fenfible, that France was dragging her forward deeply in a bloody and ruinous war, to weaken her ftrength, to impoverish her finances, to ruin her intereft, and to cut her connections with G. Britain quite off; and further informed, that the houfe of Bourbon (which had torn from her family the precious jewel of the Spanish monarchy, and was not yet content with the feveral territories they had got poffeffion of in Italy, in prejudice to her right) had kindled and kept this war on foot, to favour the scheme of univerfal monarchy, contrived and planned in their family compact; it is more than a probability, that we may foon fee the grand alliance renewed, and the arms of Auftria, the Empire, Pruffia, G. Britain, &c. united to defend themselves and the public liberty, from the pernicious effects of that familytreaty.

So that, as thefe extraordinary changes in the political state of the world convince us, that there is nothing bind ing and permanent amongst princes; that paffion and private intereft are the chief movers in all their actions; that no treaties are fufficient to afcertain how far any potentate is obliged to proceed with his ally; and that all engagements and leagues are forced to yield to neceffity: let us wait with a little patience, and it is probable, that the King of Sardinia may be provoked by the pertnefs of Don Philip, to drive him out of Parma and Placentia; that the Italian princes and states may think it the best policy to extirpate the Bourbon family out of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies; that Auftria and Germany may be convinced, that their territories can never be fate, till the power of France be reduced on the fide of the Rhine; and that there can be no balance of power maintained in Europe, without the alliance of G. Britain.

Let us therefore look upon this prefent conjuncture, as the crifis, when affairs are brought to that pafs, that France and her allies muft either deftroy the liberties of Europe, and raife the house of Bourbon to univerfal monarchy; or the house of Auftria, and the rest of the former grand alliance, muft join G. Britain in a war, to difable that ambitious, reftlefs, and perfidious, family, from ever more atteropting to forge fetters for thofe that are not connected with them by ties of blood and religion; and let us concur

with, and promote every counsel and measure for bringing about fo happy a change in the political fyftem of Europe, and for preventing the fatal effects of the Bourbon treaty.

Arguments relating to a Scots militia. [16.] SIR,

WIth humble fubmiffion to the gentle

men who have written either for or against the militia, I think that both are fo intent on making the most of their ar guments where they are the strongest, that they forget to dwell fufficiently on the points on which undetermined and candid people most need information.

It may be true, in favour of a militia, that the diftinction between a people armed and unarmed, is not only mortifying at prefent, but may in worfe times be fraught with confequences of the most dangerous and fatal effect.-But how can we, in the prefent depopulated state of the country, think of a remedy which fo far exceeds our ftrength to bear?

It may be likewife true, against a militia, that national defence is always an article of national charge, and always fome interruption to the arts of industry: and that a militia, in particular, is not only a national expence, but may be at tended too with fome incidental charge to the parishes in which militia-men leave poor families behind them, when they are called out to defend their country; and that the labour and manufacture which fuch men practifed must stand still when they are called out to learn their exercise, or oppofe an enemy. But I fee little force in this argument against a militia, unless it could be proved, that the ftanding army is no expence to the nation; that the poor which a foldier leaves behind him are not maintained by the parifh; or that labour is lefs interrupted by the total removal or banishment of a labourer for his whole life, than it is by the casual interruption of a fettled tradefiman's work.

All this I am ready to own on one fide and the other; and will go fo far in favour of militia, as to fay, that where the word national danger is mentioned, that point fhould be difcuffed before we liften to frivolous confiderations of petty intereft and conveniency. But where the blood and vitals of a country have been fucked and torn out, I think we fhould, if pof fible, look out for healing and reftoring charms, if there be any fuch, before we think of new efforts of strength and vi

gour

Feb.1762.

SIR,

Found in your paper of laft Monday a fhort letter, in which an objection is fuggefted to our making any application at prefent for a militia-law, to which, I am perfuaded, every body will give a very ferious attention.

Your correfpondent appears to know the merits of this important question too well, to lead us aftray by any frivolous cavils on the fubject. He knows, that an establishment, offered for the prefer vation of our happy conftitution, and a provifion for our national fafety, is not to be judged of upon trivial confiderations of perional intereft, or temporary conveniency. But he thinks, that, on account of the present scarcity of hands in this country, we are not in a condition to apply for any fuch establishment.

In this he does not appear to diftinguifh between an application for a law, which may be proper at any time, and the actual execution of fuch a law, which is only proper when the exigencies and fituation of the country fhall be found to permit, or require that execution.

The militia-law in England has a view to what may, and I hope will be, the fituation of that happy people for ages to come, not to any mere temporary fituation, or point of expedience. If the rights of a free people are established, and the foundations of a national fecurity are laid, it is of little confequence in what year thereafter that people fhall lay hold of their privileges, or in what feafon they are pleafed to difplay their national Arength. The threatenings of an enety, or their capacity to bear a part in e national defence, will determine them the choice of that time.

I cannot difpute what has been fo often med, in relation to the diftrefs which sur country fuffers from the high prices of

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labour, much lefs harden my heart a gainst the painful reflections which must arife in every breaft, on the view of a country fo much drained of its useful inhabitants: but the more lively the colours are in which this distress is painted, the more I am alarmed, and the more ready to move for an abolition of thofe diftinctions, from which we come to be confidered as a hoard of recruits for fo reign fervice, not as any part of the do meftic ftrength of the nation.

I believe, Sir, that the populoufnefs of any country will, in a course of years, depend very much on the manner in which its defences are constituted; and that a free people, in a condition to defend themfelves, are the likelieft to thrive, and to multiply in any country: but I will not now reft the argument upon this confideration, of which your correspondent appears to be fo competent a judge.

I will only beg leave to repeat, that he has miftaken the question which is now in agitation with the public. We do not inquire, Whether it be expedient. in any particular county, or in Scotland in general, to embody and march out a militia? but, Whether it is not only expedient, but even neceffary, in many poflible cafes, that we fhould have it in our power, under the fanction of law, to arm fome men for our own defence? and, Whether it is not dishonourable, and derogating from the credit of a people, to ftand excepted by the laws, which eftabith fuch a privilege in another part of the fame kingdom?

It may be difficult at prefent in our country to find fpare hands for the purpo fes of a militia; but the law, as it now ftands inforced in South Britain, would neither bring an enemy upon us, nor o therwife oblige us to make any efforts be yond our ftrength. That law has provided, that officers who serve in the militia fhall be qualified for that trust, by poffefling fuch an intereft and property in their country, as render them not only fit objects of the truft in the view of the public, but likewife competent judges of the expedience of its execution in any particular fituation of the counties to which they belong.

If there is a fcarcity of hands, or any other temporary circumftance which inclines them to poftpone the execution of the law, they can, by with-holding their names, delay it as long as they think proper,

The

The law was accordingly not executed in England for fome years after it was enacted; and in fome counties, to this prefent moment, nothing has been done in confequence of it.

If we therefore fhould continue to feel ourfelves diftreffed by a scarcity of hands, it is in our power to defer the raising a militia; and neither the government nor our fellow-fubjects could complain, after we have bled fo freely, and paid fo great a price for the boafted conquests of Britain. This at any rate is a point to be determined, when our option is to be made, and a question on which we may then deliberate, when it is in our power to chufe whether we fhall have a militia. But at present the question is premature; and our divifions upon it only serve to weaken the hands of those whofe hearts are sensible to the honour and interest of their countrymen.

Gentlemen may be fatisfied, that the liberty they enjoy of refufing to ferve in the rank of officers, renders this law rather a permiflion, than a compulfatory ftatute to arm the inhabitants of any county; and were the law extended to this country, we ought to confider it rather as an acknowledgment of our privileges, than any immediate call upon us to bear any further part in the public burden. In this light I am perfuaded it is confidered by the gentlemen who have given themselves fo much trouble to point out what appears to them a matter of fo much confequence to the honour, the fafety, and prefervation of their country. They have done their duty, and will have cause to rejoice, whatever the event may be. If the people of this country have no fenfe of their own importance, they may put what value upon themselves they pleafe; that is their affair: but if any perfon, from a motive of party-animofity, fets himself in oppofition to the rights of his country; or if any perfon, from an opinion of a temporary inconveniency, (which, however, we need not incur), thall move for a delay of our application to another time; it will be no difficult matter to say what value may be fet upon the heart of the one, or the understanding of the other.

We know that advantages are not always to be gained at the precife moment at which we defire them the most. We have already once petitioned in vain, and no time is improper to renew our application, fo long as we feel ourfelves diftin

guished by a mark fo dishonourable to our country. If there was a choice of times, none furely could be more proper than the prefent, nor could we be filent whilft our fellow-fubjects of England move for the renewal of a law, of whofe feverities they have had the fullest trial. When our privileges are acknowledged, we may then deliberate what ufe we will make of them, for the honour and safety of our country, and for the general advantage of that refpectable kingdom, of which we may then indeed fay, that we have the happiness to make a part. E. C. Feb. 15. Method of increasing the projectile force of fire-arms. By Lt-Gen. Creutznach. TAke one ounce of marjoram-feeds;

drop on it thirty drops of petroleum, thirty drops of antimony, and ten drops of balsam of fulphur; mix the whole thoroughly, fo that every fingle feed be impregnated with the moisture; then let the feed dry in a very hot fun-fhine; and when thoroughly dried, take about the quantity of a common charge of powder for a fufil, pour it into the barrel intended to be prepared, having first ftopped the touch-hole with an iron pin or wire; this being done, ftop the mouth of the barrel with a wooden stopple of fome length, and carefully fee that it be fo close as to exclude all air. Now the hinder part of the barrel (where, instead of powder, lay the feeds thus deficcated) is put into a coal fire to the length of full eight inches, and flowly heated; the fire must be blowed till the end of the barrel, to the prescri bed length, be red hot, flowly turning it round all the while, that the feeds may move about in the like manner; let the barrel continue red hot for about a quarter of an hour, then giving over blowing or increafing the fire, leave it to cool flowly, as the fire dies away. Let the infide of the barrel be thoroughly cleansed and fmoothed with a linen rag, at the fame time not neglecting the outfide; and this is the whole procefs of preparing a barrel for an increase of its range.

This preparation, it must be observed retains its efficacy a long time, provided the piece be not fired too often at one time or in too quick fucceflion, which heating it too much, diminishes its action. Ano ther neceflary document is, that, to fhoo at a fhort distance with a piece which ha recently undergone this operation, it mu be pointed, or aim taken, much lowe than at a greater distance. Brit. Mag

think of conferring fuch an extraordinary privilege on trade and industry. The military profeffion alone was honourable among all thofe conquerors. The warriors fubfifted by their poffetlions in land; they became confiderable by their influence over their vaflals, retainers, tenants, and flaves and it had need of strong proofs to convince us, that they would admit any of a rank fo much inferior as the Burgefles, to fhare with them in the legislative authority. Tacitus indeed affirms, that, among the ancient Germans, the confent of all the members of the community was required in every important de liberation; but he fpeaks not of reprefentatives; and this ancient practice mentioned by the Roman hiftorians, could only have place in fmall tribes, where every citizen might, without inconvenience, be affembled upon any extraordinary emergency. After principalities became more extensive; after the differences of property had formed diftinctions more important than thofe arifing from perfonal ftrength and valour; we may conclude, that the national affemblies must have been more limited in their number, and compofed only of the more confiderable citizens.

But though we must exclude the Burgefles or Commons from the Saxon wittenagemot, there is fome neceffity for fup pofing, that this affembly confifted of other members beside the Prelates, Abbots, Aldermen, and the Judges or Privy Council. For as all thefe, excepting fome of the ecclefiaftics, were anciently appointed by the King; had there been no other legislative authority, the royal power had been in a great measure defpotic; contrary to the tenor of all the hiftorians, and to the practice of all the northern nations. We may therefore conclude, that the more confiderable proprietors of land were, without any election, conflituent members of the national affembly; and there is reafon to think, that forty hides, or about four or five thousand acres, was the eftate requifite for intitling the poffeffor to this honourable privilege. There is a paffage of an ancient author, from which it appears, that a perfon of very noble birth, even one allied to the crown, was not efteemed a Princeps (the term ufually employed by ancient hiftorians when the wittenagemot is mentioned) till he had acquired a fortune of that extent. Nor need we imagine, that the public council would become diforderly or confufed by admitting fo great a multitude,

The landed property of England was properly in few hands during the Saxon times; at leaft, during the latter part of that period: and as men had fmall ambition of attending these public councils, there was no danger of the affembly's becoming too numerous for the difpatch of the little bufinefs which was brought before them."

It must be confeffed, that Mr Hume affigns very plausible reasons for fuppofing that the Commons were excluded from the Saxon wittenagemot; but they do not appear to us in any wife conclufive. He admits, that confiderable proprietors of land were conftituent members, without election; and he imagines, that forty hides of land was an eftate requifite for this privilege. As our hiftorian does not cite any authority for this fuppofition, we are at a lofs to conjecture on what ground he refts his opinion. A proprietor of forty hides must indeed have been a considerable landholder, fince even five hides, held of the King himself, by personal attendance, was fufficient to gain the holder the honorary title of King's Thane. But we are not to conclude, that none but the confiderable proprietors were admitted to the wittenagemot; neither are we to fuppofe, that the word Thane always implies nobility*. There were among the Saxons a fpecies of tenants, called Middle Thanes, otherwife Vavafours, who held their lands by a tenure which was of a feudal nature, but not honorary; and their lands, or vavafories, were held of fome mefne lord, and not immediately of the King. Thefe Middle Thanes feem to have been a diftinct order from the Leffer Thanes, who were a kind of honorary te nants, holding a certain quantity of land, together with fome office in the King's court; the Greater Thanes, being the Aldermen or Earls, who held of the King in chief, by a kind of grand ferjeantry †. Now, it is probable, that the number of thefe Middle Thanes was great; and that they made a part of the wittenagemot, either perfonally, or, more probably, by their reprefentatives. Our hiftorian's conclufion, that because the Saxons re

*Thane fometimes denotes a freeman, sometimes a magiftrate, and more properly an officer of the King.

The King's Thanes had the power of hold. ing courts, which were called halymoots, which, at this day, are termed courts-baron. We wonder our hiftorian, in fpeaking of the Saxon courts, should have omitted taking notice of thefe haly moots.