by the proposed arrangement? What would the remaining territory be worth to France (never worth a thousandth part as much to her as to the United States), in the then situation of the world, without any navigable approach to the greater portion of it, except through a river of which the United States would hold the absolute control?

To accept the President's offer would be to give up the most valuable part of the possession and the key to all the remainder for the purpose of having the remainder secured from England. Yet, if the reasoning in the President's letter was sound (which enforced the first cession), the rest would inevitably soon follow that cession. In fact, the first cession would render the second more inevitable, and a thousand times less capable of being forcibly prevented. The President's idea, then, amounted practically to this that if France would sell us all we then needed of her territory, for either commercial, military, or any other purposes, we would help her (or rather allow her to help us) keep the other part from a more dangerous occupant, until we also had need for that other part. Precisely in this light the French government viewed this offer. Talleyrand emphatically declared that if the French Government gave up what we then asked, what was left was worthless to France.

We neither accuse nor suspect Mr. Jefferson of insincerity. There is no doubt he would have respected his guaranty; and that he would have remained adverse to taking any unjust advantage. But he foresaw, and clearly and warningly pointed to the train of causes which must inevitably end, sooner or later, in the overthrow of any French power on the Mississippi. Having, done this, he took middle ground-ground that would neither disgust France nor mankind by its rapacity—and awaited the result. We have no doubt that having such intellects as Bonaparte's and Talleyrand's to deal with, he very strongly anticipated the result which finally took place. It was to be ready for this, or some other equivalent or similar proposition, that he sent Monroe to France, with verbal instructions extending to any contingency.

The President's views produced no immediate visible change in Bonaparte's plans. Livingston informed his Government, November 11th, that the military expedition to New Orleans was about embarking, and he feared "no prudence would pre

vent hostilities ere long." Some of his later dispatches were rather more hopeful in their tenor, but no marked change occurred in the open aspect of things until the news reached France of the war flame that was burning in Congress, on account of the proceedings of Morales at New Orleans. The Federalists, who were so vehemently laboring to overthrow the Administration on that question, were unconsciously playing into its hands, and as effectually serving one of its great objects -the greatest object of its foreign policy-as if they had been employed expressly for that purpose.

When intelligence of war resolutions, vehement speeches in Congress, and of every other apparent indication of a popular ferment and of a national explosion in the United States, was wafted across the Atlantic, the French Consul-used to the fiery energy of democratic legislatures-unable to discern distinctly at such a distance between parties-finding one set openly talking war and the other only asking for privacy in the deliberations on the question-observing that all were in favor of firm declarations and provisional warlike preparations-fancied he saw the American scenes of 1798 about to be reënacted. saw the United States again preparing with the prodigal bravery which distinguishes an aroused democracy, to tauntingly defy France to the combat; and he doubtless believed this was the first act in the drama which the President's letter had foreshadowed.

He

It would be something worse than ridiculous to suppose that Bonaparte was intimidated, or that the Directory were intimidated in 1798. But the question was, in commercial phrase, would the contest "pay?" Was it worth while to wage a war with so distant a power while the marine of France was so inferior to that of England, the sure ally of the enemies of France? Was it worth while to attempt to garrison a wilderness, destitute even of provisions, against five millions of contiguous people, who could reach it by a large number of navigable rivers? Was it worth while to expose the French West India possessions to the attacks of such a neighbor? Was it worth while to tempt a partition of all the colonial possessions of France between the United States and England? Was it worth while to "marry these powers in the bonds of a common interest, and induce their allied maritime flags to "maintain exclusive possession of the

ocean," and fix "the sentence which was to restrain France forever within her low-water mark?"

The shattered ships of France bore good testimony whether the menaces of the President in the last particular would prove bagatelles, if the policy he threatened was entered upon.

The victor of Lodi, Aboukir, and Marengo-the Dictator of southern Europe-could have laughed at the President's threats if nothing but the Rhine or the Pyrenees had separated the domains over which they ruled. But circumstances sometimes more than counterbalance strength. A mountaineer in a pass is more formidable than a battalion on a plain. The United States held the unapproached maritime supremacy of the western hemisphere. She held more. Maritime skill and maritime victory were hers by birthright. Never man for man and gun for gun had her flag been struck to Christian or Corsair; and now the Levantine seas were witnessing her avenging chastisement of those to whom Europe paid tribute. United with England, and only given time to build (in the mechanical sense of the term) fleets, and no ocean or sea could float a sail which was not under the protection of their associated flags.

But independently of such future results, and looking only to existing facts, Bonaparte was not weak enough in military capacity to suppose for a moment he could hold a level and comparatively unfortified mud bank, inhabited by a few thousand Creoles, and a vast wilderness occupied only by savages, with the Atlantic between it and France, against the fighting men of five millions of people, and with England joyfully and eagerly ready to intercept every succor he could send, so that not a regiment would reach America without in part owing it to favoring accidents.

The moment, therefore, he believed the President's avowals had been made in earnest, and that the American people were ready to uphold them-ready to fight for the territory-(and what could he expect if the American Republicans, the only party that could ever tolerate France, should lead in the war feeling?) his strong sagacity at once foresaw that his colonization projects were at an end; that these new domains were worthless to France, and must soon pass entirely from its grasp. Measuring as he always did the sentiment of America towards France by the Federal standard, he probably considered any guaranty the

latter could receive from the former as a far weaker and more ephemeral engagement than it would actually have proved. Necessity would have broken it. But he believed the merest pretext would suffice. It was both for his advantage and credit, then, to get rid of it for the best equivalent he could obtain, before another war should break out between France and England.

We have stated the object the President had in view in sending Monroe to France, and clothed with a still higher grade of ministerial functions than Livingston. Let the reader carefully examine the following letter and judge:

TO GOVERNOR Monroe.

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1808.

DEAR SIR:

I dropped you a line on the 10th, informing you of a nomination I had made of you to the Senate, and yesterday I inclosed you their approbation, not then having time to write. The agitation of the public mind on occasion of the late suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans is extreme. In the western country it is natural, and grounded on honest motives. In the seaports it proceeds from a desire for war, which increases the mercantile lottery: in the Federalists, generally, and especially those of Congress, the object is to force us into war if possible, in order to derange our finances, or if this cannot be done, to attach the western country to them, as their best friends, and thus get again into power. Remonstrances, memorials, etc., are now circulating through the whole of the western country, and signed by the body of the people. The measures we have been pursuing, being invisible, do not satisfy their minds. Something sensible, therefore, has become necessary; and indeed our object of purchasing New Orleans and the Floridas is a measure liable to assume so many shapes, that no instructions could be squared to fit them. It was essential, then, to send a minister extraordinary, to be joined with the ordinary one, with discretionary powers; first, however, well impressed with all our views, and therefore qualified to meet and modify to these every form of proposition which could come from the other party. This could be done only in full and frequent oral communications. Having determined on this, there could not be two opinions among the Republicans as to the person. You possessed the unlimited confidence of the Administration and of the western people; and generally of the Republicans everywhere; and were you to refuse to go, no other man can be found who does this. The measure has already silenced the Federalists here. Congress will no longer be agitated by them: and the country will become calm as fast as the information extends over it. All eyes, all hopes are now fixed on you; and were you to decline, the chagrin would be universal, and would shake under your feet the high ground on which you stand with the public. Indeed, I know nothing which would produce such a shock. For on the event of this mission depend the future destines of this Republic. If we cannot, by a purchase of the country, insure to ourselves a course of perpetual peace and friendship with all nations, then as war cannot be distant, it behoves us immediately to be preparing for that course, without, however, hastening it; and it may be necessary (on your failure on the Continent) to cross the Channel. We shall get entangled in European politics, and

figuring more, be much less happy and prosperous. This can only be prevented by a successful issue to your present mission. I am sensible, after the measures you have taken for getting into a different line of business, that it will be a great sacrifice on your part, and presents from the season and other circumstances serious difficulties. But some men are born for the public. Nature, by fitting them for the service of the human race on a broad scale, has stamped them with the evidences of her destination and their duty.

But I am particularly concerned that, in the present case, you have more than one sacrifice to make. To reform the prodigalities of our predecessors is understood to be peculiarly our duty, and to bring the Government to a simple and economical course. They, in order to increase expense, debt, taxation and patronage, tried always how much they could give. The outfit given to ministers resident to enable them to furnish their house, but given by no nation to a temporary minister, who is never expected to take a house or to entertain, but considered on the footing of a voyageur, they gave to their extraordinary missionaries by wholesale. In the beginning of our Administration, among other articles of reformation in expense, it was determined not to give an outfit to ministers extraordinary, and not to incur the expense with any minister of sending a frigate to carry or bring him. The Boston happened to be going to the Mediterranean, and was permitted, therefore, to take up Mr. Livingston and touch in a port of France. A frigate was denied to Charles Pinckney, and has been refused to Mr. King for his return. Mr. Madison's friendship and mine to you being so well known, the public will have eagle eyes to watch if we grant you any indulgences out of the general rule; and on the other hand, the example set in your case will be more cogent on future ones, and produce greater approbation to our conduct. The allowance, therefore, will be in this, and all similar cases, all the expenses of your journey and voyage, taking a ship's cabin to yourself, nine thousand dollars a year from your leaving home till the proceedings of your mission are terminated, and then the quarter's salary for the expenses of your return, as prescribed by law. As to the time of your going, you cannot too much hasten it, as the moment in France is critical. St. Domingo delays their taking possession of Louisiana, and they are in the last distress for money for current purposes. You should arrange your affairs for an absence of a year at least, perhaps for a long one. It will be necessary for you to stay here some days on your way to New York. You will receive here what advance you choose.' Accept assurances of my constant and affectionate attachment.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Mr. Livingston, meanwhile, had continued vigorously to press his applications to the French Government, and he had succeeded in obtaining a direct access for his memorials to Bonaparte, without the intervention of a minister. He procured some concessions on incidental questions, but nothing looking towards a sale of the Floridas, or of another province which it has been assumed that nobody in America had yet

The vote in the Senate on confirming Monroe's appointment stood fifteen to twelve a strict party division.