex- and a scire facius would be imperatively demanded, to put citement and distress. an end to its machinations against the peace and intereste of the people. The Government owns seven millions of its stock, equal to one-fifth of the whole amount. It is the duty of Congress to see that it be not used to oppress the people and subvert the principles of our Government. Of every hundred thousand dollars spent by the president of the bank, or distributed to advocates under the name of loans, and forever lost, twenty thousand dollars be longed to the people of the United States.

The Government directors inform us in their memorial that, on the 13th of August last, (two weeks before the Treasury agent returned from his mission to confer with the State banks, and five weeks before the determination of the Executive was announced,) the board of directors adopted a resolution, declaring that the bills of exchange purchased at the bank, and all the offices except the five Western offices, shall not have more than ninety days to run; that the five Western offices be instructed to purchase no bills of exchange, except those payable in the Atlantic cities, not having more than ninety days to run, or those which may be received in payment of existing debts to the bank and the offices, and these not have more than four months to run."

That their property may not be wasted; that the cause of their distress may be ascertained, and a remedy appl ed; and, above all, that their own funds, and the money and power of this corporation may not be employed to subvert the principles of their Government, by controlling their elections, the committee deem it necessary ttst The Government directors inform us that, on a subse. there should be a thorough investigation into the alleged quent day, a series of resolutions were adopted for redu-abuses and corruptions of that institution, and particularly cing the business of the institution, and authority given to the committee on the offices to modify them at pleasure; and, although a strenuous effort was made to require them to report such measures as might be directed by them to the board, the proposition was voted down.

into the details of its management for the last six months. To this end, they propose a resolution to invest a committee of the House with power to make such investi gations.

1. Resolved, That the Bank of the United States ought not to be rechartered.

2. Resolved, That he public deposites ought not to be restored to the Bank of the United States.

3. Resolved, That the State banks ought to be cont-pe ued as the places of deposite of the public moneys, and that it is expedient for Congress to inake further provi sion by law, prescribing the mode of selection, the seco rities to be taken, and the manner and terms on whic they are to be employed.

4. Resolved, That, the purpose of ascertaining, as far as

Thus, in direct violation of the charter, and in defiance of all prudence and propriety, was the whole power of this vast and powerful corporation to relieve or to oppress, vested in a committee who are not subject to the responsibility of even making reports to the board of directors. A few irresponsible men,issuing secret orders from their private chamber, possess more power to distress the American people than any department of their Government, or all departments, by an act short of a declaration of war. What the resolves and orders of this potent body have been, we have no means of knowing. The presi-practicable, the cause of the commercial embarrassment dent of the bank, who is ex officio a member of the com- and distress complained of by numerous citizens of the mittee, and, undoubtedly, directs its operations, is also United States, in sundry memorials which have been pres clothed with unlimited power to set the press in motion, sented to Congress at the present session, and of inquirog for the purpose of promoting the views of the bank. For whether the charter of the Bank of the United States bas months, those presses which are known to have been sus. been violated, and also what corruptions and abuses have tained by enormous loans, and those which have received existed in its management; whether it has used its corp the most liberal allowances for printing, have been incesrate power, or money, to control the press, to interfere santly engaged in an effort to spread alarm and dismay in politics, or influence elections, and whether it has throughout the land. It is impossible not to suspect that had any agency, through its management or money, is the secret management of the bank, and the use of its producing the existing pressure, a select committee be funds by its president, are in perfect concert with their appointed to inspect the books and examine into the pro dependent and devoted presses, all aiming to create a ceedings of the said bank, who shall report whether the general panic, and produce the same result. That result provisions of the charter have been violated or not, and is the restoration of the deposites, and its certain conse- also what abuses, corruptions, or malpractices have ex quence, the recharter of the bank. If any thing was want-isted in the management of said bank, and that the sad ing to confirm these suspicions, the alleged refusal of this committee be authorized to send for persons and papers, bank to co-operate with the State banks in their laudable and to summon and examine witnesses on oath, and t efforts to relieve the existing pressure upon the commu- examine into the affairs of the said bank and branches; nity in the larger commercial cities, is sufficient to re- and they are further authorized to visit the principal bar, move all doubts from the minds of the most incredulous. or any of its branches, for the purpose of inspecting the It is due to the country that the source of the embar-books, correspondence, accounts, and other papers corassments which oppress a portion of its commerce shall nected with its management or business; and that te be laid bare. Should they appear to spring solely from said committee be required to report the result of such the management of the bank, wantonly and wickedly di-investigation, together with the evidence they may take, rected to produce them, it may become the duty of Con- at as early a day as practicable. gress to resort to all the means within their constitutional authority to check its career.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, March 4, 1834. If it shall appear that the bank, by means of its money The undersigned, minority of the Committee of Ways and the papers under its control, has wilfully and inten- and Means, to which were referred the letter of the tionally produced these embarrassments, and if its power Secretary of the Treasury, communicating to the House has thus been abused, it cannot be endured that for two his reasons for removing the deposites of the public m years longer it shall be suffered wantonly to excite alarms ney from the Bank of the United States, and several me in the country, to direct a pressure first on one point,morials upon the same subject, submit the following res

Removal of the Deposites.

ns for not concurring in the report of the majority of

Various suggestions are made to sustain the position that the exercise of the Secretary's power, whether for The removal of the public deposites from the Bank of good reasons, or for no reasons at all, determines the e United States is an act upon which the judgment of right of the bank to the deposites, and leaves the nation e country has now irrevocably passed. The reasons free from all reproach of violated faith. ve been investigated in both Houses of Congress, and It is said that he is authorized to act, before be gives the public press, to such an extent that it may be fair. his reasons to Congress; and his act, therefore, has validdeemed impracticable to add any thing to the arguity, whatever may be his reasons. The efficacy of his ents by which they are either refuted or sustained; but act to remove the deposites is not the question. Whether ng most thoroughly convinced that the act of removal bis reasons be good or bad, his order is, in the first in ts wholly indefensible, without color of probable cause, stance, to be respected; but if he is bound to have good rea olation of the bank charter, an inroad upon the prop- sons, and his reasons have not been good, the subsequent ty and security of the citizens, and upon the rights of communication of them will show that his act was unjust e Legislative department, the undersigned deem it at the time; and if Congress do not rescind it, they will eir duty to submit such a s'atement as will record their sanction the injustice. There are innumerable instances rsonal opinion upon the subject. in which an order, right or wrong, must be respected when it is gwen; yet when it is subsequently shown to have been wrong, the injustice is declared, and the ag gressor punished.

It is unnecessary to dispute the position that the power in the 16th section is the old power in this sense, for the power in the 16th section is not only admitted, but asserted to go to the very extent which the Secretary claims for the old power, and no further, namely, to the extent that the safety of the deposites, and their distribution in convenient places, require. Such a power is obviously neither absolute nor uncond tional. But independent of this defi. nition of his own power by the Secretary, it seems to have been overlooked by the committee that the present power is to be applied to divest a right, whereas the former power was exercised over the possession of depositories who had no right whatever. The control of the Treasury Department over the public moneys, until the charter of the present bank, was universally a question between the Treasury and Congress; it is now a question between the bank and Congress.

It is finally said that the power of the Secretary is absolute and unconditional, because Congress have given to him their whole power, reserving none whatever to themselves to touch the deposites until he shall have restored their power to them. This argument begs the question in dispute. The Secretary supposes himself to be an independent judge in this matter, whereas the minority suppose that he is merely the agent of Congress. His power in the premises is a part of their power intrusted to him as their representative. Though he may use it for sufficient reasons, Congress may use it also for the same reasons. The restraint upon the exercise of his power is imposed by the right of the bank, and this is all the restraint that is imposed upon the right of Congress. If the bank has no right, as the committee appear to assert, upon what ground can the right of Congress be denied? If the power reserved to the Secretary, by the 16th section, is neither more nor less than the old power, how is it possible to deny the right of Congress to control the deposites, under the charter, if Congress had any right to control them before the charter? It is worthy of deep reflection, that the argument put forward by the committee, to sustain the Secretary's reasoning, has carried them to the extent of asserting that Congress abandoned the public treasure to the Secretary and the bank beyond the possibility of recall.

Upon this head the minority state their opinion to the House, that the power of the Secretary over the deposites in the bank depends for its just exercise upon the existence of adequate causes; that the bank had a direct and immediate interest in them, and is entitled to an impartial decision upon them; that an unjust decision upon them will be a violation of the charter, and a stain upon the public faith; and that the Secretary's position, that his power is absolute and unconditional in regard to the bank, is an unwarrantable assumption of power, instead of a just interpretation of that which has been given.

authority to raise revenue, or to take it into his official possession when raised, or to direct who shall possess it, or to interfere with a direction or authority in this behal, proceeding from Congress, any more than he possesses authority to direct by whom the public money shall be used and consumed. The Secretary cannot be relieved from the duty of accounting to Congress by any order of the President; nor can the reasons of the President be imposed upon him as a guide, nor be offered to Corgreat as an excuse. The discretion which is given by the charter, is given to the Secretary alone. The order of removal must c me directly from the Secretary; and if t came from the President alone, it would be null and veid The power of the President to remove the Secretary of the Treasury is no reason for holding that the Secre tary is under the direction of the President in the exer cise of the discretion conferred by the charter The President may remove the Secretary whether he pe forms or does not perform his duty. The legal power to do it is as perfect in the one case as the other. The mere existence of the power does not consequently imply the right of direction or control. The constitutional duty of the President to see that the laws are faithfully. executed, requires him to see that an officer to whom the law confides a discretion is permitted fairly to exer cise it. A law which confers a discretion upon ca officer, is violated, instead of being faithfully executed, by compelling him to submit to the discretion of another officer. If the Pr sident has in this matter, directly or indirectly, controlled the discretion of the Secretary, the law has not been faithfully executed, and his act has besa a violation both of the law and of the constitution.

III. The only adequate cause for removing the palie deposites, must be a cause affecting the safety of public moneys in the Bank, or their distribution for the public service. Such a cause alone directly concerns the subject upon which the power is to be exercised. I' the only cause of which the functions of his office and ha relations to the bank authorize and enable the Secretary to judge, and which is of such a nature as to require immediate action without a previous reference to C gress. It is the only cause which would justly deprise the bark of the use of the public moneys after havig paid for it. It is the only cause which Congress C safely submit to the discretion of the Treasury, with abandoning to that officer the whole scheme of pubi policy in regard to a national bank.

1. A cause that does not directly concern the subjet upon which the power is to be exercised, must regat the public moneys as an instrument, and not as an of of the power. To comprehend such a cause, the charte must be construed to give the Secretary an unlimite choice of the objects to be attained by the custody of the public money s; for as nose are pointed out by the Caf ter but those of mere custody and transfer, the instan that these cease to be the only objects of the powe we are without any limitation. Whether the purpose the Secretary be local or general, whether it be to mak money dear or cheap, to regulate or to disturb excha ges, to promote or retard public works, to increase diminish the amount of bank discounts, to excite or cech teract political movements, each and all of these objec must be within the discretion of the Secretary, if any them are.

II. In the execution of this power, the Secretary was the agent of Congress, and not of the President. He derived the power from Congress; he is to report his reasons for using it to Congress. The act of the Secretary in removing the deposites is neither actually, nor by construction, the act of the President, nor are the reasons of the President a satisfaction, either in effect or form, of the requisition on the Secretary to report his reasons. The exercise of this power affects the public treasure, which Congress directed to be placed in the 2. That the Secretary should be intrusted with Bank of the United States. That treasure is the treasure power necessary to protect the Treasury itself, or to mee of the people, the custody and control of which belongs the demands upon it, is reasonable. If the public mere to the Legislature and to the agents of the Legislature. are exposed to danger, he must first perceive its af The custody of the Legislature is exclusive of the Exproach, and would be best able to measure its exter ecutive department. The custody of the bank, as the agent of the Legislature, is equally exclusive. The power of the Secretary is, in like manner, exclusive. The Chief Executive Magistrate has no constitutional

He also, from his official position, must know the dire tion which public engagements require to be given to the means of satisfying them. The power, which either danger or the public credit makes necessary, is one tha

Removal of the Deposites.