thought of purchasing! He again wrote the Secretary of State, March 11 (1803), that Talleyrand "had assured him no sale would be heard of," and on the 12th as follows:

"With respect to a negotiation for Louisiana, I think nothing will be effected here. I have done everything I can, through the Spanish Ambassador, to obstruct the bargain [between France and Spain] for the Floridas, and I have great hope that it will not be soon concluded."

The Consul had not yet spoken. Talleyrand had not reached this point in the negotiation. A better offer was hoped for. But Bonaparte would soon be obliged either to speak-to give up a great European measure matured in his mind-or to undertake that measure under circumstances which would strip him of Louisiana, and possibly the French West Indies in addition, without any equivalent. The first cannon fired in Europe" was about to roar the knell of the Peace of Amiens, and it was for Bonaparte to say whether it should be the "signal" also for "holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations." There is little doubt that his mind was fully made up which was the preferable alternative long before Mr. Livingston was apprised of the fact.

In Livingston's dispatch of March 12th he mentioned an interview between the Consul and Lord Whitmouth, the English ambassador, in the drawing-rooms of Madame Bonaparte, in which the former assumed that vehemently angry and menacing tone with which he was accustomed to overwhelm the ministers of hostile powers, on the eve of war. The nerves of the stout Englishman did not shiver. None of Bonaparte's rage on this occasion, however, was affected. He had been deeply incensed by the bitter denunciations heaped upon him in the British Parliament, and by a stream of English publications, which represented him in the most odious light.' Causes of dissatisfaction had been constantly accumulating between the nations. England, indeed, wanted war. France was gaining a rapid ascendency on the Continent. The war was, therefore, inevitable. Its approach was announced by Bonaparte on the 13th of March, in an

1 Bonaparte took particular offence at Sir Robert Wilson's narrative of the English Expedition to Egypt, dedicated by permission to the Duke of York, and publicly precented by the author to George III. and accepted at a levee.

audience of foreign ministers. It soon broke out on both sides with peculiar vindictiveness, and with mutual outrage.'

On the 11th of April, Livingston wrote his government that Talleyrand had that day asked him whether the United States "wished to have the whole of Louisiana"-that he "told him no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas." Talleyrand replied, if the French "gave New Orleans, the rest would be of little value, and that he would wish to know what we would give for the whole." Livingston says:

"I told him it was a subject I had not thought of; but I supposed we should not object to twenty millions, provided our citizens were paid. He told me this was too low an offer; and that he would be glad if I would reflect upon it, and tell him to-morrow. I told him that as Mr. Monroe would be in town in two days, I would delay my further offer until I had the pleasure of introducing him. He added, that he did not speak from authority, but that the idea had struck him. I have reason, however, to think that this resolution was taken in council on Saturday."

On Friday, Livingston had received Ross's motion in the United States Senate, and given copies to Talleyrand and Marbois. Other news of the same tenor had been for some time reaching the French Government.

Monroe arrived on the 12th. On the 13th, Marbois (into whose hands Bonaparte had put the negotiations, on hearing through the English press that the United States had appropriated two millions of dollars to bribe the persons about him), informed Mr. Livingston that Bonaparte said to him on Sunday: "You have charge of the treasury; let them [the Americans] give you one hundred millions of francs, and pay their own claims and take the whole country." Livingston declined to answer this proposition without consulting Monroe. The ministers, on the 15th, offered fifty millions, including the claims; and then shrewdly "resolved to rest a few days on their oars." War was swiftly coming; additional funds were more desirable to France than additional enemies!

On the 30th of April-just eleven days before Lord Whitmouth received his passports and left France-a treaty and two conventions were entered into between the American and French ministers, by which France ceded the entire province of

1 England, before declaring war, seized two hundred French vessels, worth, with their cargoes, three millions sterling. France retaliated by ordering the arrest of about ten thousand English in France and treating them as prisoners of war.

Louisiana to the United States, for the sum of sixty millions of francs,' to be paid to France-twenty millions to be paid to citizens of the United States due from France (for supplies, embargoes, and prizes made at sea)-and in further consideration of certain stipulations in favor of the inhabitants of the ceded territory, and certain commercial privileges secured to France.

It was provided that the inhabitants of Louisiana should "be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and, in the mean time, they should be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they professed."

It was provided that French or Spanish ships coming directly from their own country, or any of their colonies, and loaded only with the produce or manufactures thereof, should for the space of twelve years be admitted to any port within the ceded territory, in the same manner and on the same terms with American vessels coming from those places. And for that period no other nation was to have a right to the same privileges in the ports of the ceded territory. But this was not to affect the regulations the United States might make concerning the exportation of their own produce and merchandise, or any right they might have to make such regulations. After the expiration of the twelve years, and forever, the ships of France were to be treated upon the footing of the most favored nations in the ports of the ceded territory.

The financial arrangements were included in the "Conventions," as France exhibited a sensitive disinclination to have this territorial transfer formally assume its real character of a sale for money. But a careful inspection of the treaties will show that she had much less reason to blush for her conduct on this occasion than nations commonly have which either cede or acquire territory. Her stipulations in behalf of the existing and future population of Louisiana were most humane and noble, and those which affected her American creditors were conceived in the highest spirit of magnanimity and honor. It is curious to

1 It was stipulated that, in this convention, five franc 3333-10000 (or five livres eight sous tournois) should equal the dollar of the United States.

speculate what a different air this international compact might have been made to wear, had the superseded Talleyrand been the negotiator instead of the austerely virtuous Marbois. And let us not withhold from the Consul of France the credit which is due him for appointing, and approving the proceedings of such a minister.

We think it was Napoleon who said he had noticed that Providence generally favored the heaviest and best disciplined battalions. Fortune wafts on those, who seize her at the ebb. The "good luck," to which it gave the opposition so much consolation to attribute the President's success in the purchase of Louisiana, continued. The house of Baring, in London, offered for a moderate commission at once to take the American stocks which were created for the purchase money of Louisiana, at their current value in England, and to meet our engagements to France by stipulated monthly installments. It is not at all probable that this offer to furnish so large a sum to an enemy could have been made without understanding with the British Government. Nay, the latter had projected an expedition to capture New Orleans as soon as her war with France should break out, but on being apprised by Mr. King of the measures of the United States towards a purchase, evinced apparent satisfaction with such an arrangement. And on learning the terms of the cession, even George III., if the well-turned diplomatic language of Lord Hawkesbury may be credited, grew gracious, and expressed high approbation of their tenor.'

No alliance.

England had every right to feel gratified. against her power, no special guaranties against her arms, no injurious discriminations against her navigation had been inserted in the treaties. France was stripped of her American continental possessions, and crippled from ever becoming the rival of England in colonial establishments. The ceded territory had gone into the hands of the only power which could hold it safely from all European rivals, and against which it would have been in vain for England herself to contend for its posses

Lord Hawkesbury wrote Mr. King (May 19th, 1803), that his Majesty expressed his satisfaction that the treaty had been so framed "as not to infringe any right of Great Britain in the navigation of the Mississippi:" and that he regarded it as "the most satisfactory evidence of a disposition on the part of the Government of the United Statescorrespondent to that which his Majesty entertained-to promote and improve that harmony and good understanding which so happily subsisted between the two countries, and which was so conducive to their mutual benefit!"

sion. The sum paid into the coffers of France would not approach that which England would save in sending fleets against and in maintaining possession of Louisiana against both France and the United States, without any hope that possession would be permanent. And finally, England could now concentrate all her force without reference to transatlantic efforts or interruptions, in her death-struggle with that modern Alexander against whom it might soon be necessary to defend even her own shores from invasion.

Livingston and Monroe communicated the result of their negotiations to the American Government, May 13th. It is to be presumed the paper was drawn up by Livingston, and was acquiesced in by Monroe, to escape an eclaircissement which would add to existing irritations.' It said that they (the ministers) "well knew" that "an acquisition of so great extent was not contemplated by their appointment," but "they were persuaded that the circumstances and considerations which induced them to make it, would justify them in the measure to their Government and country."

So far as official written instructions were concerned, this was true; but both Livingston's official and Jefferson's inofficial letters show that it was an erroneous view-show that procur ing Louisiana had been "contemplated" and made the subject of diplomatic correspondence-show that Jefferson had meditated and resolved on obtaining, if practicable, every foot of the American continental possessions of France, the moment he learned that France had obtained them-show that he had communicated these views to Livingston, while that minister was expressing to the French Government, and no doubt honestly entertaining, a wholly different class of ideas. And there is not a particle of doubt that it was precisely to seize upon a favora

! Livingston expressed considerable feeling at Monroe's appointment, and at his superiority of official grade. He believed "it was important that he [Livingston] be thought to stand as well with his government as any other person." He thought his age, and the stations he had held, entitled him not to have any person placed above him in the line he had filled," etc. (See his dispatch to Madison, April 17th.) There were not wanting persons who were earnestly attempting to convince Livingston that the Administration were secretly hostile to him, and who communicated to him all sorts of tattle and gossip to prove their assertions. We are ashamed to say that as high bred a man as Governeur Morris rivalled a chambermaid's industry in the latter particular. (See his correspondence, edited by Sparks.) A jest of Bonaparte, in regard to Livingston's deafness, was repeated by "beau Dawson at the capital, and therefore was represented to him as a Government insult, etc., etc.!