the known vaft fuperiority of the two French armies to the Allies, they march ed off different ways immediately after the battle; that commanded by M. Broglio retreating gradually towards Hefle; and the other, under the Prince de Soubife, towards the Lower Rhine. After the latter had retired to fome diftance, the hereditary Prince was fent off, with a confiderable corps, to obferve his motions; and Pr. Ferdinand advanced on the route taken by M. Broglio. Several fharp fkir mishes happened, in which both the divifions of the Allies had generally by much the advantage. A good many of the French magazines were deftroyed, and fome of their convoys of provifions intercepted, The Prince de Soubife, during his retreat, fent off two large detachments to join M. Broglio, by which his force was much reduced. Having received the provifions and forage coming to him by the Rhine, he faced about, and marched to Munfter, which he blockaded. In the mean time M. Broglio, reinforced, as has been taken notice of, made a push towards Hanover; and actually penetrated almost as far as Eimbeck. Upon this, Pr. Ferdinand, ha ving left Gen. Sporken with a corps reckoned fufficient to fecure the Wefer near Hamelen, and being joined by moft of the troops commanded by the hereditary Prince, forced all the French pofts on the Dymel, made a confiderable number of prifoners, and advanced to the neighbour hood of Caffel, which he threatened to befiege. This obliged M. Broglio to return to the neighbourhood of that city, in order that he might both fecure it, and preferve his communication with the other places where he had magazines.

Pr. Ferdinand, having thus gained fo much time, which then was his principal aim, fuddenly repafled to the left of the Dymel, caused a part of his army to extend down the Wefer, and fent a body of troops to the right of that river, which, by reinforcing tome of his poits that had been puthed, obliged the French to abandon the diftrict of Hartz in Hanover. The hereditary Prince marched back to fupFort the troops he had left in Weftphalia; and which, in his abfence, had gained fome confiderable advantages over the French, at Dorften, and along the Lippe. Having obliged the Prince de Soubife to raife the blockade of Muntter, and retire towards Wefel, he again returned, with most of the troops under him, to co-operate with Pr. Ferdinand, who made ano

tner fudden irruption into Heffe, and the 24th of September had afreth got the neighbourhood of Caffel. Though once more made a fhew of befieging t place, and the hereditary Prince, w the light troops, fcoured the country t good distance beyond it, carrying off gre quantities of provifions and warlike ftore yet M. Broglio, who had again advanc to the north of Gottingen, not fo mu alarmed as formerly, contented himi with only fending back fome ftrong d tachments. Mean while his other detac ments in a part of Hanover, and t Prince de Soubife's throughout most Weftphalia, made fuch reprisals, by r fing exorbitant contributions, plunderi places, and deftroying fome magazine as let Pr. Ferdinand fee his prefence w more neceflary elfewhere. He therefo decamped from Caflel the 3d of Octobe repafled the Dymel, and marched dov the left of the Wefer. By the 10th! headquarters had been fixed, on that fi of the river, near Hamelen; and detac ments of his troops had taken poflen of all the strong pafles leading to the ci of Hanover. That fame day, Pr. Xavi of Saxony, at the head of a confiderab corps, compofed of French, and elector troops belonging to his father, becan mafter of Wolfenbuttle by capitulatio Having exacted heavy contributions ther he went next before Brunswick, in t.op of the like fuccefs. But, upon notice th a body of the Allies was faft approachin to attack him, he not only retired fro thence, but alfo evacuated Wolfenbutt the 15th, carrying with him twelve piece of cannon from that place. There wer advices bearing, that, in his retreat, h loft 2000 men, and most of thofe canno

Soon after the Allies returned from their last expedition into Heile, the he reditary Prince once more put on marc toward the bishoprick of Munster. Upe this the Prince de Soubiie called in a his detachments, and retreated to Weil where he remained inactive till his arm feparated, feveral battalions and fqua drons returning to France, and the re being put into winter-quarters along th Lower Rhine. The hereditary Princ did quite otherwife. Having left Gen Oheim with a detachment under Munster and reinforced the garrifon of Lipftadt not knowing what Soubife might attempt he foon rejoined the main army of the Allies, with the rest of the troops unde his command,

Upor

troops into winter-quarters; and Pr. Henry followed his example.

The execution-troops of the Empire, having fuffered confiderably in the fpring, as has already been taken notice of, they did nothing afterwards worth mentioning, till Pr. Henry was obliged to call in, and keep with him, a detachment that had formerly been watching their motions, to allift him in oppofing M. Daun. Then, indeed, they chearfully embraced the opportunity of raifing exorbitant contributions, and plundering the inhabitants, in feveral places on the frontiers of his Pruflian Majesty's electoral dominions; after which they were the first to go into winterquarters. Thus the campaign has made no material alteration in Saxony.

As was formerly obferved, the King of Pruffia fet out from that electorate for Silefia the 4th of May, with a large body of troops. Gen. Goltze, with another corps, had wintered in that duchy. Upon the King's approach, M. Laudohn, who had made his way over the mountains, and fent patroles into the heart of the country, to raife contributions, retired from the places he occupied, back to the frontiers of Bohemia and the county of Glatz. The Ruffians, under Gen. But terlin, having proceeded gradually through a great part of Poland to the confines of Upper Silefia, the Auftrians, who had advanced upon information of their marches, made feveral attempts to join them fomewhere in that neighbour. hood; but were always difappointed. Whether M. Butterlin's orders from his court were actually to make a junction fo far up in the country, there appears fome reason to doubt. However that was, both the Auftrian and Russian generals put in motion for Lower Silefia; and his Pruffian Majefty ftill kept between them. As the Rulians were patting by Breflau, a body of them turned afide, and threw a number of haubitzers into it: but they were driven off with confi. derable lofs in men and artillery. Gen. Butterlin caufed his army to pass the Oder fome German miles below that city, and fixed his headquarters at Parchwitz. Notwithstanding an advantage which the King of Pruilia gained over the Auflrians on the 15th of Auguft, the armies under the Gens Laudohn and Butterlin effected their junction the 25th near Jauer; his Pruffian Majefty, who found he could not longer prevent it, having decamped, and taken a very advantageous pofition about

a German mile fouth of Schweidnitz. The two generals of the now very formidable combined army, neither thought fit to attack him, nor to continue that junction long which had been fo palionately wifhed for at Vienna. M. Butterlin, leaving with Gen. Laudohn a corps of 12 or 14,000 men under Gen. Czernicheff, marched off the 9th of September, with the rest of the Rulians, toward the Lower Oder, in order to the carrying on of defigns which his court appear to have had more at heart than the conquest of Silefia. Provifions turning fcarce in his Pruflian Majesty's army not long after, he removed from the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, leaving a garrifon of only about 3000 men in that important place; and fixed his headquarters at Strehlen, feveral | German miles farther up the country, to preferve his communication with Breflau, and draw fubfiftence from the adjacent country, by the navigation of the Oder. The only blow he received in that duchy during the campaign, but that indeed a fevere one, was itruck early in the morning of Oct. 1.; when the Auftrians, by a coup de main, made themielves matters of Schweidnitz; in which, befides the garriton, they faid that they found 184 pieces of camon, a large magazine of meal, and feveral thoufand Auftrians and Wurtembergers, who had been prifoners in the place, and recovered their liberty.

A more fevere one was intended to have been given him in the night of the 1st of December, when M. Laudohn, by the difhonourable means of a traiterous plot, formed and carried on by two of the King's own fubjects, Baron Wargotfch, whofe eftate lay near Strehlen, and one Schwidt, a Popish priest, hoped that a body of Auftrian cavalry fhould be enabled to feize and carry off his Majesty. The defign was difcovered, only about fix hours, as fome advices bore, before it was to have been put in execution; and the two villains were apprehended, but made their efcape.. By the 9th of that month the King had put his troops into winter-quarters, and had established his own at Breflau, where he remained well the 31ft. M. Laudohn had been ob liged to fend off a confiderable part of his army for the county of Glatz, not being able to find fubfiftence for the whole in that part of Silefia which was in his pofleflion. By this means the King found it easy to pare 10 or 12,000 men, whom he detached towards the Lower O

der

Jan. 1762.

it.

Towards the end of the first year in which the Ruffians got the least footing in Germany, which was 1758, they laid fiege to Colberg, a strong fortrefs belonging to his Pruffian Majefty in Pomerania, very near the fouth fide of the Baltic fea; but foon raised it. They renewed it in 1760, with like infuccefs. The King, foreseeing that they would employ their utmost endeavours laft campaign to make themselves mafters of that important place, ordered the Prince of Wurtemberg, who had been in the duchy of Mecklenburg during most of the winter, to march that way about the end of May. That prince caufed very ftrong intrenchments to be made, from the fea on one fide, a round the town, to the fea again on the other, including a part of the river Perfante, on which Colberg is fituated. Those intrenchments he took poffeffion of about the beginning of July, with 12,000 men. Such precautions were very natural, if his Majefty had good intelligence of what was at different times told the public, namely, that the Ruffian generals had orders from their court, to reduce that fortress, though at the expence of almost their whole army. It was not till toward the end of August that a large combined Russian and Swedish fleet appeared before the place by fea, and Gen. Romanzow, with about 25,000 Ruffians, by land. The fleet, after doing fome little damage, was foon obliged, by the batteries close on the fhore, to ftand fo far out to fea, that almost all the bombs thrown from it fell fhort. Several attacks were made by the land-forces on the Prince of Wurtemberg's lines; but always with very confiderable lofs to the aggreflors.

It has already been obferved, that M. Butterlin drew off the main body of the Ruffians from Gen. Laudohn the 9th of September, and marched with it toward the Lower Oder. Immediately upon his retiring, the King of Pruffia detached for Colberg about 10,000 troops, commanded by Gen. Platen; who, during his march, deftroyed most of the Ruffian magazines in Poland, made about 2000 prifoners, and arrived at the place of his ceftination the 3d of October. Whether

7

In

Gen. Butterlin would have taken the route through Poland for any confiderable way, had his magazines been entire, cannot with certainty be known. fact, he advanced towards Colberg, through the New Marche of Brandenburg, and as far into Pomerania as he thought proper, making the country all along. fuffer much, by being obliged to fupply his army with every thing neceffary. It often happens, that generals cannot fore fee what the effect of deftroying magazines of provifions will be, whether greater diftrefs to their friends or enemies. The Prince of Wurtemberg received reinforcements; but M. Butterlin, being near at hand, was ftill able to keep Gen. Romanzow greatly fuperior. An attempt was made to fend a convoy of provifions to Colberg from Stettin; but it miscarried, and many of the waggons were taken. The fleet which came to attack the place had all failed off by the end of September, except a few veffels left to prevent its getting fupplies by fea. These alfo departing at length, feveral fhips got to it with all neceffaries. This being effected, and the carrying on of a regu lar fiege being rendered extremely diffi. cult by the very feafon of the year, the Prince of Wurtemberg reinforced the garrifon, and then retired to Grieffenberg, where he arrived the 16th of November. Immediately after his departure, the Ruffians made themselves mafters of a finall fort at the mouth of the river Perfante, which again cut off all communication by fea between the besieged and Stettin, and greatly encouraged the befiegers to perfift in their operations. Gen. Romanzow's troops made different attacks, hoping to carry the fortress by ftorm; but were always repulfed with lofs. On the 12th of December, the Prince of Wurtemberg vigorously pushed the Ruffian pofts, in order to throw in a fupply of provifions. That failing in the iflue, an enemy which neither fortifications nor bravery could keep out, namely famine, obliged Col. Heyden, the governor, to furrender himself and the garrifon prifoners of war on the 17th. This was another mortifying ftroke to the King of Pruffia. The Ruffians faid they found in the place about 3000 men and 146 pieces of cannon, with 266 of their own people, prifoners, who recovered their liberty. According to a private letter from the Hague, that fiege coft the Ruffians 12,000 men. They write

B 2

from

from Vienna, that, by means of the taking of Schweidnitz, they hope to be masters of all Silefia next campaign; and that the affair of Colberg fhews the fte adinefs of their allies. Whether the court of Petersburg may not be as fteady and pertinacious in her endeavours to keep as to get that important fortrefs, time must discover. If the fhould, and actually preferves the poffellion of it, when a peace, in fome flape, must be concluded, all the German princes will then find leisure to confider how well they like it, that fo powerful an empire as the Ruflian fhould have fuch a key for opening an entrance into their country at pleasure; efpecially if the King of Pruffia be otherwife reduced to the state of debility his enemies with. Gen. Romanzow having put a strong garrifon into Colberg, the rest of his forces fpread through the neighbouring country, in order to take up winter-quarters; Gen. Berg, with about 10,000 light troops, fixing his fo near the heart of it as at Stargard. We have not diftinétly learned how M. Butterlin had his army difpofed of in the end of the year.

The operations of the Swedes, during laft campaign, may be very foon given an account of. On the 19th of July, they pafled the river Pene in Western Pomerania, and advanced upon Col. Belling; who, having but a handful of Pruffians to oppofe them, was obliged to retreat gradually for fome time. Notwithstanding the great difparity of numbers, there was very little difference as to fuccefs on the whole, in the feveral fkirmishes that happened. Upon the first notice, that Gen. Stutterheim, detached from Pr. Henry's army, with about 5000 men, was almost come up, the Swedes fuddenly turned back. Col. Belling, joined by only the half of that small corps, followed them till they had retreated to the neighbourhood of Stralfund; and then turned afide into the duchy of Mecklenburg, from whence he carried off a confiderable number of men for recruits. On advice that the Ruflians had taken Colberg, part of the Swedes intended to take up winter-quarters in Mecklenburg; but in the end of the year the Prince of Wurtemberg was marching, at the head of about 5000 troops, to difpute that point with them.

[To be continued.]

IT is

Arguments for and against a Scots militia. Copy of a letter from the country. Tis matter of furprife, the people of Scotland, who are fo jealous of what they call the point of national honour, fhould be fo infenfible to real indignities, and bear with fo much indifference the most cutting and mortifying distinction which can be made to their prejudice. If the names of poverty and the itch, of dirt and barrenness of foil, are but mentioned by a drunken mechanic, we feel a wound that fefters, and we fly in the face of him who pretends to touch our fores: But fhould we be informed, not in mere words and petulant farcasms, not in the terms of jesting and raillery, but in the terms of law and act of parliament, that we are an inferior clafs of men, not fit to be intrufted with the privilege of British subjects, not fit to maintain the honour of our country; this injurious calumny we could bear without a complaint, and submit to difgrace, as if we recognised the ground of it in our birth, or, what is more probable, in our own base and dejected fpirits.

Every body will understand, that I point at the militia of England, and the difarmed state of Scotland. The treaty of union, we are told, forbids the use of those names which of old ferved to distinguifh the two nations: but may not our fubfequent laws establish names of distinction more fignificant to future times, and lefs eafily forgotten, than thofe of Scotti and English? the titles of Dependent and Lord, of Subdued Province and Governing People?

We hear in every company, that the term of the English militia is expired; and that, because the enemies of that eftablishment dare not refufe what a generous and free-minded people confider as their right, and the privilege of their birth, we are told, that the law is to be renewed, either to perpetuity, or for another period. But we do not hear of any fuch project to provide for the fafety, or maintain the honour of this province; and, what is worse, we do not hear that any among ourselves are disposed to remonftrate on this unequal treatment, or that any inftructions on the fubject are given to the reprefentatives of our people. Nor do we ever inquire, how far those gentlemen are prepared or disposed to vindicate our rights, or whether they are gone like our drovers to fell their votes