arrives at them. This book, too, makes us forget his atrocities for a moment, in commiseration of his sufferings. I will not say that the authorities of the world, charged with the care of their country and people, had not a right to confine him for life, as a lion or tiger, on the principle of self-preservation. There was no safety to nations while he was permitted to roam at large. But the putting him to death in cold blood, by lingering tortures of mind, by vexations, insults and deprivations, was a degree of inhumanity to which the poisonings and assassinations of the school of Borgia, and the den of Marat never attained. The book proves, also, that nature had denied him the moral sense, the first excellence of well-organized man. If he could seriously and repeatedly affirm that he had raised himself to power without ever having committed a crime, it proves that he wanted totally the sense of right and wrong. If he could consider the millions of human lives which he had destroyed, or caused to be destroyed, the desolations of countries by plunderings, burnings, and famine, the destitutions of lawful rulers of the world without the consent of their constituents, to place his brothers and sisters on their thrones, the cutting up of established societies of men and jumbling them discordantly together again at his caprice, the demolition of the fairest hopes of mankind for the recovery of their rights and amelioration of their condition, and all the numberless train of his other enormities; the man, I say, who could consider all these as no crimes, must have been a moral monster, against whom every hand should have been lifted to slay him."

1

In two letters to Judge Johnson of South Carolina (March 4th, and June 12th), Mr. Jefferson complains that the Republican side of American history has not yet been written :

"We have been too careless of our future reputation, while our tories will omit nothing to place us in the wrong. Besides the five-volumed libel which represents us as struggling for office, and not at all to prevent our government from being administered into a monarchy, the life of Hamilton is in the hands of a man who, to the bitterness of the priest, adds the rancor of the fiercest Federalism. Mr. Adams' papers too, and his biography, will descend of course to his son, whose pen, you know, is pointed, and his prejudices not in our favor. And doubtless other things are in preparation, unknown to us. On our part we are depending on truth to make itself known, while history is taking a contrary set which may become too inveterate for correction."

He proceeds to say that Mr. Madison will probably leave something historical, but that it will be principally confined to the period "between the dissolution of the old and commencement of the new government." He says that he has not had time to prepare anything himself, but that his letters, "all preserved," will give daily occurrences and views from 1790 till

This word is thus printed in both editions of Mr. Jefferson's Works-but it was probably an error in the first copying, which was followed in the later edition without a reference to the original MSS, or it may have been a slip of Mr. Jefferson's pen. The sense would point to the substitution of the word dethronements.

2 Judge Marshall's Life of Washington is here referred to. This means of course, all possessing political importance.

he left public life; and that, being written "in the warmth and freshness of fact and feeling, they will carry internal evidence that what they breathe is genuine," and will "command more conviction than anything he could have written after his retirement." He adds:

"Selections from these, after my death, may come out successively as the maturity of circumstances may render their appearance seasonable. But multiplied testimony, multiplied views will be necessary to give solid establishment to truth. Much is known to one which is not known to another, and no one knows everything. It is the sum of individual knowledge which is to make up the whole truth, and to give its correct current through future time."

And in the second letter:

"History may distort truth, and will distort it for a time, by the superior efforts at justification of those who are conscious of needing it most. Nor will the opening scenes of our present government be seen in their true aspect, until the letters of the day, now held in private hoards, shall be broken up and laid open to public view. What a treasure will be found in General Washington's Cabinet, when it shall pass into the hands of as candid a friend to truth as he was himself? when no longer, like Cæsar's notes and memorandums in the hands of Anthony, it shall be open to the high priests of Federalism only, and garbled to say so much and no more, as suits their views!" 1

The remark in regard to the light to be shed on our political history, on the views of men and the objects of parties, by the breaking up of private hoards of letters, has been most signally verified. The published correspondences of Adams, Hamilton, Ames, Jefferson, etc., leave no materials wanting for a genuine history of the general course and aims of the two great American parties.

One of the preceding extracts implies that Jefferson did not consider John Q. Adams personally friendly to himself. A decisive example of the proof on which he based this conclusion might here be given, but it does not appear to be called for.

In the same letter to Johnson will be found the customary views in regard to the tenor of a class of decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States. It also contains some testimony on the subject of the authorship of Washington's Farewell Address, which distinctly confutes a modern theory that this paper was wholly, or principally, the production of Hamilton.

1 No one will forget that this was written before the publication of General Washington's Writings, by Mr. Sparks.

President Monroe failing to meet Mr. Jefferson as usual on his spring visit home (the latter being at Poplar Forest), consulted him by letter in regard to the attitude which our country ought to assume on the interference of the Allied Powers in the concerns of Spain. Mr. Jefferson replied (June 11th):

"On the question you propose, whether we can, in any form, take a bolder attitude than formerly in favor of liberty, I can give you but commonplace ideas. They will be but the widow's mite, and offered only because requested. The matter which now embroils Europe, the presumption of dictating to an independent nation the form of its government, is so arrogant, so atrocious, that indignation, as well as moral sentiment, enlists all our partialities and prayers in favor of one, and our equal execrations against the other. I do not know, indeed, whether all nations do not owe to one another a bold and open declaration of their sympathies with the one party, and their detestation of the conduct of the other. But farther than this we are not bound to go; and indeed, for the sake of the world, we ought not to increase the jealousies, or draw on ourselves the power, of this formidable confederacy. I have ever deemed it fundamental for the United States, never to take active part in the quarrels of Europe."

The reasons for this policy were further and most cogently urged; and he thought all we could do for Spain was to make our "neutrality as partial" to her, "as would be justifiable without giving cause of war to her adversary." He added:

"The foothold which the nations of Europe had in either America, is slipping from under them, so that we shall soon be rid of their neighborhood. Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable to us as if it were our own But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us; or the island will give itself to us, when able to do so.”

He believed, from the indications of circumstances, that the English Government was playing false with Spain-enacting "a theatrical farce in which the five powers were the actors, England the Tartuffe, and her people the dupes."

The views above expressed in regard to Cuba were soon retracted. An intelligent inhabitant of that island visited Mr. Jefferson at Monticello, and informed him that the Cubans would be satisfied to remain as they were, but were sensible that could not be; that their next choice would be independence, if they could see a prospect of being supported in it; but failing in this, that they would prefer incorporation either with

the United States or Mexico; that there was not a man in the island who was in favor of its becoming a subordinated colony, for it could be no more, to England. Thereupon, Mr. Jefferson again wrote the President, June 3d:

"I had supposed an English interest there quite as strong as that of the United States, and therefore, that to avoid war, and keep the island open to our own commerce, it would be best to join that power in mutually guaranteeing its independence. But if there is no danger of its falling into the possession of England, I must retract an opinion founded on an error of fact. We are surely under no obligation to give her, gratis, an interest which she has not; and the whole inhabitants being averse to her, and the climate mortal to strangers, its continued military occupation by her would be impracticable. It is better, then, to lie still in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself. For, certainly, her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanting to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest."

In October, the South American question acquired a new and momentous interest. It was rumored and believed, both in England and the United States, that the Holy Alliance, not content with meddling with the affairs of Spain, now proposed to interfere between her and her revolted colonies, and to impose conditions on the latter. Whatever might have been the secret policy of England earlier, this giant stride towards universal domination alarmed her, and Mr. Canning, formerly so fond of showing disrespect to the United States, now invoked their interposition, promising the full support of England. President Monroe at once placed the question before Mr. Jefferson. The reply rings like a battle-shout:

TO THE PRESIDENT.

MONTICELLO, October 24, 1823.

DEAR SIR,-The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our secondnever to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the band of despots, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate

cause. wars.

a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side, we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war. For how would they propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy.

But we have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being. Yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own consent, but by war; and its independence, which is our second interest (and especially its independence of England), can be secured without it, I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and accepting its independence, with peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association, at the expense of war and her enmity.

I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially, their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should think it, therefore, advisable, that the Executive should encourage the British government to a continuance in the dispositions expressed in these letters, by an assurance of his concurrence with them as far as his authority goes; and that as it may lead to war, the declaration of which requires an act of Congress, the case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting, and under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by himself.

I have been so long weaned from political subjects, and have so long ceased to take any interest in them, that I am sensible I am not qualified to offer opinions on them worthy of any attention. But the question now proposed involves consequences so lasting, and effects so decisive of our future destinies, as to re-kindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on such occasions, and to induce me to the