ON THE NATURE OF THE IMITATIVE PRINCIPLE, AND SOME OTHER FACUL I. THE first notion of the faculty which has been pointed out, under the name of Imitation, was got from observing the organization of persons, who had an uncommon power of imitating voices and gestures. But common mimicry, or acting, is probably only one of its subordinate uses, or indeed is rather a forced, and unnatural application of it. The ultimate essence of this faculty, is probably an inclination to assimilate and unite the mind to whatever objects we contemplate, or even to conceptions that we form in the imagination. It has a palpable connexion with benevolence, which has a tendency to adapt, conform, and assimilate itself to other beings; and as it were to blend the mind affectionately with their nature. Considered in this light, imitation is one of the highest faculties in the human composition, being that which unites and tunes the mind to the rest of the universe. It may be considered as a conductor stretching forth from the mind, by means of which the sentiments that exist elsewhere pass into us like electrical fire, and are again irradiated from us, and imbibed by the same faculty in other minds. At the same time, I do not suppose that the power of Assimilation, (for so it should be called) has within itself any perceptions concerning good and evil. It probably has an inclination to approximate towards all objects indiscriminately; and being as it were morally neutral, is only repelled from what is vile, by the repugnant movements of the other sentiments. On the other hand, in contemplating the aspects of inanimate nature, the assimilative power finds a free and unrestrained exercise. The mind wandering abroad, rejoices in joining itself with plants and trees, or with the soothing liquidity of rivers. The assimilative principle enters not only into what is called sym pathy, but also into many other things which have never been supposed to have any thing in common with sympathy. At the same time, it is necessary to observe, that the word sympathy is used to express a variety of dif ferent meanings, and is sometimes applied to circumstances in which there is no exercise of assimilation. The name of sympathy is sometimes given to an accidental concurrence of two persons in the same feelings and inclinations, which may be entirely selfish, although they happen to harmonize, by running in parallel channels. A herd of wolves may be said to sympathize in tearing down a horse, while in them the gentle feelings of assimilation is entirely a-wanting. Again, sympathy sometimes signifies only an operation of the imagination, which makes us suppose ourselves placed in the same circumstances as another, and causes us to experience how the situa tion would operate on our own individual constitution. Now, it appears to me, that assimilation is a peculiar act of feeling-a moulding of the mind to an external object. It is not an imaginary exchange of situation with that object, but an adaptation of the mind to its qualities. It is a faculty which almost always operates along with benevolent emotions. A mother, in addressing a young child, imitates the infantine sound of its voice; and in that imitation, we recognise the accents of intense affection. On the other hand, a person mimicking what he regards with dislike, always produces a ludicrous effect, from the forced approximation of his nature, to what it cannot harmonize with. To make the distinction which is stated above quite clear, the name of sympathy may be given to the simultaneous existence of any emotion whatever in two minds; but assimilation is another act of the mind, superadded to the emotions sympathized in. The nature of this act must be understood by feeling, not by description-I have only been pointing out its practical tendency. Probably the reason why the mind likes unity of expression in any large object, is not merely that the sense of fitness demands a certain adaptation in the parts, but is to be found also in the nature of this faculty. The mind, in turning itself to any one part of the object, would be grated, if, in turning its attention upon the rest, it found it was no longer in unison with them, because they were of a different character from the part which had been first contemplated. Therefore, artists who have an uncommon power of producing homogeneousness and harmony, must always possess the assimilative power in a high degree. It is not reflection and analysis which enable them to combine harmoniously, but this faculty operating upon the materials presented by the imagination, and drawing together every thing sweet and homogeneous, by a sort of elective attraction. Again, the pleasure found in minute and imperceptible gradation, such as that of light and shadow, is probably occasioned by the mind being thereby enabled to pass from one part to another, and still prolong its union without receiving any shock. I have often considered why these fine and delicate gradations should excite in us a certain emotion of tenderness, and I think it must be from the connection which the principle of imitation has with that of love. Large expanses of pure colour like the sky, probably please, because the mind is enabled to glide rapidly over them in every direction ; and at the same time, preserve the most complete union. Upon the whole, this power is the source of every thing bland and balmy in the arts, and in poetry. It is the power of assimilation that enables an artist to enter completely into the spirit of what he is representing, and to conceive every quality in an object more strongly but the representation itself is of course the work of other faculties. There are to be seen among mankind two principal sorts of observation; the one is that which is incited by the imitative principle; the other is that which is prompted by the personal feelings, seeking for gratification in But as the position of external circumstances; and, therefore, watching eagerly the state of facts, and studying the possibility of making them subservient to the purposes of will and action. The gratification of the personal feelings, depends always upon the position of external circumstances, and therefore the ambitious think that no species of truth is so important as the knowledge of how persons and circumstances stand; and this characteristic may be traced in all their studies. self-love inclines generally too much to confine itself to local and temporary observation, therefore, it is not the best guide to any sort of abstract truth. The other species of observation which is founded on the assimilative principle, may be called the contemplative sort; and, not being pursued for any particular purpose, is generally true and undistorted in its results; for the mind gives a faithful account of the qualities of the objects with which it has been combining itself. It is in this species of observation, that great poets and painters have excelled. It must be from the same faculty which has been pointed out, under the name of imitation, that the desire for society chiefly results. In a deserted and insulated situation, this mental impulse speaks for itself, and makes itself known by vain and ineffectual yearnings, which can no longer be gratified, as is exemplified in the beautiful verses which Cowper ascribes to Alexander Selkirk. A But at the same time, it may be observed, that in the promiscuous thorough fare of the world, the usefulness of the imitative power is experienced rather than its sweetness. rapid succession of heterogeneous objects with which the mind is constrained to effect a temporary assimilation, is certainly hostile to the cultivation of large and prolonged sentiments. And, therefore, the declamations of poets concerning the beneficial influence of the objects presented by the country, compared with that of the objects presented by the town, do not deserve to be sneered at. The passion of love may be said to pervert the use of the imitative power, by confining it to one object, when its proper use is to unite the mind to all around it. Love, however, can scarcely be disparaged by any such ab stract reasoning, but must be considered as an accidental arrestment of the imitative principle, during which the mind is not so much confined as appears externally, but derives a great variety of impressions from the many coloured images of delight which are brought by imagination, to circulate around one object. II.—The natural tendency of the assimilative principle, (if its operation were not modified by that of any other faculty), would probably be to remain fixed and stationary, without seeking for a change of objects to which the mind might successively unite itself. But I think there is, in human nature, a separate sentiment or inclination, which counteracts this want of motion in the assimilative principle, and carries it abroad through the universe, with a desire to survey and embrace as much as possible. In the diagram, which represents the position of the organs, there has been left a blank space between the imitative faculty and imagination, because it was perceived that these organs did not join; and I think that in this space, there is situated another organ, the nature of which has remained hitherto unknown, but which is undoubtedly the organ of the Desire of variety. This organ will be found greatly developed in those persons who have an uncommon range of invention, and a passion for changes and contrasts, as may be seen in Beethoven the musician. Assimilation aims only at uniting itself with such objects as are brought before it by external causes; but this other inclination, which may be called the Discursative sentiment, draws off the imitative principle, and transfers it from one object to another, so as to keep it revolving, and inhaling varied life, in its motion through the theatre of existences. Assimilation may be compared to caloric, which approaches towards objects by a gentle attraction, and gently blends itself with them; while the Discursative sentiment may be compared to light, which comes away with a new acquired motion from each object it visits. That sort of Discursativeness which relates to space, is the kind which most frequently occurs to the imagination. Any object appearing to make a free and spontaneous progression through space, probably communicates a transient pleasure to this faculty, by offer ing a representation of its own ten- Compesce clamorem, ac sepulcri It is probably by this inclination, more than any other, that men are prompted to extensive speculations and inquiries. A motive to inquire may be found in the pleasure of exercising the understanding, and in the natural desire which we have to ascertain causes. But I think the love of the unlimited is the source of the highest species of curiosity from its constant wish to enlarge the field of vision. The lower faculties seem to operate only upon what is set before them, while this sentiment is ever calling to our remembrance how much more there is besides-how endless the range of what still remains to be contemplated and embraced. The power of apprehending particular facts is a perceptive faculty-not a sentiment which, of itself, requires to be gratified with the feeling of rangeand it is a power which is often impelled to activity by vulgar and sordid motives; but the curiosity generated from Discursativeness has a spring of motion within itself, and may be considered as an endless wish, which cannot suffer death from satiety, but which soars away from each gratification with the same vitality as before. The mind, although imprisoned, as it were, by physical circumstances, is by this faculty rendered habitually conscious of the extent of what it has never seen. III. The faculty which has been pointed out under the name of imagination, and which is contiguous to discursativeness, is, probably, only the minds conceiving images without combining or comparing them. Its office is that of continually reviving and renewing, within the mind, conceptions upon which the other faculties may operate. But poetical genius results rather from the activity of the discursative principle, which, by prompting the imagination frequently to shift and change its exhibitions, furnishes the mind with opportunities of perceiving the relations of objects that lie far separate-and thus enables it to discover new modes of combining. The faculty to which the name of Wit has been given, belongs to a different class from conceptiveness, and is an intellectual power, that is to say, one which perceives relations. It would be more proper to call it the faculty of perceiving Difference-for that must be the nature of the operation performed by it. This faculty does not invent but only judges; and, I think, it has a strong connexion with discursativeness, or the love of variety, to which sentiment, the power of perceiving contrast or dissimilarity, is a corresponding power of intellect. It seems unlikely that any faculty should be implanted in human nature for the sole purpose of enabling us to perceive the ludicrous. And, therefore, I strongly suspect, that the ordinary of fice of this faculty must be of an intellectual sort, and that it is used habitually in discriminating the qualities of external objects. Yet if the faculty, named comparison, recognised both similarity and dissimilarity, the faculty of perceiving difference would appear to encroach upon its province.Perhaps the office of comparison is really limited to the recognition of identical qualities appearing in different objects. With regard to the emotion of the ludicrous, it cannot be the movement of any intellectual faculty; for the intellect is susceptible of no emotion whatever, although it experiences a certain pleasure in judging. I think the emotion of the ludicrous is produced by a rapid oscillation of the imitative principle between two dissimilar objects or conceptions; and this must be what occasions the peculiar act of the mind indicated by laughter-an emotion which is quite different in its nature from the regular movement of any other sentiment; and, indeed, the external signs of this feeling represent the internal oscillation and quivering of the mind. The highest species of wit results more from Discursativeness than from the faculty of perceiving contrast; for, taken by itself, the intellectual power would want invention. When the love of variety acquires an excessive activity, the motion of the mind, from one object to another, is accelerated into a sort of whirl; and the assimilative principle, not being allowed time to unite strongly with any object, loses its due power of retardation. Therefore the feelings, instead of receiving nourishment from the succession of objects, are hurried along unexercised ; and the emotion which results from the perception of contrast, is all that the mind is allowed to enjoy. This was remarkably the case with Voltaire, the peculiarity of whose genius hinged upon this circumstance. IV.-Probably it is neither by sight nor by the power of motion that we acquire ideas of space, but the mind is rendered conscious of it by means of the faculty which has been pointed out under the name of locality, and which gives us an intellectual perception of space, without the intervention of the senses. Blind persons have generally a very intense perception of space, and would, probably, have it although they were never to exercise the power of voluntary motion. The perception of space may be considered as an habitual one, and prior to the exercise of all the other perceptive faculties. That which has been called the faculty of observation or Individuality I think is the one which, in perception, gives us the idea of an external cause or object, to which we are to refer the sensations or effects which the object occasions in the mind.When we perceive a sound or colour, it is the faculty of individuality that takes note of the sensation, as indicating the existence of some external object separate from the mind. For this reason it might be called the perception of Externality. Space also is external, but is not an existence from which effects result. Besides the perception of space, there is said to be also a faculty of perceiving form. Now, it may be asked, in what respects the perception of form differs from that of space; for the faculty of space must perceive position, and what is form but the position of parts? Probably the power of locality perceives nothing but vacuity and the situation of points; while form is what examines the relation which real objects have to space. It may no doubt be said, that the faculty of locality, in perceiving the relative situation of points, perceives the capacity of space for form, but, probably, another faculty is necessary to enable us to determine what portions of space are actually occupied. The power of individuality gives only the idea of an external cause, but does not make known its relation to space. Therefore it would appear, that the faculty of form is always employed upon real objects, and not upon empty space; and, indeed, it may be considered as only a sort of appendage of the faculty of externality. I think it is impossible that so fine a feeling as that of symmetry can result from the mere act of perceiving shape. The faculty of form has, probably, no sense of beauty, but only perceives, as a matter of fact; the relation of parts in any physical object; and the feeling of symmetry is experienced when forms are such as to awaken sentiment, by gratifying the faculty of assimilation or discursativeness, by smoothness of prolongation, or by such lines as suggest the idea of motion. Therefore, although a designer would need to cultivate a very exact perception of form, still this only is a mechanical faculty, and the sense of beauty must be derived from a higher source. The faculty of language has a very close connexion with that of form. It is the power of perceiving the forms of sound, that is to say, the power of distinguishing the various acts of articulation by which the sound of the voice is shaped into words. It ought to be kept in view, however, that this faculty judges only of the sound of language, and never of its meaning or of the merits of expression. The reason why persons in whom this faculty is very active have an uncommon facility in acquiring languages, is that they perceive, with uncommon distinctness, the form of words, and, therefore, recognise them easily when they meet them again; but the power of remembering the meaning of words VOL. VI. must depend upon the force of association in affixing ideas to them. It would be more proper to call this faculty the power of articulation than of language, since it has nothing to do with the grammatical relations of words farther than to produce mechanically those syllabic changes by which different tenses and cases are indicated; nor does it regulate the order of words farther than harmony is concerned. Every thing in language, beyond the formation of articulate sounds, must be an act of understanding or imagination. Languages, in which the tenses are formed by auxiliary verbs, and the cases of nouns by prepositions, may, in this point of view, be considered as more metaphysical and less sensual than languages in which the same purposes are served by changes of termination. Closely connected with the faculties of form and language, I think there must be an organ which judges of tastes, and occasions a love of eating and drinking, independent of hunger and thirst; but its situation is, probably, so far back as to have prevented it from having been hitherto observed. If it be true that the taste of physical substances results from the form of their particles, it is easy to perceive why the perception, taste, should have a connexion with the faculties of shape and language. It has always been a favourite jest to ascribe an uncommon appetite to clergymen, and perhaps there may be some truth in the imputation; for since they have more to do than other men with the study of languages and with declamation, therefore the faculty of language being much exercised, may communicate a more than usual activity to the neighbouring faculty of taste. And hence also, if it were not for the influx of new men, there would be a natural cause of decay in all institutions for the preservation of learning; and sensuality would follow close upon the heels of scholarship. And it may be remarked that Handel, in whom the faculty of language was uncommonly strong, was one of the greatest eaters ever known. The most interesting point of view in which the perspective faculties can be considered, is in relation to objects of beauty. Yet in works of art they only regulate the external form of whatever is used as the vehicle of sentiment, whether 2 R |