Jussuf was defeated on the 13th of May, and more effectually so

on the 10th of June.

Eaton's hopes now soared high that with proper supplies and reinforcements from Commodore Barron, Tripoli itself would soon be at his feet. To his applications, however, the commodore made answer, that Hamet was now in possession of the second province of the regency, and that if he had the influence to which he laid claim, he ought to be able to effect his purpose by the ordinary coöperation of the fleet. Barron (wasted to great debility by illness) possibly had not too much confidence in the discretion of Eaton, and none whatever in that of Hamet Caramalli, who, he wrote Colonel Lear, had neither energy, military talents, nor resources of any kind. He believed that a powerful impression had been produced on the mind of the reigning bashaw, and that then was the time to treat favorably with him and recover Commodore Bainbridge and the crew of the Philadelphia "from the bondage of a bigoted and unfeeling tyrant."

The Danish consul, Nissen, communicated overtures from the bashaw's prime minister-evidently supposing that a peace would be desirable, under the circumstances, to the United States. Bainbridge himself wrote Barron from his captivity:

"I have not the least doubt that was a person to come here to negotiate before an attack is made, that peace would be effected for one hundred and twenty thousand dollars, and if the attack should not prove very successful, it is very probable that such a sum would not release us from captivity, at least for some time. Appre hension is often worse than realization. I sincerely hope that a person will come, because I think it the most favorable moment."

Acting under the advice of Barron, Colonel Lear opened a communication with the bashaw. The latter demanded $200,000 dollars for peace and ransom. Lear rejected the proposition at once, and proposed as his ultimatum that a mutual delivery of prisoners should take place, and as the bashaw had more than two hundred the most, he offered to "give him $60,000 for them, but not a cent for peace." These terms were agreed upon.

Both Barron's and Lear's conduct on this occasion has been often criticised. A life of Eaton has appeared, in which Lear

1 This consisted of about three hundred men, including twenty-two quarter-deck officers.

is loaded with accusations for arresting by a dishonorable peace the splendid career of the former to a great national conquest. And when a son of Hamet Caramalli was recently in the United States, soliciting compensation for the injustice done to his father, several romantic tales on the subject appeared in our periodical publications.

Commodore Rodgers, who succeeded to Barron in the command before the treaty was concluded,' and who certainly was never accused of preferring other arguments where powder and ball were the best ones, decidedly approved of his predecessor's measures and of the treaty. He wrote the Secretary of the Navy to that effect (June 8th) and then sailed to Tunis, and under the muzzles of his cannon, dictated a peace to its Bey.

Eaton's light-armed force had done well against a town whose principal batteries could be engaged on equal terms by two or three little vessels close in upon land. Tripoli was quite another affair. It had more than once repulsed our entire squadron. It had a wall and strong landward defences, against which a riffraff of two or three thousand Arabs (about as good soldiers as American Indians, and indeed very similar ones) could effect no more than a swarm of hornets. It would not have been in the power of a much better trained and more systematic soldier than Eaton to suddenly convert such materials into proper ones for conducting siege-trains and regular approaches. A perusal of not only the earlier but the subsequent history of the Barbary States will serve to dispel many fanciful impressions on this subject. It is probable that if we had attempted dynasty-founding and protectorates in Africa, we should have been compelled to engage in a land war with all the Barbary States. The degree of material necessary for such an enterprise has since been shown by the experience of the French in Algeria.

But what would have been the special objects (so long as we attained the general ones of the war) of capturing Tripoli? The ones alleged are that we should have thus avoided the degradation of paying $60,000, and that we should have discharged an obligation to Hamet.

It was not a very sore disgrace for a transatlantic power to

1 Barron resigned on account of ill health, and was succeeded by Rodgers, May 22d.

pay that sum for the greater number of prisoners, when the oldest and strongest nations of Europe continued not only to pay ransom for prisoners, but large sums avowedly for peace. When all the ends of equity and convenience are answered, the point of ceremonial honor does not rise very high in treating with barbarians.

But the other question, it must be admitted, was an important one. If we lured Hamet Caramalli from a distant retreat-if we took his contribution to our force, though it should amount to no more than five hungry Arabs, whose services were not worth their rations—and if we stipulated, in consideration of his force, his name, or on any other ground, to do our best before concluding any peace to place him on the throne which perhaps his father usurped-then Lear, and Barron, and Rogers voluntarily tarnished the good faith of their country. They could not pretend they had made all reasonable effort to redeem such a stipulation till at least a bloody assault by sea and land on Tripoli had left them victors, or sent them (as it probably would) shattered and broken from the onset. And, under the same supposition, the President disgraced himself by approving of the treachery of his instruments; the Senate disgraced itself by approving the treaty; and the House of Representatives (admitting it had some option in legislating to execute treaties) disgraced itself by making any provisions for its execution. Moreover, the American Congress and people lately doubly disgraced themselves (for now neither poverty nor ignorance of facts could be properly pleaded) by turning a deaf ear to the application of the son of a martyr to their forefathers' treachery.

But this entire hypothesis, fortunately, rests on the imagination of tale writers. Eaton was deeply chagrined at a result which he believed arrested him on the high road to victory and renown. But he never was able to show that Hamet had been, to the least degree, deceived by our Government. He wrote Commodore Rodgers (June 30th) that "our peace with Tripoli was certainly more favorable, and, considered separately, more honorable, than any peace obtained by any Christian nation with a Barbary regency, at any period within a hundred years."

In fact, Eaton was never vested with power to pledge our Government, if such had been his own wish, to an agreement to effect the restoration of Hamet. Barron, in supreme com

mand, expressly instructed him to make no such stipulations. He wrote to him March 22d, 1805:

"I feel it my duty to state explicitly that I must withhold my sanction to any convention or agreement committing the United States, or tending to impress on Hamet Bashaw [Hamet Caramalli] a conviction that we have bound ourselves to place him upon the throne. The consequences involved in such an engagement cannot but strike you forcibly, and a general view of our situation, in relation to the reigning bashaw and our unfortunate countrymen in Tripoli, will be sufficient to mark its inexpediency.”

In Eaton's reply (May 30), he urged that it would be impolitic and unjust to make peace without restoring Hamet, but he did not hint that he had entered into a stipulation to do so. He admitted that nothing could be accomplished without more "military talent and firmness" than was possessed by that prince and his followers. He described the latter as "rather a rabble than an army." His "convention" with Hamet stipulated that the United States "should use their utmost exertions" for the restoration of the latter, "so far as comported with their own honor and interest," and this convention was to be submitted to the President for ratification. After the treaty of peace was concluded with Jussuf, Hamet wrote to General Eaton (June 29th, 1805):

"On returning to your happy country, to which I wish you a safe passage, I request you will express to your sovereign my cordial thanks for his manifestations of friendship towards me. Had it been ordained that measures might have been carried forward to the attainment of my wishes, the restoration of my rightful domains to me, it would certainly have been cause of eternal gratitude. But, it is true, my own means were small. I know, indeed, that they did not answer your reasonable expectations. And this, I am ready to admit, is a good reason why you should not choose to persevere in an enterprise hazardous in itself and perhaps doubtful in its issue. I submit to the will of God, and thank the king of America, and all his servants, for their kind dispositions towards me."

Two months later, Hamet claimed that the restoration of his throne was guaranteed by the convention and by the verbal assurances of Eaton. The latter vaguely countenanced his pretensions, without, however, making any direct admission in regard to his own alleged personal promises, or attempting to show that he either had the right to make, or had made, such an official stipulation. If Hamet was misled (which is very

doubtful), he owed it entirely to the indiscretion of Eaton, who equally exceeded the letter and spirit of his instructions.

No foreign undertaking of the same magnitude in which the United States have ever been engaged, has been more proper, more useful, more creditably conducted, more brilliantly terminated, more pregnant with direct and incidental advantages to our country, than our war with the Barbary States during Mr. Jefferson's Administration. And it was no infringement of his peace policy. His peace policy did not extend to tolerating piracy or paying tribute.

The purchase of Louisiana had roused the old jealousies of Spain towards the United States. She had made and withdrawn a protest against the transfer; but the arrangement of boundaries stirred up new irritations. Her tone grew haughtier; and on the 7th of August (1805) the President wrote the Secretary of State, from Monticello, that "from the papers already received, he inferred a confident reliance, on the part of Spain, on the omnipotence of Bonaparte, but a desire of procrastination till peace in Europe should leave us without an ally." The Emperor Napoleon (he assumed the imperial title and dignity May 18th, 1804), had, indeed, adopted a very dictatorial tone towards us, and evinced a disposition to interfere directly in our disputes with Spain. Our contraband trade in the West Indies undoubtedly irritated him to some extent, but we had committed a greater sin than this. We had balked one of his projects; we had compelled him to do what he did not desire to do; the laugh of the world was against him in the affair. Since that period his fortunes had been successful; crowns had rained on his family. And he now was in close alliance with Spain.

The President had without hesitation resolved to repel Napoleon's dangerous interference, and if this course would provoke war, to invite it at once, instead of waiting for a European peace. He wrote from home (August 7th) proposing to the Cabinet a provisional alliance with England. On receiving from the Secretary of State a letter of the French minister, undertaking to say how our Government must treat General Moreau, then an exile in the United States, he said "he confessed" it "excited in him both jealousy and offence," and he added:

"The style of that Government, in the Spanish business, was calculated to excite indignation; but it was a case in which that might have done injury. But the pre