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any great military results would be gathered. The defeated force might fall back on their position at Manassas, or further south on Fredericksburg, there joining their depôts and calling in the forces at Acquia Creek and other detachments on the river. Here another battle might perhaps be fought, and again we assume the Southerners to be defeated. There are not less than three strong positions between that town and Richmond, said to be fortified, and ample time has been afforded for this, whilst the Norfolk arsenal would supply an abundance of heavy guns. Probably, another engagement might be accepted at one or more of these positions, in which we again assume the Southerners defeated, and thus at length the Federal army would approach Richmond.

That city has the resources of an old State capital united with those of a commercial town. It has iron foundries and other establishments, and its close connection with Norfolk places at command the appliances of the finest naval arsenal in the United States. Surrounded on the North by a country highly defensible and systematically fortified with earthworks, and protected on the South by the James River, Richmond would present to veteran troops a formidable object of attack, Within the intrenchments would be assembled the population of the city, the militia of the adjoining counties, and the support arriving from other States, in addition to the retreating army. The Federal forces would therefore en

counter the task of assaulting positions fortified with heavy guns, and defended by numbers probably larger than their own-fighting on their own ground-animated by a spirit, of which those alone can judge who have been amongst the people of the South. It is difficult to suppose that raw troops, led by officers equally inexperienced, reduced and worn by the losses and hardships of the campaign, will be equal to the undertaking before them. Let us, however, assume that they accomplish it, and that the Confederate Government return to Montgomery.

The next object of attack, of primary importance, would be Charleston. The overthrow of Virginia would be accompanied by a heavy drawback-the necessity of holding it down, of stifling the guerilla warfare that would arise, and of maintaining in security the line of communication with Washington. The State being as large as England and much more defensible, its people intensely hostile and embittered by defeat, the strength of no small army must be absorbed in this duty, before further advance could be made. The strongest army that has yet appeared in the North would hardly suffice for this purpose even after the disappearance of the regular army of the South. It is not, indeed, until after the conquest of the first border State, that the Northern force will begin truly to realize the nature of its enterprise. The anxiety and difficulty of the invader are in the rear. A hostile State must first be passed over

that a rear may exist, before this will come into force.

Let us assume that an army has been provided to garrison the towns of Virginia, and hold down the State, and that another is ready to advance to the attack of Charleston. That city is defended on one side by a noble harbour, and on two others by large rivers, the Ashley and the Cooper. To complete the circuit requires only a line from river to river, across the intervening ground by which alone the assailants can approach. Here would be assembled the spirited population of the city and State, and the forces of the adjoining States of Georgia and Alabama-the militia of the three being in number, by the last army register, 191,362 men. To the strength obtainable out of this number would be added that of the retreating army, and the aid from distant quarters. In all probability the defenders would be much more numerous than the assailants - reduced as the latter would be by no ordinary march, for the distance from Washington to Charleston is 650 miles. To attempt an attack if such were the circumstances would most probably be to invite a disastrous repulse, and expose the assailing force to the fate of Burgoyne. And after all, if Charleston were taken, it need of necessity have no more result upon this war than when taken by us in that of the Revolution. New Orleans is as independent of it, in any military sense, as Lisbon of Constantinople. When taken by us,

after a gallant defence, it cost more in the garrison it absorbed than we ever gained in any advantage from its occupation.

An operation has been proposed-the descent of the Mississippi from Cairo, which, to any one acquainted with that river, has almost a ludicrous aspect. Such a measure may be classed with that of calling out volunteers for three months, for the purpose of subduing a country, merely to cross which would be at least a four months' march. From Cairo to New Orleans by the river is about a thousand miles—the whole length in the hands of the enemy, and all commanding positions mounted with guns. Troops could not be conveyed in the river steamers, all of which have the boilers above the deck, and are of the flimsiest and most inflammable construction. It would be the work of years to construct such a flotilla as might face the fire of artillery, and would be sufficient for the transport of forty thousand men and the stores required. It has, indeed, been proposed that the troops should march along the banks of the river, using it only as a mode of conveying the heavier stores. The banks of the Mississippi for hundreds of miles of its course are one dreary, monotonous scene of interminable. swamp and jungle-impenetrable to other progress than that of snakes and lizards, and dismal as a campingground even for the musquitoes, that are the only inhabitants. If, at a very wide distance indeed from the river, such a march were accomplished,

few would be likely to arrive at New Orleans in fit condition to attack the fortifications that would await them, and to defeat many times their own number, whom there would have been ample opportunity to assemble during the four months that march must occupy.

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There is a resource which has been frequently alluded to abstinence from which has been described as proof of almost sublime magnanimity -that of declaring at once emancipation of the slaves, and so prostrating the South at one fell blow. This at first, as the resolve of some principle shrinking from no sacrifice, all would have respected, whatever the opinion of its wisdom. Now, as an act of revenge and spite, because the people of the South could not otherwise be subdued, it would stamp on the page of American history a stigma dark and indelible-that never, we trust, may appear there. Beyond this it would be an impotent act of vengeance. If the negroes. resolve to rise, they will wait for no act of Congress-without such resolve on their part, a proclamation would be addressed to the idle wind. And how would it help the slaves to rise who are a thousand miles off-who is to take it down there, to read to them—to go provided also, as he need be, with railway tickets and other arrangements for the removal of four millions of human beings? To leave them where they are, would simply be to light the flames of servile war, and this, as we have seen, would speedily be quenched in blood—

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